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Abstract 
This study focuses on the regulation of Tanzania’s telecommunications sector and 
enforcement of competition law. The central question under investigation is whether 
the national telecommunications regulator, the Tanzania Communications Regulatory 
Authority (TCRA), is well-equipped to enforce competition law in the sector. This 
question emanates from the TCRA’s design as the sole enforcer of competition law. 
Except for mergers and acquisitions, which fall under the Fair Competition 
Commission’s jurisdiction, the TCRA has jurisdiction in all other competition matters. 
Thus, being both the regulator and competition enforcement authority, one is 
justified to expect that its design would provide ex-ante pro-competition regulation 
and proactive and effective ex-post regulation and competition law enforcement. That 
is not the case.  
While the TCRA stands as a promising regulator, its design and capacities are only 
limited to the sector’s ex-ante technical regulation. It has fallen short on competition 
enforcement on an ex-post basis. Although there is a framework that empowers the 
Authority to enforce competition, there is no actual enforcement because of the 
existing legal and institutional weaknesses. Thus, as it stands now, in the absence of 
significant legal and institutional overhaul, the TCRA cannot effectively enforce 
competition in the sector.  
This study is primarily qualitative. It has taken an analytical approach in answering 
research questions, which probes into the regulator’s efficacy in addressing 
competition matters in the sector. In a pyramidal fashion, it builds a base by generally 
introducing telecommunications. It then proceeded to introduce regulation and 
competition as applicable in the telecommunications sector. In so doing, the study 
analyzes relevant policies, laws, regulations, and practices, among others, to ascertain 
the extent to which they promote effective competition. Based on evaluation criteria 
inspired by literature from Tanzania and other jurisdictions, the study examines the 
efficacy of the TCRA as an exclusive competition enforcement authority. The 
examined aspects include the sufficiency of the legal mandate, the sufficiency of the 
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procedural framework, the regulator’s institutional design, the regulatory 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction to the Study 
“The economic theory underlying competition laws is based on the belief 
that the market’s invisible hand is, potentially at least, a far more 
powerful guardian of the social welfare than any other form of 
regulation. Competition draws competitors into the market to remove 
excess profit. It stimulates incumbents to greater productive and dynamic 
efficiency. It weeds out the inefficient by the objective test of market 
survival, and it assures the optimal allocation of resources into 
production activities. Competition is also trusted because there is little 
basis for faith that regulators possess the knowledge and the motivation 
required to fine-tune business behavior on behalf of consumers.” 1 
1.1 Introduction  
Until about four decades ago, the telecommunications sector was considered a 
natural monopoly.2 By definition, natural monopoly means an economic situation 
where only a single firm can be the “most cost-efficient means of supplying market 
demands.”3 It is an industry in which only one firm can break even.4 Under the natural 
monopoly theory, technical and financial efficiency demand that only one firm should 
operate in the market. Because of this understanding, many governments responded 
accordingly by establishing or encouraging telecommunication monopolies. This 
policy approach set the beginning of the proliferation of monopolies and suppression 
of competition.5  
Monopoly policy had one distinct feature. It gave monopoly firms almost absolute 
powers over the sector. In due regard, they had a say on the type and quality of 
 
1 Michal S. Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2003), p. 13. 
2 See Jarleth Burke, A Critical Account of Article 106(2) TFEU: Government Failure in Public Service Provision 
(Oxford, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), p. 104; Christopher Decker, Modern Economic Regulation: An 
Introduction to Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 348; Frank H. 
Columbus, Asian Economic and Political Issues (New York: Nova Publishers, 2003), p. 65. 
3 Mark A. Jamison, Industry Structure and Pricing: The New Rivalry in Infrastructure (New York: Springer 
Science & Business Media, 2013), p. 84. 
4 Johan Willner, ‘Privatization: A Skeptical Analysis’, in International Handbook on Privatization, ed. by 
David Parker and David S. Saal (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar, Pub, 2003), pp. 60–
86 (p. 76). 
5 Burke, p. 104. 
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services and pricing arrangements.6 With support from respective governments, they 
could dictate who should receive services.7 They could also dictate the terms and 
conditions.8 Thus, the quality and availability of services depended not on powers of 
demands but service providers’ wishes and plans.  
Service provision also depended on government policies, which, as already hinted, 
supported monopolies. Such a setting alone was already problematic because it 
disregarded market forces. Instead, supply depended on governments’ monopolistic 
policies. Unfortunately, such policies were not always pro-consumers. It was not 
unusual for such policies to be irrational or focus on other matters far from 
consumers’ demands.9  
However, the bigger problem with monopolies was the lack of competition. The 
absence of competition meant limited investments resulting in inadequate services of 
low quality, unsatisfactory customer services, inferior technology, and limited 
availability of services.10 There was no allocative efficiency because even those who 
would have afforded the services could not get them timely and for acceptable 
quality. Besides, there was no productive efficiency because, generally, monopolies 
had no incentive to improve production.11 Explaining the inherent failure of 
monopolies, Keneth Grover has this to say: 
“For almost one hundred years, telecommunications users have had very restricted 
freedom to choose how their needs should be met. Apart from entirely internal 
systems, they have had to rent or buy terminals from the telecommunications 
companies owning the common user network, whether owned by the State, or by a 
public or private corporation. Even internal wiring normally had to be provided by 
the same telecommunications company. The user had to take whatever services, 
whatever standards, and whatever charges the telecommunications companies 
decided were appropriate. Such monopolistic power, albeit regulated directly or 
 
6 Kenneth C. Grover, Foundations of Business Telecommunications Management, Approaches to Information 
Technology (New York: Plenum Press, 1986), p. 159. 
7 Grover, p. 159. 
8 Grover, p. 159. 
9 Grover, p. 159. 
10 OECD, OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Mexico (Paris: OECD, 2012), p. 13. 
11 OECD, OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Mexico, p. 13. 
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indirectly by the State, allowed users negligible freedom of choice. Manufacture of 
telecommunications equipment and systems were similarly constricted. 
Manufacturers were obviously reluctant to allocate resources to research and 
development and the production of equipment and systems until they were certain 
the telecommunications companies were prepared to go into contract with them for 
manufacturing these supplies for their “captive” users.”12 
As the quote depicts, monopolistic policies were never a better way of organizing the 
telecommunications sector. They lowered consumers to a very inferior position. 
Grover notes in the quote above that consumers had to “take whatever services, 
whatever standards, and whatever charges the telecommunications companies 
decided were appropriate.”13 Monopolies also led to limited investment, research, and 
innovation. The effect was inefficiency in the sector. 
Due to monopolies’ inherent inefficiency, firms could not deliver services at the 
required and expected standards. As a result, a new policy approach was necessary. 
Thus, from the 1980s, a wave of change swept across the continents. Boosted by the 
growth of wireless services that challenged the natural monopoly theory, many 
governments decided to break telecom monopolies by opening doors to private 
firms.14 It was the birth of liberalization in the telecommunications sector, a 
movement to open markets to private entities, among others. Liberalization had at 
least three distinctive features: the privatization of national monopolies, relaxing of 
regulatory rules (deregulation), and promotion of competition in the sector.15 
The liberalization of the industry meant there was a complete change of 
telecommunications policies. The change demanded new structural arrangements. 
Thus, new frameworks to manage such a transition process became necessary. It was 
 
12 Grover, p. 159. 
13 Grover, p. 159. 
14 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), pp. 322–26; E. Kawabata, Contemporary Government Reform in Japan: The Dual State in Flux (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 28–31. 
15 See for example George Philip and Shao Hing Tsoi, ‘Regulation and Deregulation of 
Telecommunications: The Economic and Political Realities. Part I: The United States’, Journal of 
Information Science, 14.5 (1988), 257–64 (pp. 261–62) 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/016555158801400502>; Marcellus S. Snow, ‘Regulation to Deregulation: The 
Telecommunications Sector and Industrialization’, Telecommunications Policy, 9.4 (1985), 281–90 (pp. 
281–86) <https://doi.org/10.1016/0308-5961(85)90021-7>; Kenneth H. Militzer and Martin H. Wolf, 
‘Deregulation in Telecommunications’, Business Economics, 20.3 (1985), 27–33 (pp. 27–31). 
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at that point that many jurisdictions introduced sector regulation.16 The main 
argument was that because of natural monopolies and network effects, markets are 
“extremely fragile and apt to operate very efficiently if left alone”17 and, therefore, 
“governments are benign and capable of correcting these market failures through 
regulation.”18  
At first, governments regulated the sector directly. Such regulation involved price 
determination on the rate of return basis.19 Later on, many jurisdictions introduced 
price cap regulations.20 Specifically for telecommunications, many governments 
designated telephone companies as common carriers to provide services to any 
willing customer at an affordable rate without discrimination.21 Furthermore, 
governments regulated prices and availability of spectrum for communication 
purposes.22 Such type of regulation was aimed not only at protecting consumers or 
ensuring the availability of services.23 It was necessary for national, social, and 
economic interests.24 Later on, governments introduced sector-specific regulators that 
continue to regulate the sector even after introducing competition.  
Among others, sector regulators exist to address the identified failures and their 
effects on the market.25 Thus, they address dominant firms’ unwelcome behaviors, 
 
16 Kirsten Rodine-Hardy, Global Markets and Government Regulation in Telecommunications (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 10–13; John Buckley, Telecommunications Regulation, IEE 
Telecommunications Series, 50 (London, United Kingdom: Institution of Electrical Engineers, 2003), pp. 1–
2. 
17 Richard A. Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science, 5.2 (1974), 335–58 (p. 336) <https://doi.org/10.2307/3003113>. 
18 Andrei Shleifer, ‘Understanding Regulation’, European Financial Management, 11.4 (2005), 439–51 (p. 
440) <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-7798.2005.00291.x>. 
19 Patrick Xavier, ‘Price Cap Regulation for Telecommunications: How Has It Performed in Practice?’, 
Telecommunications Policy, 19.8 (1995), 599–617 (pp. 599–605) <https://doi.org/10.1016/0308-
5961(95)00040-D>. 
20 Catherine Liston, ‘Price-Cap versus Rate-of-Return Regulation’, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 5.1 
(1993), 25–48 (pp. 26–30) <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01066312>. 
21 Peter K. Pitsch and Arthur W. Bresnahan, ‘Common Carrier Regulation of Telecommunications Contracts 
and the Private Carrier Alternative’, Federal Communications Law Journal, 48.3 (1996), 447–86 (p. 448). 
22 Ronald R. Braeutigam and John C. Panzar, ‘Effects of the Change from Rate-of-Return to Price-Cap 
Regulation’, The American Economic Review, 83.2 (1993), 191–98 (pp. 193–94). 
23 Merlin Stone, ‘The Evolution of the Telecommunications Industry — What Can We Learn from It?’, 
Journal of Direct, Data and Digital Marketing Practice, 16.3 (2015), 157–65 (p. 159) 
<https://doi.org/10.1057/dddmp.2014.80>. 
24 Stone, p. 159. 
25 Market failure has been argued as the main justification for telecommunications regulation. See Rachel 
Alemu, The Liberalisation of the Telecommunications Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa and Fostering Competition 
in Telecommunications Services Markets: An Analysis of the Regulatory Framework in Uganda, Munich 
Studies on Innovation and Competition (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2018), p. 18; Niamh Dunne, 
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create “as if” market conditions, address anti-competitive practices, and promote 
competition. For example, aspects like interconnection or access to the incumbents’ 
systems and infrastructure became paramount because of the sector’s monopolistic 
features. Former monopolies had to forego their glory and compete with newcomers. 
Sector regulators had to play their part to facilitate the mentioned new developments, 
i.e., the provision of telecom services in a liberalized environment.  
To a large extent, sector-specific regulation focused on the markets’ supply side to set 
entry rules, licensing, tariff regulation, and access.26 The regulators’ roles have been to 
create a level playing field for all interested players in the market. One of the best 
ways to do so, among others, is to protect and promote competition. 
Much as there is no dispute that regulation has proved pivotal in transforming 
monopolized telecommunications into competitive sectors, debates abound as to what 
extent sector regulation is necessary after introducing competition.27 For instance, 
should the regulator assume the role of competition agencies? Should it vacate after 
establishing competition? Or can competition authorities and regulators co-exist? The 
main concern here is how best can competition be enforced in a sector where there is 
also regulation. Some jurisdictions have separated competition enforcement (for 
competition agencies) from technical regulation (for sector regulators). Others have 
allowed concurrent enforcement of competition.28  
Tanzania is not an exception in the regulation of its telecommunications sector. Like 
other countries, it preferred sector-specific regulation to liberalize its sector and 
introduce competition. However, unlike many other jurisdictions, Tanzania’s 
framework excludes the national competition authority, the Fair Competition 
 
Competition Law and Economic Regulation: Making and Managing Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), p. 43; Roger King, Regulatory State in an Age of Governance: Soft Words and Big 
Sticks. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 26 & 36. 
26 Patrick Xavier and Dimitri Ypsilanti, ‘Behavioral Economics and Telecommunications Policy’, in 
Regulation and the Evolution of the Global Telecommunications Industry, ed. by Anastassios Gentzoglanis and 
Anders Henten (Cheltenham, Glos, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 83–108 (p. 83). 
27 See for example Martin Hellwig, ‘Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network 
Industries’, in Competition Policy in the EU: Fifty Years on from the Treaty of Rome, ed. by Xavier Vives 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 203–35 (pp. 207–9); Milena Stoyanova, 
Competition Problems in Liberalized Telecommunications: Regulatory Solutions to Promote Effective 
Competition (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International B.V., 2008), pp. 87–88. 
28 Maher M. Dabbah, ‘The Relationship Between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators’, The 
Cambridge Law Journal, 70.1 (2011), 113–43 (p. 116). 
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Commission (FCC), from regulating the telecommunication sector. Instead, the 
regulator has the duty of both regulating and enforcing competition.  
While Tanzania’s enforcement approach may not inherently be problematic, a review 
of its efficacy raises some concerns. For example, while there is much jurisprudence 
on the sector’s technical regulation, a gap exists in competition enforcement. There is 
no legal or practical jurisprudence on competition enforcement. Further, there is no 
clear legal framework to guide how the enforcement process takes place. The 
Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA), the only mandated authority 
to enforce competition in the sector, had only blanket powers to enforce competition 
since its inception. For a long time, there were no rules to indicate what is prohibited 
and the corresponding remedies. It was only in 2010 that the Electronic and Postal 
Communications Act introduced competition rules in the sector. Even after 
introducing competition rules in 2010, the Authority has not demonstrated its resolve 
to address anti-competitive issues in the sector on an ex-post basis. The evidence can 
be seen in the lack of jurisprudence on competition enforcement, while the same 
exists in other technical and regulatory matters.  
Because of the observations described above, this study seeks to investigate the 
efficacy of the TCRA in enforcing competition. The main argument is that it is not 
sufficient to have in place rules prohibiting anti-competitive practices. There must 
also be exhaustive and sufficient enforcement structures to translate regulatory rules 
into tangible results. To this end, the main research question, which this study 
attempts to answer, is whether the current legal, policy, institutional, and regulatory 
frameworks enable effective enforcement of competition in the sector.   
1.2 The Structure  
This study has seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the study by presenting the 
research problem, objectives, and research questions. Also, it provides reviews of 
existing relevant literature. In chapter two, there is a discussion of fundamental 
telecommunications concepts. This discussion is critical because most of the concepts 
in this work have economic or science (telecommunications) backgrounds. Thus, 
discussing those terms is mandatory to gain a contextual understanding of the rest of 
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the work. Furthermore, the chapter explains the rise of sector regulation and its 
justifications, even after introducing competition. The chapter also examines the 
sector’s general features and trends and how they affect competition and regulation.  
Chapter three narrows down to discuss the evolution of the telecommunications 
sector in Tanzania. The chapter reviews crucial developments, traces how regulation 
came into play, and describes current trends and players. This chapter is relevant in 
providing the sector’s detailed background. It is a base upon which the subsequent 
discussion of regulation, competition, and its enforcement stand.  
An assessment of regulatory and legal frameworks is in chapter four. Specifically, the 
chapter looks at how ex-ante regulation happens and how it promotes or, where 
applicable, discourages competition. The ex-post regulation of competition is 
presented in chapter five. The chapter defines the existing competition rules and 
proceeds to describe existing enforcement structures. The difference between chapter 
five and chapter four is that while the former focuses on ex-ante rules, the latter 
focuses on ex-post rules, which would have been enforced by competition authorities 
(as is the case in many other jurisdictions).  
Chapter six narrows down to focus on the TCRA’s efficacy in enforcing competition. 
Its critical approach vigorously tests the sufficiency of the existing legal mandate, 
design of the TCRA, and adequacy of institutional capacities, including financial 
resources. The analysis in chapter six stands on five factors inspired by relevant 
literature. Finally, based on findings presented in chapter six and the rest of the 
chapters, chapter seven advances conclusions, recommendations for better regulation 
and enforcement of competition in the telecommunications sector.    
1.3 Study Area  
This study covers the United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania), a developing country 
in the eastern part of the African continent. Tanzania shares its borders with eight 
countries: Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique. To the east, Tanzania borders the Indian Ocean 
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with over 800 kilometers of coastline. A country of diverse culture, natural riches, and 
rich history, Tanzania is home to more than fifty million people.29 It is also home to 
some of the world’s natural wonders, including the spectacular Mount Kilimanjaro, 
the mighty Serengeti National Park, the breath-taking Ngorongoro Conservation Area, 
and the beautiful Zanzibar isles.  
Compared to other nations in the world, Tanzania is a relatively young country. At 
first, it was under German rule for 33 years, from 1884/5 to 1918. It then fell under 
British rule for over 40 years until it obtained its independence on the 9th day of 
December 1961.30 Two years after its independence, in December 1963, the Zanzibar 
isles lying some 50 kilometers east of Dar es Salaam also got their independence, 
followed by the Revolution on the 12th day of April 1964.31 Later in the same year, on 
the 26th day of April, Tanganyika (now mainland Tanzania) and Zanzibar united to 
form a new country, the United Republic of Tanzania.32  
Therefore, Tanzania is a unitary country with a unique structure. It is a united 
country with two governments.33 The first one is the union government (other 
jurisdictions may consider this structure a federal government) that governs all union 
matters listed in the First Schedule of the Tanzanian Constitution. The Union 
Government is also a de facto government for mainland Tanzania (former 
Tanganyika) for all non-union matters. The second one is the Revolutionary 
Government of Zanzibar. It is responsible for all non-union matters in Zanzibar.34  
This study covers the entire United Republic of Tanzania since post and 
telecommunications are union matters, as the constitution’s first schedule provides. 
Thus, unless otherwise provided, the discussion on legal rules, institutional 
 
29 National Bureau of Statistics, 2016 Tanzania in Figures, National Bureau of Statistics (Dar es Salaam: 
NBS, 2017), p. 11; The National Bureau of Statistics estimates that there are about 57 million Tanzanians 
as of June 2020. See NBS, ‘National Bureau of Statistics - Home’, 2020 
<https://www.nbs.go.tz/index.php/en/> [accessed 30 July 2020]. 
30 Bank of Tanzania, Tanzania Mainland’s 50 Years of Independence: A Review of the Role and Functions of the 
Bank of Tanzania 1961-2011 (Dar es Salaam: Bank of Tanzania, 2011), p. 1. 
31 See Helen-Louise Hunter, Zanzibar: The Hundred Days Revolution: The Hundred Days Revolution 
(California: ABC-CLIO, 2009), p. 1. 
32 For further details on the union see Godfrey Mwakikagile, The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar: 
Formation of Tanzania and Its Challenges (Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2016); Issa G. Shivji, Tanzania: 
The Legal Foundations of the Union (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 2009). 
33 See Article 4 The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, CAP 2 [R.E 2002]. 
34 Constitution of Zanzibar of 1984 as revised in 2010. 
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frameworks, and practical examples apply to the whole of Tanzania. However, 
competition is not a union matter under Sections 6(1) of the Fair Competition Act. 
Thus, discussions regarding competition policy and regulation apply only to mainland 
Tanzania unless indicated otherwise.  
1.4 Research Problem, Research Questions, and Objectives of the Study 
1.4.1 Background  
Literature suggests that two observations regarding policy formulation are necessary 
to enjoy the fruits of regulation in a liberalized telecommunications sector. Firstly, 
regulatory rules must support competition and not otherwise.35 One such way is for 
regulation to act as a tool of opening markets to competition.36 This approach is 
necessary because empirical studies suggest that markets work well when there is 
unfettered competition, i.e., the absence of policies, laws, and practices that 
discourage market operations.37 Secondly, there must be efficient enforcement 
structures that translate rules into tangible results.38   
As already explained, the practice of enforcing regulatory rules has been to establish 
sector regulators. Typically, such regulators deal with several issues, but more 
frequently, they focus on ex-ante regulation, that is, setting up operational standards 
 
35 See details for example in In`es Ben Dkhil, ‘Regulation and Investment in Telecom Network 
Infrastructure Facilities: The Recent Developments and Debates’ (Laboratory of Management of Innovation 
and Durable development (LAMIDED) Faculty of Management and Economic Sciences of Sousse, 
University of Sousse, Tunisia, 2014), pp. 2–3 <https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/72910/1/MPRA_paper_72910.pdf> [accessed 18 September 2019]; OECD, Promoting Trade 
in Services Experience of the Baltic States: Experience of the Baltic States (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2004), p. 
87; Peter L Smith and Björn Wellenius, ‘Strategies for Successful Telecommunications Regulation in Weak 
Governance Environments’, 1999, pp. 2–3. 
36 See Jerry A. Hausman and William E. Taylor, ‘Telecommunication in the US: From Regulation to 
Competition (Almost)’, Review of Industrial Organization, 42.2 (2013), 203–30 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-012-9366-4>; Jerry A Hausman and William E Taylor, 
‘Telecommunications Deregulation’, American Economic Review, 102.3 (2012), 386–90 
<https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.386>. 
37 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither Socialism? (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: MIT Press, 1996), p. 
134; Kapunda Stephen, Industrial and Development Economics: An African Perspective (Dakar, Senegal: 
CODESRIA, 2017), pp. 156–57. 
38 Peter Rott, ‘The EU Legal Framework for the Enforcement of Consumer Law’, in Enforcement and 
Effectiveness of Consumer Law, ed. by Hans-W. Micklitz and Geneviève Saumier, Ius Comparatum - Global 
Studies in Comparative Law (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), pp. 249–85 (p. 272) 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78431-1_10>; ERGA, ERGA Report on the Independence of NRAs 
(ERGA, 2015), p. 31 <http://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/report_indep_nra_2015.pdf> 
[accessed 16 October 2019]. 
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beforehand.39 Nevertheless, it is also not exceptional for regulators to have jurisdiction 
to enforce competition. A study of different enforcement models around the world 
reveals four models. In the first model, sector regulators deal only with technical 
matters, while competition authorities deal with competition matters. In the second 
model, there is concurrent enforcement between the sector regulators and 
competition authorities. In the third model, exclusive enforcement of competition lies 
with the sector regulator, whereas in the last one, competition authorities also have 
economic and technical powers of regulation in the sector.40 
The first two are very common, while the last one is almost non-existent. The third 
exists in a few countries, including Tanzania, and it is not without some difficulties.41 
For example, there are some concerns on whether or not sector regulators are better 
placed to exclusively enforce competition law. This argument comes out because 
studies have shown that regulatory rules, as applied by regulators, have, at times, 
contradicted with rules of competition.42 It has further been argued that placing 
competition enforcement under sector regulators may lead to perpetual regulation 
against what is desired in the market.43  
It has also been argued that sector regulators are more apt to capture than 
competition authorities.44 Furthermore, there is a material difference between 
competition rules, which are enforced ex-post and regulatory rules that are enforced 
ex-ante. More importantly, while they stand out concerning regulation of technical 
issues such as interconnection or spectrum management, regulators are said to lack 
 
39 Christian Jaag and Urs Trinker, ‘A General Framework for Regulation and Liberalization in Network 
Industries’, in International Handbook of Network Industries: The Liberalization of Infrastructure, ed. by 
Matthias Finger and Rolf Kunneke (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 
pp. 26–53 (p. 40). 
40 Dabbah, p. 116. 
41 Some of those countries include India and Tanzania. 
42 OECD, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Regulatory Reform in Ireland 2001 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 
2001), p. 180. 
43 See Jerry A Hausman and Taylor, pp. 86–90; Marcel Boyer, ‘The Measure and Regulation of Competition 
in Telecommunications Markets’, in Regulation and the Evolution of the Global Telecommunications Industry, 
ed. by Anastassios Gentzoglanis and Anders Henten (Cheltenham, Glos, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar, 2010), pp. 109–27 (p. 109). 
44 See Toddy J Zywicki and James C Cooper, ‘The US Federal Trade Commission & Competition Advocacy: 
Lessons for Latina America Competition Policy’, in Competition Law and Policy in Latin America, ed. by 
Eleanor Fox and Daniel Sokol (Portland, Oregon: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009), pp. 351–76 (p. 364). 
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expertise in legal and economic analyses of market operations.45 Further, it has been 
argued that sector regulators may end up treating telecommunications firms as their 
clients.46 In effect, these differences make it difficult, at least in theory, for sector 
regulators to effectively deal with competition enforcement.  
With these concerns in mind, it is crucial to ascertain that when a regulator has 
powers to enforce competition law, there are legal stipulations to ensure that it can 
effectively do so. The law must stipulate what anti-competitive practices are 
prohibited. As a step further, it must also elucidate clearly how the regulator can 
effectively enforce those rules. Where necessary, the law must stipulate the 
relationship between the regulator and competition authorities. Thus, aspects such as 
sufficiency and clarity of regulatory rules, jurisdiction, and independence of the 
regulator and the resources’ sufficiency become paramount.47  
1.4.2 The Problem  
The Tanzanian telecommunications laws have established the Tanzania 
Communications Regulatory Authority as an exclusive enforcer of competition law in 
the telecommunications sector. According to Section 96 of the Fair Competition Act 
and Sections 5, 19, and 20 of the TCRA Act, the Fair Competition Commission, which 
is the national competition authority,  has no jurisdiction in the sector.48 Instead, the 
law empowers only the TCRA to promote and enforce competition.49 As a result, the 
TCRA exclusively acts as a regulator and an enforcer of competition in the sector.  
Because Tanzania preferred this approach, it was expected that the law would be 
apparent on at least three points. Firstly, the law must have exhaustively defined all 
necessary substantive rules of competition. Secondly, it must have laid down rules to 
govern the enforcement process and structures. Thirdly, it must have designed the 
regulator such that it can efficiently enforce competition. The presence of these three 
 
45 OECD, ‘Independent Sector Regulators – Background Note’ (OECD Publishing, 2019), p. 7. 
46 See Zywicki and Cooper, p. 364; OECD, ‘Independent Sector Regulators – Background Note’, p. 7. 
47 Rott, p. 272; OECD, Policy Framework for Investment A Review of Good Practices: A Review of Good 
Practices (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2006), pp. 91–92; ERGA, p. 31; United States Department of the 
Treasury, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on Government Sponsored Enterprises (Washington, D.C: 
Department of the Treasury, 1991), p. 14. 
48 Fair Competition Act, ACT NO 8 OF 2003. 
49 The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, 2003, ACT NO 12 OF 2003. 
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factors would indicate a sector regulator capable of effectively addressing competition 
concerns in the sector, both on an ex-ante and ex-post basis.  
However, the TCRA regulatory structure paints a different picture. An initial survey 
indicated that even though the TCRA was established in 2003 with a mandate to 
enforce competition, it was only until 2010 that the law establishing substantive rules 
of competition was enacted. Even after the enacting of competition rules, ex-post 
enforcement of competition law has not been evidenced. For example, while there is 
a significant jurisprudence on ex-ante regulation on various technical matters such as 
interconnection, spectrum management, access, and consumer protection, there is no 
similar jurisprudence on ex-post enforcement of competition, even though some 
elements of anti-competitive practices have been witnessed.50 This enforcement gap 
raises the question of the TCRA’s efficacy in enforcing competition law in the sector. 
It is unclear whether the TCRA has the requisite capacities for effective enforcement 
of competition. Thus, it is against these observations that this research seeks to 
investigate the efficacy of the TCRA in enforcing competition law.  
1.4.3 Questions 
Based on the preceding observations, the primary question arises on whether the 
current legal, policy, institutional, and regulatory frameworks enable effective 
enforcement of competition in the sector. This question proposes looking into the 
TCRA’s legal mandate, institutional design, and institutional capacities and resources. 
Thus, to exhaustively address this question, it is further subdivided into three;  
1. Whether the current policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks 
enable the TCRA to enforce competition rules in the sector effectively, 
2. Whether the Authority possesses requisite resources and capacities to enforce 
competition law, and  
3. What should be the best way to enforce competition law in the 
telecommunications sector.  
 
50 See chapter five for further detail.  
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1.4.4 Objectives  
This study’s main objective is to critically examine, analyze, and evaluate the legal, 
policy, institutional, and practical framework for the enforcement of competition in 
the telecommunications sector. Specifically, it evaluates whether or not the TCRA is 
best-placed legally and institutionally to enforce competition in the sector. The study 
further had the following specific objectives: 
1. To analyze the legal, policy, and regulatory framework governing 
telecommunications regulation and competition in the telecommunications 
sector; 
2. To critically assess the efficacy of TCRA’s institutional design, practice, and 
procedures in promoting and enforcing competition law; 
3. To critically assess the sufficiency of TCRA’s resources and capacities in the 
promotion and enforcement of competition law; and 
4. To recommend the best ways to enforce competition law in the 
telecommunications sector. 
1.5 Methodological Framework and Approach  
1.5.1 Methodological Approach  
This research employs qualitative research methods. It takes an analytical approach to 
answer the research questions. At first, it starts by setting a base through a descriptive 
analysis of the telecommunications sector. It then examines relevant policies, laws, 
regulations, and practices adopted to regulate telecommunications and promote and 
enforce competition in the sector. In the process, the study reviews relevant legal 
instruments and institutional frameworks central to comprehending the sector and its 
regulatory environment. Such descriptive analysis is presented from chapter two to 
chapter five of this work.  
Chapter six is narrowed down to focus only on TCRA’s enforcement of competition. It 
employs a critical approach to analyzing the efficacy of the TCRA in promoting and 
enforcing competition law. It vigorously tests the sufficiency of the existing legal 
mandate, design of the TCRA, and adequacy of institutional capacities and resources. 
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Having examined the enforcement of competition in the sector critically, chapter 
seven prescribes necessary reforms for better regulation and effective enforcement of 
competition. It is hoped that regulation can deliver maximum benefits of a vibrant 
and competitive sector if these recommendations are considered.  
In another perspective, this study also considered the country’s historical, socio-
political, and economic contexts. The approach was necessary because legal rules and 
related practices do not develop or operate in a vacuum. Thus, instead of looking at 
the existing legal framework and practices in isolation from other actors, the study 
incorporated necessary backgrounds to better understand the current frameworks and 
practices. For example, a historical context helps to trace the development of 
regulation and competition law.  
The socio-political context considers how various social and political policies affected 
regulation and related practices. For example, one will find an apparent link between 
adopting socialism and monopolies’ growth in the country. In the economic context, 
the research refers to how various economic considerations have affected the 
telecommunications sector’s regulation.51 Explicitly, the sector’s economic 
characteristics are considered in evaluating existing regulatory frameworks’ efficacy 
and recommending reforms for better regulation.  
1.5.2 Data Collection Methods 
1.5.2.1 Field Study 
First-hand information was necessary to understand the TCRA’s design, practices, and 
procedures in regulating the sector and promoting and enforcing competition. To this 
end, it was necessary to visit the TCRA and other institutions and organizations that 
deal with competition matters. Therefore, apart from the TCRA, research visits were 
 
51 For proper understanding of Tanzania economic policies see David Potts, Policy Reform and the Economic 
Development of Tanzania (Bradford, United Kingdom: Bradford Centre for International Development, 
2008); Robert J. Utz, Sustaining and Sharing Economic Growth in Tanzania (Washington, D.C: World Bank 
Publications, 2008); Anna Muganda, ‘Tanzania’s Economic Reforms— and Lessons Learned’, in Scaling Up 
Poverty Reduction: A Global Learning Process and Conference (presented at the Reducing Poverty, Sustaining 
Growth—What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why A Global Exchange for Scaling Up Success, Shanghai: The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK, 2004); The World Bank, 
Tanzania at the Turn of the Century: From Reforms to Sustained Growth and Poverty Reduction (Washington, 
D.C: World Bank Publications, 2001). 
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made to the Ministry of Communications, the Fair Competition Commission, and the 
Fair Competition Tribunal. Also, the researcher paid a visit to six public and private 
telecommunications companies in Tanzania. They included Tanzania 
Telecommunications Company [TTCL (a public corporation)], Vodacom Tanzania, 
Tigo (and Zantel, which is now owned by Tigo), Halotel, and Smart Tanzania. Data 
collected from these firms were detailed enough to provide a clear picture of 
regulation and competition enforcement in their perspectives. Additionally, secondary 
information regarding these firms, such as their annual and special reports, provided 
useful data to complement information already collected from the field.52  
Apart from the stated visits, the researcher carried out in-depth interviews with over 
thirty academicians, legal practitioners, and other persons working in the telecom 
sector.53 These, as far as the researcher could tell, were at the time of concluding this 
study very conversant with the subject matter of the study. Their contributions 
provided a highly balanced and (most of the time) objective perspective. In due 
regard, the researcher learned how regulated firms perceive regulation. Their 
contribution was enormously critical because they even formulated possible 
theoretical approaches for effective regulation and competition enforcement. 
Two data collection methods were employed to gather information from the 
mentioned respondents; questionnaires and guided interviews. In practice, both 
methods were used concurrently. Questionnaires were first sent to respondents at 
their request, presumably to familiarize themselves with the nature and type of 
questions. They were followed by interview sessions, which were informative and 
provided the researcher with an opportunity to seek clarifications and ask follow-up 
questions. More importantly, interview sessions were instrumental in establishing a 
rapport that became very useful in the follow-up sessions.  
1.5.3 Documentary Review 
This work relied much on the existing literary works. The objective was to set 
conceptual foundations by understanding the telecommunication sector and how 
 
52 For logistical reasons, it was impossible to visit Smile and Airtel. 
53 For a breakdown of these respondents, see the annexed list. 
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regulation and competition became critical in its development. The study dedicated 
considerable efforts to review various legal, economic, technical, and related texts. 
The researcher reviewed books, book chapters, and journal articles from many 
authors across many jurisdictions. Also, the review dwelt on relevant technical texts, 
particularly those dealing with telecommunications engineering and Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT).  
The researcher extended the literature review to conference papers and other 
unpublished works. Also, special acknowledgment goes to reports, studies, and 
related works on competition law and telecommunication regulations from renowned 
institutions that deal with telecommunications sectors. Among others, such 
institutions include the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations (UN), the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Competition Network (ICN), and 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Most of the 
referred texts from these organizations are technical, addressing critical and relevant 
issues to this study. Thus, they helped understand the telecommunications sector, 
especially by referring to several jurisdictions’ laws and practices. Besides, they 
proved helpful in formulating recommendations for legal and policy reforms.  
1.6 State of the Existing Literature  
Literature originating from Tanzania on regulation or promotion and enforcement of 
competition law in the sector is scarce. Most of the available sources, which are few, 
focus on general competition law. There are limited references to sector regulation. 
For instance, Eliamani Laltaika,54 Halima Noor,55 the UNCTAD,56 and Goodluck Temu57 
have analyzed the importance of clear legal mandate and institutional design in 
enforcing competition law. Their works focused much on the FCC. Most of their 
 
54 Eliamani Laltaika, ‘Legal and Institutional Aspects of Fair Competition in Tanzania’, Open University Law 
Journal, 5.1 (2014), 58-68. 
55 Halima Noor, The State of Play of Competition Policy and Law Reform: The Case of Tanzania (Nairobi.: 
CUTS International, 2015). 
56 UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: United Republic of Tanzania (New York & 
Geneva: The United Nations, 2012). 
57 Goodluck Temu, ‘Reflections on the Enforcement of Competition Rules in Tanzania’, The East Africa Law 
Review, 41.2 (2015), 86–110. 
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references to the TCRA are haphazard. They do not systematically address TCRA’s 
efficacy in regulating telecommunications and enforcing competition law. For 
example, Laltaika briefly provides an explanatory account of the TCRA setup without 
further analysis.58  
The UNCTAD work briefly looks at the TCRA’s setup. It has pointed out the absence 
of the FCC’s jurisdiction on the sector as the main weakness and recommended some 
policy reforms. Increased FCC’s advocacy in the sector is one of the 
recommendations.59 For Halima Noor, her significant observation is that absence of 
the FCC’s jurisdiction in the sector is a considerable enforcement weakness.60 She 
opines that the relationship between the FCC and the TCRA is unhealthy as the 
practice has evidenced turf wars between them.61 Halima also doubts the regulator’s 
independence, especially when the responsible minister has broad powers compared 
to the accepted international practice.62 Even though they do not present a complete 
understanding of the sector, all these observations offer an essential base on which 
this study undertakes to build. They further point out that competition matters in the 
telecommunications sector have not received appropriate attention from researchers 
and academics in the country.  
Apart from the mentioned studies, two studies are relevant to understanding the 
country’s general state of competition. The first study was by Francis Sabby in 2018.63 
Sabby looks at how the East African Community (EAC) countries progress in 
approximating competition laws.64 In so doing, he takes a multinational approach by 
involving all the EAC countries. He brought critical conclusions that reflect on how 
the EAC countries perceive competition. He observes a laxity in EAC countries in 
dealing with competition matters.65 For example, he notes, while Tanzania, Kenya, 
 
58 See Laltaika, pp. 65–66. 
59 UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: United Republic of Tanzania, p. 17. 
60 Noor, p. 44. 
61 Noor, p. 44. 
62 Noor, p. 48. 
63 Francis Sabby, ‘Approximation of Competition Rules within the EAC Partner States: A Case Study of 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda’ (unpublished A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in Law of the University of Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es 
Salaam, Dar es Salaam), p. 1. 
64 Sabby, p. 1. 
65 Sabby, p. 269. 
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and Rwanda, have competition laws, others, namely Burundi, Uganda, and South 
Sudan, do not have such laws.66 As a result, there is very little progress made in the 
approximation of competition rules.67  
Sabby’s work reflects how the EAC countries, Tanzania included, perceive and 
prioritize competition matters. Such laxity observed by the author indicates that EAC 
countries are yet to perceive the importance of competition. As a result, there is 
insufficient investment in establishing workable frameworks to yield optimal results 
in the markets, a fact apparent in Tanzania’s telecommunications sector.  
The second study is by Elias Mwashiuya of 2019.68 Mwashiuya assessed the 
implementation of competition law in the real estate sector. He found out that a lack 
of adequate regulations created an opportunity for unfair competition practices.69 In 
his opinion, the inadequacy resulted from a lack of awareness of all actors.70 Such lack 
of awareness cut across many other sectors.71 The effect is to have an industry 
characterized by uncompetitive practices.72 Mwashiuya’s study is also relevant as it 
shows the overall policy deficit in addressing competition matters.    
An account of past developments in the sector is also scanty and haphazard. In many 
cases, telecommunications regulation comes up just as a tiny part of a broader 
narrative, predominantly when authors revisit Tanzania’s economic history. Such 
accounts are found in several authors’ works, including Sebastian Edwards,73 Rodger 
Noll and Marry Shirley,74 Andrew Temu and Jean Due,75 Mohamad Mustafa et al.,76 
 
66 Sabby, p. 269. 
67 Sabby, p. 270. 
68 Elias Mwashiuya, ‘Examining Application of Competition Rules in the Tanzania Real Estate Market’ 
(unpublished A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
(Law) of the University of Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam, 2019). 
69 Mwashiuya, p. 284. 
70 Mwashiuya, p. 287. 
71 Mwashiuya, p. 287. 
72 Mwashiuya, p. 288. 
73 Sebastian Edwards, Toxic Aid: Economic Collapse and Recovery in Tanzania, First edition (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 29, 137, 198. 
74 Roger G. Noll and Mary M. Shirley, ‘Telecommunications Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: Politics, 
Institutions and Performance’, pp. 52–55 
<https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/656_nollshirley.pdf> [accessed 10 December 2019]. 
75 Andrew E. Temu and Jean M. Due, ‘The Business Environment in Tanzania after Socialism: Challenges of 
Reforming Banks, Parastatals, Taxation and the Civil Service’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 38.4 
(2000), 683–712 (p. 697). 
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Jean-Jacques Laffont,77 and Lawrence Mbogoni.78 In all these works, the 
telecommunications sector’s reference is hasty as authors’ focuses were on other 
matters.  
Nevertheless, when patching together bits of information collected from the 
mentioned works, one can have a rough picture of the sector’s early developments. 
From such accounts, it is learned that the telecommunications sector has always been 
critical to Tanzania’s economy. As a result, its development has been affected by 
changing policy developments. Thus, based on these works’ observations, it can be 
realized that the sector cannot be understood in the exclusion of other national 
policies.  
There is, however, one comprehensive account of early regulatory steps taken in 
Tanzania in the 1990s. The account is in an edited work by Mwandosya, Mbowe, and 
Young.79 The importance of this work is that it pictures how regulation facilitated 
competition in the sector. It also shows how the first regulator perceived and 
promoted competition.80 Further, this work helps explain why the government 
preferred utility regulation to transit from monopolies to market economy.  
Furthermore, the work demonstrates why reforms were necessary for the sector.81 It 
shows the early experiences, including challenges in regulating the sector.82 It also 
details the procedures and processes that the government adopted to introduce 
 
76 Mohammad A. Mustafa, Bruce Laidlaw, and Mark Brand, Telecommunications Policies for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (World Bank Publications, 1997), pp. 5 & 65. 
77 Jean-Jacques Laffont, Regulation and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 
99–100. 
78 Lawrence Ezekiel Yona Mbogoni, Aspects of Colonial Tanzania History (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 
2013), pp. 121–22. 
79 Competition Policy and Utility Regulation, ed. by J. M. Mwandosya, George F. Mbowe, and Peter Young, 
CEEST Research Report Series, no. 6 (Dar-es-Salaam: Centre for Energy, Environment, Science and 
Technology, 1997). 
80 George Mbowe, ‘An Overview of Divestiture Process and Progress in Tanzania’, in Competition Policy and 
Utility Regulation, ed. by Mark Mwandosya, George F Mbowe, and Peter Young, CEEST Research Report 
Series, no. 6 (Dar-es-Salaam: Centre for Energy, Environment, Science and Technology, 1997), pp. 3–12. 
81 Mathew Luhanga and Adollar Mapunda, ‘Telecommunications: Current Status and Rationale for Reforms 
in Tanzania’, in Competition Policy and Utility Regulation, ed. by Mark Mwandosya, George Mbowe, and 
Peter Young, CEEST Research Report Series, no. 6 (Dar-es-Salaam: Centre for Energy, Environment, 
Science and Technology, 1997), pp. 95–110. 
82 Awadhi Mawenya, ‘Regulating the Communications Sector in Tanzania: Experiences and Lessons’, in 
Competition Policy and Utility Regulation, ed. by Mark Mwandosya, George Mbowe, and Peter Young, 
CEEST Research Report Series, no. 6 (Dar-es-Salaam: Centre for Energy, Environment, Science and 
Technology, 1997), pp. 111–24. 
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competition in the sector.83 The book, short as it is, provides a classical account of 
what transpired in the early times of telecommunications liberalization. It is critical 
because only through a proper understanding of the past can the present be 
understood. Further, it is through past practical experiences that policymakers can 
correctly project the future when necessary.  
Apart from the mentioned works, nothing else significant of Tanzanian origin could 
be found. For that reason, the study employed literature from outside Tanzania. In 
due regard, two major types of literature are relevant. The first body of literature 
focuses on competition agencies, which also have jurisdiction to enforce competition 
in the telecommunications sector. Since such agencies have enforcement powers in 
the telecommunications sector, their designs and enforcement structures help 
understand and assess the efficacy of sector regulators that have powers to enforce 
competition. Some of the first group’s works are William E Kovacic,84 William E 
Kovacic and Marianela Lopez-Galdos,85 UNCTAD,86 Timothy J Muris,87 and Annetje 
Ottow.88 They all agree that an authority can efficiently enforce competition if it has a 
clear legal mandate, clear statements of objectives, and exhaustive enforcement 
 
83 Catherin Waddams, ‘Competition Policy and Utility Regulation: A Conceptual Framework’, in Competition 
Policy and Utility Regulation, ed. by Mark Mwandosya, George F Mbowe, and Peter Young, CEEST Research 
Report Series, no. 6 (Dar-es-Salaam: Centre for Energy, Environment, Science and Technology, 1997), pp. 
55–74. 
84 William E. Kovacic, ‘Distinguished Essay: Good Agency Practice and the Implementation of Competition 
Law’, in European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2013, ed. by Christoph Herrmann, Markus 
Krajewski, and Jörg Philipp Terhechte, European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), pp. 3–22 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33917-2_1>; William E. 
Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance? (Rochester, NY: Social 
Science Research Network, 8 March 2012) <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2018710> [accessed 11 
December 2019]; William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: 
Building the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future (Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network, 8 March 2012) <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2018734> [accessed 11 December 
2019]; William E. Kovacic, ‘Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process’, in Competition 
Policy and the Economic Approach Foundations and Limitations, ed. by Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber, and 
Rupprecht Podszun (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), pp. 291–
311. 
85 William E. Kovacic and Marianela Lopez-Galdos, ‘Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining Variation 
in the Implementation of New Regimes | Law & Contemporary Problems’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
79 (2016), 85–122. 
86 UNCTAD Secretariat, ‘Foundations of an Effective Competition Agency’, in Trade and Development 
Commission Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy (presented at the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2011) 
<https://unctad.org/en/Docs/ciclpd8_en.pdf> [accessed 11 January 2019]. 
87 Timothy J. Muris, ‘Principles for a Successful Competition Agency’, The University of Chicago Law Review, 
72.1 (2006), 165–87. 
88 Annetje Ottow, Market and Competition Authorities: Good Agency Principles (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), pp. 8–144. 
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procedures. Further, the authority must be independent, accountable, and with well-
developed internal procedures. Among others, these qualities ensure the authority’s 
ability to act professionally, autonomously, and with integrity.  
The second body of literature deals directly with sector regulators as enforcers of 
competition law. The leading work in this group is that by Robert Baldwin, Martin 
Cave, and Martin Lodge.89 They argue that a regulator must have a clear legislative 
mandate, be accountable, observe due process, maintain expertise, be independent, 
and act efficiently.90 To them, regulators play a significant role in the economy. If they 
act ineffectively, they harm not only the economy but also consumers.  
Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that law, institutional design, and practice allow 
authorities to deliver to their optimal requirements. Several other works agree with 
the referred views above. Such works include those by the OECD,91 William Kovacic,92 
Francesc Trillas,93 Davesh Kapur and Madhav Khosla,94 Daniel Müller-Jentsch,95 Chris 
Hanretty, Pierre Larouche and Andreas Reindl,96 the World Bank,97 OECD,98 and 
Shelley Metzenbaum and Gaurav Vasisht.99  
Despite the absence of detailed Tanzania’s literature on the telecommunications 
sector, a resort to other jurisdictions and international publications paints a clear 
 
89 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and 
Practice, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 25–31. 
90 Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, Understanding Regulation, p. 28. 
91 OECD, The Governance of Regulators: OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2014), pp. 79–103. 
92 Kovacic, ‘Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process’, pp. 291–311. 
93 Francesc Trillas, ‘Independent Regulators: Theory, Evidence and Reform Proposals’ (IESE Business 
School – University of Navarra, 2010) <https://media.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0860-E.pdf> [accessed 
12 October 2019]. 
94 Devesh Kapur and Madhav Khosla, ‘The Reality of Indian Regulation’, in Regulation in India: Design, 
Capacity, Performance, ed. by Devesh Kapur and Madhav Khosla (Oxford: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 
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Prospects for Liberalization and Regional Integration (Washington, D.C: World Bank Publications, 2001), p. 
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of Regulators, A CERRE Study (Brussels: Center on Regulation in Europe, 6 March 2012). 
97 The World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development (Washington, D.C: 
Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1994), p. 67. 
98 OECD, The Governance of Regulators, p. 1. 
99 Shelley H. Metzenbaum and Gaurav Vasisht, ‘What Makes a Regulator Excellent?’ (unpublished 
Discussion Paper for the Penn Program on Regulation’s International Expert Dialogue on “Defining and 
Measuring Regulatory Excellence”, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2015) 
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picture of an efficient regulator. The reviewed literature shows that having such a 
regulator is a calculated decision resulting from deliberate investments in systems and 
structures. Such decisions must be reflected in legislative frameworks and 
institutional designs. It is only with these prerequisites carefully crafted and sorted in 
the respective legal maps, together with a supportive government with an 
unquestionable political will, that the regulator may graduate to an effective level. 
1.7 Significance and Policy Relevance 
This research adds useful literature in regulation and promotion and enforcement of 
competition law in telecommunications. The literature review section already reveals 
limited Tanzanian literature on the subject matter of this work. For this reason, this 
research dedicated sufficient background on the sector and its regulation, as chapters 
three to five reveal. With these chapters, one gets a complete picture of the nature 
and dynamics of the sector, not only in Tanzania but also with global experiences and 
perspectives. Also, the chapters provide a clear framework of how the regulator 
regulates the sector.  
Chapter six is very significant, for it seeks to answer the main research question. At 
this point, the research has already demonstrated that competition is a prerequisite 
for a vibrant, effective, and competitive telecommunications sector. It is through 
competition that consumers can receive maximum benefits from the markets. The 
remaining point of examination, which chapter six looks at, is whether the regulator 
can translate competition rules into practice to harness their potential in the sector’s 
growth and development. Therefore, chapter six delves into the practical aspects of 
TCRA’s enforcement of competition law in the sector. And, it shall be seen, significant 
concerns exist that put the competition enforcement in limbo.  
Therefore, the overall significance lies in demonstrating the implication of 
competition and regulation in the sector. The research findings have shown the state 
of regulation and competition. They have further shown how the regulator discharges 
its enforcement mandate. Furthermore, the research has studied the entire regulatory 
architecture, for example, by pointing at its strengths and weaknesses. It has taken a 
pragmatic approach by examining how competition regulation and enforcement 
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should occur. With the overall findings presented in chapter seven, the research set a 
benchmark for necessary institutional evaluations and further legal and policy 
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Chapter 2:  Telecommunication, Regulation, and   Competition: 
Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations 
“…regulation which respects competition principles is the most efficient 
type of regulation. When that regulation succeeds in enabling a 
competitive market, there is less to worry about both for the consumers 
and for the enforcers of competition rules.100 
2.1 Introduction  
Before the nineteenth century, communication was a prolonged process. It was not 
unusual to communicate by shouting from hill to hill, horse riders, pigeons, beacons, 
and ships’ posts.101 What is seen today in the communication world is a relatively new 
concept. Let us think of these facts.  From 1812 to 1815, there was a war between the 
United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).102 In that war, the US 
won the Battle of New Orleans in 1814.103 However, celebrations had to wait for 
another three weeks because of the terrible state of communications.104 It is assumed 
that the American General Andrew Jackson did not enjoy better communication 
between New York and New Orleans than Julius Caesar did between Rome and 
Gaul.105 Information was passing on horsebacks or slow sailing ships. It is argued, 
 
100 Neelie Kroes, ‘The Interface between Regulation and Competition Law’, in Bundeskartellamt Conference 
on ’Dominant Companies – The Thin Line between Regulation and Competition Law (presented at the 
Bundeskartellamt Conference on ’Dominant Companies – The Thin Line between Regulation and 
Competition Law, Hamburg, 2009), p. 6. 
101 See Patrick D. Van der Puije, Telecommunication Circuit Design (New York: J. Wiley, 2002), p. 1; Eli M. 
Noam, Telecommunications in Europe, Communication and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992), p. 7. 
102 Jeanne T. Heidler and David S. Heidler, ‘War of 1812: History, Causes, Effects, Timeline, Facts, & 
Significance’, Encyclopedia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 2019) 
<https://www.britannica.com/event/War-of-1812> [accessed 25 September 2019]. 
103 Heidler and Heidler. 
104 Joseph J Carr, Steve Winder, and Stephen J Bigelow, Understanding Telephone Electronics (Fourth 
Edition), 4th edn (Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2001), p. ix. 
105 Carr, Winder, and Bigelow, p. ix. 
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perhaps, that Caesar had better communications channels because of the well-built 
roads of Rome.106  
The poor state of communication, however, did not last long after that war. It was the 
discovery of the telephone that changed the game. However, how did that happen? At 
around the 1830s, there were already efforts to shorten long-distance 
communication.107 For example, scientists like Charles Wheatstone and Sir William 
Fothergill Cooke in the UK and Samuel Morse in the US invented the electronic 
telegraph.108 By then, such an invention was undeniably revolutionary. As of 1855, 
one could send fifty words in a minute.109  
However, the telegraph was still not fast. Alexander Graham Bell,110 a Scottish 
scientist, was not content.111 He thus dedicated his mind to improving it. In 1876 
while in his laboratory, he spilled acid on his trousers.112 He had to call the attendance 
of his assistant. His assistant could hear him properly, but at that time, not through 
the usual transmission of the human voice through the air as sound waves facilitated 
by our hearing system. On the contrary, the transmission was through a receiver 
which was still in the experiment. Thus, the assistant could hear Bell’s call directly as 
a result of electronic transmission.113 The working of the receiver meant a new 
development in the world of communication. An electronic device that would later be 
 
106 Carr, Winder, and Bigelow, p. ix. 
107 Tarmo Anttalainen, Introduction to Telecommunications Network Engineering, Artech House 
Telecommunications Library, 2nd ed (Boston: Artech House, 2003), p. 4. 
108 Andy Valdar, Understanding Telecommunications Networks, IET Telecommunications Series, 71, 2nd 
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the United States (McFarland: Jefferson, N.C, 2003). 
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110 For more about Bell see Great Lives from History. Inventors & Inventions, ed. by Alvin K. Benson, Great 
Lives from History (Pasadena, Calif: Salem Press, 2010), pp. 75–77; Samuel Willard Crompton, Alexander 
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History (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2009). 
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principles of voice transmission. His device, however, never worked in practice. See Eli M. Noam, 
Telecommunications in Europe, p. 69; Eleven years before Bell, one Amos Emerson Dolbear had already 
invented a permanent-magnetic telephone receiver in 1865. His delays in patent applications would see 
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regarded as the “most complicated equipment in the world” was invented; the 
telephone.114    
The invention of the telephone changed the concept of communication altogether. 
Distant communication that was seen as impossible a few years before became a 
reality. More importantly, unprecedented technological developments have happened 
such that today, the telecommunications sector forms part and parcel of our daily 
lives. The developments reflect what one author, David Loomis, once noted that, 
“The [telecommunication] industry, in fact, is hard to define because technological 
advances cause the industry to continually redefine itself. Indeed, the only constant 
in the telecommunications industry is that it is always changing.”115 
From Loomis’ perspective, the sector’s most distinguishing feature is its constant 
changing charged by technological developments happening at an unprecedented 
pace. These changes, among others, result from the impact of the sector’s regulation. 
They depict what regulation can and has done in the sector. They reflect a bigger 
picture of policy developments translated into legal rules that regulate 
communication services and competition among service providers. Thus, the state of 
communication services as seen today- whether excellent or worse-is a recipe of 
several ingredients, most notably three: rapid technological developments, regulation, 
and competition.116 
Therefore, this chapter presents the conceptual foundations upon which one will 
better understand the study. Specifically, it examines three concepts, namely, 
telecommunication, regulation, and competition. In so doing, the chapter does not 
only define these terms. It also looks at how they came into play in the sector and 
how they relate to each other. Furthermore, it looks at how telecommunications’ 
inherent features made it necessary to have rules for regulation and competition. 
 
114 See Anttalainen, p. 3. 
115 David Loomis, ‘The Telecommunications Industry’, in Handbook of Computer Networks: Key Concepts, 
Data Transmission, and Digital and Optical Networks, ed. by Hossein Bidgoli (Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & 
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116 Harald Gruber, The Economics of Mobile Telecommunications (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
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2.2 Telecommunications and Related Concepts  
Before proceeding further, we must define telecommunications and related terms, 
especially those connected with regulation and competition. The definitions are 
important because they appear repetitively in the rest of this work. Apart from 
telecommunications, other concepts defined in this section include the Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), Local loop, Mobile Networks, the internet, the 
Broadband internet, internet telephony, and the convergence of communications 
services. 
2.2.1 Telecommunications  
Telecommunication has to do with distant communications.117 It is an “electrical 
means of communicating over a long distance.”118 Through telecommunication, 
information transmits over a distance, especially using “electromagnetic or photonic 
signals.”119 The extent of the distance is not material. It may be between points located 
in a few meters, for example, in the same building or different regions of the same 
country. It may also be between two parties located in the most extreme points of the 
earth, say, the north and south poles, or even between the earth and space, for 
example, Mars.  
The use of telephones, mobile phones, data networks, radios, televisions, cable 
television, and even highly sophisticated communication with space devices such as 
mars exploration rovers are just a few examples of telecommunications.120 This work, 
however, is limited only to telecommunications services offered through the use of 
telephone networks. Thus, a reference to the telecommunications sector, unless 
otherwise stated, does not extend to other communication aspects such as 
broadcasting. 
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2.2.2 Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 
The first telephone required at least two points physically connected by copper 
wires.121 With an increase in demand, exchange points were introduced to establish a 
connection between the two points.122 At first, a connection at the exchange points 
was by the manual switching system.123 A new profession dominated mainly by 
women developed,124 connecting two customers to establish a call.125 Further increase 
in demand made automatic switching systems necessary.126 Thus, connections 
between different points would be established using public switching, later known as 
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).127  
The PSTN has three key attributes: “it is public (meaning that anyone can use it), it is 
switched (meaning that anyone can call anyone else who is on it, based on a common 
addressing system, known to experts as E.164 numbering), and finally, it is accessed 
via telephones (whether fixed or mobile).”128 Today, PSTN has gone digital, and it 
embraces an aggregate of the circuit-switched global system of telephone 
communications, including both fixed and mobile connections.129 In its original form, 
the PSTN architecture was a pure network like a tree and its branches. Such structure 
was responsible for what is known as network effects, a crucial concept in the 
development of regulation and competition in the sector.130  
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2.2.3 Local Loop 
In PSTN, a subscriber needs a physical connection from his or her premise to the 
nearest point of connection of the communication service provider.131 The connection 
is known as a local loop, subscriber line, or last mile.132 With a local loop, a subscriber 
has a dedicated line for real-time connections.133 The local loop had some competitive 
effects because the first service provider to establish it would have an absolute 
monopoly. Since it was the only way to physically access consumers’ premises, the 
question has always been whether it should be available to other service providers.134 
The practice has been to have regulatory interventions for mandatory unbundling of 
the local loop.135 Unbundling provides access to new entrants. It is useful to promote 
competition.136 Today, large parts of the PSTN, as known in the traditional telephone, 
have gone digital. Advanced versions of the local loop include digital loop career, 
Broadband microwave/millimeter-wave, and fiber optics.137 
2.2.4 Mobile Networks  
The key difference between mobile wireless and wireline networks is that physical 
connectivity (copper wires) is unnecessary for mobile communications. Mobile 
networks operate in a wireless mode where the transmission of information is by use 
of radio frequencies.138 Mobile network is linked to the Global System for Mobile 
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Communication (GSM) in the early 1990s.139 The GSM project started in 1982, 
intending to achieve a European digital mobile network capable of handling 
international roaming.140 It was a very successful project. For example, by 1997, 98 
percent of the European population could be reachable.141 GSM was later known as 
the second-generation network (2G) and was adopted as a standard system for world 
mobile communications.142 Development of other network generations, which is from 
3G to 5G, stands on the GSM system.143  
The unique feature of a mobile network is that each mobile device connected to the 
network can identify another connected device. The architecture of the mobile 
network, in a simple form, consists of a Mobile Station (M.S.), Base Station (B.S.), 
and Core Network (C.N.).144 The Mobile Station (M.S.), also known as User 
Equipment (U.E.), is a user device that contains terminal equipment and the 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM).145 The most common M.S. is a mobile phone. The 
BS is a piece of equipment (generally hosted in a tower) that facilitates a connection 
between the U.E. and the C.N. The C.N. provides, among others, connectivity 
between different user equipment.146 Each geographical area served by a single B.S. is 
known as a cell and provides connectivity to all M.S. in the area.147 
2.2.5 The Internet 
The internet is a constellation of many networks in the world. It is a network of 
networks.148 With the internet, “millions of computers connected via cables and radio 
waves.”149 Each network has a unique form of switching designed to handle data using 
a standard way of packing and addressing data known as the internet Protocol 
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(I.P.).150 Started in 1969 as a project (ARPANET-Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network) of the Department of Defense of the United States of America, the internet 
has become a network of networks where each connected device can communicate 
with another connected device in the world.151  
At the center of the internet is an enhanced global flow of information.152 The internet 
has not only revolutionized the communication field but also has affected human 
lives in so many ways, including, for example, new approaches to doing business.153 
The OECD could not put the role of the internet in better terms when it held that, 
“From a practical standpoint, internet openness enables people to do more things 
online: starting a business, creating new services or revolutionizing the provision of 
existing ones, expressing opinions, raising capital, sharing knowledge and ideas, 
conducting research, interacting with government, or improving skills.” 154 
2.2.6 Broadband Internet 
One needs to understand the broadband internet in terms of speed and functionality 
of internet service. The primary factor is the speed at which data can transfer from 
one device to another.155 To some low-end countries, an internet qualifies as 
broadband if the download speed is not below 256Kbps.156 In high-end countries, 
Canada, for example, broadband internet should have at least a download speed of 
1.5Mbits/s.157 From a rather technical perspective, broadband can be defined as a 
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“type of telecommunication that supplies multiple channels of data in a single 
communications platform using some form of wave or frequency division 
multiplexing. In other words, broadband refers to telecommunication in which a 
wide band of frequencies is available to transmit data.”158  
Broadband internet can either be fixed or wireless. Broadband access is possible 
through several channels. It can be through the use of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 
in which data are transmitted over traditional telephone copper wires, by use of 
Coaxial Cables, by Community Access Cable Television (Cable T.V.), by use of Fiber 
Optics Cables or by use of Wireless Radio Frequencies.159 Because of the convergence 
of communication services, broadband internet is now an integral part of telephone 
communication, as the following sub-sections show. Indeed, one author even argues 
that the future of telecommunication rests on this technology.160  
2.2.7 Internet Telephony 
Initially, the internet was dedicated to data services like it was telephoning to voice 
services. Technological improvements on the internet, however, saw a diminishing of 
differences between the two. In 1995, Jim Clark, the then President of Netscape 
Communications Corporation, stated that 
“in my mind, the internet is nothing but a data communications equivalent to the 
telephone system. In other words, the Internet system is for data what the telephone 
is for voice. Now, obviously, when you digitize voice, it becomes data, so ultimately, 
the internet subsumes voice, and I think over the longer-term voice communication 
will be just about as commonplace on the internet as it is over the real-time 
telephone system.”161 
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Today, it is possible to call over the internet, a concept known as internet telephony 
or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).162 The VoIP is the “routing of voice 
communications through the internet or any other internet protocol (I.P.)-based 
networks.”163 With VoIP, 
“the user’s voice is converted from an analogue form into a digital signal, 
compressed (or uncompressed), and is then broken down into a series of 
packets (packetization). These packets are routed through public or private IP 
networks—from one user to another—and are reassembled and decoded (if 
compressed) at the receiving end.”164 
The VoIP allows calling without necessarily using a conventional telephone. Examples 
of popular VoIP services include WhatsApp, Skype, Facebook Messenger, and Viber, 
to mention but a few.  
2.3 The Birth of the Modern Telecommunication Sector  
We have seen in the introduction section how the invention of the telephone 
happened. Developments that followed after that invention are unparalleled. They 
established a foundation for the modern telecommunication sector as understood in 
the 21st century. For example, Bell incorporated Bell Telephone Company (1877) and 
later on, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company [(AT&T) 1885].165 AT&T 
later monopolized the US telephony market for almost a century.166 Developments in 
the US spread to other parts of the world. For example, in Germany, Werner Siemens 
and Emil Rathenau, in improving the telegraph through Bell’s devices, saw the 
establishment of the Reichspost. The Reichpost was the national postal authority of the 
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then Imperial German.167 It later became the Deutsche Bundespost and, finally, 
Deutsche Telekom, one of the biggest telecommunications companies in present-day 
Europe.168 Elsewhere, other more prominent firms developed, including, for example, 
the UK’s Vodafone, Telefoníca of Spain, and Orange of France.169 
In summary, the telecommunications sector went through the following stages:  
1. Firstly, after discovering the telephone and forming new companies (primarily 
government-owned), many governments restricted competition to protect such 
companies.170 The theory of natural monopoly developed as a justification for 
such protective measures.171 Monopoly dominated the sector’s liberalization, 
starting with the US in the first half of the 20th century and Europe in the 
1980s.172  
2. Secondly, due to restricted competition, national monopolies gained almost 
absolute powers in their respective markets.173 Consumers had no choice of 
goods or services. The national monopolies became price makers. Thus, 
governments had to intervene to protect broader interests, including those of 
consumers. The intervention is known as regulation.174  
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3. Thirdly, technological developments such as the arrival of mobile telephony in 
the sector invalidated the relevance of natural monopolies. It became evident 
that such justification would not continue to hold water in support of 
monopolies. Furthermore, inherent failures of monopolies to deliver what is 
expected from consumers paved the way to competition policy.175 Thus, from the 
1980s, many countries started to break telecommunications monopolies through 
privatization and competition (also known as liberalization).176 
4. Fourthly, the convergence of communication services means that now 
telecommunication is just part of a broader communication ecosystem.177 With 
the convergence of communications services, which has been facilitated 
explicitly by the broadband internet, the telecommunications sector has grown 
beyond voice services. It includes data and content services that a single 
provider can offer through a single channel.178  
Today, as we are about to close the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the world 
testifies to unprecedented telecommunications developments.179 Such developments, 
with unmatched velocity, have seen a revolutionary growth of communications 
services. In terms of access, for example, there were over 1.1 billion subscriptions to 
fixed telephones and over 7.7 billion mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions as of 
2018.180 Over 50 percent of the global population had access to the internet.181 Two 
years later, in 2020, world mobile phone subscriptions stood at 105 per 100 
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inhabitants.182 Fixed connections, however, remain on the lower side at 15 
connections per 100 inhabitants. 
Regarding internet connectivity, 2020 saw access to a 4G network standing at 95% of 
the entire population in urban areas and 71% in rural areas.183 These figures represent 
the world average. Regional variations exist, especially between developing and 
developed countries.184 
The telecommunications sector is now expanding from connecting people to 
connecting devices (internet of things-IoT).185 For example, the development of smart 
homes allows a communication network to connect with different home devices and 
appliances so that one can access or control such devices remotely.186 Smart cities, 
another modern development in the communication industry, allow the integration of 
ICT to provide public services, improve participation and governance.187 These 
developments show how far the telecommunications sector is willing to go. In short, 
what has happened in the telecommunications sector is electrifying. It is now a broad 
communication ecosystem that is nothing but a necessity to human life.188  
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2.4 Material Features of the Telecommunications Sector in the 21st Century  
This sub-section presents a few features of the telecommunications sector as it stands 
today, in the first quarter of the 21st century.  
2.4.1 Liberalization is the New Normal  
So far, this research has shown that monopolies in telecommunications were the 
acceptable choice for organizing the sector until the early 1980s. Governments of the 
day deliberately protected national monopolies by foreclosing competition.189 Only the 
US had started to liberalize its telecommunications sector as early as 1947, climaxing 
in 1996 after passing the Telecommunications Act.190 Most of the European countries 
waited until 1987, when liberalization took shape under the European Commission 
framework.191 In Africa, liberalization was, instead, a slow process.192 Most of the 
liberalization reforms took place in the middle and late 1990s.193  
At the heart of liberalization are efforts to relax regulatory rules in favor of the 
market economy.194 In principle, liberalization demands pro-competitive regulatory 
rules.195 The result of this process is to have competition replacing monopolies.196 One 
must note that liberalization is a continuous process. For example, one study showed 
that as of 2014, there were incumbent firms with monopoly powers in 31 countries in 
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Africa.197 In 2020, other countries like Ethiopia are still in the early stages of 
liberalizing their telecommunications services by breaking through their national 
mobile monopoly.198 
2.4.2 Increased Access to Communication Services  
The world today witnesses a significant increase in access to communication services. 
The increase is both in terms of users and available services. The general trend is an 
increase in subscriptions to mobile networks while subscriptions to a fixed network 
decrease. Several factors account for this trend, key ones being flexibility and the 
groundbreaking technology associated with mobile networks. For example, today, a 
cellular mobile phone performs beyond the standard voice services. Beyond voice 
services, a mobile phone is now a television, a radio, a computer, a GPS device, a 
camera, and a storage device. With the help of millions of applications in applications 
stores, it is a device that can be turned into (almost) anything.199 
At first, communication services were seen only as a luxury for the few.200 Current 
statistics, however, suggest that access to such services has gained universal 
significance. For example, whereas in 2005, there were only 2.2 billion connections to 
mobile telephony, the end of 2018 recorded over 8.1 billion connections.201 The trend 
is the same for internet access, even though there is a significant variation in different 
world regions. For example, even though there is a considerable improvement now 
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compared to the early 1990s, Africa still has the lowest penetration of telephone 
services in the world. In 1994, Africa accounted for only 2% of the world 
telecommunications. The penetration rate was only 1.5 lines per 100 inhabitants 
compared to 65 and 47 per 100 inhabitants in the US and OECD countries.202 Today, 
while the world average records over 100% penetration rate, Africa records stand at 
76%. The penetration rate in sub-Saharan Africa remains the lowest, with only 45% 
of the entire population connected to telecommunications services.203  
The presented data in the preceding paragraph sends a clear message on the 
relevance of telecommunications. Telecommunications services now form an integral 
part of human life. More importantly, they are becoming increasingly crucial in many 
countries’ development agendas. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the 
telecommunications sector is one of those sectors receiving much attention from 
authorities, even after its liberalization. One such attention is regulation, which is at 
the center of this research.  
2.4.3 Enhanced Role of Broadband Internet  
Apart from the increased access to telephone services, there is also an increase in 
demand for broadband internet for, among others, communication purposes.204 
Current trends and developments have made the broadband internet part and parcel 
of communication services as its role in the economy has become ubiquitous.205 
Furthermore, the needs increase as broadband internet becomes pivotal for the 
delivery of communication services. Such needs include service delivery via internet 
protocol, such as online content and voice services (Voice over IP). Other needs that 
surge demand for broadband internet include increased use and reliance on mobile 
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applications (apps),206 considerable developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI),207 and 
increased preference for smart living such as smart cities208 and smart homes.209  
These new trends push governments to set better policies for enhanced broadband 
services.210 They also pressure providers of telecommunications services to concentrate 
on the provision of even faster broadband internet.211 There are already movements to 
recognize the right to the internet (and broadband internet) as one of the 
fundamental rights.212 The argument here is that the internet provides a vital link to 
all other fundamental rights.213 
2.4.4 The convergence of Communication Services 
Slightly over ten years ago, in 2008, OECD Ministers met in Seoul, South Korea.214 
They deliberated on the “Future of the Internet Economy.”215 At that time, not much of 
the impact of communication convergence was ubiquitous.216 However, they 
anticipated what such convergence could do. Thus, they declared to “facilitate the 
convergence of digital networks, devices, applications, and services.”217 Their 
declaration was not in vain. Eight years later, the OECD boldly acknowledged that 
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“the digital convergence anticipated during the 2008 Seoul Ministerial has become a 
reality.”218  
So, what is the convergence of communication services? Historically, communications 
services were delivered via single-purpose dedicated networks.219 Each service needed 
a different technology and, therefore, different transmission channels together with 
delivering devices.220 There was a boundary between information technology (I.T.) 
and Communication Technology (C.T.).221 With the convergence of I.T. and C.T., the 
walls no longer exist. Thus, convergence is “the ability to bring together classical 
telecommunication services, internet, computing, and broadcasting into one.”222 Under 
the converged services, one can access telephone, broadcasting, internet services 
using the same device or channel.223 
Thus, the convergence of communication services, which is perhaps the most recent 
development in the sector, has revolutionized and improved the way things operate. 
The effects of such convergence are ubiquitous. They range from simplifying the 
availability of services to consumers to the rise of technological disruptors (discussed 
in the next section). There is also a need to change or improve regulatory 
perspectives. For consumers, however, convergence is a blessing. Just one channel, 
such as a personal computer, is sufficient to deliver ICT services.  
More effects of the convergence are perhaps evident to service providers. To them, 
convergence means the need to streamline their services to meet new consumers’ 
demands. Of course, venturing into new and sophisticated technologies and raising 
new investments become inevitable. Also, such convergence brings about new 
dimensions in the state of competition as new markets develop.  
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For governments, unique challenges arise on how to address the converged sector. 
Indeed, the legal framework, which was tailored in the old PSTN, would not suffice. A 
new focus on the converged and digitalized services becomes inevitable. All that can 
be said is that convergence has brought about a unique architecture, affecting almost 
every stakeholder in communications. 
2.4.5 The emergence of Technological Disruptors 
Due to the convergence of technology, there is an emergence of ‘technological 
disruptors.’224 Technological disruptors come from disruptive technology, meaning a 
new invention that alters consumers’, industries,’ and businesses’ long-term 
perspectives, approaches, and preferences.225 Technological disruption renders those 
businesses and services that were considered superior and standard irrelevant. As for 
the telecommunications sector, disruptors, for example, those offering VoIP services 
such as WhatsApp and Microsoft or those like Netflix and Amazon that use telecom 
infrastructure, are already challenging telecommunications firms’ traditional voice 
and messaging services.226 This calls for the review of the legal and regulatory 
frameworks to address these new dimensions adequately.  
2.4.6 Changing of Telecommunications Firms’ Business Model 
Telecommunications firms are now ‘forced’ to change their business models to 
mitigate the effects of convergence and technological disruptions. The move includes 
venturing into new territories such as content services. For example, British Telecom 
has already launched BT TV and BT Sports.227  It offers a bundled television (TV) and 
fiber broadband package.228 In the US, AT&T acquired DirecTV, making AT&T the 
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largest provider of TV subscriptions in the USA.229 It moved to acquire Time Warner (a 
media giant owning CNN and entertainment channels such as HBO) successfully in 
2018 despite fierce opposition from the US Department of Justice.230 Apart from Time 
Warner, Comcast, one of the US telecommunications conglomerates, has already 
deepened itself in media. Just recently, it has acquired Sky, one of the UK’s media 
giants.231 Several other telecommunications giants such as Deutsche Telekom, 
Telefónica, MTN, and Verizon have already changed their business model to address 
these new sector patterns.  
Because of these developments brought by the convergence, there is a change in 
understanding telecommunications markets. In order to carry out market analysis for 
competition purposes, telecommunications services must not be understood in 
isolation but in a more comprehensive package of converged services.232 These 
changes also call for a review of regulatory regimes. There will be a need to review 
the regulatory mandate and institutional capacity to ensure that the regulatory 
framework is modernized to accommodate these changes.233 
2.5 Economics of Telecommunications Sector  
Unlike other economic sectors, the telecommunications sector has peculiar economic 
features. Through these features, one understands why many governments had 
decided to monopolize telecommunications. They also shed light on how 
liberalization took place. It is through these features that one can also better 
understand regulation and competition. This section, therefore, briefly discusses the 
key features of the telecommunications sector.   
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2.5.1 Network Structure and its Monopolistic Effects  
This chapter has shown that telecommunication has been considered a network 
industry similar to a tree and its branches.234 That being the case, not every interested 
person could establish a network segment (at least not in the traditional setup of a 
telephone network). As a result, it became economically and practically feasible and 
efficient for just one or a few firms to run such networks. The telecommunications 
network structure is crucial in understanding the place of competition. At first, 
especially before the introduction of mobile networks, this structure called for 
monopolies. As already presented, the concept of natural monopoly developed to 
justify only one firm to operate in the sector.235   
Today, the network concept is still applicable in the sector, especially when 
considered in terms of network effects (as discussed in the next section). However, 
there is consensus that the sector is no longer a natural monopoly, although 
monopoly may continue to exist in some parts of it.236 Many countries now have more 
than one telecommunications provider, proving that telecom firms can co-exist to 
bring additional competitive benefits to consumers. Thus, even though the sector is 
still a network one, technological innovations have made it possible for many firms to 
compete. What is required is for policymakers to create a supportive environment for 
these players. 
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2.5.2 Network Effects  
The network effects theory is an economic theory that argues that the value of goods 
or services depends on the number of users.237 Consumers seek compatibility with 
other users to interact or trade with them or enjoy similar complements in such a 
situation.238 In other words, as Farrell and Klemperer argue, network effects exist “if 
one agent’s adoption of a good (a) benefits other adopters of the good (a ‘total effect’) 
and (b) increases others’ incentives to adopt it (a ‘marginal effect’).”239  
Telecommunications is one of the sectors with pronounced network effects where a 
network’s value increases with subscribers.240 With these effects, a service provider 
with many subscribers will likely attract more customers because each new customer 
wants to join such a network.241 As a result, network effects give such providers 
economies of scale and scope and hence, a competitive advantage.242 In other words, 
network effects may increase the market shares of an already dominant firm in the 
market. Such an increase in shares and dominance is, in itself, not a problem. 
However, it provides a door for abuse. At this point, rules of regulation and 
competition must come to play to tame firms benefiting from network effect against 
possible abuse of their dominance.  
2.5.3 Natural Monopoly 
Connected with the two preceding concepts is the natural monopoly theory. Natural 
monopoly happens when only one firm becomes efficient to satisfy the market 
demand either because of economies of scale or substantial start-up costs. Richard 
Posner defines natural monopoly by arguing that “if the entire demand within a 
relevant market can be satisfied at the lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or 
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more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of firms in it.”243 
Expanding on the market, Gruzman holds,  
“if one firm has lower costs than any other firm or combination of firms in producing 
a good or service at the full level of market demand, then the industry, operating in 
a free market, will become a monopoly because the one firm can always profitably 
underprice entrants and drive them out of business.”244 
Based on these definitions, services provided under public utilities such as water, gas, 
electricity have been considered natural monopolies. This has also been true for 
telecommunications and public transportation.245  
The relevance of natural monopoly in telecommunications is that it helps to 
understand the monopolistic history of the sector. As already provided in the chapter, 
the telecommunications sector once possessed features of a natural monopoly. This 
was the main reason why the competition was suppressed. Explaining the 
justifications, Posner argues that  
“if such a market contains more than one firm, either the firms will quickly 
shakedown to one through mergers or failures, or production will continue to 
consume more resources than necessary. In the first case, competition is short-lived, 
and in the second, it produces inefficient results. Competition is thus not a viable 
regulatory mechanism under conditions of natural monopoly.” 
However, natural monopolies are hardly a case in the telecommunications sector 
today. The coming of mobile services has made the theory redundant. However, for 
those parts of the sector where natural monopoly may continue to exist, the theory 
helps one to understand regulatory actions taken instead of adopting competition 
rules. 
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2.5.4 Huge Investments Costs  
It is undisputed that the establishment and running of telecommunications are very 
costly.246 Investment costs are sunk as they are all needed once at the beginning of the 
network rolling. As a result, entry becomes difficult for relatively new and small 
firms.247 As for those already in the market, the question of recouping investment costs 
becomes overriding. Thus, it is not surprising that some of them adopt uncompetitive 
measures such as high prices, predatory prices, or collusive practices. The intention is 
to foreclose competition in order to recover investment costs quickly. Thus, it follows 
that rules to ensure fair competition are necessary to ensure that the desire to recover 
investment costs does not lead to anti-competitive practices.   
2.5.5 Economies of Scope and Scale 
There is sufficient literature to indicate that economies of scale and scope apply 
significantly in the telecommunications industry.248 On the one hand, economies of 
scale mean that a firm will reduce production costs if the production of goods 
increases.249  Simply put, the costs of producing goods or services sink as production 
increases. If translated in the telecommunications context, operating costs decrease as 
many people join the network. On the other hand, economies of scope mean that 
producing or offering two or more products is cheaper than if each item is produced 
or offered separately.250 Thus, it is more profitable for telecommunications firms to 
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offer bundled services, such as expanding their product range rather than dealing 
with a single product. The economies of scope would quickly justify why telecom 
firms are ever-expanding the scope of their services and prefer to offer them bundled.  
In the context of liberalization, economies of scale and scope can no longer be 
considered as a critical factor to support monopolies. However, as long as they 
continue to exist in the sector (or part thereof), they give firms with significant 
market powers an added competitive advantage, for example, by being an entry 
barrier to new firms.251 Such barriers are prominent if the sector has elements that 
may affect free competition. Such elements may include, for example, tying and 
bundling, exclusive dealing, high switching costs, geographical dominance, and 
considerable investments in research or advertising costs.252 In the absence of pro-
competition policies, economies of scope and scale may seriously impair competition 
in the sector.  
2.5.6 Locking-in Effects 
Literature shows that locking-in effects are apparent in the sector and may, at times, 
have anti-competitive effects.253 Locking-in happens when switching is either too 
costly or complicated. As a result, customers are ‘forced’ to remain with the same 
network.254 Switching costs may result from many factors, some of them being 
complicated contractual terms or long-term contracts.255 Such costs may also come 
from market practices such as locked sim cards, mobile phones, or other 
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telecommunications equipment, inability to retain sim-card numbers after switching, 
and many more.256  
Switching often comes with financial repercussions. For example, one study 
quantified switching costs from France Telekom to Cegetel to around 420 Euros.257 
Apart from financial costs, switching costs may also extend to procedural and 
relational costs.258 They may include “compatibility, transaction, learning, uncertainty, 
contractual (or discount coupons), and search costs.”259 
Even though policy trends now shift towards simplifying the switching process, 
complications still abound.260 For example, there are still complications in switching 
processes such as long and cumbersome switching procedures, early exist charges, 
non-transparent charges, technical inoperability, or long-term deals that make 
switching expensive.261  
The locking-in effects extend beyond inconveniences and losses that customers 
experience. It is a significant blow to new firms trying to enter new markets or 
relatively young firms that seek to expand after a successful entry. In both cases, 
efforts to secure new customers may not pay off quickly because potential customers 
are already locked elsewhere. It is not difficult to see that in the absence of pro-
competitive regulation, locking-in may also be a source creating or strengthening 
dominance and hence, affect competition in the sector.262 As some authors have put it 
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correctly, switching costs “usually increase firms’ profits, deter entry, and make the 
market less competitive.”263  
2.6 Theoretical Aspects of Telecommunication Regulation  
Until now, this chapter has introduced telecommunications. It has traced the 
invention of the mobile phone and the development of telecommunications as a 
sector. It has also shown key features that identify with the sector. This section 
presents regulation as a theory and its justification.  
2.6.1 Understanding Regulation  
Scholarly attempts to define regulation have not found consensus. The evidence of 
this argument lies in the manner several authors define the concept. It has been 
described as a “multifaceted notion,”264 a “slippery concept,”265 an “old battleground of 
ideas,”266 or a “highly contested concept.”267 The term has been defined in “myriad 
ways”268 and has “acquired a bewildering variety of meanings.”269 Some argue that it is 
difficult “to obtain a holistic sense of its contours and the nature of its terrain.”270 
Thus, it remains “notoriously difficult to define with clarity and precision, as its 
meaning and the scope of its inquiry are unsettled and contested.”271  
Mariateresa Maggiolino argues that “only a cubist rendition would be capable of 
showing on a single plane what current economic regulation is – a kaleidoscopic 
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object whose many facets result from more than thirty years of continuous theoretical 
and practical changes.”272 Variations and difficulties in defining regulation result from 
it being a multidisciplinary concept and hence, capable of multiple expressions.273  
Nevertheless, this study confines regulation within specified limits. As prominent 
authors of regulation have once argued, a “field of study that does not know its 
boundaries could be accused of youthful empire-building or unimaginative 
scholarship: if regulation is everything, then it is nothing.”274 In short, in a broader 
approach, regulation entails various forms of governmental control of public and 
private actions, especially what they may do and, to some extent, how they can do 
it.275 It includes ways in which governments affect private life through various 
instruments such as specific sets of commands (binding rules), deliberate influence, 
and all forms of socio-economic influence. The result of regulation is to restrict some 
unwanted behaviors and to prevent the occurrence of unwanted results.276 Thus, 
anything, which controls what and how to conduct specific activities may fall into 
regulation.277  
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However, in this study, the focus lies on the narrow approach to regulation, otherwise 
known as economic regulation.278 This kind of regulation deals with governmental 
control of economic activities. Economic regulation, it has been argued, is “an integral 
– vital, even – component of all developed economies, and, usually to an even greater 
extent, of developing markets.”279 It is a “state-imposed, positive, coercive alteration of 
or derogation from the operation of the free market in a sector, typically undertaken 
to correct market defects of an economic rather than social nature.”280  
Economic regulation addresses market failures by either creating markets or 
correcting them. The preferred tools of economic regulation may include controls on 
entry, prices, or even production.281 Economic regulation may also extend to the 
control of technology, marketing, and advertisement.282 In telecommunications, 
regulation concerns governments’ intervention in the sectoral operations, for 
example, by dictating conditions on entry, output, quality of service, competition, or 
consumer protection.283 
2.6.2 Justifications for Regulation  
What this chapter has shown so far is that the telecommunications sector is a 
changing industry. The nature of technology and the types of services offered have 
been changing over time. These changes question the relevance of various policies 
adopted in the sector. One of them, which is at the center of this study, is the extent 
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of regulation. What factors justify regulation even after liberalization has taken place? 
This section attempts to answer the question. One would notice that the rationale 
spans beyond traditional justifications of market failure to other policy 
considerations.  
2.6.2.1 Telecommunications Economics 
This study has shown in Section 2.4 that telecommunications economics can easily 
create dominant firms. If left unchecked, the potential for foreclosing competition, for 
example, through elevated entry barriers, is imminent. Thus, it is not difficult to see 
that it is telecommunication economics that calls for regulation. Given the sector’s 
economic features, the markets’ failures are likely to happen in the total absence of 
governments’ intervention.284  
Traditionally, the (then) presence of natural monopoly and network effects were 
cited to justify regulation.285 The argument here, as already presented, is that because 
of natural monopolies and network effects, markets are “extremely fragile and apt to 
operate very efficiently if left alone,”286 and, therefore, “governments are benign and 
capable of correcting these market failures through regulation.”287 In other words, it is 
in the public’s interests for governments to intervene to rectify those failures.288 Thus, 
governments regulate telecommunications to correct “imperfect competition, 
incorrect market operation, missing markets, and undesirable markets.”289  
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Even though public interests gained prominence, criticisms abound. Andrei Shleifer, 
for example, advances the criticisms on the theory in the following words;  
“first, markets and private orderings can take care of most market failures without 
any government intervention at all, let alone regulation. Second, in the few cases 
where markets might not work perfectly, private litigation can address whatever 
conflicts market participants might have. And third, even if markets and courts 
cannot solve all problems perfectly, government regulators are incompetent, corrupt, 
and captured, so regulation would make things even worse.”290  
From the above quote, we learn that Shleifer dismisses public interests as a 
justification for regulation. His view is that markets alone can correct such failures 
without any government interference. Daniel Carpenter, on his side, considers the 
theory as a “fictional straw man.”291 He argues that there is no such thing as a public 
interest regulation theory. If anything, Daniel continues to argue, “it has been 
synthesized much more clearly in the writings of its opponents than by any who 
would call themselves public interest scholars of regulation.”292 Further, he holds, the 
theory is “a normative portrait of what regulation ought to look like, but since it lacks 
an account of how regulatory politics might create regulation, it is woefully 
incomplete.”293 If anything, concludes Carpenter, the theory commits a form of 
“theoretical naivete.”294  
Despite these criticisms of the concept that Jane Johnstone calls “contentious,” 
“ambiguous,” and “slippery,”295 the theory helps understand why governments may 
find it necessary to regulate a specific sector of the economy. Put differently, the 
theory suggests that if it becomes necessary to regulate, then it must be for the direct 
benefit of the entire public, which can be seen in various forms such as improved 
consumer welfare through decreased prices and increased innovation.  
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Apart from traditional justifications, other economic features may also justify 
regulation. For example, the locking-in effects demand legal oversight to ensure a 
smooth transition from one firm to another. Similarly, economies of scale and scope 
may demand a regulatory eye to see that the resulting market powers are not abused. 
Thus, it is telecommunications economics that calls for minimal regulation to 
facilitate effective market functioning.  
2.6.2.2 Facilitation of Competition  
We have seen monopolies were once a preferred model of industrial organization in 
telecommunications. However, when the liberalization wind swept in, sector-specific 
regulation became a fitting precursor to introducing competition.296 Sector regulation 
was necessary to introduce competition in a once monopolized sector. However, a 
word of caution is needed here. Regulation is highly appreciated only when it 
performs transitional roles, helping the sector’s transformation from monopoly to 
competition.297 This role is necessary to ensure orderly evolution to competition 
through appropriate structures, infrastructures, and certainty of procedures.298  
Therefore, regulation becomes necessary only to the extent discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, for example, to set rules for entry, interoperability, and availability of 
communication resources. After achieving competition, the role of regulation 
dwindles only to the extent necessitated by natural market structures. At this stage, 
“soft regulation” or “competition-based regulation,” which means limited state 
interference as long as competition exists, is desirable.299  
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In other words, there is no need to impose regulations on markets where competition 
is working. However, if parts of the markets have monopolistic trends or have other 
trends that make it difficult for competition rules to apply ex-ante, regulation may 
continue to exist. The determinant factor here should be pro-competitive regulation, 
i.e., a regulation that mimics markets operations as far as possible. 
2.6.2.3 Technical Necessity  
Even after full liberalization of the telecommunications sector, the sector’s inherent 
nature may still necessitate regulation. For instance, technical questions like 
interconnection, access, or spectrum rights availability might need ex-ante 
regulatory.300 Further, as telecommunications move to IP-based services (packet 
switching), regulation becomes even highly important to regulate the interaction 
between traditional circuiting switching and IP-based services.301 Also, regulation may 
be necessary to ensure the quality of service and safety of communication systems 
and equipment.302 Furthermore, it may be necessary to regulate the sector’s converged 
aspects to avoid any possible failures.303  
Of all justifications discussed in this section, this study opines that technical 
regulation is the most crucial. Such regulation sets the necessary conditions and 
environment for meaningful competition. For example, let us think of spectrum rights 
that are at the core of wireless communication. There will be a complete foreclosure 
of competition if relevant authorities monopolize them. As presented in the latter 
parts of this work, the spectrum is also a scarce resource, meaning it demands 
effective management for optimal results. The practical approach is to have a 
manager, a regulator, whose role is to ensure equitable availability. The ex-post rules 
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of competition alone cannot address this question. The same argument is also valid 
regarding access and interconnection, or other technical questions, for example. 
2.6.2.4 Rapid Technological Advancement and Consumer Protection 
This chapter has already shown that telecommunication is constantly changing. One 
of the facilitating factors is rapid technological advancement. New products that are 
rolled out in the market regularly would demand rational consumers to make rational 
decisions.304 However, this is not always the case. Consumers are not always rational 
and may fall victim to big firms’ marketing tricks, including powerful branding and 
advertisements resulting from strong financial muscles.305 They need protection.306  
At this point, sector regulation comes in as a neutral umpire to protect the welfare of 
consumers.307 However, there is a caveat that we must observe here. Such regulation 
must only address effects that cannot be corrected by market forces and rules of 
competition. In other words, as this study has consistently put it so far, only pro-
competitive regulation can address consumers’ concerns in the age of rapid 
technological advancement. For example, such measures may include rules on 
comprehensive consumer education and awareness programs, addressing consumer 
complaints, quality of goods and services, and protecting consumer rights, among 
many others.  
2.6.2.5 Other Justifications 
Many other justifications for regulation may exist apart from those already examined 
in this part. For example, regulation may continue for national security reasons.308 It 
may also exist for reasons spanning beyond welfare economics, such as promoting 
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social solidarity, human rights (through universal communication initiatives), 
distributional justice, and environmental considerations.309 Because of expanding 
justifications for regulation, the subject matter of regulation has also expanded 
beyond market failures such that a new terminology known as the regulatory state has 
developed.310  
Regulatory state indicates the increasing governments’ preferences for regulation. For 
example, at one time, the UK had 63 national regulators and 468 local authority 
regulators, hence earning the nickname a “regulatory laboratory.”311 In the US, where 
regulation had already taken prominence as early as the late 1880s, regulation has 
sometimes been referred to as “the fourth branch of government.”312 Similar 
preference to regulation also became prominent in Europe, especially after the 
1970s.313 All this means that it is possible to have many other justifications as 
determined by the jurisdiction in question. 
2.6.3 Regulation and Establishment of [Independent] Sector Regulators  
In regulating the telecommunications sector, the practice shows that many countries 
prefer to establish independent sector regulators.314 Sector regulators are typically 
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sector-specific, majoring in addressing failures in such a sector.315 For example, a 
regulator may intervene through overseeing or setting prices (not encouraged in 
today’s standards), determining acceptable standards on the return of investment, 
setting up product standards, or ensuring the fulfillment of other social objectives.316 
The peculiar feature of sector regulators is that they are separated from central 
government hierarchies. Therefore, while central government departments (mostly 
ministries) remain with policy setting roles, a regulator, which is supposed to have 
some degree of independence, gets actively engaged in the sector's daily regulation.317 
Apart from technical regulation, it is not rare for regulators to promote competition. 
They do so by setting up regulatory standards that promote competition, such as 
entry rules, licensing, tariff regulation, and access.318 Furthermore, depending on the 
jurisdiction in question, regulators may also have direct powers to enforce 
competition laws. In this case, they assume a role usually enjoyed by competition 
authorities. Therefore, sector regulators are critical in the whole regulation agenda. 
Their central role, if summarized, is to translate regulatory rules into tangible results. 
A well-designed regulator, in most cases, will translate into sound and effective 
regulation. 
2.7 Aspects of Competition in the Telecommunications Sector   
Four decades ago, competition law was but a realm of few jurisdictions. Until the 
1980s, only the US and some EU countries had competition legislation.319 From the 
1980s, however, many countries started to adopt competition policies.320 Such 
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changes resulted from several factors. Among others, they include the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (communism) and the signing of the Treaty of European Union in 1992, 
where competition policy has always been considered an integral part or pillar of 
European integration.321 These changes spread to developing countries as competition 
became an integral package of extensive economic reforms.322  
Today, the importance of competition law is ubiquitous. One author has even argued 
that competition is “an economic lubricant.”323 It would follow, the argument goes, 
that “the machine works more efficiently when all the parts move freely.”324 Through 
competition, “we get more output from the same input or the same output with less 
input.”325 Thus, “take away the competition,” and the argument concludes, “it all 
begins to grind together. Eventually, friction brings it to a halt, sometimes a fiery 
one.”326 
Many jurisdictions have now adopted competition policies after understanding their 
overarching importance. Preference for competition comes from understanding that 
competition is vital for economic efficiency (allocative, productive, and distributive 
efficiency), innovation, and overall economic growth and development.327 For 
example, as of 2013, over one hundred and thirty countries had competition laws.328 
Twenty-six of them were from Africa.329 The growth depicts the global understanding 
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of the ever-increasing role of competition in the economy. As one author has put it, 
competition is a “precious public benefit that should be safeguarded” and that any 
attempts to discourage it are likely to cause “greater overall harm than individual 
gain.”330  
This section introduces the concept of competition. It first defines competition and 
proceeds to look briefly at different forms of competition. Included in this discussion 
are definitions of monopoly, perfect competition, oligopoly, and effective competition.  
2.7.1 Defining competition  
In its simple plain meaning, competition indicates a process by which two or more 
parties engage in a contest/rivalry. It is a competition for a particular reward, just as 
two football teams compete for a trophy. Prima facie, this definition appears 
understandable and straightforward. When considered as a legal and technical term, 
however, its meaning gets complicated. A proof of this assertion lies in how several 
authors of competition law define it. Many of such attempts, one author would argue, 
are vague.331 Even after a century and three decades have passed since the passage of 
Sherman’s Act in 1890,332 the first masterpiece of law that laid down rules on 
competition, no consensus exists on its meaning.333 One author, Oliver Black, calls this 
lack of consensus “a scandal of anti-trust.”334  
A panoramic view from several authors reveals that they equate competition to a 
rivalry among economic agents/firms in the market.335 John M Clarks (the pioneer of 
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the workable/effective competition concept) puts it even in better terms. He says that 
competition is, 
“rivalry in selling goods, in which each selling unit normally seeks maximum net 
revenue, under conditions such that the price or prices each seller can charge are 
effectively limited by the free option of the buyer to buy from a rival seller or sellers 
of what we think of as “the same” product, necessitating an effort by each seller to 
equal or exceed the attractiveness of the others’ offerings to a sufficient number of 
sellers to accomplish the end in view.”336 
Some other authors go a step further beyond the rivalry concept. One of them is 
Robert Bork, one of the luminary leaders of the Chicago School of Economics.337 Bork 
argues that competition is a state of affairs where consumers’ welfare cannot be 
increased by moving to an alternative state of affairs through judicial decree.338 To 
Bork, the concept of rivalry is insufficient because it judges illegal any attempt to 
eliminate rivalry.339  
Joana and Albertina define competition as the relationship between several 
undertakings offering the same goods or services to identifiable customers.340 As for 
George Stigler, also one of the leading authors of the Chicago School of Economics, 
competition is the absence of monopoly powers.341 When competition exists in the 
market, argues Niamh Dune of the London School of Economics, a “single seller’s 
sales would plummet if it [the seller] raised its prices above those charged by other 
sellers.”342   
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As for Tanzania, the definition of competition is in S. 5(2) of the Fair Competition 
Act. The Section reads that, 
“Competition means competition in a market in Tanzania and refers to the process 
whereby two or more persons: (a) supply or attempt to supply the same or 
substitutable goods or services to the persons in the same relevant geographical 
market; or (b) acquire or attempt to acquire the same or substitutable goods or 
services from the persons in the same relevant geographical market.” 
The above definition takes a technical approach to define competition in two 
dimensions, the supply-side competition and the demand-side competition. There is 
competition on the supply-side if at least two or more persons supply goods or 
services, including substitutable goods or services, and that supply is in the same 
relevant geographical market. Competition on the demand-side means that at least 
two or more persons demand the same or similar goods or services within the same 
relevant geographical market.  
From these definitions, competition implies some rivalry in the marketplace under the 
following conditions. Firstly, at least two or more providers or suppliers of goods or 
services must exist in the market, i.e., the absence of monopolistic or heavily 
concentrated markets. Secondly, there must be some rivalry vis-à-vis cooperation or 
coordination between providers or suppliers. Price setting, for example, should purely 
result from market operations instead of suppliers’ agreements. Thirdly, the suppliers 
or providers must be operating within the same market limitations. Fourthly, there 
must be sufficient competitive restraints such that consumers may easily and swiftly 
change to another supplier if there is a change in behavior of one firm, say, in cases of 
excessive increase in price.  
2.7.2 Different Forms of Competition  
The competitiveness of markets depends on several factors. Among others, they 
include government policies on the economy, established constitutional and legal 
orders, and the peculiar characteristic of respective markets. For example, 
government licensing policies or patent systems may either consolidate monopolies or 
facilitate entry to promote competition.  Some firms may also grow and tilt the 
competition equilibrium because of sound business plans, suitable investments, and 
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entrepreneurial innovation.343 As a result, several forms of competition develop in 
different markets. This sub-section briefly looks at various forms of competition.  
2.7.2.1 Monopolies in Telecommunications 
A monopoly exists where only one firm offers goods or services without any actual or 
potential competition.344 Such a firm has market control. It is the price maker.345 
Usually, monopolistic markets may result from several factors, such as entry barriers 
or natural market conditions.346 Monopolies may also result from government support. 
Milton Friedmann argues such government support to be the most important source 
of monopoly.347 Through government support and interventions, protection policies in 
the form of licensing, patents, tariff setting, tax legislation, or other restrictions of 
production inputs result in monopolies.348 Monopolies may also develop due to 
economies of scale and scope.349 Telecommunication is one of the sectors, which 
developed into monopolies in many parts of the world.350  
2.7.2.2 Perfect Competition in Telecommunications 
Perfect competition is an extreme opposite of a monopoly. It provides a benchmark to 
understand competition better. 351  Some features of perfect competition include many 
(more than one) buyers and sellers with homogeneous products or services.352 
Further,  both service providers and consumers should have perfect information on 
market operations. Also, there should be no entry or exit barriers, which means firms 
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can enter and exit markets as freely as they desire.353 Moreover, there is a question of 
transaction costs and externalities, which ought to be absent.354 It is also important to 
note that in such a market, suppliers and consumers must act independently to 
maximize individual profits and utility, respectively.355 Summarized by McKenzie and 
Lee, a market with perfect competition market has the following features:  
 “(1) numerous producers are in the market; (2) all producers produce the same 
product, meaning all producers’ products are identical in all regards; (3) the cost of 
entry into and exit from the market is zero; (4) the cost of information about the 
prices and products, both current and future, is also zero to both producers and 
consumers, which implies that everyone in the market is perfectly informed; and (5) 
no costs and benefits can be externalized to parties not involved in the market 
transactions.” 356 
Obviously, with perfect competition, sellers cannot control prices to the disservice of 
consumers.357 There cannot be an abuse of dominance since no one is dominant. 
Ultimately, it is the consumer who stands to benefit more. As Whish and Bailey sum it 
up, the benefits of perfect competition include “lower prices, better products, wider 
choice, and greater efficiency than would be obtained under conditions of 
monopoly.”358  
Perfect competition, however, does not exist.359 Some authors have even argued it to 
be an invalid concept.360 Any argument purporting to prove the existence of perfect 
competition, argues one economist, is similar to one trying to prove that a fish can 
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fly.361 In other words, the principal argument here is that it is impossible to have such 
a market, even though the idea remains valuable in understanding competition.362 The 
same is also true for the telecom sector, both in Tanzania and other jurisdictions. 
Being a sector with peculiar economic features and characterized by information 
asymmetries, it is far from displaying perfect competition. In many cases, as the next 
subsections show, oligopoly is the main identifying feature of the industry. 
2.7.2.3 Oligopolies in Telecommunications 
Oligopoly originates from two Greek words oligos (few) and polein (to sell), meaning 
a market structure with few firms in competition.363 Exactly how many firms are few is 
not absolute, although some argue that in such markets, there are always a handful of 
competitors, usually between two and eight.364 Others suggest that oligopoly exists if 
the top five leading firms control at least 60 percent of the market shares or sales.365 
What is clear is that with oligopoly, there is a concentration of market powers to a 
few firms. As a result of this structure, firms end up being highly interdependent.366 
For example, a change in one firm’s output affects another firm’s profit.367 This 
relationship compels other firms to change their outputs as well.368 Thus, it is not 
surprising to learn that oligopoly is a breeding ground for collusive practices.369 Entry 
barriers also characterize oligopolistic markets, resulting from incumbent firms’ 
behaviors or other extraneous factors such as government policies.370 In many parts of 
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the world, including Tanzania, the telecommunication sector appears to be 
oligopolistic.371  
2.7.2.4 Effective Competition in Telecommunications 
The concept of ‘effective competition’ surfaces a lot in many competition laws and 
legal texts. Indeed, the promotion of effective competition has been defined as the 
main objective of competition law.372 For example, the reading of the EU Merger 
Control Regulation reveals that its key objective is to promote effective competition in 
the EU internal market.373 In Tanzania, S. 5(a) of the TCRA Act directs the TCRA to 
“promote effective competition.”  
Despite promoting effective competition being considered the main objective of 
competition policy, little effort has been dedicated to its definition.374 From Whish and 
Bailey, however, we learn that effective competition is a state of the market where 
firms are subjected to “a reasonable degree of competitive constraints, from actual 
and potential competitors and customers, and that the role of a competition authority 
is to see that such constraints are present on the market.”375   
It follows that effective competition is not a specific competition model. It is not the 
means but rather the ends. 376 It is, Stephen Sosnick argues, “an image of a socially 
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desirable state of affairs in an industry or market.”377 To achieve that state of effective 
competition, Sosnick identifies twenty-five flaws that should not exist in the market.378 
Given the identified flaws, effective competition means, among others, the absence of 
abusive and unfair practices, the absence of collusive practices, the presence of 
enough market information, and freedom of choice.379 It is a market structure that 
delivers the best outcomes to the consumers.380  
One may equate effective competition with workable competition, which John Clark 
developed over eighty years ago. Workable competition, Clarks argues, must avoid 
the extreme of perfect competition or monopoly. Somewhere between monopoly and 
perfect competition should the effective competition lie. Technically, this means 
 “when, after the structural characteristics of its market and the dynamic forces that 
shaped them have been thoroughly examined, there is no clearly indicated change 
that can be effected through public policy measures that would result in greater 
social gains than social losses.” 381  
Thus, effective competition, according to Clark, can be measured by examining its 
results. If, in the end, the market yields maximum benefit to consumers, then such 
market has effective competition. Thus, an industry may be oligopolistic, and yet, it 
yields effective competition.382  
2.8 Regulation and Competition: Synergies and Discord  
As a general rule, it is clear that regulation applies to sectors “whose structure is such 
that one would not expect competitive forces to operate without problems.”383 
Telecommunication has been, and in some instances, continues to be, one of those 
sectors. Among others, regulation deals with market failures in these sectors, trying to 
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approximate markets as close to typical functioning competitive markets as possible.384 
Put differently, the ideal regulatory regime ought to mimic a competitive market.385  
On the other hand, competition policy applies to sectors where structural conditions 
allow optimal competition.386 For example, rail transport will have some monopolistic 
characteristics in many countries, hence, calls for regulation. On the contrary, many 
regional land transportations do not have the same characteristics, so they are open 
to competition. Similarly, upstream services in the telecom sector, such as wholesale 
internet services, may call for regulation if there is a monopoly or high concentration. 
However, in the downstream market in which providers offer connectivity to the last 
consumers, competition is already in place in many countries, and therefore, 
regulation is generally unjustified.  
The preceding premise shows that it is possible to have both competition and 
regulation in one sector. The deciding factor on whether regulation or competition or 
both, are necessary depends on the sector’s inherent competitive characteristic. There 
is no reason that regulation and competition rules cannot exist in a sector where 
segments are already competitive while others are under monopoly. Where 
competition is not fully achieved, some studies argue, sector regulation may be the 
best alternative.387 The internet services market, as already pointed before, is a good 
example. 
2.8.1 Similarities and Differences 
From the preceding explanation, both competition and regulation appear to address 
almost similar market problems. In essence, they both “seek to identify conditions in 
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which effective downstream competition can function.”388 On the one hand, sector 
regulation impacts the competitive process by regulating incumbents and other 
service providers’ relationships.389 On the other hand, it “promotes competition as a 
process and urges competitors to innovate and perform efficiently to the ultimate 
benefit of consumers.”390 It would then appear that both sector regulation and 
competition have a similar objective. It is as if, one would rightly argue, that sector 
regulation creates a level playing field upon which competition will swiftly operate.   
A closer examination of the two, however, reveals significant differences. Niamh 
Dunne put it in better terms by asserting that 
“the spheres of application for competition law and regulation are neither entirely 
co-extensive nor mutually exclusive. Certain forms of market failure can be 
addressed effectively only by competition law mechanisms; others can be remedied 
only through regulation; and some market failures are susceptible to both 
competition law and regulatory intervention, albeit the outcome might vary 
depending on the mechanism selected.”391  
What then are the differences between competition law and regulation?  
1. There is a difference in the scope of their application. While competition law is 
of general application,392 sector regulation focuses on specific sectors of the 
economy in which their economic characteristics do not allow the working of 
effective competition.393  
2. The level of expertise required is different. As a general rule, competition law 
enforcement does not require persons with specific knowledge of specific 
industries. Regulation, however, requires persons with specific expertise in the 
sector.394 Expertise is necessary because regulation determines the industry's 
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shape and fate beforehand (on the ex-ante basis). Thus, regulatory actions 
must be carried out based on scientific analysis of peculiar features in the 
industry. This analysis calls for expert intervention.395 
3. Competition and regulation operate on different approaches. Except for 
mergers and acquisitions, competition law operates ex-post by correcting 
markets retrospectively.396 As for regulation, it operates ex-ante by establishing 
structures to normalize markets.397 Ex-ante regulations can predefine the 
sector’s structure and operations.398 
4. Some authors argue that there are low chances of capture in competition 
law.399 This argument stems from the fact that there is no close relationship 
between enforcing authorities and business firms.400 However, the chances of 
capture in regulation are higher because of close relationships between 
regulators and the regulated.401 This kind of “symbiotic relationship” may affect 
the quality of regulatory decisions. Revolving doors concept thus apply in this 
sector, raising doubts on the efficacy of regulation.402 Revolving door refers to 
the movement of high-level employees from the public sector to the private 
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sector and vice versa. The impact of revolving doors is that it creates the 
possibility of lobbying and affects the quality of the public sectors’ decisions. 
For example, the regulators’ employees may favor the regulated sector on the 
expectation of future employment, whether guaranteed or not.403 
5. There is a difference in the permanency of rules. Sector regulation ought to be 
transitional only to pave the way for competition.404 Its role is to ensure “a 
smooth transition towards a regular functioning of competition in the 
market.”405 As for competition rules, there is consensus on their permanency 
nature where they must take precedence when markets are sufficiently 
competitive.406  
2.8.2 Co-Existence of Sector Regulation and Competition Law  
The co-existence of sector regulation and competition law is often approached with 
different perspectives and mixed reactions. For example, some argue that competition 
and regulation are “very close relatives.”407 As would be expected, the argument goes 
on, “the relationships between close relatives can be quite complicated.”408 At times, 
such a relationship is blurred with some complexities.409 Elsewhere, competition is 
said to be a “close ally” of regulation.410 Those sharing this perspective see no possible 
conflict between the two. Be what it may, the relationship between the two is not 
short of exciting debates. One point of concern is the possibility of divergence in 
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objectives and how they address such objectives. Regulation may limit the application 
of competition law411 or may make its application highly complicated.412 
Even though close relatives’ chances of clashes are relatively higher, this study argues 
that it must not always be the case. A clear definition of the relationship and the role 
of each “relative” is what matters. With precise terms and limits, it is possible to have 
both sector regulation and competition work in harmony to achieve the desired 
objective of enhancing functioning markets.413 Such co-existence must respond to 
fundamental changes in the economy, such that the competitive structure of the 
relevant market justifies their co-existence.414 Perhaps Neelie Kroes, the former 
European Commissioner for Competition Policy (2004-2010), summarizes best the 
relationship between the two concepts by holding that, 
“We have to get the front end and the back end of market supervision right. Key to 
that is understanding the limits and roles of regulation and competition law. Our 
experience is that regulation which respects competition principles is the most 
efficient type of regulation. When that regulation succeeds in enabling a competitive 
market, there is less to worry about both for the consumers and for the enforcers of 
competition rules. But even the most perfectly designed regulation will not eliminate 
the risk of abuses, so there will always be a role also for competition enforcement. 
Getting this balance right requires constant dialogue between regulators and 
competition enforcers.”415 
2.9 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has presented concepts necessary to apprehend this study in its entirety. 
Specifically, it has introduced the concepts of telecommunications, regulation, 
competition, and how they interact. However, what is clear is that the sector is 
 
411 Howard A. Shelanski, ‘The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation’, Michigan Law Review, 109.5 
(2011), 683–732; OECD, United States - The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 1998). 
412 Meltem Bagis Akkaya, ‘Competition Law Enforcement in Regulated Markets: When Competition 
Enforcement Clashes with a Regulatory Agency’s Enforcement’ (Turin School of Local Regulation, 2014). 
413 See Chapter 5 of Dunne, Competition Law and Economic Regulation: Making and Managing Markets; 
Timothy Brennan, ‘Regulation and Competition as Complements’, in Obtaining the Best from Regulation and 
Competition, ed. by Michael Crew and Menahem Spiegel, Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy 
Series, 47 (New York, NY: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005), pp. 1–20. 
414 Alexiadis and Cave, pp. 506–7; Hellwig, p. 209. 
415 Kroes, p. 6. 
 
 74  
continuously changing, and so are its policies and corresponding legal frameworks. 
Thus, governments have always been busy understanding these changes and bringing 
them under their policies and legal purview. On this footing, we first see the 
telecommunication sector as a natural monopoly, and later on, as a sector in which 
regulation and competition policies came to play a significant role. These 
developments, of course, result from the sector’s economic features and rapid 
technological developments. Thus, in the preceding view, the telecommunication 
sector must be apprehended as an evolving phenomenon. Laws, policies, and 
regulatory practices must be conscious of this factor and respond accordingly. Only 
then, like the rest of this work demonstrates, would regulatory frameworks bring 
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Chapter 3:  Evolution of Tanzania’s Telecommunications Sector  
Tanzania is undergoing a digital transformation, reflected by the 
growing number of people connected to communications and internet 
services. This is having a profound impact on the country’s social, 
cultural, and economic frameworks, through enhanced access to key 
services and improved productivity and efficiency across economic 
sectors. 416 
3.1 Introduction  
By the time Tanzania adopted its Telecommunication Policy in 1997, four years had 
passed since the start of the liberalization process (further explained in this chapter). 
However, the state of telecommunication service was disappointing. The telephone 
density stood at 0.32 per 100 inhabitants.417 Such average was very well below 
Tanzania’s neighbors, such as Kenya and Southern African Development Cooperation 
(SADC) countries, with an average of 0.92 and 3.4 per 100 inhabitants, 
respectively.418 Compared to other regions of the world, Tanzania fared even worse. 
By then, the telephone density in Asia, Europe, and the world stood at 3.86, 35.36, 
and 10.49 per 100 inhabitants, respectively.419 By any standard, the situation was 
unsatisfactory and unacceptable. Because of this reality, in their full wisdom, 
policymakers envisaged that by 2020, Tanzania would have about six connections for 
every 100 inhabitants.420 
Surprisingly, Tanzania overtook its projection just a few years after the adoption of 
the policy. For example, at the dawn of the new millennium, 1 percent of Tanzanians 
already had access to telephone services.421 The access increased to 10 percent, 50 
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percent, and over 80 percent in 2010, 2015, and 2020.422 These numbers convey one 
fact; that the Tanzania communication sector is rapidly growing. How could all of this 
happen so fast, given the sector’s worse background? The answer comes from 
Tanzania’s shift of policy direction from command to a market economy. Through 
such change, several reforms took place to shape the sector in its present state.  
This chapter discusses the Tanzania telecommunications sector and its evolution. 
Firstly, for a proper contextual understanding, the chapter starts by giving a brief 
historical background. The account is crucial because it reflects on the past 
developments and proceeds to show how their effects extend to the sector at present. 
Secondly, the chapter appreciates that it is impossible to understand the sector 
outside its economic context. Thus, it provides an overview of Tanzania’s economic 
environment. It then proceeds to look at early developments in the sector. Thirdly, 
the chapter looks at reforms in the sector, including the introduction and 
development of sector regulation. It gives an overview of the telecom markets by 
analyzing notable market features, market structures, shares, and competition 
concerns. The objective is to give a holistic picture of the sector and its dimensions. 
3.2 General Overview of Tanzania’s Economy 
Typically, accounts of Tanzania’s economic background usually accommodate pre-
colonial and colonial aspects.423 In most cases, these accounts seek to depict 
developments reached before and after the influx of colonialism in the country, 
aiming to contrast the two socio-economic systems. However, this study does not deal 
with pre-colonial history because telecommunications, as understood in this research, 
did not exist by then. The focus starts with Tanzania’s independence since the 
telecommunications sector started to gain prominence in some parts of the country 
during that time.  
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Since attaining its independence in 1961, Tanzania’s economy has passed three 
significant phases. The first phase (1961-1967) promoted a free market economy. 
During that phase, Tanzania continued with economic systems inherited from the 
British. The second phase (from 1967 to the early 1980s) saw a large public sector 
and centrally planned economy (command economy). It was during that time that 
Tanzania introduced and glorified socialism. Nationalization took place, and the 
government was in charge of the economy. The private sector was dead, and 
competition abhorred. The third phase began in the late 1980s. It saw the undoing of 
the previous policy decisions. The phase, which continues to exist to date, marked the 
reintroduction of the market economy. This part explores these phases further.  
3.2.1 Market Economy: From 1961-1967 
Immediately after its independence in 1961, Tanzania followed a market economy 
system.424 What happened was that it continued with economic systems inherited from 
British rule. Thus, it emphasized production based on market principles, industrial 
developments, and exports of goods and services (most of the goods were 
agricultural-based).425 In other words, the country opted for the market economy. 
However, the colonial legacy meant that significant means of production were in the 
hands of the few. Many of them were of foreign origin (the British, Indians, and 
Arabs).426 This fact did not sit well with the political cadre, which was of African 
origin. There was a disappointment in the market economy’s inability to address 
poverty amongst the Tanzanians.427 To them, the market economy had failed the 
people of Tanzania. The government had to intervene.428  
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There was another factor; the growth of Africanization. Africanization was a 
philosophical approach that advocated for more Africans, i.e., black people instead of 
whites (Europeans), to hold more political and economic power.429 It demonized 
whatever systems of life and governance that the colonizers left. The market economy 
was perceived as too ‘western’ to be accepted by patriotic African leaders. And then 
there was the growth of socialism in the world. By then, many African leaders sought 
and revered it as a perfect model to settle old colonial exploitation scores.430 It has 
also been argued that being an African Socialist or espouse ‘African Socialism’ during 
that period was one of the most respectable things for any African leader.431 Through 
socialism, African leaders believed, a new and fair society would thrive in which no 
doors of exploitation could ever exist. These reasons led Tanzania to take a dramatic 
policy decision that altered its economic history to date. It adopted socialism.432  
3.2.2 Command Economy (Socialism): From 1967 to the 1980s 
In 1967, Tanzania adopted the celebrated and glorified Arusha Declaration.433 The 
Declaration intended, among others, to reaffirm the State’s control of its people, 
resources, and development process. As a result, it brought about tremendous effects 
on the country’s socio-economic policies: a complete shift from the market economy 
to a socialist economy. According to this Declaration, peasants and workers (and not 
capitalist exploiters) should own all means of production through their government 
and cooperative societies.434 As a result, the Arusha Declaration gave birth to 
socialism. In reality, however, socialism did not place the economy under the people. 
It was under the state command.  
The shift to command economy was very fast, blowing away the private sector. 
Specifically, the following changes took place. Firstly, the government nationalized 
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private entities in existence at that time at an unprecedented speed. The Declaration 
was passed on 5th February 1967. In the same week which President Nyerere called 
‘exciting week,’ the government nationalized all private banks, insurance companies, 
certain trading corporations, and export and import trade. 
Furthermore, every week after that, the government took a series of similar actions.435 
The nationalization was made possible by several Acts of Parliament.436 Secondly, the 
government statutorily acquired shares in industries, whenever necessary, forcibly.437 
The government acquired shares in private industries that it had not invested in 
before. Thirdly, the government regulated prices under the Regulation of Prices Act.438 
With the Regulation of Prices Act, prices were no longer determined by the market 
powers but by the government discretion.  
The effect of such changes meant that Tanzania officially became a socialist state. 
Almost all economic activities were under the monopoly of the state. Such a new form 
of the economic model would exist until the middle of the1980s.  
3.2.3 Re-introduction of the Market Economy: From the 1980s 
Socialism enjoyed brief years of survival. It yielded little contrary to what was 
anticipated, even to the dismay of its principal architect, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the 
first president of Tanzania.439 Its negative impact on the economy was ubiquitous. 
Ironically, policies that the political elite hailed to solve Tanzania’s economic 
problems left Tanzania more destitute than before. For example, in 1975, there were 
24 countries poorer than Tanzania.440 That number dropped only to one 
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(Mozambique) at the end of the 1980s.441 As of 1980-85, there was almost a complete 
collapse of the economy.442 The economic growth rate was disappointing. As of 1986, 
for example, there was already negative growth.443  
At that point, it became clear that the socialist policies were not yielding the expected 
results.444 They had failed. They could not address many problems, including the 
unequal distribution of wealth. Thus, Tanzania had no option but to reform its 
policies, reverting to market economy policies. Reforms taken were extensive and 
cross-cutting. For example, the Foreign Exchange Act of 1992 introduced and 
regulated foreign currency business. The National Investment (Promotion and 
Protection) Act 1990 set a framework for foreign and local investors. And the Public 
Corporations Act 1992 dissolved public corporations that had enjoyed a monopoly 
since 1967.  
Tanzania’s economic reforms also resulted from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) pressure as they were ready to support Tanzania, 
but not under the socialist settings.445 Thus, the reforms were intended to rescue the 
already dying economy.446 Tanzania had to allow private investment, and, for the first 
time, it also introduced a legal framework to promote and enforce competition.447 
Since then, Tanzania has been carrying out several reform programs to revive its 
economy. For example, some of those reforms include the following: 
1. Firstly, the government adopted several policies to open up the Tanzanian 
economy. They include the National Investment Policy of 1996 to attract 
foreign investors,448 the Sustainable Industries Development Policies (SIDP) of 
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1996 to replace central planning with the market economy,449 and the 
Integrated Industrial Development Strategy (IIDS 2025) of 2011, which, 
among others, emphasizes on competition to attract investment and promote 
economic growth.450 Furthermore, the government adopted the National Trade 
Policy of 2003, which projects economic growth centered on a liberalized 
economic environment.451  
2. Secondly, in line with the adopted policies, the government passed several 
laws to break monopolies. They include the Foreign Exchange Act of 1992,452 
the National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act of 1990,453 and the 
Public Corporations Act of 1992.454 
3. Thirdly, the government took practical steps to abolish monopolies either by 
breaking them or privatizing them. The government had several programs, 
such as the National Economic Recovery Program (NESP), the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP), and the Economic Recovery Program (ERP).455 
Specifically, the government established the Presidential Parastatal Sector 
Reform Commission to facilitate the privatization of public corporations.456  
4. Fourthly, the government established a framework to promote and protect 
competition. It first established the Fair Trade Practices Act of 1994. Later on, 
in 2003, the government enacted the Fair Competition Act and established the 
Fair Competition Commission. The establishment of competition frameworks 
marked the apex of liberalization reforms in the country.  
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3.2.4 Current Economic Policies  
Tanzania’s economic policies have been changing and developing over time. Thus, it 
is not surprising to point out that its economic reforms are a continuous process. Even 
though Article 3(1) of the Tanzania Constitution maintains Tanzania to be a socialist 
state, the reforms point towards a market economy. Several policy developments 
confirm this assertion. For example, in its National Development Vision 2025, 
Tanzania sees itself as a competitive and dynamic economy that yields sustainable 
growth and development.457 To this end, the National Trade Policy seeks to facilitate a 
“shift from a protected and controlled economy towards a competitive market 
economy.” It has committed to promoting private investment. It has further 
recognized the private sector’s role as a critical component of economic growth and 
development.458 It also commits to creating supporting institutions and capacity 
development for the market economy in the same spirit.459  
The summation of the preceding observations is that Tanzania now supports the 
market economy, where enterprises are free to operate as market forces demand. 
However, there remain some reservations within political powers in which some 
elements of the command economy persist. For example, it is not rare for political 
powers to dictate market operations by controlling the production, import, or export 
of some goods and services. Furthermore, elements of control are present through 
increased regulation of goods and services, even where there is full competition, such 
as in transportation, insurance, agricultural products, and services. In other words, it 
is safe to say that even though, in principle, Tanzania follows the market economy 
principles, it still has retained some command in the economy in the form of political 
decisions and regulatory powers. Such command has a direct effect on the economy 
and the telecom sector, too.  
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3.3 Early Developments of the Telecommunications Sector in Tanzania 
The history of Tanzania’s telecom sector goes back to before its independence in 
1961. A look at its early developments takes us to the era of supra-national monopoly 
during colonial administration. One must recall that after the first world war, 
Tanzania (then known as Tanganyika) fell under the British mandate. The British 
offered communications to Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. These countries formed a 
single British East African territory.  Telecom services were first under the East 
African High Commission (EAHC) and then under the East African Common Services 
Organization (EACSO).  
The EAHC and EACSO were precursors to the East African Community (EAC), which 
the three countries established in 1967. Following the EAC establishment, telecom 
services continued to be provided jointly until 1977, when the EAC collapsed. It was 
from then that each country established its telecom system. This part looks at the 
development of Tanzania’s telecom sector with the preceding background into 
consideration. 
3.3.1 East African High Commission and the East African Common Services 
Organization  
As already noted, Tanzania fell under British rule after the First World War (WWI), 
joining Kenya and Uganda, which were already under the British since the Berlin 
Conference of 1884/5.460 The British had already introduced joint administration of 
services such as postal, harbors, and railways in Uganda and Kenya.461 Therefore, 
Tanzania became a party to the already established joint services. In the same spirit of 
joint services in its colonies, the British unified communications and transportation 
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facilities in all three territories under the East African Common Services Organization 
(EACSO).462 The EACSO had a monopoly over those services.463  
In 1948, the British established the East African High Commission (EAHC) as a 
regional organization to administer the joint services, including communications, in 
the three territories.464 The EAHC became the first intergovernmental body with a 
monopoly over telecom services, among others. For example, at the end of 1950, the 
EAHC saw more than 5760 telephones installed in East Africa.465 The EAHC lasted 
until 1961 when the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) replaced 
it.466  
The EACSO was a new post-independent regional body that continued to administer 
the services, which the EAHC had administered under British rule.467 It was a peculiar 
body, some sort of federalism without federation. It had a specialized legislative body 
to legislate on matters jointly administered in the three states. This legislative body 
was fashioned in the lines of the European Community.468 Thus, even after the three 
territories’ independence, communication services were still under the monopoly 
administration of the EACSO.469 
3.3.2 East Africa Postal and Telecommunications Corporation 
The cooperation, which Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda had since their pre-colonial 
times, continued even after their independence. The peak came when they signed a 
treaty to establish the East African Cooperation on the 6th day of June 1967 (the 1967 
EAC).470 The 1967 EAC, which replaced the EACSO, aimed to deepen cooperation in 
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the region’s economic activities. For instance, Article 71(2) of the EAC Treaty 
established four corporations. One of them was the East Africa Postal and 
Telecommunications Corporation (EAPTC), others being the East African Railways 
Corporation, the East African Harbours Corporation, and the East African Airways 
Corporation. 
The EAPTC had jurisdiction in all three countries. It also covered Zanzibar, whose 
post and telecom company, the Zanzibar Post and Telecommunication Services, 
merged with EAPTC.471 The EAPTC offered, coordinated, and regulated post and 
telecommunications services in the region. Individual member states of the EAC had 
no national telecommunications companies as all three countries were under the 
monopoly of the East Africa Postal and Telecommunications Corporation. 
3.3.3 Tanzania Postal and Telecommunication Corporation: The National 
Monopoly 
The 1967 East Africa Cooperation, once hailed as the oldest and most prosperous 
regional economic community in the world, collapsed in 1977.472 Eventually, all of its 
corporations were dissolved, including the East Africa Postal and Telecommunications 
Corporation. Each country, in that painful process, had to start up with whatever 
remained in its control. For telecommunications, it meant each country would have to 
establish its own telecom company. Tanzania had to follow suit as well. Through an 
Act of Parliament, it established the Tanzania Postal and Telecommunication 
Corporation (TPTC) of 1977.473 
It is worth a mention that in 1977, ten years had already passed since Tanzania 
adopted socialism. Therefore, the TPTC automatically held a monopoly over the 
provision of postal and telephone services. Under Section 59(1) of the Tanzania 
Postal and Telecommunications Corporation Act, it had “the exclusive privilege of 
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providing telephone services and or constructing maintaining and operating 
telephone apparatus within the United Republic.” No private entity had the right to 
offer telephone services. Similarly, it was not possible to construct, operate, or 
maintain a communication apparatus without the approval of the Director-General of 
the corporation. In other words, the absolute monopoly of communication services 
was under the corporation.  
Therefore, Tanzania’s telecom sector’s early days saw service provision in a highly 
monopolized structure. This structure was unique as it was under the supranational 
arrangement where supranational organizations monopolized telecom services for a 
long time. The national telecom monopoly, the TPTC, enjoyed brief years of absolute 
monopoly from 1977 to 1993. From 1993, the newly formed national telecom, the 
Tanzania Telecommunications Company Limited (TTCL), had a monopoly over fixed-
line services until 2005.  
3.4 Telecommunications Reforms  
We have seen in the previous sections that Tanzania had to reform its economy from 
the 1980s. The reforms appreciated that the market economy was the best policy 
option for national development. The reforms were crosscutting, affecting different 
sectors and extending to the telecom sector, which was dreadful. Major reforms 
centered on breaking the telecom monopoly, separation of regulatory and operational 
function, liberalization of mobile telephony and fixed telephony.  
3.4.1 Breaking of the National Monopoly 
The first step in the reform process involved breaking the national monopoly, the 
Tanzania Postal and Telecommunication Corporation. Two companies came out of it. 
Regarding telecommunications, the government established a new company known 
as Tanzania Telecommunication Company Limited (TTCL).474 The new company did 
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not have a monopoly over mobile services. However, it continued to have a monopoly 
over fixed network telephony until 2005, when the sector became fully liberalized.475  
As for postal services, the government established the Tanzania Posts Corporation 
(TPC) in 1994.476 The same spirit of reforms created a competitive environment in the 
postal sector by allowing other interested service providers.477 Immediately after 
allowing competition in the sector, several new couriers received their licenses to 
operate in the country. They include, for example, Skynet, TNT Express Worldwide, 
DHL Worldwide Express, Atlas Freight Services, Tanzania Post Corporation (EMS), 
Ndondondo Mwendambio, and Sangare Enterprises.478 
3.4.2 Separation of Operational and Regulatory Functions  
It is important to recall that the Tanzania Posts and Telecommunication Corporation 
was both a regulator and service provider. By several Acts of Parliament in 1993, the 
government separated postal, broadcasting, and telecommunications services and 
established a separate regulatory framework.479 For example, it established the 
Tanzania Communication Commission (TCC) to regulate telecommunications and 
postal services.480 Regarding broadcasting services, it established the Tanzania 
Broadcasting Commission (TBC).481 In line with the broader reform agenda, the 
regulators, among others,  had to open up markets to competition by encouraging 
private investment, licensing new operators, and promoting and enforcing 
competition.  
3.4.3 The liberalization of Telecom Services 
The breaking of the national monopoly was just one step in the reform process. The 
next one involved the liberalization of telecom services by allowing private firms in 
the sector. The process took two steps. The government immediately allowed private 
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investment in the mobile sector.482 As for fixed telecom services, the government took 
a different turn. TTCL had to continue with the fixed-line monopoly until the year 
2005. 483 The rationale was simple. Since the mobile services market was not active, 
the government had no direct interests to protect. Everyone was free to enter the 
market immediately. The situation was different for fixed services as TTCL was the 
sole services provider. The government sought it better to protect it against possible 
fierce competition until it was well prepared to compete with private firms.     
3.4.3.1 Licensing Mobile Services  
The telecommunication reform process went in tandem with the liberalization of 
telephony services, starting with mobile services. Licensing regulation was a vital tool 
to facilitate the process under Sections 9-20 of the Tanzania Communications Act. 
The TCC, which was the regulator then, divided Tanzania into zones and issued 
licenses accordingly.484 The plan was to offer two licenses for each zone.485 In other 
words, the regulator opted for duopoly at the local level. The first mobile operators, 
MIC Tanzania Limited (Mobitel), now trading as Tigo, got its license in November 
1993 (reviewed and renewed by TCC in 1996).486 TRI Telecommunications Tanzania 
Limited (Tritel) entered the market shortly after Mobitel in 1994.487 In 1995, Zantel 
got its license to provide telecommunications services to Zanzibar.488 Tritel went into 
bankruptcy and lost its license in 2003.489 
Because of the duopolistic regulatory approach, all newly licensed mobile operators 
concentrated on the coastal zone, Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, for practical business 
reasons. As a result, market penetration was unsatisfactory. There were only 37,940 
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cellular subscribers in 1998.490 Such a rate prompted the regulator to review its 
licensing framework. Consequently, it abandoned zonal licensing in place of national 
licensing.491 Two more operators entered the Tanzanian market; Vodacom Tanzania 
Limited (2000) and Celtel Tanzania Limited, now Airtel Tanzania Limited (2001).492 
The two companies’ entrance, plus the TCC’s restructuring of the licensing 
framework, saw an increase in mobile telephone subscriptions. In 2004, for example, 
there were 1,600,000 subscribers, up from 37,940 in 1998.493  
3.4.3.2 Licensing Fixed Telephony Services 
We noted already that when the liberalization of mobile telephony services started 
early in 1993, TTCL continued with an absolute monopoly over fixed-line services. 
The monopoly prevented other interested firms from rolling out fixed-line networks, a 
factor accounting for a very little penetration of such services to date. In 2001, 
however, the government of Tanzania decided to privatize the TTCL.494 Celtel 
International (MSI) from the Netherlands and Detecon from Germany obtained 35 
percent of the government’s shares.495 The government retained 36 percent while 
giving up the remaining 29 percent to financial institutions and its employees.496  
Even after the privatization process, the government continued to grant the TTCL 
monopoly over the fixed-line network.497 Only after 2005 were other companies 
allowed in this market. During this exclusivity period, TTCL was to connect 800,000 
more subscribers and establish two public payphones for every 3000 inhabitants.498 
However, the task was too huge for TTCL to execute. At the end of the exclusivity 
period, TTCL had added only 80,000 subscribers and 2200 public payphones over ten 
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years.499 Establishing a fixed-line network, it would appear, was a more challenging 
task than TTCL had envisaged. Perhaps this explains why, even after the expiry of 
TTCL exclusive operation, no other firm has attempted to dip its toes in this market.   
3.4.4 Introduction of Competition Policy in the Telecom Sector 
Together with the presented developments, Tanzania introduced a competition policy 
in the sector. The first developments came with pronouncements in its liberalization 
policies. The government adopted the telecommunications, investment, trade, and 
ICT policies, all of which sought to promote competition. It then translated these 
policies into law and proceeded to establish institutions to foresee the enforcement 
process. All these developments paved the way for competition in the sector. 
3.4.4.1 Policy Developments 
Usually, the Tanzanian government works through policy pronouncements. They are 
government declarations on its direction in specific sectors of the economy or 
governance. Among others, policy documents usually carry a situational analysis, an 
examination of observed weaknesses, and statements on the government’s 
commitments, that is, what it plans to do. Regarding the telecom sector, the leading 
policy is the National Telecommunication Policy of 1997. Its main objective is to 
ensure telecom services provision “in a liberalized and competitive manner.”500  
To achieve the stated objective, paragraph 3.3.1 of the Policy directs the government 
“to encourage fair competition and create an enabling environment to attract 
investors and private sector participation.”501 To do so requires, among others, efforts 
to ensure a friendly environment for effective competition. Thus, the Policy indicates 
the government’s commitment to establishing supportive and enabling 
macroeconomic, legal, and regulatory environments in which telecom firms can 
operate freely and competitively.502 To this end, the government is committed to 
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encouraging fair competition and ensuring that it fosters competition in its regulatory 
functions.503  
The introduction of the competition policy meant that the government must create a 
welcoming atmosphere to attract investment and promote trade.504 Two policy 
documents serve this objective: The National Investment Promotion Policy and the 
National Trade Policy. On the one hand, the National Investment Promotion Policy of 
1996 reiterates the government’s withdrawal from doing business, and instead, its 
role is limited to providing guidance, promotion, and facilitation of services 
providers.505 Specifically, under paragraph 4.1.1., the policy states that:  
“With the on-going economic reforms, the role of the Government in investment has 
been narrowed down to the provision of clear policy guidelines, the stimulation and 
promotion of investment sectors, and overseeing the general development, rather 
than directly engaging itself into productive activities within the investment sector. 
Therefore, the Government’s role is limited to guiding, promoting, and facilitation, 
and being a service provider for investment.”506  
The quoted commitment meant that now the government would focus only on 
establishing a supportive regulatory framework.507 The literal interpretation of the 
quoted policy statement suggests that it will not engage directly in production and 
trading activities. This policy statement is the basis of the government’s all-time 
rhetoric when tasked with challenging questions on the availability of goods or 
services; ‘the government does not do business.’ 
On the other hand, the National Trade Policy of 2003, among others, seeks to 
maintain a conducive and enabling environment in which trade thrives.508 Under this 
policy, the government’s vision is to ensure freedom of trade through economic 
regulation and competition policy, freedom of choice, access to the market, and 
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improved innovation, all of which contribute to consumer protection.509 Of interest, 
the government repeats its commitment to withdraw from trading activities to 
provide competitive space for private firms. Paragraph 4.1 of the Policy reads,  
“The fundamental role of government is in providing the enabling policy 
environment that will facilitate the private sector in becoming the engine of 
economic activity and growth through efficiency and better performance. The 
Tanzanian Government is already implementing a policy entailing its 
withdrawal from direct involvement in economic activity to facilitate 
channeling its resources in the conventional area of establishing and 
maintaining a conducive and enabling policy environment.”510  
The Government’s decision to get out of active business aimed to create a conducive 
environment for private actors.511 One must remember that before this decision, the 
government participated both in making business policies and doing business. This 
position would not be ideal with the market economy because the government would 
have to compete with other private entities, which it also regulates through various 
laws, regulations, and administrative directions. Simply put, there would not be a 
level playing field.  
Other policies also stress the role of competition in the sector. One of them is the ICT 
Policy of 2003, which was reviewed in 2016. The policy recognizes that ICT is the 
“bedrock for national economic development in a rapidly changing global 
environment.”512 Thus, it seeks to build Tanzania with “economically, socially and 
culturally enriched people in ICT-enabled knowledge society.”513  
The role of ICT policy in competition comes to the effective utilization of 
communications resources. For example, paragraph 3.3.1.1 seeks to ensure effective 
and competitive allocation of such resources to facilitate entry to attract new 
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investment.514 Thus, such resources should be allocated on a “fair, transparent, and 
non-discriminatory basis.”515 To do so, a legal and regulatory framework, which 
promotes effective competition, becomes necessary.516 Further, the Policy calls for 
rules to ensure neutrality in service provision and technology.517 Similarly, it calls for 
frameworks to guarantee the standardization of rules, technology, and equipment to 
ensure interoperability for effective competition.518 All of these envisaged objectives 
are only possible, the Policy further holds, if there is a regulator who promotes 
effective competition in the sector. 519 
3.4.4.2 Legislative Developments  
To translate policy directions into enforceable legal norms, the government enacted 
several laws to promote and enforce competition. The first attempt came in 1993 with 
the introduction of the Tanzania Communications Act. However, as we shall see later 
in this section, this law had blanket provisions on competition enforcement. There 
were no rules to define anti-competitive practices and corresponding remedies. Thus, 
as a result, no active competition enforcement took place under it. 
A meaningful attempt to introduce competition law in the sector was the enacting of 
the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority Act of 2003. This law under 
Section 4 established a regulator: the TCRA, with an overall mandate to regulate and 
promote competition in the sector. Specifically, Section 5(a) and Section 19 of the Act 
put competition policy at the top of the sector regulatory activities. For instance, 
Section 19(1) & (2) reads,  
“19. - (1) In carrying out its functions and exercising its powers under this Act, and 
under sector legislation in relation to particular markets for regulated services, the 
Authority shall take into account; (a) whether the conditions for effective 
competition exist in on the market; (b) whether any exercise by the Authority is 
likely to cause any lessening of competition or additional costs in the market and is 
 
514 National Information and Communications Technology Policy, p. 20. 
515 National Information and Communications Technology Policy, p. 22. 
516 National Information and Communications Technology Policy, p. 25. 
517 National Information and Communications Technology Policy, pp. 25–27. 
518 National Information and Communications Technology Policy, pp. 25–27. 
519 National Information and Communications Technology Policy, p. 35. 
 
 94  
likely to be detrimental to the public; (c) whether any such detriments to the public 
are likely to outweigh any benefits to the public resulting from the exercise of the 
powers.” 
“(2) The Authority shall deal with all competition issues which may arise in the 
course of the discharge of the functions, and may investigate and report on those 
issues, making appropriate recommendations to the Commission or any other 
relevant authority in relation to; (a) any contravention of the Fair Competition Act, 
2003 the Tanzania Bureau of Standards Act, 1975, or any other written law; (b) 
actual or potential competition in any market for regulated services competition or 
additional costs in the market and is likely to be detrimental to the public; (c) any 
determinants likely to result to the members of the public.” 
The quoted Section puts three fundamental principles to guide the regulation of 
competition in the sector. The first principle concerns the regulator’s role in the 
sector. The law calls for the regulator to be the guardian of competition by ensuring 
that market conditions for effective competition exist. This obligation demands the 
Authority to constantly monitor developments in the sector to satisfy the absence of 
anti-competitive practices. The second principle regards the Authority’s conduct. 
Here, the law directs that it must not engage in any conduct that lessens competition. 
In other words, the law calls for pro-competition regulation.  
The third principle regards instances where it becomes necessary for the Authority to 
compromise competition rules. The law provides that if it becomes necessary to 
engage in or sanction any practice that might otherwise be against competition rules, 
then such conduct must have more public benefits than its possible detriments. 
Literature suggests that such benefits may include the need to increase employment 
opportunities or reduce unemployment, better allocation of resources, cost reduction 
at all production levels, improving quality of goods or services, fostering international 
competitiveness, and environmental concerns.520 
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However, the TCRA Act did not set rules to prohibit anti-competitive behaviors in the 
sector. That had to wait until 2010 when the government enacted the Electronic and 
Postal Communications Act (EPOCA).521 Under the EPOCA, there are rules to regulate 
anti-competitive practices, for instance, abuse of dominance and collusive practices. 
Further details are in the Competition Regulations of 2018.522 As regards mergers and 
acquisitions, the regulation is under the Fair Competition Act of 2003.523   
Therefore, since 2005, the telecommunication sector is fully liberalized. In principle, 
frameworks are in place to facilitate entry. As we have seen, full liberalization has 
been instrumentalized by enacting the Tanzania Communications Regulatory 
Authority Act (The TCRA Act) of 2003. This law is further complemented by the 
Electronic and Postal Communications Act of 2010, together with over two dozen 
Rules and Regulations. Under the current liberalized framework, monopolies no 
longer exist in fixed and mobile telephony. Any interested firm is welcome to invest in 
the sector. Further, there are competition rules to ensure that firms compete freely 
and fairly. Also, a quasi-independent regulator exists to ensure, among others, fair 
play in the sector.  
3.5 Introduction and Development of Regulation  
Chapter two has defined regulation as governmental interventions in markets to 
determine or limit their operations to attain particular policy objectives. Also, it shows 
that regulation became intensified as many governments embarked on the 
liberalization of their economies. Therefore, there is a close link between the 
introduction of sector-specific regulation and the telecom sector’s liberalization. This 
link also applies to Tanzania, where effective regulation traces back to 1993 when 
reforms took shape. Therefore, this part examines the introduction and developments 
of regulation in the sector from 1993 to the present.   
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3.5.1 Early Attempts to Regulate the Sector: The 1993 Regulatory Framework  
The year 1993 was the turning point of the Tanzania telecommunications sector. It 
witnessed the opening of doors to private investment.524 The only exception was the 
continuous monopoly over domestic fixed-line telephony given to the TTCL until 
2005.525 As already noted, Section 4(1) of the Tanzania Communications Act of 1993 
established the Tanzania Communications Commission (TCC). The TCC was a 
considerable step in the development of the telecommunications sector in the 
country. One author noted that  
“Tanzania’s establishment of a regulator [the TCC] in 1993 was for Africa, and even 
worldwide, an early endeavor to regulating the telecommunications market: TCC 
was among the first 30 autonomous regulatory authorities in the world”.526  
The reading of the Tanzania Communication Act (the Act) reveals that the first 
regulatory framework was meant to facilitate the transition from monopoly to the 
market economy. Its key features were the following: 
1. Firstly, the government established the Tanzania Communication Commission 
(TCC) as a regulator. The TCC’s establishment meant that the Ministry 
responsible for communication remained only with policy formulation roles 
while the TCC dealt with regulation.  
2. Secondly, despite the separation of regulatory activities, the Minister 
responsible for communication retained significant regulatory powers. Such 
powers were beyond general policy settings. Thus, for example, Section 
7(3)(a)(ii)-(v) of the Act gave the Minister various powers such as powers to 
issue directives to the Commission on the nature and extent of licensing 
conditions. The Minister could also direct the Commission on how to set 
tariffs. Similarly, the Minister had powers to direct the Commission on various 
technical standards. Furthermore, such powers included issuing directives 
relating to issuing, varying, or canceling communications licenses. 
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3. Thirdly, apart from the above-mentioned specific powers, the law also 
permitted the Minister to do almost everything in the sector. Section 
7(3)(a)(iv) of the Act permitted the Minister to direct the Commission on “any 
other general policy matter within the powers of the Commission.” These 
powers, in essence, made the Minister on top of the Commission. He/she was, 
in all sense, based on powers provided under Section 7(3)(a)(i)-(iv) of the Act, 
the one calling the shots.   
4. Fourthly, Sections 5, 10, and 20 of the Act granted the TCC powers of 
technical regulation. Thus, apart from licensing, the TCC dealt with the 
management of radiofrequency. It was also responsible for setting up technical 
standards for telecom networks and equipment. This regulation would ensure 
technical interoperability and safety of communications systems as well as 
users of communication services. 
5. Fifthly, the Tanzania Communications Act empowered the TCC to deal with 
competition matters. Section 5(1)(k) of the Act directed the TCC to “promote 
competition in telecommunications services.” Furthermore, Section 5(2)(c) 
required the TCC to consider effective competition in discharging its functions. 
This provision meant that the TCC was not allowed, as a general rule, to 
engage in any practice that makes telecom services less competitive. It was also 
the TCC’s duty to protect and promote competition. Thus, the general 
competition framework under the Fair Trade Practices Act did not apply. 
6. Lastly, even though the TCC had powers to promote and enforce competition 
in the sector, it did little in ex-post enforcement. There is no jurisprudential 
experience showing how it addressed competition matters. This enforcement 
deficit could be explained by the inherent weakness of the competition 
framework. The enforcement mandate was just blanket with neither rules to 
define anti-competitive practices nor regulations on how enforcement should 
occur. It was, therefore, not surprising that nothing was done regarding ex-post 
competition enforcement. 
The presented features show that the first regulatory framework took a rudimentary 
approach. Its focus was on facilitating the new firms’ entry. As a result, the emphasis 
was on the ex-ante regulation. It is, for this reason, the framework for effective 
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enforcement of competition never fully developed. Neither substantive nor procedural 
rules were present to precisely define parameters of competition enforcement. The 
TCC had to enforce what was uncertain. Nevertheless, the law gave it broader 
regulatory powers such that most of the regulatory decisions ended without further 
opportunities for appeal, for example. Appeals against the TCC’s decision were 
limited. Sections 11(5), 19(4), and 20(2) of the Act confined the right to appeal only 
to technical issues, meaning it was not possible to appeal on substantive grounds. 
The most important observation is that even though the law separated the TCC from 
the Ministry, the same law gave the Minister enormous powers such that he/she 
could change the course of regulation. In other words, the TCC was not independent. 
The regulatory practice witnessed strong governmental interferences and control.527 
For example, since its establishment in 1994, the Minister did not appoint the 
commissioners until four years later, in 1998.528 However, soon after the Minister 
appointed the commissioners, he dismissed them over a dispute on who should be 
licensed as a mobile phone operator.529 Here, it would appear that while the Minister 
favored one operator, the commissioners favored another.530 The simple solution was 
for the Minister to dismiss the commissioners, making him the de facto regulator.531   
Therefore, while the first regulatory framework was instrumental in liberalizing the 
sector, some weaknesses existed regarding its independence and efficiency. It appears 
that the government was still not fully cognizant of the powers it had to yield after 
years of control under the command economy. It was, for this reason, that it 
maintained considerable powers in the sector. 
The exclusion of general competition law meant that the government desired to have 
a special treatment in the sector, having less application of market principles and 
competition and more governmental involvement through regulation. Unfortunately, 
the approach did not end with the first regulator. As chapter six shows, the 
 
527 Mohammad A. Mustafa, Bruce Laidlaw, and Mark Brand, Telecommunications Policies for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Washington, D.C: World Bank Publications, 1997), p. 65. 
528 Noll and Shirley, p. 54. 
529 Noll and Shirley, p. 54. 
530 Noll and Shirley, p. 54. 
531 Noll and Shirley, p. 54. 
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government continues to control the whole regulatory framework through different 
regulatory and administrative practices. 
3.5.2 Regulating the Liberalized Sector: The 2003 Framework 
In 2003, the Government of Tanzania carried out yet other significant reforms by 
enacting the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act. This law 
introduced the new regulator, the TCRA, with an expanded mandate compared to the 
now-defunct TCC.532 The long title of this law provides for its objectives, which, 
among others, seek to intensify regulation. This law merged the regulation of 
telecommunications and broadcasting services. As a result, the new regulator, the 
TCRA, replaced the TCC and TBC.  
In the same year, the government enacted the Fair Competition Act (from now on: 
FCA). The FCA established the Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT) under Section 83(1). 
This tribunal became the first quasi-judicial body to receive appeals from the TCRA 
decisions. The FCT’s name is misleading because it does not deal only with 
competition matters. It is also an appellate body for all other regulatory bodies in the 
country.533 In short, the 2003 framework has the following features: 
1. Firstly, there are institutional reforms in which the law came out concerning 
which institution performs which functions. Section 4 of the TCRA Act 
established the TCRA as the overall regulator of communications services. As 
for the appellate framework, Part XIII of the Fair Competition Act established 
the Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT).  
2. Secondly, there is now the convergence of regulatory functions. The TCRA, 
under Sections 6(1)(e), 56(1), and 58(1) of the TCRA Act, has combined 
functions of TCC and TBC. Thus, TCRA is the regulator of telecommunication, 
postal, broadcasting, and internet services. 
3. Thirdly, there is a reduction of ministerial powers compared to the 1993 
framework. The 2003 framework has further distanced the regulator from the 
 
532 Part II of The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, ACT NO 12 OF 2003. 
533 See S 61 of Fair Competition Act, ACT NO 8 OF 2003; and Section 36 of The Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority Act, ACT NO 12 OF 2003. 
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ministry responsible for communication. However, as the rest of this work 
shows, the Minister still retains some considerable influence.  
4. Fourthly, there is now an explicit exclusion of the general competition 
framework in the sector. Under Sections 19&20 of the TCRA Act and Section 
96(1)-(3) of the FCA, the Fair Competition Commission (FCC) does not have 
the powers to enforce or promote competition in the sector. The only 
exception is on merger and acquisitions cases where FCC has jurisdictions 
across all sectors of the economy in the country. Apart from mergers and 
acquisitions, the FCC can only act in the telecom sector if it has been 
specifically asked by the TCRA to do so. 
5. Fifthly, there is an exclusion of the ordinary courts of law in enforcing 
competition. The TCRA acts as a ‘court’ of the first instance. There is only one 
level of appeal to the FCT, whose decision is final per Section 84(1) of the FCA 
and Section 36(3) of the TCRA Act. 
6. Sixthly, even after structural and institutional reforms initiated in the 2003 
framework, there is no guarantee of the TCRA’s independence. 
The 2003 framework was the first detailed framework to address the sector’s 
regulation. It succeeded, for example, in establishing regulatory and institutional 
frameworks and standards. However, there were no detailed regulatory rules. The 
detailed regulatory rules, including those dealing with competition enforcement, had 
to wait for seven years until 2010 when further legislative development took place.  
3.5.3 The 2010 Regulatory Framework 
The process of reforming the sector reached its climax in the year 2010. The 
government decided to address one problem that had persisted since the first 
introduction of regulation in 1993; lack of detailed regulation rules. It enacted the 
Electronic and Postal Communications Act of 2010 (EPOCA). The Act, among others, 
intended to 
“make provisions for the enactment of electronic and postal communications law 
with a view to keeping abreast with developments in the electronic communications 
industry; to provide for a comprehensive regulatory regime for electronic 
communications service providers and postal communications service providers, to 
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establish the Central Equipment Identification Register for registration of detachable 
SIM card and built-in SIM card mobile phones; to provide for duties of electronic 
communications and postal licensees, agents and customers, content regulation, 
issuance of postal communication licenses and to regulate competitions and 
practices; to provide for offenses relating to electronic communications and postal 
communications and to provide for transitional provisions, consequential 
amendments, and other related matters.”534 
From the mentioned long title to the Act, it is clear that EPOCA intended to be as 
detailed as possible to cover almost every sector aspect. For example, there are rules 
under the Act to regulate licensing, interconnection, access to infrastructure and 
infrastructure sharing, and spectrum management.535 Furthermore, there are now 
rules to regulate technical standards and to regulate competition.536 It is also worth 
noting that the law gives TCRA powers to regulate broadcasting and online content. 
Thus, not only does the TCRA has the power to regulate what broadcasters broadcast, 
but also it has the power to monitor and control contents posted online, including 
those shared through social media.537   
3.5.4 Policy Objectives for Regulating the Telecom Sector in Tanzania  
This chapter has so far looked at the introduction of regulation in Tanzania. In this 
subsection, the focus is on the policy objectives for regulating telecommunications 
services in the country. Such objectives could be deduced from the provisions of the 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977, the Tanzania 
Communications Act of 1993 (now repealed), the Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority Act of 2003, the Universal Communications Services Act of 
2006, the Electronic and Postal Communications Act of 2010 and the Cybercrimes Act 
of 2015. As for policy directions, the focus lies on the National Telecommunications 
Policy of 1997 and the National Information and Communications Technology Policy 
(ICT Policy) of 2016.  
 
534 The long title to The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010. 
535 See Part II (a), (b) and Part IV (d) of The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010. 
536 See Part IV (a), (b), and (f)-(h) of The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010. 
537 See Part IV (i) of The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010; And The Electronic 
and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2018., GN NO. 133 OF 2018. 
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3.5.4.1 Promotion of Efficiency 
Section 5(a) and Section 6(1)(c) of the TCRA Act require the TCRA to promote 
economic efficiency and monitor the efficiency of production and distribution of 
services in the sector. The Act, however, does not define the term ‘efficiency.’ 
Nonetheless, in the general economic understanding, efficiency has been described to 
include production efficiency (i.e., producing at the lowest costs possible), allocative 
efficiency (producing and distributing goods and services to those in demand 
(consumer preferences) and dynamic efficiency (productive efficiency) achieved over 
time, for example, by investing in new technologies.538 
In promoting efficiency, there must be rules that promote and facilitate entry, 
efficient use of communication resources such as spectrum and numbering resources, 
and the creation of market conditions that stimulate innovation amongst service 
providers. These rules are provided for and enforced by sector regulation. 
Furthermore, in promoting efficiency in the sector, Clause 2.2.2. of the National 
Telecommunication Policy advocates for regulatory measures that promote research 
and development, encourage new services and technologies, and local production of 
communication devices.539 Thus, efficiency goals cut across all firms, irrespective of 
their market powers, to ensure the sector’s delivery of quality and affordable services 
to consumers.  
3.5.4.2 Promotion of New Investment 
To transform a once-monopoly sector into a competitive one, adequate strategies to 
attract new investments are necessary. The same is true for Tanzania, as it was 
essential to get new investors to supplement meager work already done by the TTCL 
during its monopoly era. Clause 2.2.2 of the National Telecommunication Policy calls 
explicitly for “the creation of a conducive microeconomic, legal and regulatory 
 
538 For an interesting and critical discussion on the subject see Francesco Ducci and Michael Trebilcock, 
‘The Revival of Fairness Discourse in Competition Policy’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 64.1 (2019), 79–104 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X18822580>; Albert Allen Foer and Arthur Durst, ‘The Multiple Goals 
of Antitrust’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 63.4 (2018), 494–508 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X18807808>; Gregory T. Gundlach and Diana Moss, ‘The Role of 
Efficiencies in Antitrust Law: Introduction and Overview’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 60.2 (2015), 91–102 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X15591991>. 
539 National Telecommunications Policy, p. 3. 
 
 103  
environment to attract investment in the sector.”540 One way of creating such an 
environment is through a friendly regulatory environment. Such a regulatory 
environment must guarantee prospective investors the right to entry, protect their 
investment, and ensure a competitive environment. Furthermore, such regulation 
must ensure private investors compete fairly even with government-owned 
corporations and that they do not become victims of inconsistent or unstable 
government policies.  
The role of regulation in promoting investment must, however, be treated with 
caution. On the one hand, literature shows that regulation has been vital in 
developing telecommunications in the world.541 Some argue that regulatory measures 
have led to an increase in investment.542 They have also led to an increase in 
competition as well as a reduction in prices.543 For example, because of adequate 
regulatory frameworks, EU countries, which were behind the US in fixed and mobile 
access per 100 inhabitants, overtook it by 2002.544  
On the other hand, however, there is a scholarly consensus that deregulation should 
follow after achieving competition.545 Prolonged regulation, some scholars argue, may 
discourage new investments.546 Cave, Genakos, and Valletti, for instance, argue that 
“sector-specific regulation of particular markets can be maintained where firms are 
found in periodic market reviews to exercise significant market power.”547 In other 
words, the authors argue that sector-specific regulation is unjustified in the absence 
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of firms with significant market powers. Similar observations were made on a recent 
study conducted on behalf of Deutsche Telekom AG.548 The study found out that full 
deregulation is ideal in promoting investment.549 It noted that  
“if full deregulation is not feasible due to monopolistic market structures, a less 
intrusive regulatory approach abandoning cost orientation contributes to an increase 
in investment incentives (albeit not to the extent of full deregulation). On the one 
hand, cost-based access prices inevitably shift market dynamics away from 
investment to “wait-and-see” strategies.”550 
As already noted, the introduction of regulation in Tanzania was necessary to provide 
a conducive environment for private actors. Both the defunct TCC and the current 
TCRA worked hard to develop an environment that attracts new investments. Such 
regulatory efforts have contributed to the sector’s growth through increased 
investments, mostly from foreign firms. Only to this extent does the sector regulation 
find justifications on investment grounds. Caution is necessary here. Too much 
regulation is to be avoided as it can achieve precisely the opposite.  
3.5.4.3 Promotion of Competition  
One must note that sector regulation can promote or discourage competition.551 On 
the one hand, it can contradict or complicate competition, for example, by adopting 
rules that foreclose competition or make competition practically impossible.552 Critics 
of regulation would go a step further even to paint a negative image of regulation. 
Some argue that “regulation breeds inefficiency, fosters corruption and protects only 
vested interests, or it may be enacted with the best of intentions but is impossible to 
get right in practice.”553  
On the other hand, regulation can reproduce competition or apply competition policy 
in its regulatory activities. The point here is to ensure the presence of pro-competition 
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regulatory frameworks.554 In that regard, regulation performs complementary roles. It 
fills in gaps caused by competition law’s impracticality either because of markets’ 
natural demands or inherent factors in a specific sector of the economy.  
Since regulation can either promote or discourage competition, there is a support of 
regulation as a precursor to competition.555 Regulation is highly appreciated when it 
performs transitional roles, helping the sector’s transformation from monopoly to 
competition.556 For example, during the high times of monopolies, state monopolies 
owned all essential infrastructures.557  They had all the potential to abuse their 
dominance.558 Further, information asymmetries frequently characterized the sector.559 
Such features made entry very complicated. The role of regulation as a transition tool 
becomes necessary to ensure orderly evolution to competition by maintaining 
appropriate structures, needed infrastructures and to ensure certainty of 
procedures.560  
After achieving competition, regulation’s role should dwindle only to the extent 
necessitated by natural market structures. At this stage, “soft regulation” or 
“competition-based regulation,” which means limited state interference as long as 
competition exists, is desirable.561 Continued regulation in a competitive telecom 
sector, unless justified by technical necessity, may bring more harm than good.  
In Tanzania, among others, sector regulation was introduced in the spirit of 
promoting competition. It was expected that through competition, other regulatory 
objectives such as the attraction of investments and promotion of efficiency could be 
achieved. Thus, regulation should not only “just allow competition, but it should 
foster it.”562 For example, Section 19 (1)(a)-(c) of the TCRA Act explicitly directs the 
TCRA not only to “promote effective competition.” It also directs it to prioritize 
 
554 OECD, Regulation Reform in Greece: The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform, p. 7. 
555 See for example, Cave, Genakos, and Valletti; Briglauer and Cambini; Jerry A. Hausman and Taylor, 
‘Partial Deregulation in Telecommunications: An Update’; Jerry A Hausman and Taylor. 
556 Crampton, p. 6. 
557 Hans Schedl, ‘Sector-Specific Regulation: Transitory or Ad Infinitum? An International Status Report on 
Regulatory Institutions’, Journal for Institutional Comparisons, 5.4 (2007), 35–40 (p. 35). 
558 Schedl, p. 35. 
559 Schedl, p. 35. 
560 Crampton, p. 8. 
561 Briglauer and Cambini, p. iii; Biondi and Giannoccolo, p. 11. 
562 Crampton, p. 8. 
 
 106  
effective competition when deciding on several issues in its regulatory capacity. 
Under no circumstances, the law directs, should the TCRA act to lessens competition 
in the sector. The same call is in Clause 3.6.1.2. (ii) of the National Information and 
Communications Technology Policy.  
3.5.4.4 Promotion of Universal Communications Service  
Promotion of private investment in the sector means market forces now determine 
market decisions. In principle, market decisions require that production and supply 
correspond to the existing scales of demands. In other words, production and supply 
ought to follow attractive markets, that is, where there are substantial corresponding 
demands. It follows that market forces may not consider other social or political 
factors. Put differently, market forces in a competitive world are not perfect enough 
to deliver services to everyone.563  
For example, one should think of the costs of taking communications services to a 
small rural settlement of a few hundred peasants separated from the nearest town by 
a hundred kilometers. Unless it has significant economic activities to warrant the 
return of such investment, such a community offers no incentive for investment. In 
such cases, governments must act. They are not expected to provide such services on 
their own. However, they have “to influence market participants and to create 
conditions for the accomplishment of the universal service quest.”564 
For Tanzania, the government policy is to deliver communications to everyone, 
including those scattered in the most remote villages.565 This policy objective agrees 
with the equity justifications, often cited as a basis for universal services obligations.566 
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For developing countries like Tanzania, universal service is “a necessary component 
of equitable development strategies—redistribution toward the poor and the 
underdeveloped regions as part of USOs.”567 This is what Cremer and others call the 
“redistributive role” of universal services obligations.568 
Apart from equity considerations, communication for all is, in fact, a constitutional 
requirement in Tanzania. For example, Article 18(a) and (c) of the Tanzania 
constitution states clearly that every person has the right to seek, receive, and 
disseminate information. Also, every person has the right to freedom of 
communication. It is impossible to realize these rights for everyone if some are 
excluded from accessing telecom services. Thus, imposing universal services 
obligations is the best approach to discharge the preceding constitutional duty.  
The establishment of universal obligations, however, is not automatic. It requires 
regulatory coordination. Here is where the TCRA, as the sector regulator, comes in. 
Through Section 5(d) of the TCRA Act, the law directs the TCRA to “promote the 
availability of the regulated services to all consumers, including low-income, rural 
and disadvantaged consumers.” In practice, universal communication services 
delivery is possible through a fund (Universal Communications Services Access Fund 
(UCSAF)) established by Section 4 of the Universal Communications Services Act.569 
With the said Fund, the government agrees with telecom firms whereby they deliver 
communications services to rural or urban under-served areas in exchange for 
subsidies from the Fund. For example, the Fund reported in May 2019 to have spent 
Tanzanian shillings 118 billion to boost communication services to over five million 
 
567 Laffont, Estache, and Zhang, p. 2; For discussion on the redistributive role of regulation see Navroz 
Dubash and Bronwen Morgan, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South’, in The Rise of the Regulatory 
State of the South: Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies, ed. by Navroz Dubash and 
Bronwen Morgan, Law and Global Governance Series, 1st ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 
1–26. 
568 Helmuth Cremer and others, ‘Social Costs and Benefits of the Universal Service Obligation in the Postal’, 
in Market Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector, ed. by Michael A Crew and Paul R. 
Kleindorfer (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), pp. 23–35 (p. 24). 
569 The Universal Communications Services Act, NO 11 OF 2006. 
 
 108  
Tanzanians in 2501 villages.570 This achievement would not have been possible in the 
absence of regulation.  
3.5.4.5 Protection of Consumers’ Interests  
There is consensus in the literature that consumer protection is one of the main 
objectives of telecom regulation.571 The argument here is that telecom firms are 
powerful enough to exploit the majority of consumers. In some parts of the world, 
telecom firms have a bad reputation. Some even argue them to be “thieves who are 
not known as thieves.”572 This argument, though debatable as telecom companies have 
proved vital in charging economic growth and development worldwide, means that a 
section in society considers them too powerful to warranty some external checks, 
mostly from government authorities. Consequently, the argument goes, governments 
must intervene to protect the wider population, which is likely to fall prey to these 
powerful companies.573  
Apart from the above observations, rapid technological advancements in the 
communications sector also necessitate thoughtful reconsiderations on how 
consumers, especially end consumers, remain protected. Reconsiderations of 
protection approaches and frameworks are necessary because of the prevalence of 
harmful practices to consumers, such as lack of clarity and transparency, non-
disclosure of all necessary information, deceptive, fraudulent, and misleading 
commercial practices, as well as lack of immediate and useful frameworks for dispute 
resolutions.574  
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It is not tough to justify regulation having the mentioned concerns in mind. A neutral 
umpire is necessary to limit the growing powers of telecom firms over consumers. 
Thus, Section 5(b) of the TCRA Act directs the TCRA to adopt rules, regulations, 
practices, and measures that promote and protect all consumers of communications 
services in the country. The TCRA must, as Section 5(e) of the same law directs, raise 
consumers’ awareness of their rights and responsibilities, educate the public on the 
nature of the regulated services, and establish structures to effectively and timely 
mediate consumer disputes. In furthering this goal, specific Regulations exist to 
ensure that telecom firms do not prey on consumers.575 
3.5.4.6 Control on Wealth Distribution and Local Participation  
The presence of many foreign-based telecom firms has disturbed policymakers for 
quite some time. The argument has always been that these firms make windfall 
profits that do not benefit Tanzanians.576 Thus, through regulation, Tanzania seeks to 
distribute telecom wealth and stimulate local participation in the telecom economy.577 
A good example is a requirement under Section 26 of the EPOCA, which directs all 
telecom firms to offer 25 percent of their shares to the public. Furthermore, by setting 
the rules of entry, regulation can also determine how small and medium firms 
participate in the sector.578 
3.5.4.7 Boosting of Government Revenue 
Even though nowhere to be found in its policy books, field findings established that 
Tanzania uses regulation to boost revenue collection. This objective is not peculiar to 
Tanzania as studies indicate huge fees and taxes in the telecom sector in developing 
countries.579 The taxes and fees target telecom firms and consumers through various 
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charges for using telecommunications services and devices.580 The introduction of 
unusual charges, such as social media tax in Uganda, is a good example.581 Recent 
studies indicate that telecom firms in Tanzania pay up to over 40 percent of their 
revenues to the government.582 Telecom revenues would not land into government 
coffers in the absence of regulation. In other words, the more regulatory requirements 
are in place, the higher the revenues to be collected.  
3.5.4.8 Control of the Use of Communication Services  
Again, though not expressly declared in its policy books, findings from the field 
revealed that Tanzania uses regulation to control communications services. This 
objective is not peculiar to Tanzania. Elsewhere, especially in many African countries, 
regulation has proved a practical tool for limiting the freedom to consume 
communication services.583 In Tanzania, for example, Sections 4(3)(b) and 59 of the 
EPOCA and 28(1) of the TCRA Act empower the President and the Minister to 
exercise some controls for “national security reasons.”  
Similarly, the Regulations allow the government to control how its people consume 
communication services. For example, through a regulatory order, the TCRA 
restricted the bulk circulation of SMS for almost a month during the October 2020 
general elections. Similarly, although the Authorities have not acknowledged it in 
public, there was a complete shutdown of the internet and blockage of social media 
such as WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube during the same time. All these 
were done through the existing regulatory powers.  
 
580 Deloitte, Digital Inclusion and Mobile Sector Taxation 2016: The Impacts of Sector-Specific Taxes and Fees 
on the Affordability of Mobile Services, p. 21; Rogers and Pedros, pp. 14–16; Sivakumaran, pp. 15–17. 
581 Simone Schlindwein, ‘Uganda: One Year of Social Media Tax’, Deutsche Welle Website, 2019 
<https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-one-year-of-social-media-tax/a-49672632> [accessed 30 October 
2020]. 
582 PWC, Sustaining the Momentum National Budget Bulletin 2019/20 (Dar es Salaam: PWC, June 2019), p. 
21; Rogers and Pedros, p. 12. 
583 George Ogola, ‘Threats to Media Freedom in Africa: Some Old Methods and Some New’, The 
Conversation, 3 October 2018 <http://theconversation.com/threats-to-media-freedom-in-africa-some-old-
methods-and-some-new-104168> [accessed 5 September 2019]; CIPESA, State of Internet Freedom in 
Africa 2016: Case Studies from Select Countries on Strategies African Governments Use to Stifle Citizens’ 
Digital Rights (Kampala, Uganda: CIPESA, 2016); ‘How African Governments Try to Control What Is Said 
Online’, The Economist, 19 April 2018 <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-
africa/2018/04/19/how-african-governments-try-to-control-what-is-said-online> [accessed 6 September 
2019]. 
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There is also a criminal aspect of the regulation of communication services. Through 
the Cybercrimes Act and the Online Contents Regulations, regulatory powers extend 
surveillance and policing to what people post on the internet and social media to 
private conversations via platforms such as WhatsApp or Facebook chats.584 Strong 
regulatory measures are already in place, where a single post on a Facebook page or 
text sent via WhatsApp has landed some people good years in jail.585    
3.5.5 Major Regulatory Milestones to the Present  
Apart from the three significant developments, which took place between 2003 and 
2010, several other regulatory steps have contributed to shaping the 
telecommunication sector. Table 3.5-1 presents a summary of major regulatory 
milestones. It includes those already discussed in the previous sections.  
Table 3.5-1 Regulatory milestones and developments in Tanzania from 1977 to 2018 
Year  Regulatory Milestone Remarks 
1993 Official start of the liberalization of 
telecommunications services 
TPTC is dissolved, and TTCL is 
established to provide telecom 
services in a liberalized sector. 
However, TTCL maintains a monopoly 
over fixed network services.  
The new regulator, the TCC, is 
established to regulate telecom 
services. As for broadcasting, a new 
regulator, TBC, is also established. 
The first private telecom firm, MIC 
Tanzania Ltd, get its license. 
1995 Further private firms acquire licenses 
to operate in the sector  
Tri Telecom Tanzania Ltd becomes 
the second private telecom to get a 
license for mobile services.  
Zanzibar Telecommunications Limited 
gets a license to operate in Zanzibar. 
 
584 See specifically Part III of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, GN 
NO. 538 OF 2020. 
585 See various sections of the Cybercrimes Act of 2015, ACT NO 14 OF 2015. 
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1996 Former monopoly ventures into a 
mobile telephone 
TTCL gets license for the provision of 
mobile services. 
2003 Passing of Tanzania Communication 
Regulatory Authority Act  
The law establishes the new regulator, 
the TCRA, to regulate the entire 
communications sector, including 
postal services. It also abolishes the 
TCC and TBC. 
2005 End of the TTCL monopoly over fixed 
telecom services  
All firms can now enter the fixed 
network market.  
2005 Introduction of convergence 
licensing framework 
Licensing is now offered based on 
service and technology neutrality. 
Licensees have choices on the type of 
service, technology, and the market 
they wish to enter.  
2006 Introduction of universal services 
obligations 
TCRA to regulate universal services 
together with the Universal 
Communications Services Access Fund 
(UCSAF). 
2010 Enactment of the Electronic and 
Postal Communications Act 
Detailed regulatory rules are enacted 
under the Act and several Regulations 
enacted under the Act. 
2015 Enactment of the Cybercrimes Act 
and the Electronic Transactions Act  
The TCRA mandate now regulates 
cybersecurity and cybercrimes. There 
is now an increase in monitoring and 
control of Tanzania’s cyberspace. 
2018 The Online-contents Regulations 
enacted  
The TCRA mandate now regulates 
online content. This mandate includes 
the monitoring of social media 
content.  
Source: Developed by the researcher 
3.6 Notable Market Features of the Tanzania Telecom Market 
As already explained, Tanzania’s telecom sector currently operates in a liberalized 
environment. This environment is, of course, a result of several factors, including the 
extended policy and legal reforms spanning over two decades. As a result of such 
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reforms, one could notice an increase from just one private firm in 1993 to more than 
ten firms in 2020. Furthermore, one can also see an increase from less than one 
percent to over 80 percent subscriptions of the total population within the same 
period. Apart from policy and legal developments, the effects of a globalized economy 
and favorable investment policy, which attracted investments from foreign firms in 
Tanzania, have contributed to such growth.586 Thus, at present, the sector has the 
following features presented in subsequent sub-sections. 
3.6.1 Increasing Numbers of Providers of Telecom Services  
As of June 2020, Tanzania had fourteen operators licensed to provide communication 
services.587 Of these, seven are active in providing telecommunications services. They 
include Vodacom Tanzania Limited (Vodacom), Airtel Tanzania Limited (Airtel), MIC 
Tanzania Limited (Tigo), Tanzania Telecommunication Company Limited (TTCL), 
Viettel Tanzania Limited (Halotel), Zanzibar Telecommunications Limited (Zantel), 
and Smile Communications Tanzania Limited (Smile).  
Apart from the mentioned firms, others are either new or have not rolled out their 
network services. For example, some of the latest entries include Wiafrica Tanzania 
Limited (Cootel), Mkulima Africa Telecom Company Limited (Amotel-the first MVNO 
in the country, and Azam Telecom (T) Limited, owned by one of the biggest 
companies in Tanzania, Bakhresa group of companies.588 Some have focused more on 
internet data, for example, Smart, Cootel, and Smile, while the rest focus on both 
internet data and voice services. Also, of all these service providers, only TTCL 
provides fixed network services as of 2020. 
3.6.2 Continued Dominance of Three Firms: Vodacom, Tigo, and Airtel 
It is interesting to note that Vodacom, Tigo, and Airtel have dominated the market to 
date despite the increasing number of service providers. These firms were among the 
 
586 See for example OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Tanzania 2013 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013), 
p. 99; UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: The United Republic of Tanzania, Investment Policy Review Series 
(Geneva: United Nations, 2002), p. 16,20. 
587 TCRA, ‘Licensed Operators › Network Services Licences’, Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, 
2020 <https://www.tcra.go.tz/licensing/licensed-operators/network-services-licenses> [accessed 14 May 
2020]. 
588 Daily News Reporter, ‘Azam Mobile Network in Pipeline’, Daily News (Dar es Salaam, 25 June 2018) 
<https://www.dailynews.co.tz/news/2018-06-255b30c5a54d9f5.aspx> [accessed 7 October 2019]. 
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first to enter the Tanzania market. Other entry attempts have either failed to enter or 
failed to expand after successful entry. In its recent study, the TCRA established 
reasons for complicated entry patterns, including entry and expansion barriers, firms’ 
pricing behaviors, and a strong influence of advertisement and branding.589  
The only exception came in 2015 when Halotel brought some competition after 
gaining around 10 percent of market shares within a short time. The entry of Halotel 
was different from all others. In less than two years, it gained almost ten percent of 
market shares. Information from the field indicated the reasons for this exception. 
Firstly, Halotel is owned by the Government of Vietnam with considerable resources 
at its disposal. As a result, it could easily cover the investment costs needed to roll out 
its network in the entire country. Secondly, Halotel had received special attention 
from the authorities, mostly because of the prior political connection. It did not face 
many regulatory hurdles in the rolling of its network. Thirdly, Halotel’s focus on the 
rural community was one of its selling points in garnering subscribers whom other 
operators had left out. 
Apart from Halotel’s entry, there was also a slight decrease in the three firms’ shares 
in 2012 as Zantel tried to raise its share to 10 percent through aggressive promotions. 
This rise, however, was short-lived because Zantel could not keep up with the 
competition. Its shares dropped dramatically, and as of 2019, it only had 2 percent of 
all subscribers.590 Therefore, as Table 3.6-1 shows, the market is concentrated on the 
three firms, even after almost twenty years of liberalization.   
Table 3.6-1 Percentage of market share based on customers’ subscriptions belonging to Vodacom, 























Firm   
Vodaco
m 
41 45 34 36 37 32 31 32 32 33 31 
Tigo 21 22 24 23 27 28 29 28 29 26.3 25 
 
589 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets (Dar es Salaam: 
Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, December 2018), pp. 22–23. 
590 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2019 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2020), p. 3. 
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Airtel 28 27 30 33 30 28 26 27 25 26.9 27 
Total 
shares  
90 94 88 92 96 88 86 87 86 85.9 83 
Others 10 6 12 8 6 12 14 13 14 14.1 17 
Source: Extracted from TCRA communications statistics from Dec 2010 to December 
2020 
3.6.3 Increase in Penetration of Telephony Services  
Access to telephony services in the country has increased significantly, especially after 
the year 2000. For example, according to TCRA, mobile penetration was only 1 
percent in the year 2000.591 Only 100,518 Tanzanians had subscribed to mobile 
services. In 2007, the number of mobile subscriptions increased by nearly eighty-five 
times to around 8.4 million.592 In 2010, the number of mobile network subscriptions 
had almost tripled to 21 million.593 Furthermore, at the end of 2018, telephone 
penetration stood at 81 percent, with over 43.4 million Tanzania people subscribed to 
mobile telephony.594 Table 3.6-2 shows the penetration of telephony services from 
2000 to 20120, given in five years intervals. 
Table 3.6-2 Percentage of telephone penetration per population from 2000 to 2020 
Year 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Telephone penetration % 1 10 50 79 89 
Source: TCRA Communication Statistics from 2000 to 2020  
3.6.4 The Decline of Fixed Network Services 
This study noted a significant decline in fixed network connections in the country. For 
example, in 2000, fixed network penetration stood at 61 percent of all connections.595  
However, while technological advancements saw a massive increase in mobile phone 
penetrations, fixed network connections decreased dramatically. In 2010, fixed 
networks accounted for only 0.82 percent of all connections, further decreasing to 
 
591 TCRA, Telecommunications Statistics from 2000 to 2010. 
592 TCRA, Telecommunications Statistics from 2000 to 2010. 
593 TCRA, Telecommunications Statistics from 2000 to 2010. 
594 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: July-September 2017 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2018). 
595 TCRA, Telecommunications Statistics from 2000 to 2010, pp. 1–3. 
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0.35 percent and 0.2 percent in 2015 and 2020, respectively.596 For example, as of 
March 2020, there were only about 76,000 connections of fixed network services vis-
à-vis 49 million mobile network connections.597  
There are many reasons for such a trend. It was observed that there are only two 
providers with a rollout plan for fixed-line network services; TTCL and Zantel. 
However, both companies have had poor market performance, and hence, they were 
unable to expand their client bases. Zantel is already pulling out of this market. It had 
no single fixed-line connection as of December 2019.598 The TTCL, which is the former 
monopoly, is also not doing well either. It had only 2 percent of all subscribers (both 
fixed and mobile) as of March 2020.599  
The country’s infrastructural challenges also play a significant role in establishing 
fixed-line networks. As of 2015, only 11 percent of Tanzanian land was surveyed.600 
As a result, it becomes difficult to roll out a plan for establishing a physical network 
to prospective customers for the remainder of 90 percent. Furthermore, the former 
monopoly, TTCL, did not invest much in establishing such infrastructure. Thus, 
without prior infrastructures in place, subsequent investment by newcomers becomes 
almost impossible.  
Beyond the mentioned challenges, one must consider consumers’ preference for 
mobile networks, which offer more flexibility. With continued innovations, mobile 
phones now offer beyond conventional calling services. Video streaming, radio 
services, internet access, location-based services, photographing, gaming, and even 
computing services are just a few examples. They give mobile networks an edge over 
fixed-line services. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that many people are 
now attracted to mobile services.  
 
596 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2019. 
597 TCRA, Quarterly Communication Statistics: January to March 2020 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2020), p. 4. 
598 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2019. 
599 TCRA, Quarterly Communication Statistics: January to March 2020, p. 4. 
600 Plans were to see that about 20% of all land is registered by 2020, and 50% by 2025/26. See Ministry of 
Finance and Planning, National Five Years Development Plan 2016/17-2020/21 (Dar es Salaam: 
Government Printers, 2016), p. 73. 
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3.6.5 Limited Access to Internet Services 
In general, there is an increase in access to internet services in the country. For 
example, in December 2018, TCRA recorded 43 percent of internet access. In contrast 
to that, internet access stood at 17 percent in 2012.601 By 2018, over 23 million 
Tanzanians were already accessing the internet. Nonetheless, this number is low 
compared to other regions of the world. For example, developed countries record 
over 121 percent of active mobile broadband internet while the world average stands 
at around 75.2 percent.602 Tanzania is, by these standards, on the lowest side. 
Despite the current growth, access to the internet is primarily through mobile wireless 
internet as there are limited infrastructures for fixed internet services in the country. 
Fixed internet services account for less than one percent, meaning only a handful of 
the Tanzanian population can enjoy broadband services.603 Consequently, only a few 
Tanzanians can enjoy communication services enhanced by broadband internet such 
as VoIP. 
3.6.6 Integration of Communication Services and Mobile Money Services 
Mobile money is perhaps one of the few inventions identifying with the developing 
countries. Whereas European countries rely on traditional banking with cashless 
payment methods such as credit cards, many Tanzanians use their mobile phones for 
the same purposes. Synchronization of mobile money and telecommunication services 
in the country is so advanced that each sim card is a default mobile money account. 
In short, what a bank does, mobile money can do it as well.  
The technology of using mobile phones for financial transactions in developing 
countries has been described to have spread faster than any other technology in 
human history.604 Vodacom was the first telecom firm to introduce mobile money 
 
601 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2018 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2018). 
602 ITU, ‘Key ICT Indicators for Developed and Developing Countries and The World (Totals and 
Penetration Rates 2005-2018)’, p. 2. 
603 Shaban Msafiri Pazi, ‘Assessment of Broadband Access Technologies in Tanzanian Rural Areas’, 
International Journal of Internet of Things, 8.1 (2019), 1–9 (p. 7). 
604 Bossi Masamila, ‘State of Mobile Banking in Tanzania and Security Issues’, International Journal of 
Network Security & Its Applications, 6.4 (2014), 53–64 (p. 53) 
<https://doi.org/10.5121/ijnsa.2014.6405>. 
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services in Tanzania in 2008.605 The whole idea was to enable any Vodacom network 
user to send and receive money through a simple text-based transaction. Mobile 
banking has made life easy. It is now possible to make online payments for various 
services such as settling utility bills, various central and local government fees, levies, 
taxes, and subscription-based services. The same is convenient for daily transactions 
such as payment for groceries. As a plus, interoperability between mobile money and 
banks has been enhanced. Transferring money from a mobile account to a bank 
account and vice versa is less than a one-minute task.  
The use of mobile money service is easy because it requires no internet connection 
unless one opts to use smartphone applications. Withdrawal of cash is possible 
through agents spread all over the country. In big cities like Dar es Salaam, Arusha, 
and Mwanza, businesspersons and firms that do not accept mobile money payments 
are becoming exceptions to the general rule. Because of its simplicity, Vodacom’s 
mobile money was well received. Other companies had followed suit. Thus, MIC 
Tanzania Limited (Tigo) runs Tigo Pesa,606 Airtel Tanzania Limited runs Airtel 
Money,607 Zanzibar Telecommunication Limited (Zantel) operates Ezy Pesa,608 Viettel 
Tanzania Limited (Halotel) operates Halopesa,609 and TTCL runs TTCL Pesa.610 
The introduction of mobile money services is revolutionary because it brings financial 
inclusivity for those long forgotten by the traditional banking sector. However, such 
innovation may also have regulatory and competition concerns. For example, it has to 
be clear which aspects of mobile money fall under the telecom or financial sectors in 
terms of regulation. The role of each regulator (the telecom and financial regulators) 
must be clear. Furthermore, the impact of mobile money services on assessing the 
sector’s competitiveness also comes into question. Will the overall market powers in 
 
605 Masamila, p. 53. 
606 Tigo Tanzania, ‘Tigo Pesa’, Tigo Tanzania, 2020 <https://www.tigo.co.tz/tigo-pesa> [accessed 19 
February 2020]. 
607 ‘Tanzania’s Leading Provider of Prepaid, Postpaid Mobile, Internet Services & Mobile Money.’, Airtel 
<http://www.airtel.co.tz/> [accessed 19 February 2020]. 
608 Zantel, ‘Zantel Ezypesa’, 2020 <https://zantel.co.tz/ezypesa> [accessed 19 February 2020]. 
609 Halotel, ‘Halotel’, 2020 <https://halotel.co.tz/halopesa> [accessed 19 February 2020]. 
610 TTCL, ‘TTCL Pesa - TTCL’, 2020 <https://www.ttcl.co.tz/ttclpesa_index.asp> [accessed 19 February 
2020]. 
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mobile money impact overall competition in the sector? The question is essential as 
the wall between mobile money and network services is not clear to end-users.  
Some of these concerns, such as clarity of regulatory roles, have been partly 
addressed in the Competition Regulations. However, there is insufficient 
jurisprudence on the relationship between telecom and mobile money services, 
including possible anti-competitive effects. Note that for a long time, the 
interoperability of mobile money services did not exist. The first mover, Vodacom 
Tanzania, had the absolute advantage of attracting many new customers. It is only in 
2016 that Vodacom introduced interoperability. By then, it had more than 50 percent 
of shares of the mobile money market.611 This factor alone gives Vodacom significant 
powers, which can prove useful in its competitive strategies.  
3.7 Market Structures and Shares 
The TCRA provides quarterly reports based on the type of markets it has defined in 
the sector. Regulation 15 of Competition Regulations requires the Authority to define 
markets in terms of product and geography and substitutability of services on the 
demand and supply side.612 In so doing, the Authority acknowledges the use of the 
Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price (“SSNIP”) method to define 
relevant markets.613 The SSNIP, the Authority argues, intends “to arrive at the smallest 
product group and the smallest geographic area within which a hypothetical 
monopolist supplying the focal product would be able to sustain prices above 
competitive levels profitably.”614  
However, because of challenges inherent to the sector, the Authority does not use this 
method. The reasons are that it demands intensive data and information. Moreover, 
the Authority argues that it is hard to use it in the sector because it is difficult to 
understand “the cross-elasticities of demand for all products and services.”615 
 
611 Jason Blechman, Faith Odhiambo, and Simon Roberts, Competition Dynamics in Mobile Money Markets 
in Tanzania, Working Paper, 22/2017 (University of Johannesburg: Centre for Competition, Regulation 
and Economic Development, Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, 2017), p. 33. 
612 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, GN. NO 26 OF 2018. 
613 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 13. 
614 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 13. 
615 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 13. 
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Furthermore, the Authority opines that it is impractical for one firm to “raise the price 
of one good and watch the resultant change in quantity for the other goods.”616 
Finally, the Authority holds that there is a “lack of strict guideline as to the degree of 
a price change that might be expected to cause a change in a potential competitive 
good or time frame in which such a change might occur.”617  
As a result of these challenges, the Authority defines markets in the following ways. 
Firstly, it receives information from all service providers on the type and nature of 
their services. Secondly, it groups those services into two major groups, wholesale 
services and retail services. Thirdly, the Authority puts all substitutable goods or 
services as belonging to one market for each group. Thus, the Authority defines a 
relevant market as “all those products and or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by consumer, because of the products’ 
characteristics, prices, and their intended use.”618  
Based on the Authority’s definition of markets, this section briefly looks at the existing 
markets and corresponding share structures. Accordingly, there are two categories of 
markets. The first category is the retail market, which includes all telecom firms’ 
services directly offered to their customers. In this category, there are the following 
four markets: voice call originating, short messaging, mobile money services, and 
data services. The second category of market relates to wholesale services. There are 
four markets: wholesale broadband services, broadband transmission services, passive 
infrastructures, and call termination. 
3.7.1 Retail Markets  
3.7.1.1 Voice Call Originating  
According to the TCRA, the voice call originating market includes subscription shares 
to the network and comprises on-net calls, off-net calls, and international calls. 
Regarding subscriptions, it is clear that Vodacom has been dominant for many years. 
 
616 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 13. 
617 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 13. 
618 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 14. 
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Until 2005, it commanded more than 35 percent of all subscriptions. 619  The 35 
percent market share is the threshold for determining dominance in the sector.620 It 
was only the entry of Halotel into the market in 2015 that diluted Vodacom’s 
dominance.621  
Halotel’s entry into the Tanzania market was exciting. Having rolled its network plan 
only in 2015, it was the first company to have laid 18,000 kilometers (km) of fiber 
optic cable covering all 26 mainland Tanzania regions. Such grand entry saw Halotel 
installing over 2500 antenna towers covering almost 95 percent of the Tanzania 
population. It covered mostly rural dwellers. If anything, Halotel is a game-changer. It 
has brought about vigorous competition in the market. With only two years of 
existence, it garnered 10 percent of all subscriptions. Nonetheless, Vodacom still 
enjoys the highest number of subscribers compared to other operators. Tigo and 
Airtel closely follow Vodacom in this respect.622 Subscriptions alone are not enough to 
give the exact picture of the market. The Authority also looks further into other 
factors such as voice calls traffic and revenue from voice call services. For example, it 
came out clear that Vodacom has been commanding 37 percent of all voice call traffic 
and 41 percent of revenue from the same services.623 As a result, the TCRA declared 
that the voice originating market is concentrated, with Vodacom and Tigo having 
significant market powers.624  
3.7.1.2 Short Messaging Services 
The TCRA has established that Short Messaging Services (SMS) and Over the Top 
services (OTT) belong to different markets. Hence, there is a need to undertake an 
independent examination of the SMS market. Here, again, based on the TCRA 
statistics, Vodacom and Tigo have continued to dominate the market, each with more 
than the 35 percent threshold.625 When it comes to revenue shares on SMS, however, 
 
619 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics April-June 2015 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2015). 
620 See Section 3 of The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010. 
621 See the TCRA communications statistics from 2015 to 2020. 
622 See Table 3.6-1 for details on the percentage of market shares base on customers’ subscriptions from 
2010-2019. 
623 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, pp. 20 & 21. 
624 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 23. 
625 Data obtain from TCRA statics reports from 2010 to 2019. 
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a different picture emerges. Tigo has more than half of all shares, leaving the rest 
behind.626 As a result of its analysis, TCRA declared the SMS market concentrated as 
of 2018, with Tigo having significant market powers over the others.627  
The TCRA also provides statistics for local and international markets. Whereas 
Vodacom leads in terms of subscriptions, Tigo leads in terms of revenues collected. In 
total, Vodacom, Tigo, and Airtel lead the market by over 98 percent, both in terms of 
subscriptions and revenue. Table 3.7-1 presents the latest breakdown in the SMS 
market. 
Table 3.7-1 Shares (in percentage) of local and international SMS and revenue shares of local SMS as 
of December 2017 
Year  SMS share as of December 2017 Revenue Shares as of 
December 2017 
Operator  Local SMS International SMS Local SMS628 
Vodacom  46 41 14 
Tigo 40 38 57 
Airtel 11 20 20 
Others 3 1 9 
Source: TCRA’s Competition Assessment Report of 2018629 
3.7.1.3 Mobile Money Services 
We have already noted that mobile money technology spread in Tanzania at a very 
high speed. Following regulatory directives, each telecom company has to establish a 
separate unit to run mobile money services. Vodacom Tanzania, the pioneer of mobile 
money in Tanzania, has remained the leading operator with the highest number of 
mobile money subscriptions despite stiff competition from other providers. There is 
no official data on mobile money subscriptions from the TCRA before 2015. However, 
other sources have indicated that Vodacom enjoyed over 50 percent of all mobile 
 
626 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 33. 
627 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 35. 
628 Note that the TCRA does not provide an assessment of international SMS.  
629 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 35. 
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money subscribers in 2013.630 The available data from 2015 still places Vodacom at 
the top of the board. The three first telecommunication companies have continued to 
enjoy over 90 percent of the mobile money market.631 Table 3.7-2, for example, shows 
subscriptions in the past five years with Vodacom leading the way. 
Table 3.7-2 Shares (in percentage) of subscription of mobile money per firm from 2015 
to 2020 
Firm  2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Vodacom M-Pesa 45 42 37 39 39 41 
Tigo Pesa 30 34 31 32 30 28 
Airtel Money 23 23 27 21 20 20 
Others  2 1 5 8 11 11 
Source: Extracted from TCRA communication statistics from 2015-2020 
Apart from the subscription, Vodacom is commanding a significant share in the 
volume and value of transactions. As a result, the TCRA declared both Vodacom and 
Tigo to have SMP in the mobile money industry.632 Table 3.7-3 shows shares of 
volume and value of mobile money transactions in the year 2017. 
Table 3.7-3 Mobile money shares (in percentage) in volume and value for 2017 
Firm  Volume of Transactions Value of Transaction 
Vodacom M-Pesa 45 48 
Tigo Pesa 38 36 
Airtel Money  10 15 
Others 7 1 
Source: TCRA’s Competition Assessment Report of 2018633 
3.7.1.4 Data Services Market  
Data services form an integral part of telecom services in the country. Because of the 
lack of infrastructure for fixed data services, most people get data services through 
 
630 CGAP, ‘Tanzania’s Mobile Money Revolution’, 2015 
<https://www.cgap.org/research/infographic/tanzanias-mobile-money-revolution> [accessed 19 
February 2020]. 
631 See for example in TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2016 (Dar es Salaam: 
TCRA, 2017); TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2017 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 
2018); TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2018. 
632 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, pp. 31 & 32. 
633 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, pp. 26–28. 
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wireless networks. For example, in 2018, more than 23 million people had access to 
the internet.634 Only 0.7 percent had access through fixed networks.635 The rest 
accessed the internet using wireless internet networks mostly provided by telecom 
firms.636 
It follows that telecom firms capitalize on data services. Again, the leaders here are 
the three companies, Vodacom, Tigo, and Airtel.637 There is a significant rise in TTCL 
and Halotel shares in this market for varied reasons. In this study’s opinion, the 
increase in the two companies’ shares comes from providing cheaper internet services, 
thereby attracting customers interested in data services. TTCL has the added 
advantage of being the former monopoly with the exclusive right to establish fixed 
infrastructures. It has, for this reason, continued to provide fixed wired and wireless 
data services. As a result, it commands a significant share in the data market 
compared to other markets. Halotel’s rise in shares in the data market results from its 
cheap data bundles and intensive penetration in rural areas. 
Table 3.7-4 Shares (in percentage) of subscription and revenue from internet services as 
of December 2019 
Firm Subscription shares Revenue Shares 
Vodacom 35 24 
Tigo 37 35 
Airtel 24 16 
Others 4 25 
Source: TCRA’s Competition Assessment Report of 2018638 
As Table 3.7-4 clearly shows, it is only in data services that other firms challenge the 
three firms (Vodacom, Tigo, and Airtel). For example, Halotel had a 13 percent share 
of all revenues from data services, while TTCL retained 12 percent. Data service is the 
only market with no concentration and which no firm with SMP exists.639 
 
634 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2018, p. 15. 
635 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2018, p. 15. 
636 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2018, p. 15. 
637 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 25. 
638 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 25. 
639 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 27. 
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3.7.2 Wholesale Markets  
3.7.2.1 Wholesale Broadband Services 
It is interesting to note that no telecom firm provides wholesale broadband services in 
Tanzania. Instead, the wholesale broadband market is duopolistic, with only two 
companies offering such services; Seacom Tanzania Limited and Eastern African 
Submarine Cable (EASSy). Seacom Tanzania is part of the Seacom company, a 
privately-owned submarine cable company system that connects Africa to the rest of 
the world. It has points of connection in Africa and beyond, for example, in London, 
Frankfurt, and Amsterdam.640  
EASSy, the second provider of broadband services, is a submarine cable with more 
than 10 Terabytes per second (Tbps) capacity.641 It is the first of its kind to link East 
and South Africa to the world. Thus, it connects South Africa in the south with Sudan 
at the northern point.642 There are connections for Mozambique, Comoros, 
Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti.643 The two companies, Seacom 
and EASSy, have a duopoly over wholesale broadband services. Tanzania telecom 
firms have to procure from either of them and, at times, from both to secure 
continued connectivity.644 This structure is not healthy for a competitive data market 
because the two firms are price makers. Consequently, there are complaints about 
high data prices in the country.645 
 
640 See Seacom, ‘About Seacom’ (2019) <https://seacom.com/about> accessed 28 February 2020. 
641 See African Development Bank, ‘EASSy: The Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System’ (African 
Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow, 13 March 2019) 
<https://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/selected-projects/eassy-the-eastern-africa-submarine-
cable-system-156> accessed 28 February 2020. 
642 See African Development Bank, ‘EASSy: The Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System’ (African 
Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow, 13 March 2019) 
<https://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/selected-projects/eassy-the-eastern-africa-submarine-
cable-system-156> accessed 28 February 2020. 
643 See African Development Bank, ‘EASSy: The Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System’ (African 
Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow, 13 March 2019) 
<https://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/selected-projects/eassy-the-eastern-africa-submarine-
cable-system-156> accessed 28 February 2020. 
644 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 36. 
645 A recent published study shows that data prices in Tanzania are the highest in the region with 1GB 
averaging above 5USD. See Stefen Kafeero, ‘Ugandans Paying Highest for Mobile Data in E. Africa - 
Survey’, Daily Monitor (Kampala, Uganda, 22 September 2019) 
<https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Ugandans-paying-highest-for-mobile-data-in-E--
Africa/688334-5282268-s90bmv/index.html> [accessed 3 March 2020]. 
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3.7.2.2 Broadband Transmission Services 
The transmission of data services forms a separate market. The submarine cable 
systems deliver connectivity only to the designated point of connection for specific 
countries. It is upon telecom firms to transmit data to their points of connection. In 
Tanzania, the National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB) transmits data from 
submarine cable providers to the operators.  
The NICTBB is a national fiber optic cable network constructed to enhance the 
national ICT’s policy and promote e-learning, e-government, e-health, and related 
services. The total planned coverage is 100,000 km to cover all Tanzania villages, to 
be completed in different phases.646 Two phases of NICTBB construction are complete, 
covering 7560 km in 21 regions. NICTBB is connected to international undersea 
cables such as SEACOM and East Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy).647 
Even though the government owns NICTBB, it is under the management of the TTCL. 
The government is the sole shareholder of the TTCL. Thus, TTCL participates in data 
services transmission (where it leases or sells transmission capacities to telecom 
firms) and in the retail market of data services. Therefore, TTCL, in a joint venture 
with NICTBB, has a monopoly over the transmission of data services. As some 
telecom firms noted during this study, this fact gives TTCL an unfair competitive 
advantage in the retail data market.  
The other aspect of transmission is that of last-mile connectivity. Last-mile or last-
kilometers is a term widely used in the telecom sector (as well as in other network 
industries). It means the last part of the network that delivers services to customer 
premises. In the old times of the PSTN, last-mile meant copper wires that connected 
the customer premises to the nearest network exchange.648 As we have already noted, 
TTCL did not command significant market share and, therefore, did not establish 
significant last-mile connections during its high monopoly time. Nevertheless, 
 
646 Shaban Msafiri Pazi and Chris Chatwin, ‘Assessing the Economic Benefits and Challenges of Tanzania’s 
National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB)’, International Journal of Information and Computer Science, 
2.7 (2013), 117-126. (p. 118). 
647 Pazi and Chatwin, p. 118. 
648 S. C Strother, Telecommunications Cost Management (Boston: Artech House, 2002), pp. 168–69. 
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recognizing the importance of last-mile connections, the government contracted 
Viettel Tanzania Limited (Halotel) to lay down about 18,000 km of such connections 
to region and district centers.649 So far, Halotel has already established 16,000 km of 
fiber cable.650 However, the cable is unavailable for leasing or sale, and instead, it is 
used only by Halotel for its data services. 651 This structure gives Halotel a competitive 
advantage, especially in rural areas. 
3.7.2.3 Passive Infrastructure 
Passive infrastructure relates to infrastructures responsible for hosting and 
transmitting network services, for example, transmission towers. Initially, telecom 
firms were actively involved in this market by establishing their towers.652 In 2012, for 
example, Vodacom, Airtel, and Zantel owned their towers by 100 percent.653  It was 
only Tigo that had outsourced to Helios towers.654 Today, however, the market has 
changed considerably. Outsourcing of towering services has become a common trend, 
the major tower operator being HHT Infraco Limited (Ltd).655 HHT Infraco Ltd 
commanded nearly 40 percent share of all towers as of 2017.656 There is no telecom 
firm, which owns a significant part of towers to harm competition. Furthermore, the 
firms, which own the towers lease them to each other’s on net off basis without actual 
movement of cash.657  
3.7.2.4 Call Termination  
Call termination happens when one firm facilitates a call from another firm to its 
network. For example, if a customer from Vodacom calls Tigo, Tigo has the right to 
terminate the call. Under the Tanzanian framework, it is the calling party that pays. It 
 
649 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 37. 
650 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 37. 
651 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 37. 
652 GSMA, Powering Telecoms: East Africa Market Analysis Sizing the Potential for Green Telecoms in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda (London: GSMA, 2012), p. 14. 
653 GSMA, Powering Telecoms: East Africa Market Analysis Sizing the Potential for Green Telecoms in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, p. 14. 
654 GSMA, Powering Telecoms: East Africa Market Analysis Sizing the Potential for Green Telecoms in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, p. 14. 
655 HH Infraco Limited is a subsidiary of Helios Towers, one of the three independent towers operators in 
the Africa. See HHT Infraco Ltd, ‘Project Detail - HTT Infraco Limited’, 2020 <https://www.fmo.nl/project-
detail/43223> [accessed 28 February 2020]. 
656 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 39. 
657 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 39. 
 
 128  
means that the receiving party, that is, each firm, has a monopoly over termination.658 
Therefore, the competitive advantage would arise when one firm has such scales such 
that it receives more calls than the others. In any case, the regulation of termination 
is done ex-ante to avoid anti-competitive results.659  
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter intended to introduce the telecommunications sector in Tanzania. At 
first, it traced the early days of the sector that saw the birth and growth of monopoly. 
It then looked at various reforms that the country had to embark on because 
monopoly did not prove efficient. As a result of these reforms, the sector was 
liberalized. The doors for private investment became wide open. To ensure the 
transition from monopoly to competition, the government introduced regulation. 
Regulation saw the establishment of the sector regulators, which also doubled as 
competition enforcement agencies. To a large extent, the regulators became 
instrumental in the liberalization process and facilitation of competition. Therefore, 
the sector is now fully liberalized, with a monopoly existing only in the wholesale 
transmission of broadband internet.  
This study must mention a critical lesson at this point; that is, market systems can 
deliver greater efficiency than monopolies. One ought to consider this. Telecom 
services in Tanzania came with colonialism, gaining prominence at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Throughout the colonial era and after independence, the 
telecom sector was monopolized. Monopoly continued until 1993. Under the state 
command, the sector could achieve only 0.32 connections per one hundred 
inhabitants for almost one entire century. However, when the government 
reintroduced market-based policies, new investments arrived. Competition 
intensified. Innovation increased. New technologies advanced. New products and 
services improved. As a result, connections skyrocketed to 50 percent of the 
population in just ten years. In 20 years, connections already stand at around 80 
percent.  
 
658 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 40. 
659 Chapter three provides details on termination.  
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Such developments depict what a market economy could deliver in contrast with a 
command economy, even though it does not yet operate at its optimal level. One can 
argue that these developments were a mere reflection of the global telecom 
developments. That is true. However, it is also true that rapid developments and 
technological advancements in telecommunications resulted from the liberalization 
process that paved the way for the market economy. Thus, Tanzanian consumers 
stand to benefit more if the sector adheres to market economy principles. 
Even though the presented figures are promising, the chapter notes that the sector 
still has some concerns. The telecom market does not operate at its optimal level 
because some parts are still concentrated. Vodacom, Tigo, and Airtel command more 
than 80 percent of all shares in almost all markets, with Vodacom and Tigo taking the 
lead. The TCRA, rightly so, describes this pattern as a result of entry barriers. Thus, 
the authority acknowledges a problem worth examining to ensure a highly 
competitive sector. However, the problem is beyond entry barriers. Other concerns go 
to the root of firms’ behaviors. They require ex-post intervention. The Authority’s ex-
ante regulation has not done much in this regard. Thus, the question of its efficacy, 
especially when it has ex-post enforcement powers, comes to light. Chapter six of this 
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Chapter 4:  Legal and Institutional Framework  
“The institutional governance arrangements for regulators are critical for 
assisting or impeding the social, environmental and economic outcomes 
that it was set up for.”660 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that Tanzania had to reintroduce market 
policies after the failure of socialism. Legal and institutional reforms became 
necessary to support the new policy shift. It was, so to say, a change of economic and 
legal system and operational cultures. In the telecom sector, it was sector regulation 
that had to effect these changes. However, one must note, it was not a comfortable 
journey to introduce, develop, and perfect these changes. At times, it became 
necessary to have several attempts to introduce and reintroduce regulatory rules and 
design and redesign the institutions. As a framework for regulating the sector, we 
have today a product of over twenty years of policy rehearsals, legislative 
assignments, and institutional developments.  
This chapter introduces the Legal and institutional framework that regulates the 
sector. The objective is to give a detailed picture of how regulation takes place. The 
chapter focuses only on TCRA’s ex-ante regulation. The ex-post regulation of 
competition law is presented in the next chapter. Nonetheless, this chapter also looks 
at the competition dimensions of the ex-ante regulation. For instance, it shows the 
extent to which regulatory rules promote or distort competition.  
Therefore, the chapter takes the following format. Firstly, it briefly provides for 
constitutional aspects of telecommunications regulation. Secondly, it looks at some of 
the regulatory frameworks, which impact competition in one way or another. Among 
others, it looks at the regulation of licensing, access, interconnection, radiofrequency, 
 
660 OECD, The Governance of Regulators, p. 18. 
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tariff, quality of service, and consumer protection. Thirdly, it introduces and describes 
various institutions responsible for the regulation.  
4.2 The Constitutional Aspects of Telecommunications Regulation  
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania does not have direct provisions 
for regulating the telecommunications sector. However, a few provisions may impact 
the country’s policies, generally on the entire economy and specifically on 
telecommunication regulation. For instance, we have seen in chapter three how 
Tanzania adopted socialist policies and their impact in the sector. This chapter will 
also show how the government wants to exercise control of the sector through 
regulation. This policy approach is a product of the constitutional provisions that 
maintain Tanzania as a socialist state, almost 30 years after its economic reforms to 
reintroduce the market economy.  
Article 3(1) declares Tanzania a socialist state. Article 9 of the Constitutional upholds 
the policy of socialism and self-reliance. By upholding this policy, the Constitution 
directs Tanzania to manage its economy as a socialist state. For instance, Article 9(d) 
and (j) require the state to plan its national economy, meaning that the economic 
activities should not rely on market operations but the dictates of the state. To avoid 
any doubt, Article 9(k) states that the country should be governed by principles of 
“democracy and socialism.” Tanzania followed these constitutional principles to the 
letter in crafting national economic policies until its economic reforms in the mid-
1980s. Since then, Tanzania has been shifting towards a market economy. However, 
it has retained some policies that promote state control in the economy, including the 
telecommunication sector. This, it is argued, comes from the constitutional provisions 
examined above.  
Constitutional aspects of telecommunication regulation can also be understood in 
light of fundamental rights and freedoms, mainly as provided in Articles 16 and 18. 
Article 16(1) provides for the right to the protection of private communications. 
Regarding Article 18, the Constitution establishes the right to freedom of expression. 
The Article establishes that every person has the right to express his or her idea, the 
right to seek, receive and disseminate information, and the right to have protection 
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against interference of private communications. The Constitution directs the 
parliament to enact laws to give effects to these protections. Regulatory laws are 
among those established in response to these provisions. For example, as this chapter 
reveals, the TCRA has been established to regulate telecommunication-related 
services. Thus, it can be argued, the constitutional mandate to regulate 
telecommunications services comes from these provisions as well. 
4.3 The Legal Framework for Telecommunications Regulation   
The framework for regulating the sector is extensive. This work cannot afford to 
investigate each in detail. Thus, it focuses only on the major frameworks that, in one 
way or another, have an impact on competition. This section looks at the regulation 
of licensing, access, interconnection, radiofrequency spectrum, tariff, quality of 
service, and consumer protection. In examining this framework, reference is made to 
mainly two legislation central to telecommunications regulations: The Tanzania 
Communications Regulatory Authority Act of 2003 and the Electronic and Postal 
Communications Act of 2010. Under these two Acts are over two dozen Rules and 
Regulations that form part of the legal framework under examination. 
4.3.1 The Licensing Framework 
Licensing of telecommunications services is one of the powerful regulatory tools in 
the sector. The most obvious goal of licensing is to grant authorizations for service 
provision. Beyond this objective, licensing can also be an instrument of controlling 
and shaping telecommunication markets, for example, through controls on entry or 
local participation.661 For investment protection purposes, licensing can also act as a 
private contract between the government and service providers to secure investment 
rights.662 Besides, it is not exceptional to have licenses for purposes of extracting fees 
and levies.663  
 
661 Anne Flanagan, ‘Authorization and Licensing’, in Telecommunications Law and Regulation, ed. by Ian 
Walden, Fifth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 285–380 (pp. 285–86). 
662 Anne Flanagan, p. 286. 
663 Anne Flanagan, p. 290. 
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Beyond the mentioned objectives, it is usual, especially in developing countries, to use 
licenses to set out rolling-out obligations to ensure equitable distribution of 
communication services.664 Thus, it is without a doubt that licensing is applied to 
achieve many objectives. As Beatrice and Sydney Webb noted, albeit in a non-
communications context,  
“The device of licensing—that is, the requirement that any person desiring to pursue 
a particular occupation shall first obtain specific permission from a governing 
authority—may be used to attain many different ends. The license may be merely an 
occasion for extracting a fee or levying a tax. It may be an instrument for registering 
all those who are following a particular occupation, in order, for some reason or 
another, to ensure their being brought under public notice. It may be a device for 
limiting the numbers of those so engaged, or for selecting them according to their 
possession of certain qualifications. Finally, the act of licensing may be the means of 
imposing special rules upon the occupation, or of more easily enforcing the 
fulfilment either of these special rules or of the general law of the land.”665 
Tanzania’s licensing framework is governed by the Electronic and Postal 
Communications Act, together with its Licensing Regulations of 2018.666 It regulates 
entry to telecommunications markets, operations of firms in the market, and their 
exit. This section sheds light on how licensing works in the sector.   
4.3.1.1 Licensing Categories  
Generally, the literature suggests the presence of three licensing regimes in the 
telecom sector; individual licenses, class licenses (or general authorization), and the 
absence of any licensing requirements.667 Whereas individual licenses are limited to 
specific operators, general authorizations or class licenses entitle all qualified 
 
664 Arturo Muente-Kunigami and Juan Navas-Sabater, Options to Increase Access to Telecommunications 
Services in Rural and Low-Income Areas (Washington, D.C: World Bank Publications, 2010), pp. 27–28. 
665 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The History of Liquor Licensing in England Principally from 1700 to 
1830 (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1903), p. 4. 
666 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Licensing) Regulations, GN NO 57 OF 2018. 
667 Blackman and Srivastava, p. 65; Hank Intven, Jeremy Oliver, and Erdgardo Sepúlveda, 
Telecommunications Regulation Handbook. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, infoDev Program, 2000), pp. 2–
10; Tim Schwarz and David Satola, Telecommunications Legislation in Transitional and Developing 
Economies, World Bank Technical Paper, no. 489 (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2000), p. 4. 
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personnel to offer authorized services.668 It is possible to have a regime that requires 
no licensing, especially when the sector is already fully liberalized.669 World trends 
indicate a shift from individual licenses to general authorizations.670 For example, a 
telecom firm does not need an individual license to offer network services in the EU 
framework.671 Article 6 of the Authorization Directive provides general authorizations 
and conditions in which such authorizations may be limited.672  
Many developing economies, however, are still upholding individual licenses.673 
Tanzania is not an exception. According to the Licensing Regulations of 2018, there 
are two licensing regimes; individual licenses and class licenses. Under the category 
of individual license, there are at least four essential licenses, Network facility license, 
Network services license, Application services license, and radiofrequency license.  
4.3.1.1.1 Network Facility License  
To understand this license, we must first ascertain the meaning of a network facility. 
Section 3 of the EPOCA and Regulation 3 of Licensing Regulations define network 
facility as an element or combination of physical infrastructure elements, which either 
alone or in connection with another is used to provide network services. Network 
facilities, however, do not include customer premises. Thus, network facilities mean 
physical infrastructures that enable a firm to provide network services. Therefore, a 
network facility license is a type of license that allows the holder to establish such 
communication infrastructure. It permits the holder, for example, to establish 
submarine cables, fiber optics, towers, ducts, switching centers, and satellites.  
4.3.1.1.2 Network Services License  
Network services refer to the actual process of transmitting data for communication 
purposes. Section 3 of the EPOCA defines network service as “the carrying of 
information in the form of speech or other sound, data, text or images, by means of 
 
668 Intven, Oliver, and Sepúlveda, pp. 2–10. 
669 Intven, Oliver, and Sepúlveda, pp. 2–10. 
670 Blackman and Srivastava, p. 63. 
671 Anne Flanagan, p. 286. 
672 See Art 6 of the ‘Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on the Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Authorisation Directive)’, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 108, 2002, 21. 
673 Blackman and Srivastava, p. 63. 
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guided or unguided electromagnetic energy.” Network Service License provides 
holders with the right to network access codes and interconnection capabilities. This 
license, it is argued, is the primary license permitting the holder to provide network 
services. This license permits the provision of network services only, for example, 
virtual electronic services. If a firm holding this license also desires to own 
communication infrastructure, which is typical for many telecom firms, then a 
network license facility becomes necessary.  
4.3.1.1.3 Application Services License  
Both the EPOCA and Licensing Regulations do not define application service. 
However, both Section 3 and Regulation 3 of the EPOCA and Licensing Regulation 
define an application services license as a license that allows the provision of 
application services. Regulation 3 of the Licensing Regulations hints that application 
services include all services provided “by means of one or more network services.” 
Examples of such services are in the First Schedule to the Licensing Regulations. 
Thus, an application services license allows the provision of international 
connectivity/bandwidth regardless of the technology used, for example, by using 
satellite or submarine cables. Also, it allows the provision of public voice and 
messaging services, internet services, internet telephony, data services, and tracking 
services. Under this license, it is possible to establish private networks, virtual 
networks, or reselling of communications services to end consumers.  
4.3.1.1.4 Radio Frequency Spectrum User License 
Access to and use of radiofrequency require a separate license under the Radio 
Frequency Regulations of 2018.674 Regulation 4 prohibits using radio frequency 
spectrum or any part thereof without the TCRA’s authorization. Thus, telecom firms 
must also apply for this license as provided in Regulation 26. Failure to procure this 
license, Regulation 37(1) of the Radio Frequency Regulations provides, may lead to 
fines or imprisonment of not less than twelve months. 
 
674 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Radio Communication and Frequency Spectrum) Regulations, 
GN. NO 24 OF 2018. 
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4.3.1.1.5 Class License and Other Licenses  
Apart from individual licenses already discussed, there are scenarios in which the 
Authority may issue class licenses. Section 3 of the EPOCA defines class license as the 
Authority’s declaration “authorizing a class of persons to provide electronic 
communication services subject to requirements as may be determined by the 
Authority.” According to Section 23(1) of the EPOCA and Regulation 40 of Licensing 
Regulations, a class license may be issued for several activities, including dealing with 
electronic equipment such as construction, installing, and electronic equipment 
maintenance. Also, it may be issued for importation, distribution, and selling of 
communication equipment. Dealing with V-SAT services also requires a class license. 
Furthermore, it may be issued for radio communications services, Global Marine 
Distress Safety Systems (GMDSS), or electronic numbering resources.  
4.3.1.2 Licensing Practices and Principles  
The law has established practices and principles that govern the licensing process. 
Such principles intend to achieve several objectives. They include promoting 
competitive licensing, embracing technological changes in the sector, promoting 
market entry and competition, and controlling the utilization of issued licenses. The 
next parts present essential practices and principles. 
4.3.1.2.1 Converged Framework 
Since 2005, the TCRA offers licenses under the converged framework.675 The 
converged framework develops from the convergence of communications services 
that have torn down walls between information and communication technologies. 
This framework observes the principles of technology and service neutrality. 
Technology neutrality allows telecom firms to adopt whatever technology is 
convenient to deliver their services as consumers demand. As for service neutrality, 
the framework allows licensees to decide on the type of services to offer as 
 
675 Raynold Mfungahema, ‘Policy and Regulatory Approach on The Next Generation Networks: The Case of 
Tanzania’ (presented at the ITU-Regional Workshop on the Next Generation Networks (NGN), Markham 
Suite Hotel, Dar es Salaam, 2006), pp. 17–18 <https://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/worksem/ngn/200610/presentations/npr-p2.pdf> [accessed 17 September 2019]. 
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determined by the firm’s capacity, business orientation, and service needs.676 Thus, a 
firm can decide only to provide communication facilities or to enter fully into telecom 
services using the technology of its choice within the region of its preference.  
A converged licensing framework is suitable for competition promotion because it 
widens entry possibilities. For example, small firms may only choose certain services 
to test waters before the full entry. The framework also provides room for specialized 
services or services that depend on other providers. For example, it is through this 
licensing framework that virtual networks are possible. In short, the framework is 
conducive to promote competition hence benefits consumers with expanded choices 
at presumably better prices.  
4.3.1.2.2 Market Segmentation  
Regulation 9(1)-(4) of the Licensing Regulations allows licenses based on market 
segmentation. There are four market segments; international, national, regional, and 
district markets. International licenses serve international markets, while national 
licenses serve the whole of Tanzania. A licensee serves up to ten geographical regions 
with a regional license, while with a district license, a licensee may serve up to three 
geographical districts. The segmentation accommodates different firms with different 
market capabilities and hence, facilitates entry as well as competition. Well-equipped 
firms with sufficient resources are welcome to start in the international market. As for 
start-ups, for example, the district or regional market may be a good option.  
4.3.1.2.3 Competitive Licensing 
Licenses are offered under a competitive framework as provided in Regulation 20(1) 
of the Licensing Regulations. This framework replaces licensing based on government 
discretions and gives preference to those firms with requisite capacities. Rooms for 
extraneous considerations, for example, political connection or financial influences, 
are reduced. If all goes well, at least on a theoretical level, it is expected that only 
those firms with the requisite capacity will compete for and acquire the required 
 
676 Chris Kosmopoulos, ‘Why Telcos Are Acquiring Ad Tech and Media Companies’, Marfeel, 2018 
<https://www.marfeel.com/blog/why-telcos-are-acquiring-ad-tech-and-media-companies/> [accessed 18 
September 2019]; Spanier, p. 1. 
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licenses. However, the same framework may end up favoring those who are already 
strong in the market. As a result, the framework may also hinder entry because only 
those already well-established are likely to win.  
4.3.1.2.4 Restricted Disposition  
As Regulation 4(1) of Licensing Regulations provides, there is a restricted disposition 
of licenses. Disposition is widely defined by Regulation 4(2) to include any attempt to 
assign, transfer, dispose of any rights or obligations, or in any manner, alienate the 
license or any part thereof.  In the same spirit, Regulations 23&24 of the Licensing 
Regulations prohibit a licensee from changing its share structure without first 
notifying the Authority. Once issued, the license does not become an absolute private 
property as the Authority continues to exercise control over it despite complicated 
procedures and processes in the application and considerable fees.  
4.3.1.3 Licensing Conditions  
As already noted, licensing can be and is, in fact, a powerful tool of governmental 
control of the sector. Through licensing, the government (through the regulator) can 
insert conditions for each firm as determined by regulatory needs. As the Licensing 
Regulation provides, such conditions are many, and the Authority has powers to add 
specific conditions to each licensee.677 This part explores some of the significant 
conditions.  
4.3.1.3.1 Payment of Fees and Royalties 
The Licensing Regulations require each licensee to pay fees and royalties. Such fees 
include application fees, initial license fees, renewal fees, and annual royalty.678 It has 
to be noted that licensing fees are not low. As Table 4.3-1 indicates, each license 
attracts varying fees and royalties. For example, there is an application fee for each 
license, initial license fee, and renewal fees. 
Further, there is an annual royalty fee calculated on gross yearly turnover. Thus, it 
would turn out that licensing is also a significant source of the Authority’s revenue. As 
 
677 See Part III of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Licensing) Regulations, GN NO 57 OF 2018. 
678 First Schedule, The Electronic and Postal Communications (Licensing) Regulations, GN NO 57 OF 2018. 
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a result, both the law and Authority take licensing fees seriously because failure to 
pay them may lead to the license’s cancellation.679 Table 4.3-1 gives a breakdown of 
necessary fees and royalties under the current framework. Note that fees for 
spectrum, which are not insignificant, are not included in the Table.  
Table 4.3-1 An Extract of licensing fees for international and national licenses 













Royalty fee (Annual Gross Turnover 
(GAT) (USD) 
Duration 
International 10,000 200,000 300,000 1% of GAT 25 years 
National 10,000 400,000 500,000 1% of GAT or 3,000 UDS whichever is 
greater 
25 years  
Network Services Licenses 
International 10,000 300,000 400,000 1% of GAT 25 years 
National 5,000 600,000 750,000 1% of GAT or 3,000 USD whichever is 
greater 
25 years 
Application Service License (With Network Facility and Services Licenses) 
National  5,000 100,000 120,000 1% of GAT 10 years 
International 1,000 10,000 15, 500 1% of GAT or 3000 USD whichever is 
greater 
10 years 
Source: Extracted from the Licensing Regulation of 2018 
4.3.1.3.2 Minimum Public Shareholding Requirement  
Observations from the field indicated that the application and process of licenses, 
including payment of required fees and royalties thereof, are already complicated 
enough to pose a significant regulatory challenge. Nevertheless, to even complicate 
matters, Section 26 of the EPOCA requires every telecommunication company to offer 
at least 25 percent of its shares to the public. Failure to comply with this requirement 
risks revocation of communications licenses under Section 22 of the EPOCA.  
At first, the law under Section 26 of the EPOCA demanded that the 25 percent be 
offered only to Tanzania nationals. Here, the motivation was more politically 
motivated with nationalistic inspirations to ensure that Tanzanians are not side-lined 
in the telecom economy while telecom firms reap enormous profits. However, this 
inspiration was short-lived. Later on, there were changes of the law through Section 7 
 
679 See S 15(1) The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010; and Reg. 10(1), The 
Electronic and Postal Communications (Licensing) Regulations, GN NO 57 OF 2018. 
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of the Finance Act of 2017, in which the 25 percent public offer remains but is not 
limited only to Tanzanians. 
At the time of completing this study, only Vodacom Tanzania had succeeded in 
complying with this condition. Other companies had not complied, although reports 
indicated that some were at preparatory stages. For example, Tigo had filed a draft 
prospectus in 2019, planning to have the initial offer in the first half of 2020.680 The 
TCRA has already issued notices of a material breach of licensing conditions. For 
example, in early 2017, the Authority issued notices to Tigo and Zantel, indicating 
that the companies could face penalties such as fines, suspension of licenses, or in the 
worst cases, cancellation.681 
4.3.1.3.3 Other Conditions  
More conditions come with telecommunications licenses. For example, Regulation 
6(1) of the Licensing Regulations states clearly that no license may be issued unless 
the applicant has a physical presence in Tanzania. This requirement aims to simplify 
regulatory governance as the authorities are sure of where to find licensees. It is also 
a condition under Regulation 25(1) of the Licensee Regulations that a licensee must 
prove “interoperability and compatibility of the network service system with other 
network services systems.” This would allow access and interconnection with other 
service providers. Additionally, the applicant must be willing to provide emergency 
services as the TCRA determines.682 
4.3.1.4 Suspension and Cancellation 
The Authority has powers to suspend or cancel issued licenses. Grounds for 
suspension include material breach of conditions, lack of compliance with minimum 
public shareholding obligation as provided under Section 26 of the EPOCA, and 
suspension or cancellation agreement between the Authority and licensee.683 
Furthermore, the Authority may cancel a non-renewed license. Before canceling or 
 
680 Millicom, 2019 Millicom Integrated Report (Luxembourg: Millicom, 2019), p. 212. 
681 See Millicom, 2018 Millicom Integrated Report (Luxembourg: Millicom, 2018), p. 188. 
682 See Section 12(2) of The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010; And Reg. 25 & 49 
of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Licensing) Regulations, GN NO 57 OF 2018. 
683 S. 22 of the The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010. 
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suspending a license of five or more years, the Authority must first consult with the 
Minister for communications.684  
The Authority has already canceled several licenses so far. For example, some telecom 
firms whose licenses have been canceled include Augere Tanzania Limited685 and Six 
Telecom Company Limited.686 When concluding this study, the Authority had issued 
cancellation notices for Mycell Communications Limited687 and 4G Mobile Limited for 
failing to roll out their network facilities and services, as the law requires.688 
4.3.1.5 Comments on the General Licensing Framework  
The licenses examined above are not exhaustive. Many more licenses may be 
necessary, depending on the type of activities in question. What comes out visibly is 
an unnecessary multiplicity of licenses when one enters the country’s communication 
market. Think of this framework as a person who wants to run regional bus services. 
Firstly, such a person requires a license to own busses and other related infrastructure 
(network facilities license). Secondly, he will need a license that authorizes him to 
offer the service between the regions in question (network services license).  
Note that the license does not allow him to carry passengers but only qualifies him to 
do so. When ready, he will need a license to carry passengers and related services 
between the two regions (application services). This is not an end. The person will 
need to use the only road available to carry his passengers. Thus, he will need 
another license for this matter (spectrum user license). All these licenses are 
individual as he cannot transfer them to another user.   
 
684 S. 6(3), The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, ACT NO 12 OF 2003. 
685 See TCRA, ‘Cancellation of Licence Granted to Augere Tanzania Limited (Issued under Section 22 of the 
Electronic and Postal Communications Act, Cap. 306)’, 2016 <https://www.tcra.go.tz/index.php/archive-
panel/headlines-archive/284-cancellation-of-licence-granted-to-augere-tanzania-limited> [accessed 5 
August 2019]. 
686 Six Telecoms lost its licenses for ‘repeatedly failing to pay regulatory fees.’ See TCRA, ‘Cancellation of 
Licenses Granted to Six Telecoms Company Limited’ (TCRA, 2020). 
687 TCRA, ‘Taarifa Kwa Umma Kuhusu Kusudio La Kufuta Leseni Ya Kampuni Ya Mycell Company Limited’, 
TCRA Website <https://www.tcra.go.tz/index.php/archive-panel/headlines-archive/283-taarifa-kwa-
umma-kuhusu-kusudio-la-kufuta-leseni-ya-kampuni-ya-mycell-company-limited> [accessed 17 September 
2019]. 
688 TCRA, ‘Taarifa Kwa Umma Kuhusu Kusudio La Kufuta Leseni Ya Kampuni Ya 4G Mobile Limited’ 
<https://www.tcra.go.tz/index.php/archive-panel/headlines-archive/282-taarifa-kwa-umma-kuhusu-
kusudio-la-kufuta-leseni-ya-kampuni-ya-4g-mobile-limited> [accessed 17 September 2019]. 
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Now, assume the person also wants to import, sell, and distribute busses, including 
related spare parts. Another license is needed. Furthermore, if he wants to repair his 
busses or do some installations, well, he will need another license. Moreover, if his 
passengers use other services connected to his bus, for example, carrying their bags 
with them, then another license is needed (for example, mobile money licenses). All 
these licenses entail different procedures for application and renewal as well as 
different royalties and fees as the First Schedule to the Licensing Regulations of 2018 
provide.  
This requirement for licenses is cumbersome. It is also annoying. Why not issue a 
single license that authorizes everything? This approach (single authorization) is 
friendly to investors and instills compliance for its simplicity.689 It is what the ITU 
advocates.690 What is needed is a licensing framework that is flexible enough to 
accommodate rapid technological changes and promote the ease of doing business.691 
Should individual licensing becomes mandatory, then the focus should be only on 
essential services. The adopted licensing framework should be pro-competitive and on 
objective, transparent, non-discriminatory, and proportionate conditions.692 
The licensing framework also has an impact on the companies’ corporate structures. 
The mandatory offering of 25 percent of telecom firms to the public is a regulatory 
challenge that may act as a disincentive to invest in the sector.693 It is argued that this 
is a political decision that disregards the market economy’s principles. Nor does it 
consider corporate structures and interests of investors who now have to rearrange to 
accommodate this regulatory requirement. It is an intrusion to firms’ corporate 
structures with no apparent regulatory objective in promoting investment, 
competition, and efficiency in the sector.  
 
689 John Buckley, ‘Telecommunication Regulation’, in The Cable and Telecommunications Professionals’ 
Reference: PSTN, IP and Cellular Networks, and Mathematical Techniques, ed. by Goff Hill, 3rd ed 
(Amsterdam ; Boston: Focal Press, 2007), pp. 11–33. 
690 ITU, Regulatory Incentives to Achieve Digital Opportunities, Trends in Telecommunication Reform, 
16.2016 (Geneva: ITU, 2016), p. 130. 
691 Larouche, p. 13. 
692 See for example in Larouche, pp. 34–35. 
693 PWC, ‘Doing Business in Africa Focus on Tanzania and Uganda’ (PWC, 2018), p. 29 
<https://www.pwc.com/ug/en/assets/pdf/doing-business-in-africa-tz-ug.pdf> [accessed 18 September 
2019]. 
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A word of caution is necessary at this point. This research does not argue against the 
need to promote Tanzanians’ participation in the sector. However, it argues that only 
fewer people with stable financial means can hold shares in telecom firms. Thus, only 
a handful may benefit from direct ownership of shares. After all, shares do not 
automatically translate into wealth. There is a question of profitability in order to 
attract dividends. Dividends are not guaranteed. Thus, the best way to serve the 
public is through a friendly and competitive regulatory environment that will 
significantly reduce communications costs, improve access, increase broadband 
penetration, and improve service quality. In this way, it will be possible to assess how 
the sector benefits the public, compared to dividends accrued to fewer shareholders 
as determined by the respective year’s profit.  
It is worth noting that the licensing framework may present an entry barrier and act 
as an instrument of facilitating dominance. For example, we have seen that three 
firms dominate the Tanzanian market. Only these, one can safely assume, will attract 
subscribers for 25 percent of their shares. Under normal circumstances, it is not 
expected that a firm with about 1 percent of market shares will attract a good number 
of investors like a firm with more than 35 percent. This requirement might push 
smaller firms out of the market, strengthening those already with significant market 
powers.  
4.3.2 Access Regulation  
The economics of telecom suggest that well-rooted firms in the market have 
competitive advantages above newcomers. For example, they already have an 
extensive infrastructure, which newcomers do not have. In the case of former 
monopolies, most of their infrastructure came from public monies. Such firms’ 
investments commanded huge sunk costs over time and had to acquire necessary 
property rights such as access to laying cables over land, water, or air.  
Now, in the absence of regulation to guarantee access, new firms have to replicate the 
same investment process. Although not impossible, it may be difficult because of the 
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enormous costs involved, or in some instances, because it is impractical.694 At this 
point, it becomes necessary for new firms to gain access to the incumbent’s network. 
However, access is not readily available. As the OECD notes, 
“It is hard to find a more controversial issue in industrial policy than that concerning 
the terms on which entrants can gain access to an incumbent firm’s network. As a 
result of the waves of deregulation of the past two decades, the regulation of the 
terms and conditions under which competing firms have access to essential inputs 
provided by rivals has become the single biggest issue facing regulators of public 
utility industries. This issue is both theoretically complex and inherently 
controversial. Since the development of competition and the success of liberalization 
often depend on the access terms and conditions chosen, there is also a strong public 
policy interest in getting these terms and conditions “right.” At the same time, new 
entrant firms and incumbents often have a substantial financial stake in the outcome 
and therefore a strong interest in negotiating aggressively.”695 
Because of the complicated nature of access, as the OECD rightly observes in the 
quote, access regulation becomes necessary.  
4.3.2.1 Defining Access  
Access is an act of one undertaking, making available its services or facilities to 
another undertaking for purposes of providing telecommunications services.696 It may 
include simple aspects such as roaming and more complex undertakings such as 
procurement of unutilized network capacity or sharing the core network. The core 
system comprises the main network system and may include transmission systems, 
switching centers, billing platforms, value-added services, and many more.697 The 
primary rationale of access, argues Ian Walden,  is “to reduce barriers to market 
entry, so a new operator will not have to replicate every network element that the 
 
694 See Dkhil, p. 2; Martyn Taylor, ‘Access Regulation versus Infrastructure Investment: Important Lessons 
from Australia’, in Regulation and the Evolution of the Global Telecommunications Industry, ed. by 
Anastassios Gentzoglanis (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010), pp. 63–82 (p. 64). 
695 OECD, Access Pricing in Telecommunications (Paris: OECD, 2004), p. 7. 
696 Kay Winkler and Glen Baumgarten, ‘The Framework for Network Access and Interconnection’, in EC 
Competition and Telecommunications Law, ed. by Christian Koenig, International Competition Law Series, v. 
6, 2nd ed (Austin : Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands : Frederick, MD: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 
2009), pp. 421–69 (p. 422). 
697 Jose Marino Garcia and Tim Kelly, The Economics and Policy Implications of Infrastructure Sharing and 
Mutualisation in Africa, World Development Report (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2015), p. 26. 
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incumbent has before being able to offer a competing end-to-end service.”698 Access 
has been described as “a key element in any strategy to develop competition for local 
access.”699 It is through access regulation that new firms can penetrate existing 
markets. 
Tanzania’s framework for access is governed by the Electronic and Postal 
Communications Act and the Communications (Access, Co-Location, and 
Infrastructure Sharing) Regulations of 2018.700 Under Section 3 of the EPOCA, access 
refers to a firm making its infrastructure networks and services available for others to 
either establish and run their networks or to provide network services.  Therefore, 
access is an extensive package. It includes other aspects such as co-location and 
sharing of infrastructure.  
4.3.2.2 Sharing of Communication Infrastructure and Services  
Infrastructure sharing is not an exceptional practice in the telecom sector.701 In 
Tanzania, Section 28(1) and (b) of the EPOCA provide infrastructure sharing as a 
right. Every telecom firm has a right to apply for access to another firm’s network 
facilities. The envisaged facilities include “any element, or combination of elements, 
of physical infrastructure used principally for, or in connection with, the provision of 
one or more network services or multiplex operations, but not including customer 
equipment.” Under Section 3 of the EPOCA, the list of facilities includes lines, cables, 
towers, wires, pits, poles, holes, land, access roads, and intangible infrastructures 
such as agreements, arrangements, franchises, licenses, and right of way. 
These facilities broadly fit into two groups. Firstly, there are active infrastructures 
essential for “transmission, reception, or transformation of telecommunication 
signals.”702 Such infrastructures are defined under Regulation 6(1) and the Second 
 
698 Ian Walden, ‘Access and Interconnection’, in Telecommunications Law and Regulation, ed. by Ian Walden, 
Fifth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 435–90 (p. 435). 
699 Nikolinakos, p. 614. 
700 The Communications (Access, Co-Location and Infrastructure Sharing) Regulations, GN No. 59 of 2018, 
2018. 
701 See practices in several countries covered in Natalija Gelvanovska, Michel Rogy, and Carlo Maria 
Rossotto, Broadband Networks in the Middle East and North Africa: Accelerating High-Speed Internet Access 
(Washington, D.C: World Bank Publications, 2014), pp. 115–19; OECD, OECD Review of Telecommunication 
Policy and Regulation in Colombia (OECD Publishing, 2014), pp. 88–89. 
702 Garcia and Kelly, p. 8. 
 
 146  
Schedule to Access, Co-location, and Infrastructure Regulations to include all 
electronic telecommunication infrastructures like core nodes, radio nodes, antenna, 
and transmission equipment. Secondly, there are passive infrastructures (civil 
structures and no-electronic elements), including towers, power, shelter, and security. 
They also include transmission infrastructures like optical fiber, copper cable, 
trenches, ducts, and poles. Besides, it is possible to include non-telecom facilities such 
as water and sanitary systems, gas and electrical pipes, or transporting channels in 
the category of passive infrastructure for sharing.703 
4.3.2.3 Co-location of Infrastructure  
Just as it is with sharing, co-location is also not an infrequent practice around the 
world.704 Co-location provides two or more firms with an opportunity to place their 
infrastructure together. Regulation 3 of Access Regulations defines co-location as “the 
accommodation of two or more licensee’s switches, antennas or other electronic 
communications equipment in, or on a single building, tower or other structure.” For 
example, a new firm has a right to request the existing provider to place its 
infrastructure together with the existing firms. Co-location promotes the efficient use 
of land that is already scarce in Tanzania. Principally, Regulation 10(1) of Access 
Regulations requires every provider hosting another provider’s facility to conclude a 
co-location agreement that stipulates the terms and conditions of such co-location. 
4.3.2.4 Principles Governing Access Regulation 
Much as sharing and co-location of infrastructure appear appealing and conceiving, 
not all firms may be open to it. Thus, ex-ante regulation is necessary to ensure the 
availability of access on reasonable terms and conditions. It is also necessary to avoid 
possible conflicts amongst telecom firms. It is for this reason that the law empowers 
the TCRA to regulate such transactions. The following principles apply:  
 
703 Gelvanovska, Rogy, and Rossotto, p. 116. 
704 For co-location practices on different parts of the world see Trevonne Clarke-Ferguson, ‘Infrastructure 
Sharing -Towers & Poles (Co-Location Access Charge-Benchmarking Study) Towards the Development of 
Global Best Practices’ (presented at the Regional Standardization Forum for Bridging the Standardization 
Gap (BSG), Hyatt Regency Trinidad, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 2017), pp. 8–9. 
 
 147  
1. Access is a matter of right as Section 28(1) of EPOCA and Regulation 4(1) and 
(10)(1) of Access Regulations put it in clear terms. No telecom firm may deny 
an access request in the absence of an excuse permitted by the law. 
2. Under Regulation 4(3) of Access Regulations, access must be impartial and 
non-discriminatory. Regulation 20 requires the infrastructure provider to 
provide no less treatment to the access seeker than it would to its customers, 
subsidiaries, and affiliates. Regulation 4(2) requires the provision of access on 
a first-come-first-served basis to ensure this impartiality.  
3. Access must be on a commercial basis. Regulation 14(1) of Access Regulation 
allows rejection of access requests if they are of no commercial benefit. Even 
though there is repeated use of the terms “commercial benefit,” “commercial 
agreement,” and the like, what exactly is “commercial” is not defined. 
However, the holistic reading of the Regulations indicates that a commercial 
agreement is one in which the access provider can realize material or monetary 
benefits. 
4. Parties’ negotiations take precedence. Sections 28(2), 29, and 30 of the EPOCA 
and Regulation 9(3) of Access Regulations give the Authority powers to 
oversee the negotiation process and approve the concluded agreements. As a 
general rule, this means that the Authority’s role is to encourage parties to 
agree without intervening. However, Regulation 19 of the Access Regulation 
allows the Authority to intervene where parties cannot agree, or it considers it 
best for national interests.   
5. Access Regulations apply to all firms symmetrically. Under Section 28(1) of the 
EPOCA and Regulation 4(1) of Access Regulations, both dominant and non-
dominant firms have the same access obligations. However, particular 
infrastructures built before enacting EPOCA in 2010 are excluded from access 
regulation under Section 29(3). 
4.3.2.5 Comments on the Access Framework  
The terrain for access regulation, which sets a framework for infrastructure sharing 
and co-location, has not been adequately exploited in Tanzania. Apart from tower 
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sharing, not much has been recorded so far.705 Future projections, nonetheless, 
indicate growing interests in sharing 3G (and possibly 4G infrastructure).706 Once fully 
exploited, sharing and co-location may yield several advantages in the country. For 
example, if experience from other jurisdictions is anything to go with, access 
regulation can lead to cost reduction in the form of capital expenditure (CapEx) and 
operating expenditure (OpEx).707 
Furthermore, access and sharing may prove useful to reach rural areas, as it has 
proved the case in Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, and Latvia.708 Access is also helpful to 
promote environment-friendly investments.709 Sharing is further essential to address 
the challenges of deploying infrastructure due to urbanization and lack of space.710 
Thus, it all turns out that access improves efficiency, reduces investment costs, and 
promotes entry and competition, which benefits consumers and the economy at large.  
However, there are some concerns about whether or not access regulation promotes 
investment. On the one hand, some argue that access regulation is likely to 
discourage new investments.711 That through access regulation, risks are shifted from 
the new entrants to the incumbents while “entrants enjoy a risk-free option to lease 
infrastructure and exploit the regulatory arbitrage between wholesale and retail 
prices.”712 On the other hand, some argue that access regulation promotes new 
 
705 Steve Esselaar and Lishan Adam, What Is Happening in ICT in Tanzania: A Supply- and Demand Side 
Analysis of the ICT Sector, Policy Paper 11 (Cape Town: Research ICT Africa, 2013), p. 9. 
706 GSMA, Mobile Infrastructure Sharing (London: GSMA, 2012), p. 18. 
707 See BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications), BEREC Report on 
Infrastructure Sharing (BEREC, 14 June 2018), p. 15. 
708 See BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications), p. 15. 
709 BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications), p. 16. 
710 Garcia and Kelly, p. 25; GSMA, Mobile Infrastructure Sharing, pp. 12, 17–19. 
711 Michael Grajek and Lars-Hendrik Röller, ‘Regulation and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence 
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investments.713 By having access, the argument goes, new entrants have a starting foot 
upon which they will have to proceed in growth.714 
From the preceding arguments, the relevance of access to investment promotion, 
which is crucial for telecom services’ growth, is mixed. It will largely depend on the 
economic circumstances of each sector. However, for purposes of promoting 
competition, this study argues that the access framework is indispensable. Simplifying 
entry, which access seeks to achieve, is a healthy decision for the growth of 
competition and consumer welfare. However, the study argues that it should not be a 
continuous process. Sometimes, after entry, new entrants must be able to stand on 
their feet. Thus, the best approach is to have access regulation for a limited time so 
that new entrants would have sufficient time to develop themselves.715 
As for Tanzania, a pertinent question is perhaps the rationale for access regulation in 
the context of the country’s peculiar environment. We noted that specific 
infrastructures constructed before the year 2010 are excluded from access regulation. 
Under Section 29(3) of the EPOCA, the laws exclude “towers, masts, ducts, poles, 
power systems, and cooling systems” constructed before EPOCA’s commencement in 
2010. This exception means that infrastructures owned by all major firms in the 
country (Vodacom, Airtel, and Tigo), together with TTCL, are not available for access. 
Thus, it is not surprising that tower sharing is the only area where active sharing 
occurs.716  
If almost all infrastructures that would have been subject to access are unavailable for 
the same purpose, it does not make sense to have access regulation. By limiting access 
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only to infrastructures built after 2010, the law creates an awkward regulatory 
environment. For example, new entrants like Halotel must make their infrastructures 
available for sharing even if they cannot access infrastructures owned by predecessors 
in the market. This asymmetrical treatment does not have any economic justification. 
However, it may have anti-competitive advantages as older firms in the market have 
access to new firms’ infrastructure while vice versa is invalid. It might well serve as a 
disincentive for new investments. 
4.3.3 Interconnection Regulation  
Interconnection is another form of access. However, due to its importance, it warrants 
a separate discussion. We have already seen that national monopolies had dominated 
the telecom sector for a long time. Their shadows are far from fading away. They had 
owned not only all communication infrastructure but also the available customers. 
Having a monopoly without competition means monopoly firms gained profit with 
minimum efforts. Any new entrance, whose purpose is to challenge the existing 
incumbent’s hegemony, would not receive a cheery welcome in such settings. 
Naturally, incumbents would want to protect their interests by complicating entry, 
whenever possible, not least to recoup their investments.    
Besides the need to protect their interests, we now know that telecom economics 
suggests that a network’s value depends on the number of its subscribers reachable in 
and off the network.717 This economic perspective makes it likely for an incumbent to 
do all it can to amass a broader customer base while complicating the newcomers’ 
same efforts. One of the techniques is to deny or complicate interconnection.  
Interconnection is a vital aspect of telecommunications. Without it, the new firms’ 
customers cannot reach subscribers outside their small network. This being the case, 
no customer will like to join a network with limited access to other networks. In other 
words, denying or complicating interconnection to a new firm means throwing it off 
the market. If not well regulated, interconnection is a prime barrier to entry and a 
sure method of eradicating competition in the market.  
 
717 Larouche, p. 33. 
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Complicating or denying interconnection altogether is not a hypothetical assumption. 
For dominant incumbents, every new firm in the market poses an existential threat. 
For this reason, such firms may complicate interconnection arrangements, for 
example, by discriminating against prices or by complicating the process by setting 
unreasonable terms and conditions.718 In worst cases, as literature would prove in 
detail, the incumbent may deny interconnection altogether.719 These practices are 
possible because incumbent dominant firms have competitive advantage and 
bargaining powers over others.720  
At this point, it becomes necessary not only to regulate interconnection but also to 
ensure its availability on reasonable terms.721 More importantly, interconnection 
becomes an indispensable tool for facilitating market entry and ensuring the effective 
utilization of existing infrastructures.722 “If new entrants are given insufficient rights to 
acquire interconnection and access from incumbents,” argues Walden, then 
“effectively competitive markets are unlikely to develop.”723 Mitchel and Vogelsang 
explain the justification for interconnection regulation when they say, 
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<https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/dcc-clears-imposing-penalty-on-airtel-voda-idea-seeks-
trai-view-on-fine-amount/article27993124.ece> [accessed 9 March 2020]. 
720 Lisa Correa, ‘The Economics of Telecommunications Regulation’, in Telecommunications Law and 
Regulation, ed. by Ian Walden, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 27–100 (p. 63); It has 
also been observed that termination is a monopoly market which can be used by bigger firms to exclude 
the smaller ones from competition. See Christoph Stork, Mobile Termination Benchmarking: The Case of 
Namibia, Towards Evidence-Based ICT Policy and Regulation (Cape Town: Research ICT Africa, 2010), pp. 
1–2 <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4f89/43dec76941d20cbea8277eae2742546b8679.pdf> [accessed 
19 September 2019]. 
721 Correa, p. 63; Larouche, p. 33. 
722 See further details in Eli Noam, ‘Interconnection Practices’, in Handbook of Telecommunications 
Economics, ed. by Martin Cave, Sumit Kumar Majumdar, and Ingo Vogelsang, 1st ed (Amsterdam ; Boston: 
Elsevier, 2002), pp. 387–423 (pp. 389–95); Nicolas Curren and Dominique Bureau, ‘Establishing 
Independent Regulators in France’, in Regulation of Network Utilities: The European Experience, ed. by 
Claude Henry, Michel Matheu, and Alain Jeunemaître (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 143–
69 (p. 148). 
723 Ian Walden, p. 437. 
 
 152  
“The prototypical telecommunications market structure has been a vertically-
integrated dominant operator (DO) that supplies a wholesale interconnection service 
and a variety of retail services. For the DO’s retail competitors, interconnection is a 
bottleneck resource, and decisions about the pricing of interconnection, more than 
any other relationship between the DO and other operators, will profoundly affect 
the terms of telecommunications competition. Continued regulation is necessary to 
prevent the abuse of market power by the dominant provider and to ensure the 
supply of interconnection on equal terms to competitors.”724 
In principle, therefore, interconnection deals with network connectivity and 
interoperability of different service providers in which they connect their “network, 
equipment, and services to enable customers to have access to the customers, 
services, and networks of other service providers.”725  
4.3.3.1 Regulating Interconnection in the Sector  
Tanzania law defines interconnection in Section 3 of the EPOCA as “the physical or 
logical linking of one public electronic communications network to another for 
allowing the persons using one of them to be able to communicate with users of the 
other network, or make use of services provided using the other one.” Interconnection 
can either be one-way, in which one carrier connects to another to offer 
communications services, or two-way, where two or more carriers must connect their 
networks to enable customers of one carrier to call customers from another carrier.726 
The power to regulate interconnection lies with the TCRA. Section 27 of the EPOCA 
empowers the Authority to: 
“(a) regulate all interconnection arrangements between network 
service licensees where there is a market failure; (b) issue 
interconnection negotiations procedure and guidance on approval or 
rejection of interconnection agreements; (c) place all interconnection 
 
724 Bridger Mitchel and Ingo Vogelsang, ‘Markup Pricing For Interconnection: A Conceptual Framework’, in 
Opening Networks to Competition: The Regulation and Pricing of Access, ed. by David Gabel and David F. 
Weiman, (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 1998), pp. 31–48 (p.31). 
725 Eli Noam, p. 387. 
726 Blackman and Srivastava, p. 120. 
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agreements in the public register; and (d) arbitrate or appoint an 
arbitrator to arbitrate on interconnection disputes.” 
The presented provisions indicate that the Authority’s powers to regulate 
interconnection are limited only to instances of market failures. However, in practice, 
the Authority always conducts inquiries and sets up interconnection rates applicable 
symmetrically to all firms. Vodacom Tanzania has challenged this practice twice 
unsuccessfully. The first instance was in 2007 in Vodacom Tanzania Limited v 
Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority & Six Telecommunications Company 
Limited.727 Among others, Vodacom opposed the Authority’s decision to set 
termination rates. The FCT agreed that the Authority had no specific powers to set 
such rates. However, it maintained that the Authority could do so under its general 
regulatory powers when telecom firms have failed to agree on the termination 
terms.728  
In the second case, Vodacom challenged the Authority’s powers in 2018 in Vodacom 
Tanzania Plc v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority.729 The challenge came 
after the Authority issued Interconnection Determination Number 5 of 2017, which 
drastically reduced termination rates.730 At that time, Vodacom relied on Section 27(a) 
of the EPOCA, which gives the Authority powers to set interconnection rates when a 
market failure occurs. Vodacom argued that since there was no market failure, in its 
opinion, the Authority had no right to set such rates. The Tribunal agreed in principle 
that the Authority could set rates only in cases of market failure. However, it 
interpreted the firms’ failure to agree on termination rates (telecom firms had not 
agreed on the new rates as the former Determination was about to expire) as 
amounting to market failure.731 In its words, the Tribunal observed, 
 
727 Vodacom Tanzania Limited v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority & Six 
Telecommunications Company Limited, Appeal No 2 of 2007, Fair Competition Tribunal (Unreported). 
728 Vodacom Tanzania Limited v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority & Six Telecommunications 
Company Limited, p. 60. 
729 Vodacom Tanzania PLC v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, Appeal No 8 of 2018, Fair 
Competition Tribunal (Unreported), p. 1. 
730 TCRA, The Tanzania Communications (Interconnection Rates Determinations), 2017, NO 5 OF 2017. 
731 Vodacom Tanzania PLC v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, p. 14. 
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“In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal does subscribe to the definition of market 
failure as enlightened by the appellant. However, the correct state of affairs by the 
time the respondent issued the impugned Interconnection Determination was that 
the Network Providers had failed to reach an agreement on interconnection 
rates. In that regard, there was a market failure in the interconnection 
market.”732  
The appellant had previously introduced the definition to which the FCT subscribed. 
The appellant held that market failure means “a state of fact showing that the 
interconnection market has failed.”733 The FCT inadvertently defined market failure 
based on parties’ conduct and not on the analysis of the termination market. Based on 
this understanding, the Tribunal concluded that there was a market failure. Thus, the 
Tribunal held, the Authority was justified to intervene by setting termination rates.  
4.3.3.2 Principles Governing Interconnection Regulation in the sector 
Section 27(1) of the EPOCA, together with Interconnection Regulations, empowers 
the TCRA to regulate interconnection in the sector.734 Since interconnection has 
commercial interests, the law has set some principles to govern its regulation. They 
include the following: 
1. Under Regulation 4(1) and (2) of Interconnection Regulations, interconnection 
is mandatory. Unless interconnection is not feasible for technical or commercial 
reasons, a telecom firm must negotiate an interconnection agreement upon 
receiving an interconnection request. Under Regulations 5(5)(a)-(d) of 
Interconnection Regulations, Commercial infeasibility means that such an 
agreement will not have any material benefit, while technical infeasibility means 
that infrastructure is incompatible, making any envisaged connection impossible 
2. Under Regulation 4(1) of the Interconnection Regulation, interconnection is 
symmetrical. Interconnection obligations apply equally to dominant and non-
dominant firms. 
 
732 Vodacom Tanzania PLC v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, p. 14. 
733 Vodacom Tanzania PLC v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, p. 11. 
734 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Interconnection) Regulations, GN NO 25 OF 2018. 
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3. Regulation 6 of Interconnection Regulations directs that interconnection 
agreements must be free, transparent, and in good faith. Some of the indications 
of bad faith as provided for in Regulation 17(5) of Interconnection Regulations 
include, for example, intentionally misleading or coercion, refusal or delay of 
information, and delaying or obstructing negotiations. 
4. Under Regulation 14(1), interconnection agreements must be commercial. In 
other words, the agreement must have a material advantage for both parties. If 
a provider receives no economic benefit, it may refuse interconnection. 
5. Under Regulation 4(6), interconnection negotiations must conform to the 
Authority’s already established framework. Reg. 6(3) empowers the Authority to 
intervene and impose an agreement in case of failure to agree.  
6. Under Regulation 9(1) and (2), the interconnection agreement must base on the 
Forwarding Looking-Long Run Incremental Costs (FL-LRIC) formula. The FL-
LRIC is a method of recovering changing costs that a firm can foresee based on 
the changes in input level relevant to the costs to be recovered. 735 
4.3.3.3 Determination of Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs)  
Even though the law, in theory, envisages negotiation amongst telecom firms, the 
practice suggests otherwise. What happens is that the Authority issues indicative rates 
after every five years. All firms must negotiate and enter into new interconnection 
agreements in conformity with the new interconnection determination. For example, 
Table 4.3-2 shows the interconnection rates from 2004 to 2022. Note that the 
Authority used to set interconnection rates in USD from 2004 to 2012. Only from 
2013, it started using Tanzanian shillings in setting termination rates. 
Table 4.3-2 Interconnections termination rates as determined by the Authority from 
2004 to 2022 
Determination  Year  Rates  
Interconnection Determination No 1 of 2004 




735 For a detailed definition see Reg. 3 of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Interconnection) 
Regulations, GN NO 25 OF 2018. 
736 TCRA, The Tanzania Communications (Interconnection Rates Determinations), 2004, NO 1 OF 2004. 
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Interconnection Determination No 2 of 2007 
(Rates are in USD Cents)737 
2008 7.83 
2012 7.16 
Interconnection Determination No 3 of 2013 
(Rates are in Tanzania shillings)738  
2013 34.92 
2017 26.96 
Interconnection Determination No 4 of 2018 
(Rates are in Tanzania shillings)739 
2018 15.6 
2022 2.0 
Source: Developed from Interconnection Determinations of 2004, 2007, 2012, and 
2018 
Table 4.3-2 shows a trend in which there is a reduction of termination rates. The last 
determination saw a sweeping reduction from Tanzanian shillings (Tsh) 15.6 in 2018 
to just Tsh 2.0 in 2022. It is believed that such a reduction is likely to reduce 
communications costs.740 Furthermore, it is expected that such reduction may have 
competitive advantages to smaller firms, which can now reduce their charges due to 
lower termination rates.  
The Authority’s lowering of the termination rates does not always receive a positive 
response from some telecommunication firms. The main opposition has always been 
from Vodacom. One must consider the sector’s pattern to appreciate Vodacom’s 
concerns. With the largest percentage of subscribers, it receives many off-net calls 
compared to others. As a result, it terminates many calls. The termination entitles it 
to a large share of termination payments.741 Thus, a reduction of termination rates 
means a direct reduction of its revenue. It is not surprising that in 2008, it was the 
only firm to unsuccessfully challenge the Authority’s determination in Vodacom 
Tanzania Limited v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority & Six 
Telecommunications Company Limited.742  
 
737 TCRA, The Tanzania Communications (Interconnection Rates Determinations), 2007, NO 2 OF 2007. 
738 TCRA, The Tanzania Communications (Interconnection Rates Determinations), 2013, NO 3 OF 2013. 
739 TCRA, NO 5 OF 2017, p. 2. 
740 The Guardian Reporter, ‘Mobile Call Rates May Fall as Govt Plans to Slash Interconnect Fees’ (Dar es 
Salaam, 2 December 2017), The Guardian edition <https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/mobile-call-
rates-may-fall-govt-plans-slash-interconnect-fees> [accessed 19 September 2019]. 
741 See the way Vodacom laments over the reduction of these rates at Vodacom Tanzania, Vodacom 
Tanzania Public Limited Company (Dar es Salaam: Vodacom Tanzania, 12 July 2018), pp. 8, 9, 15 & 96. 
742 Vodacom Tanzania Limited v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority & Six Telecommunications 
Company Limited, p. 1. 
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Ten years later, Vodacom again moved to challenge the Authority’s determination in 
Vodacom Tanzania Plc v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority.743 In this 
second challenge, Vodacom raised several arguments, including that the new rates 
are below costs, and they are likely to impede competition, growth, and investment 
efforts in the sector. The FCT dismissed such urgings. It reasoned that except for 
Vodacom and Tigo (and Zantel, which is already part of Tigo), all other firms agreed 
to the new rates.744 If the rates are acceptable to others, opined the Tribunal, they 
should be for Vodacom as well.745 
4.3.3.4 Comments on Interconnection Regulation 
One cannot overemphasize the role of interconnection and its regulation in 
facilitating entry and promoting competition. Effective competition remains to be a 
far reality without interconnection on reasonable terms. When properly regulated, 
interconnection goes beyond providing connectivity to improved consumer services. 
For example, in South Africa and other Sub-Saharan countries, reducing termination 
rates has lowered communications costs.746 As for Tanzania, interconnection became 
vital in ensuring the smooth interoperability of services between different providers. 
In this way, it also was and still is vital to facilitate entry, thereby promoting 
competition.  
The impact of interconnection regulation in reducing prices is yet to be seen in 
Tanzania. Some studies have found out that prices have been increasing despite the 
yearly reduction of termination rates.747 Perhaps, the TCRA’s recent substantial 
reduction of MTRs may bring more competitive advantages to the sector, and finally, 
to consumers. However, one should not expect such changes to happen automatically, 
only due to reduced termination rates. Studies indicate that several other factors are 
 
743 Vodacom Tanzania PLC v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, p. 1. 
744 Vodacom Tanzania PLC v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, p. 1. 
745 Vodacom Tanzania PLC v Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, p. 1. 
746 Ryan Hawthorne, ‘The Effects of Lower Mobile Termination Rates in South Africa’, Telecommunications 
Policy, 42.5 (2018), 374–85 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2018.02.007>; Onkokame Mothobi, ‘The 
Impact of Telecommunication Regulatory Policy on Mobile Retail Price in Sub-Saharan African Countries’, 
ERSA Working Paper 662, 2017. 
747 Asinta Manyele and Deograsias Moyo, ‘Impacts of the Tanzanian 2013 - 2017 Glide Path 
Implementation Phase on Telecom Voice Call Pricing’, International Journal of Scientific & Engineering 
Research, 10.6 (2019), 1–5 (p. 4). 
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necessary for the eventual price reduction.748 Therefore, while interconnection 
regulation is instrumental in determining communications rates, achieving better 
(lower) rates will depend on the sector’s holistic approach to regulation. 
Nevertheless, interconnection regulation is undoubtedly crucial to facilitate entry and 
promote competition. The vice versa is also true. Lack of effective interconnection 
regulation may result to direct foreclosure of competition.  
4.3.4 Radiofrequency Spectrum Regulation 
At the outset, this study notes that radiofrequency is a scientific term in the domain of 
physics. It can only be understood in its scientific context. The starting point is to 
understand what scientists call electromagnetic radiation. This term means “the flow 
of energy at the universal speed of light through free space or a material medium in 
the form of the electric and magnetic fields.”749 When distributed according to 
frequency or wavelength, such radiations are known as the electromagnetic 
spectrum.750 Thus, frequencies describe different parts of the spectrum.751 They are 
measured in Hertz after Heinrich Hertz, a German physicist who first proved radio 
waves’ existence.752 
Therefore, radio waves are just part of the entire electromagnetic spectrum.753 They 
deliver a range of services, including broadcasting, maritime and air communications, 
mobile telephony, scientific research, health treatment, and even heating food at 
 
748 Steffen Hoernig and Tommaso Valletti, ‘Mobile Telephony’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Digital 
Economy, ed. by Martin Peitz and Joel Waldfogel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 136–60 
(pp. 144–45); Stork, p. 1; OECD, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: France 2004 Charting a Clearer Way 
Forward (OECD Publishing, 2004), p. 174. 
749 Hellmut Fritzsche and Melba Phillips, ‘Electromagnetic Radiation’, Encyclopedia Britannica 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 2017) <https://www.britannica.com/science/electromagnetic-radiation> 
[accessed 23 September 2019]. 
750 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Electromagnetic Spectrum’, Encyclopedia Britannica 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 2019) <https://www.britannica.com/science/electromagnetic-spectrum> 
[accessed 23 September 2019]. 
751 Martin Sims, Toby Youell, and Richard Womersley, Understanding Spectrum Liberalisation (Boca Rto: 
CRC Press, 2016), p. 23. 
752 Sims, Youell, and Womersley, p. 23. 
753 For technical details on radio waves see John Pahl, Interference Analysis: Modelling Radio Systems for 
Spectrum Management (Chichester, UK ; Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), pp. 45–49; Willium 
Gosling, Radio Spectrum Conservation (Oxford ; Boston: Newnes, 2000), pp. 5–16. 
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home using a microwave oven.754 Thus, the radio spectrum refers to sets of 
frequencies that are “suitable for technically feasible uses in wireless 
communications.”755 
Spectrum’s role in wireless communication cannot be exaggerated. Although wireless 
technology gained prominence towards the end of the 20th century, it had already 
been in use as early as 1897.756 A hundred years later, the world had a total 
population of 10 million cell phones using wireless technology.757 As of 2015, wireless 
mobile phone subscriptions reached seven billion, an average worldwide penetration 
of 97 percent.758 In other words, it is safe to say that in today’s world, the use of 
wireless technology has become the order of the day.759 It has been argued that no 
other resource is likely to be more critical to human development in the 21st century 
than the spectrum.760  
Wireless technology has surged a demand for the spectrum, making it a scarce and 
valuable resource.761 Furthermore, spectrum usage brings about negative externalities 
because two persons cannot use the same frequency without interferences.762 
Therefore, a more sophisticated, market-based approach is necessary to manage the 
radio frequency spectrum for effective, optimal, and economical use. Efficient 
spectrum management will “maximize the value that society gains from the radio 
 
754 Arturas Medeisis and Oliver Holland, ‘State-of-the-Art in Policy and Regulation of Radio Spectrum’, in 
Cognitive Radio Policy and Regulation, ed. by Arturas Medeisis and Oliver Holland (Cham: Springer 
International Publishing, 2014), pp. 1–48 (p. 2) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04022-6_1>. 
755 Margherita Colangelo, Creating Property Rights: Law and Regulation of Secondary Trading in the 
European Union (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), p. 68. 
756 Early uses of wireless were seen in the wireless telegraphy. See David Tse and Pramod Viswanath, 
Fundamentals of Wireless Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 2. 
757 T.S. Rappaport and others, ‘Wireless Communications: Past Events and a Future Perspective’, IEEE 
Communications Magazine, 40.5 (2002), 148–61 (p. 148) 
<https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2002.1006984>. 
758 ITU, ‘Statistics’. 
759 Colangelo, p. 67; Tse and Viswanath, p. 10. 
760 Thomas Winslow Hazlett, The Political Spectrum: The Tumultuous Liberation of Wireless Technology, from 
Herbert Hoover to the Smartphone (Yale University Press, 2017), p. 1. 
761 For details on the scarcity of spectrum see Anandakumar Haldorai and Umamaheswari Kandaswamy, 
Intelligent Spectrum Handovers in Cognitive Radio Networks (Switzerland: Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 
2019), p. 9; Shweta Pandit and Ghanshyam Singh, Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks: Medium 
Access Control Protocol Based Approach (Cham: Springer International Publishing Imprint : Springer, 2017), 
p. 117; Changyan Yi and Jun Cai, Market-Driven Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio (Cham: Springer, 
2016), p. 5; Rohit Prasad, Varadharajan Sridhar, and Alison Bunel, ‘An Institutional Analysis of Spectrum 
Management in India’, Journal of Information Policy, 6 (2016), 252–93 (p. 269) 
<https://doi.org/10.5325/jinfopoli.6.2016.0252>; Harvey J. Levin, The Invisible Resource: Use and 
Regulation of the Radio Spectrum (Routledge, 2013), p. 16; Nacimiento, p. 569. 
762 Colangelo, p. 69. 
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spectrum by allowing as many efficient users as possible while ensuring that the 
interference between different users remains manageable.”763 
4.3.4.1 Global Spectrum Regulation  
Radio frequencies are intangible properties, untouchable, unseen with naked eyes, 
and therefore, unconfined into specific geographical zones. These features mean that 
the chances of interferences are imminent. Therefore, some form of international 
regulation is indispensable. As one author noted,  
“all radio systems share the same electromagnetic spectrum. This means each radio 
receiver is detecting not just its wanted signal but all other signals transmitted at the 
same time anywhere – not just on this planet, but anywhere, even in space. If there 
are aliens out there using radio technology, their signals will also be added to the 
mix.”764  
The core feature of the radio spectrum is that interferences are bound to occur 
without proper regulation. This is why the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) comes in.765 Through its Radio Communications Sector (ITU-R), ITU regulates 
the world radio frequencies through Radio Regulations that bind all ITU members, 
including Tanzania. The Regulations are regularly updated, especially after the World 
Radiocommunication Conference (WRC), which is convened after every three to five 
years, the last one being in 2019 in Egypt.766 Hailed as “a fruit of international 
cooperation,” the Regulations allow the ITU to divide radio spectrum into frequency 
bands for different uses to avoid interferences, as Table 4.3-3 indicates.767 For 
example, the most attractive band for communication services is the 800MHz band 
because it covers a large area and long-distance at relatively low costs. They can also 
travel inside buildings and can accommodate broadband services.768 There is an 
allocation of uses for each designated band at the global, regional, and national 
 
763 Martin Cave, Chris Doyle and William Webb (2007), Essentials of Modern Spectrum Management, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 3. 
764 See Pahl, p. 1. 
765 See Pahl, p. 1. 
766 For the latest edition see ITU, Radio Regulations Articles (Geneva: ITU Publishing, 2020). 
767 The Radio Spectrum: Managing a Strategic Resource, ed. by Jean-Marc Chaduc and Gerard Pogorel 
(London : Hoboken, NJ: ISTE; Wiley, 2008), pp. 71 & 83. 
768 Peter Cramton and Axel Ockenfels, ‘The German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and Behaviour’, The 
Economic Journal, 127.605 (2017), F305–24 (p. 308) <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12406>. 
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levels. Thus, it is expected that the national designation will correspond with the 
regional one, which, in turn, must correspond to the ITU designation.769  
The idea here, as already pointed out, is to avoid interferences.  Frequency band 9 
(bolded in the Table), with frequency ranging from 300Mhz to 3000Mh, is said to be 
a sweet spot for wireless communications.770 Thus, national authorities have to 
manage it effectively to ensure all prospective entrants have unhindered access. 
Table 4.3-3 Frequencies Bands as Determined by the ITU 
Band  Symbol Frequency range (lower limit 










VLF (Very Low Frequency) 
LF (Low Frequency) 
MF (Medium Frequency) 
HF (High Frequency) 
VHF (Very High Frequency) 
UHF (Ultra High Frequency) 
SHF (Super High Frequency) 










Source: ITU Frequency Bands. Note that the bolded band is ideal for wireless 
communications and is considered a wireless sweet spot. 
4.3.4.2 National Spectrum Regulation  
Legal rules for spectrum regulation are provided under the EPOCA and its Spectrum 
Regulations of 2018.771 In principle, Sections 71 and 72 of EPOCA give the TCRA 
powers to regulate the spectrum, including to “allocate, reallocate, assign, reassign, 
issue, reissue, redistribute, retrieve, suspend, cancel, or otherwise modify the 
distribution amongst users or licensees of any radio communication frequencies or 
frequency channels.” Therefore, any use of a spectrum is only possible under a license 
issued by the TCRA.772 Under Section 74(1) of the EPOCA, it is an offense to use 
spectrum without a valid license. Punishment for such contravention may go up to 
 
769 See for example Electronic Communications Committee and European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations, The European Table of Frequency Allocations and Applications in the 
Frequency Range 8.3kHz to 3000GHz (ECA Table), March 2019, pp. 5–199 
<https://www.ecodocdb.dk/download/2ca5fcbd-4090/ERCREP025.pdf> [accessed 5 August 2020]. 
770 Djafar K. Mynbaev and Lowell L. Scheiner, Essentials of Modern Communication (Hoboken, NJ, USA: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2020), pp. 49–50. 
771 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Radio Communication and Frequency Spectrum) Regulations, 
GN. NO 24 OF 2018. 
772 For national allocation of frequency, see TCRA, ‘National Frequency Allocation Table’ (Tanzania 
Communications Regulatory Authority, 2020). 
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Tanzania shillings 2.5 billion (equivalent to about 1.2 mil USD) and 75 million (about 
34,000 USD) for each day of continued violation.773  
4.3.4.3 Objectives of National Spectrum Regulation 
According to Sections 71&72 of the EPOCA, spectrum regulation in Tanzania seeks to 
ensure efficiency in its utilization. Efficient utilization is crucial as Tanzania has 
already acknowledged in Clause 1(2)(ii) of its National ICT Policy that in the past 
“there was an underutilization of deployed frequency spectrum and efficient 
management systems.” With efficient spectrum management, there are high chances 
to “maximize the value that society gains from the radio spectrum by allowing as 
many efficient users as possible while ensuring that the interference between 
different users remains manageable.”774 Further studies indicate diverse economic 
advantages resulting from such efficient management.775  
Like the international community, Clauses 2&3 of the National ICT Policy direct 
Tanzania to regulate spectrum to promote innovation, research, and development, 
foster competition, and attract foreign investment. Furthermore, spectrum regulation 
is necessary to protect national interests, including national safety and security, as 
Section 4(3)(b) of the EPOCA and Regulation 9 of Spectrum Regulations provide. 
This is possible by protecting individuals and sensitive communications systems such 
as those belonging to armies, air crafts, and ships against undue interferences.  
4.3.4.4 Principles of Regulating National Spectrum 
Certain principles exist to guide the spectrum’s regulation due to its relevance in 
communication services: 
1. Firstly, Section 72(1) of the EPOCA declares the spectrum as a national 
resource. The Government of Tanzania has the power to hold and control it on 
 
773 Exchange rate as of February 2020. 
774 Martin Cave, Christopher Doyle, and William Webb, Essentials of Modern Spectrum Management 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 3. 
775 See for example ITU-R, Economic Aspects of Spectrum Management (Geneva, Switzerland: ITU, June 
2016), pp. 30–44; Antonio García Zaballos and Nathalia Foditsch, Spectrum Management The Key Lever for 
Achieving Universality (Washington, D.C: Inter-American Development Bank, 2015), pp. 16–46. 
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behalf of the people. Theoretically, it means the government cannot use or allow 
the spectrum’s use for purposes that contradict the public interests. 
2. Secondly, spectrum being a public resource, its assignment must be on a 
competitive basis. Despite the presence of other methods of spectrum allocation 
such as administrative process (beauty contest), lottery, and first-come-first-
served method), auctions appear to have received wider acceptance as the 
preferable competitive method of allocation. It has been argued that auctions 
may achieve allocative efficiency, consistency of rules, transparency of results, 
and legality and legitimacy of allocation. Nevertheless, there are also some 
arguments to the contrary. For instance, some argue that auctions make 
spectrum so expensive, causing customers to carry that burden.776 In Tanzania, 
the assignment of the spectrum takes a hybrid tendering process.777 Ideally, the 
Authority selects pre-qualified bidders who meet the Authority’s criteria. The 
pre-qualified bidders go to the second round for an auction. With this 
competitive allocation, the government no longer has the monopoly to trade 
with it discretionally.  
3. Thirdly, spectrum rights are not disposable. Section 73 of the EPOCA prohibits 
the transfer of spectrum rights for commercial purposes or otherwise. Thus, 
even though firms have to pay for spectrum rights, they have no right to dispose 
of them when it becomes necessary. 
4.3.4.5 Comments on Spectrum Regulation  
Spectrum’s regulation is necessary to ensure its orderly and efficient utilization. 
Without regulation, chaos will likely follow. The regulation is even more critical 
because, without spectrum, it is impossible to provide wireless communications 
 
776 See GSMA, ‘Using Auctions to Support Effective Pricing of Spectrum’ (Nairobi, Kenya, 2017), p. 2 
<https://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/6-Day-1-Session-2-Using-auctions-to-
support-effective-pricing-of-spectrum-Richard-Marsden.pdf> [accessed 20 February 2020]; Syed Atif Jilani, 
‘Spectrum Allocation Methods: Studying Allocation through Auctions’, Journal of Economics, Business and 
Management, 3.7 (2015), 742–45 (p. 742) <https://doi.org/10.7763/JOEBM.2015.V3.278>; Peter 
Cramton and others, ‘Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services’, The Journal 
of Law & Economics, 54.4 (2011), S167–88 (pp. 167–68) <https://doi.org/10.1086/661939>. 
777 See John Mpapalika, ‘A Market Led Approach to Digital Dividend Review for Financing Digital 
Broadcasting Migration’, in 9th Annual Digital Switchover Forum Africa (presented at the 9th Annual Digital 
Switchover Forum Africa, Arusha, Tanzania, 2014), p. 18 <https://cto.int/media/events/pst-
ev/2014/DBSF/Dr%20John%20Andrew%20Mpapalika.pdf> [accessed 23 September 2019]. 
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services. In terms of promoting competition, spectrum rights provide an entry point. 
The absence of proper regulation to ensure easy availability of such rights would 
mean an erection of an entry barrier. Thus, it is very critical to ensure that its 
regulation is pro-competitive.  
However, some concerns may render the framework uncompetitive. For example, the 
existing framework, which focuses on the firms’ financial muscles, is not ideal for 
promoting entry and competition. This practice creates structural barriers, a fact 
observed by the TCRA, making it impossible for smaller firms to penetrate the 
market.778 In other words, it is more likely for existing firms with sufficient financial 
resources to get more spectrum compared to newcomers. 
Furthermore, the law restricts the disposition of spectrum rights. Apart from being 
against market principles, which promote freedom of contract, the restricted 
disposition may end up being uncompetitive. For example, if a small firm cannot 
acquire spectrum rights through auction, it could negotiate with those already 
possessing such rights. Transfer of spectrum rights is not a new phenomenon. Instead, 
it is encouraged as an efficient way to utilize the spectrum.779  
By restricting the transfer of spectrum rights, the law blocks out potential 
competitors, who, even though not able to buy spectrum rights directly from the 
Authority, could gain entry by other means such as spectrum sharing or leasing. The 
best approach, it is argued, would be to allow transfer subject to the regulator’s 
approval, which should not be unduly withheld.780 Beyond being uncompetitive, the 
restricted disposition of spectrum rights creates unnecessary financial burdens.  
It is surprising that even when one firm acquires another firm with spectrum rights, 
the acquiring firm cannot use the targeted firm’s spectrum rights. What happens is 
that the Authority cancels the targeted firm’s spectrum rights. It is upon the new firm 
 
778 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 22,26,31 & 43. 
779 See Martin Cave and William Webb, Spectrum Management: Using the Airwaves for Maximum Social and 
Economic Benefit (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 116; Sudharman K. Jayaweera, 
Signal Processing for Cognitive Radios (Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), p. 54. 
780 See Ofcom, Trading Guidance Notes (London: Ofcom, 2018), pp. 8–11 
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/88337/Trading-guidance-notes.pdf> [accessed 
20 February 2018]; OECD and IDB, pp. 77–79. 
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to apply for such new rights if it so wishes. Vodacom’s acquisition of Share Network 
Tanzania Limited is a good example. In this case, the targeted company had 900-
MegaHertz (MHz) spectrum for usage in rural areas.781 After the acquisition was 
complete, Vodacom learned from the Authority that it could not acquire the 
spectrums’ rights. It had to repurchase them.  
A similar case happened to Tigo after it acquired Zantel.782 One of Zantel’s 
subsidiaries, Telesis, had spectrum rights for 4G services.783 After the acquisition, the 
Authority canceled the Telesis’ spectrum rights, which Millicom estimated to have a 
value of 8 million USD. Tigo had to repurchase the spectrum rights, now at 12 million 
USD.784 All these bring financial burdens to telecom firms, which in practice are 
shifted to consumers. The impact is that consumers will not quickly see and enjoy 
fruits of competition through reduced prices, for example.  
4.3.5 Tariff Regulation, Quality of Service and Consumer Protection  
4.3.5.1 Tariff Regulation 
Although the Tanzania telecommunication sector is now fully liberalized, the 
Authority still has powers to regulate tariffs under the TCRA Act, the EPOCA, and the 
Tariff Regulations of 2018 (Tariff Regulations).785 Regulation 3 of the Tariff 
Regulations defines tariffs as charges, prices, levies, and associated terms and 
conditions imposed by telecom firms. In practice, the regulation of tariffs is 
asymmetrical. As for firms with significant market powers, Regulations 5(5) and 
12(1) & (2) of Tariff Regulations direct the Authority to take an ex-ante approach by 
approving their tariffs before they are operative. Thus, dominant firms cannot charge 
unapproved tariffs. As for firms without significant market powers, the law under 
Regulation 5 of Tariff Regulations requires the regulator to ensure that tariffs are 
within the established rules. Such rules include, for example, a requirement to file 
tariffs with the regulator quarterly, a requirement not to charge rates different from 
 
781 Vodacom Tanzania, p. 61. 
782 Millicom, 2019 Millicom Integrated Report, p. 195. 
783 Millicom, 2019 Millicom Integrated Report, p. 195. 
784 Millicom, 2019 Millicom Integrated Report, p. 195. 
785 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Tariff) Regulations, GN. NO 22 OF 2018. 
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what has been filed, and a requirement to inform the public through widely 
circulating media of their applicable rates and charges. 
In order to ensure fairness to the consumers, the law sets principles to govern tariff 
regulation. For example, Regulation 4(1) of Tariff Regulations requires 
telecommunication companies to charge just and reasonable tariffs. Just and 
reasonable tariffs are defined by Regulation 3 to mean: “tariffs that enable a licensee 
to maintain its financial viability, attract capital, operate efficiently and promote fair 
competition in the supply and demand for communication services.” Furthermore, 
Regulation 4(2) requires tariffs to be clear to end-users. There must be a sufficient 
description of services, the amount payable, and means of payment. Furthermore, 
tariffs must be non-discriminatory. Regulation 3 defines “non-discriminatory tariff” as 
“an application of equal tariff for similar services or products amongst providers.” 
Tariff regulation in the sector has two primary objectives. Firstly, it seeks to control 
against abuse by firms with significant market powers. It is for this reason that such 
firms must first seek the Authority’s approval. Secondly, the regulation seeks to 
exercise control on pricing methods, even for firms with no market powers. This 
approach, it may be argued, is an unnecessary complication in the liberalized sector. 
Trying to adopt a uniform pricing approach for all firms does not serve any legitimate 
regulatory objectives. Instead of setting ex-ante regulatory frameworks, the Authority 
should strengthen its ability to monitor and enforce competition rules on an ex-post 
basis.  
It may further be argued that tariff regulation is unnecessary since, in their absence, 
firms can still set competitive prices based on market demands. If a dominant firm 
sets too high prices, it will fall victim to abuse of dominance. Alternatively, if at all 
possible, setting low prices will likely not be sustainable as a firm in question will 
force itself out of the market for failure to make a profit unless there are other anti-
competitive concerns, for example, cross-subsidization or margin squeezing. If there 
are right enforcement strategies, such practices will also be addressed on an ex-post 
basis. The bottom line here is that pricing is one of the crucial tools for competition in 
any market. Unless there are justifications based on monopolies’ presence, the market 
should be left alone to set prices. Then, ex-ante regulation becomes unnecessary.   
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4.3.5.2 Quality of Service (QoS) 
Since consumers pay for communication services, it is logical that such services 
should be of quality commensurate to the price charged. However, studies indicate 
the opposite in Tanzania, where service provision is usually unsatisfactory, 
characterized by anomalies such as network unavailability or weak connection.786 
These anomalies are one of the reasons that make regulation of the quality of service 
necessary. The TCRA has such duty through the Quality of Service Regulations of 
2018 (QoS Regulations).787 According to Regulation 4 of the QoS Regulations, the 
objectives of Quality of Services Regulations include ensuring customer satisfaction, 
guarantee the quality of delivered services, and protecting consumers.  
The Quality of Service Regulations prescribe minimum standards of quality of service 
for each service offered in the sector. For example, from Part III of the Regulations, 
network availability for mobile services should not be less than 99 percent. The call 
connection failure rate must be less than 2 percent. As for the call setup time, it 
should be less than 10 seconds. Regulation 5(1) (a) and (b) and Regulation 6(a) of 
QoS Regulation impose self-regulation obligations to telecom firms. All licensees must 
meet prescribed quality standards, adopt an individual quality measurement system, 
and regularly monitor the quality of their services.  
The law empowers the Authority to investigate the quality of services and penalize 
telecom firms in cases of non-compliances. For example, in 2016, it conducted a study 
on service compliance quality in Arusha, Mwanza, and Dar es Salaam regions. It 
found that almost all licensees were not providing satisfactory mobile 
communications services and penalized them accordingly. The Authority fined all 
 
786 TCRA, Quality of Service Report for Cellular Mobile Operators for Arusha, Dar Es Salaam and Mwanza 
Service Areas for The Period of January March 2016 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2016); Eliamani Sedoyeka, 
‘Quality of Service Perception in Telecom Business in Tanzania’, International Journal of Computing and ICT 
Research, 9.2 (2015), 9–20; Adam B. Mtaho and Fredrick Romanus Ishengoma, ‘Factors Affecting QoS in 
Tanzania Cellular Networks’, International Journal of Computer Science and Network Solutions, 2.4 (2014), 
29–36. 
787 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Quality of Service) Regulations, GN. NO 201 OF 2018. 
 
 168  
companies Tanzania shillings six hundred and ninety-five million (about 264, 718 
USD).788 
4.3.5.3 Consumer Protection 
Consumer protection is a vital aspect of the provision of telecommunications services. 
Some authors argue that if consumers need to enjoy the benefits of competitive 
markets, they must understand  
“at least most of the features – especially price, quality, and contractual terms – of 
products and services available in the market and should be willing and able to 
make rational buying decisions.”789  
The very nature of telecommunications services demands protective mechanisms for 
the safety and interests of consumers.790 In the absence of such protection, it is 
possible to have demand-sided market failure evidenced by customers’ inability to 
switch, information asymmetries, and failure to make rational decisions.791 
Tanzania’s consumer protection framework centers on service providers’ obligations 
when dealing with consumers’ affairs.792 Detail of the protection framework is under 
the Electronic and Postal Communications (Consumer Protection) Regulations, GN. 
No. 61 of 2018. The Regulations cover several aspects. For example, in Part II of the 
Regulations, there are rules regarding providing timely, complete, accurate, and up-
to-date information to consumers. There are also requirements to ensure the terms 
and conditions of all contractual relationships are made clear to consumers. In line 
with the preceding requirement, Regulation 5(7) of the Consumer Protection 
Regulations has standardized terms and conditions of consumers’ contracts to include 
all crucial aspects. Furthermore, there are frameworks for handling consumers’ data 
 
788 See TCRA, Quality of Service Report for Cellular Mobile Operators for Arusha, Dar Es Salaam and Mwanza 
Service Areas for The Period of January March 2016, p. 2. 
789 Hilda Jacob Mwakatumbula, Goodiel Charles Moshi, and Hitoshi Mitomo, ‘Consumer Protection in the 
Telecommunication Sector: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Five African Countries’, 
Telecommunications Policy, 43.7 (2019), 1–8 (p. 1) <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2019.02.002>. 
790 See details in OECD, Enhancing Competition in Telecommunications: Protecting and Empowering 
Consumers. 
791 Mwakatumbula, Moshi, and Mitomo, p. 2. 
792 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Consumer Protection) Regulations, GN. NO. 61 OF 2018. 
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under Regulation 6, handling the billing process under Regulation 9, and settling 
disputes under Part III.  
The framework for consumer protection is as necessary today as ever. Consumers may 
be victims of unfair telecom transactions in a country with significant information 
asymmetries (information failure) and rapid technological advancements.793 
Consumers lack perfect knowledge, while telecom services providers are loaded with 
useful market information. As a result, unbalanced information ensues, which affects 
consumers’ reasoning in decision-making. Thus, the regulator needs to bridge the 
gap. Where damages have happened, it should rectify them. 
It is also important to note that measures included in the consumer protection 
framework may promote competition. For example, by addressing information gaps, 
the Authority ensures that firms do not use it as an instrument of monopolization. 
The same applies to unfair advertising or promotional activities, which seek to exploit 
consumers’ ignorance. Thus, consumer protection regulation is useful not only for 
consumers but also for the market and its operations. When properly utilized, it is a 
tool sufficient to promote competition.  
4.4 Other Regulated Matters 
Apart from matters already mentioned, TCRA regulates several other issues. For 
example, it regulates tele-trafficking under the Tele-traffic Regulations of 2018.794 
Through these Regulations, the Authority can install monitoring systems in the 
telecom’s premises, regulate billing systems, monitor mobile money transactions, 
establish tele-traffic systems, and collect revenue from incoming international tele-
traffic.795 The Authority also regulates telecom’s accounting systems under the 
Accounting Regulations of 2018.796 For example, each telecom firm must prepare 
separate accounts for wholesale, retail, and other services and a separate account for 
 
793 For more on information failure see George Higson, Markets and Market Failures (United Kingdom: 
Economics Online, 2011), p. 143; Buckley, Telecommunications Regulation, pp. 28–29. 
794 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Tele-Traffic) Regulations, GN. NO 14 OF 2018. 
795 See Reg. 4(2) and 6(1) of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Tele-Traffic) Regulations, GN. NO 14 
OF 2018. 
796 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Accounting Separation) Regulations, GN NO 23 OF 2018. 
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universal obligations services.797 Furthermore, it regulates numbering resources,798 
number portability799 and registration, and standardization of electronic equipment.800 
All these indicate that nothing in the sector escapes the Authority’s hands.  
4.5 The Institutional Framework  
At the policy level, the Government of Tanzania recognizes the significance of an 
adequate institutional framework for optimal results in the communications sector. 
For example, the telecommunication policies accentuate the need to have institutions 
that will spearhead rapid development in the sector. It is these institutions that will 
deliver the established policy objectives in the sector. For instance, as we have already 
seen, the National Telecommunications Policy’s overall objective is to have a sector 
where services are provided in a liberalized and competitive manner.801 Achieving 
such an objective is possible with an adequate institutional framework in place. For 
these reasons, the Government of Tanzania has committed itself to “ensure that there 
are an appropriate institutional capacity and supportive legal framework for the 
development of ICT industry that promotes competition under the principle of 
technology and service neutrality.”802  
As a result of this commitment, several institutions exist to regulate the sector. The 
institutions broadly fall into two categories; core institutions and other institutions. 
The core institutions are directly involved in the regular regulation of 
communications services. They include the TCRA, the Minister for communications, 
and the Fair Competition Tribunal. Other institutions do not regulate the sector 
regularly, or they regulate incidental matters relating to communications services. 
They comprise the Fair Competition Commission and the Bank of Tanzania. This 
section examines these institutions. 
 
797 See Reg. 4 of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Accounting Separation) Regulations, GN NO 23 
OF 2018. 
798 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Electronic Communication Numbering and Address) 
Regulations, GN. NO 62 OF 2018. 
799 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Mobile Number Portability) Regulations, GN. NO 20 OF 2018. 
800 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Central Equipment Identification Register) Regulations, GN. NO 
55 OF 2018; The Electronic and Postal Communications (Electronic Communications Equipment Standards) 
Regulations, GN. NO 19 OF 2018. 
801 National Telecommunications Policy, p. 2. 
802 See Policy Statement No 3.6.1.2. (ii), National Information and Communications Technology Policy. 
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4.5.1 The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) 
The TCRA is the primary institution responsible for regulating the 
telecommunications sector in the country. It was established in 2003 under Section 4 
of the TCRA Act as a body corporate. We may recall here that the TCRA replaced both 
the Tanzania Communications Commission and Tanzania Broadcasting Commission. 
The two commissions were established in 1993 during the early years of liberalization 
of the communications sector. Now, the TCRA becomes a converged regulator for 
communication and broadcasting services.  
The TCRA’s mission is “to be a world-class Communications Regulator creating a level 
playing field among Communication Service Providers, and promoting 
environmentally friendly, accessible, and affordable services to consumers.”803 It is a 
sector regulator regulating broadcasting, telecommunications, postal, internet, and 
related activities. Specifically, it has exclusive jurisprudence on competition law 
enforcement in the sector, contrary to practices in many jurisdictions in which 
enforcement of competition law is done either by a national competition authority or 
concurrently between the national competition authorities and the telecom 
regulators.804  
4.5.1.1 TCRA’s Governance  
The TCRA’s governance is by the Board of Directors, the Authority’s supreme 
decision-making body. Among others, it oversees and reviews the Authority’s 
performance as well as operations.805 It also makes strategic plans, corporate 
decisions, and operational decisions.806 The board under Section 7(1) of the TCRA Act 
comprises seven persons: the chairperson and vice-chairperson (non-executive 
directors appointed by the president) and five other members appointed by the 
 
803 TCRA, ‘TCRA Profile’ <https://www.tcra.go.tz/index.php/about-tcra/tcra-profile> [accessed 6 
September 2019]. 
804 See for example Julia Woodward-Carlton and Adam Collinson, ‘The Sectoral Regulation’, in UK 
Competition Law: The New Framework, ed. by Ros Kellaway, Rhodri Thompson, and Christopher Brown 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 139–74 (pp. 142–45 & 164–67); Competition and 
Markets Authority, Guidance on Concurrent Application of Competition Law to Regulated Industries 
(Competition and Markets Authority, 2014), p. 10. 
805 TCRA, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2011 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2012), pp. 10 & 11. 
806 TCRA, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2011, pp. 10 & 11. 
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Minister responsible for communications. The daily Authority’s operations are under 
the Director-General, who is also part of the Board. It is the Minister who appoints 
the Director-General and sets the terms and conditions of his or her engagement. The 
Director-General, however, must meet the minimum qualifications set for the 
Authority’s board members. As per Clause 1(2) of the Schedule to the TCRA Act, a 
prospective board member must be a graduate of a recognized university with 
experience in the fields of “management, law, economics, finance, engineering, 
broadcasting or information, and communications technology.” 
4.5.1.2 Powers and Jurisdiction 
The TCRA has broad powers in regulating telecommunications in the country. These 
powers primarily come from the TCRA Act and the EPOCA, together with their 
several Regulations. Table 4.5-1 provides details of the TCRA’s jurisdiction and 
competencies only in the telecommunications sector, that is, excluding broadcasting 
and postal services. The table shows that TCRA covers almost everything in the 
sector. Its functions range from monitoring of the sector to economic, technical, and 
social regulation. It also deals with enforcement issues under its various mandate 
provided in different legislations. The bottom line here is that there is almost nothing 
that can escape the TCRA’s hands.  
Table 4.5-1: Jurisdiction and Competencies of the TCRA in the telecom sector. 
Jurisdiction  Source  Some Remarks 
Licensing regulation S. 6(1)(b)(i) of TCRA Act and 
Licensing Regulations of 2018 
Granting radio frequency licenses.  
Granting licenses for operating 
electronic communication.  
Supervising compliance with licensing 
conditions. 
Access regulation S. 27-31 of the EPOCA  Regulate access to infrastructure and 
networks and interconnection. 
Technical regulation S. 71-75 and 82-90 of the EPOCA Management and allocation of 
numbering plans and schemes, regulate 
spectrum and control and authorization 
of importation, transportation, 






S. 19(2), 40 and Part VIII of the 
TCRA Act, S. 16, 18 and 34 of the 
Second Schedule to the TCRA Act 
and S 114 of the EPOCA 
 
Powers to address all disputes arising in 
the sector. This means it has the power 
to allege the violation of regulatory 
rules, proceed to investigate, prosecute, 
and pass a decision. And then, it has 
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The 2nd Schedule of the EPOCA 
powers to enforce its own decision.  
Powers to obtain all information, 
documents, and other evidence it 
deems necessary in the discharge of its 
functions.  
To collect data and information on the 
market and its operations.  
Competition Regulation  S. 19 of the TCRA Act and Part IV 
(a) and (b) of the EPOCA 
General responsibility to enforce 
competition in the sector.   
Consumer Protection  Consumer Protection Regulations 
of 2018 
Establish a framework to address the 
concerns of electronic services 
consumers.  
Administrative 
Oversight of the 
regulated firms  
S. 6(1)(c) of the TCRA Act  Monitor sector’s operation to promote 
compliance to the law. 
Tariff Regulation S. 16 of the TCRA Act  May regulate, set, and publish tariffs in 
the sector.  
Content Regulation Online Contents Regulation of 
2020 
The Authority determines what may or 
may not be allowed online, including 
on social media. 
Cyberspace Regulation Cybercrimes Act of 2015 Control the use of cyberspace, provide 
cybersecurity, and be involved in the 





Services Access Act of 2006 
To ensure availability of 
communication services to all through 
the Universal Communications Services 
Access Fund (UCSAF). 
Policy Formulation and 
Industry Development  
2nd Schedule to the TCRA Act  Researching and reporting on 
innovative technologies, keeping the 
government appraised of obligations 
under international electronic 
communications treaties. Cooperating 
technically with the government and to 
define strategic policy. Proposing 
national technological development 
programs, plans, and schemes. 
Proposing international electronic 
communications policy to the 
government. 
 Preparing policies for the development 
of national technology. 
Public Awareness 2nd Schedule to the TCRA Act  Raising public awareness of the 
structure and regulation of electronic 
communications.  
Informing the public of reports, studies, 
and regulations as and when published. 
Corporate 
Administration  
2nd Schedule to the TCRA Act  Efficient utilization of the Authority’s 
assets. 
Contracting powers for the efficient 
functioning of the Authority. 
Source: Compiled by the researcher from different legislation 
 
 174  
4.5.2 The Minister Responsible for Communications 
Generally, there are concerns over the extent of political officials’ involvement in the 
regulation process. For example, on the one hand, literature shows that politicians (in 
most cases, ministers) have, in certain instances, interfered with regulatory 
processes.807 They have sometimes even dictated how regulation should take place.808 
On the other hand, evidence indicates that political officials provide essential links 
and facilitation in the regulatory agenda.809 Thus, it would appear, the role of 
politicians, especially Ministers responsible for communications, depends much on 
the extent of power bestowed upon them and on the presence of control mechanisms 
against regulatory capture.  
In Tanzania, the Minister responsible for telecommunications services (the Minister) 
has certain powers, which, when exercised, affect and shape the whole regulatory 
framework. Table 4.5-2 shows some of the ministerial powers in the sector’s 
regulation. As the table shows, the Minister maintains considerable powers. Although 
not as detailed as in the 1993 framework, such powers give the Minister some control 
over the regulatory process. The Minister can shape the regulatory course by issuing 
general or specific regulatory directives. 
Table 4.5-2 Ministerial Powers in the sector’s regulation 
Power Source of Power Some Remarks 
Issuance of general or 
specific directives  
S. 6(4) and 18 of the 
TCRA Act  
General powers to issue orders and 
directives to the regulator. There are 
not limited directions on how the 
regulator should act in certain aspects 
and powers to assess the Authority’s 
 
807 Paulo Correa and others, ‘Political Interference and Regulatory Resilience in Brazil’, Regulation & 
Governance, 2019, 1–21 (p. 7) <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12274>; OECD, OECD Review of 
Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Colombia, p. 56; Dominik Böllhoff, ‘Developments in 
Regulatory Regimes: Comparison of Telecommunications, Energy and Rail’, in Refining Regulatory Regimes: 
Utilities in Europe, ed. by David Coen and Adrienne Windhoff-Héritier (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, 
MA: E. Elgar, 2005), pp. 15–52; Mustafa, Laidlaw, and Brand, Telecommunications Policies for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, p. 68; Stewart-Smith, pp. 36–38. 
808 Correa and others, p. 7; OECD, OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Colombia, p. 
56; Böllhoff; Mustafa, Laidlaw, and Brand, Telecommunications Policies for Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 68; 
Stewart-Smith, pp. 36–38. 
809 Uchenna Jerome Orji, Telecommunications Law and Regulation in Nigeria (Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2018), p. 152; OECD, Regulatory Policy and Governance: Supporting Economic Growth and 
Serving the Public Interest (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), pp. 74–77 
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264116573-en>; OECD, Regulatory Institutions: A Blueprint for the Russian 
Federation (Paris: OECD, 2008) <https://doi.org/10.1787/241530366501>. 
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and take some measures, whether 
necessary. 810 
Powers to order the Authority to carry 
general or specific inquiries.  
Approval of some regulatory 
decisions 
S. 6(3) of the TCRA 
Act, S. 70(1) of the 
EPOCA 
Powers to approve issuance or 
cancellation of licenses for five years 
old or more or any license with 
universal services obligations. 
Powers to approve regulatory 
forbearance for some or all operators 
in the sector.  
Appointing of regulatory 
officials  
S. 7(6) and S. 13(1) 
of the TCRA Act 
Appoint the Authority’s board members 
apart from the chairperson and the 
vice-chairperson.  
Appoint the Authority’s Director-
General. Also determines the terms 
and conditions of the DG and other 
board members.  
Supervisory powers S. 18(3) and S. 52 of 
the TCRA Act 
Inquire into the functioning of the 
Authority.  
May order inquiry and audit of the 
regulator’s performance. 
Making laws S. 47(1) of the TCRA 
Act and S. 26(1) and 
103(1) of the EPOCA  
Powers to make laws through 
subsidiary legislation. These laws 
shape the sector because they detail 
what is to be regulated and the extent 
of regulation.  
Budget approval  S. 54(1) and (2) of 
the TCRA Act 
The Authority cannot proceed with its 
budget without informing the Minister.  
Source: Compiled by the researcher from different legislation 
4.5.3 The Fair Competition Tribunal  
The Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT) is an independent, specialized quasi-judicial 
body established under Section 83 (1) of the Fair Competition Act. It determines 
appeals made against the decisions from the TCRA (and other sector regulators as 
well). According to Section 83(2) & (3) of the FCA, the Tribunal comprises seven 
members. All members, including the chairperson, serve on a part-time basis. After 
consulting with the Chief Justice, the President appoints the chairperson, a sitting 
judge of the High Court of Tanzania. The President also appoints the remaining 
members after consultation with the Attorney General. 
 
810 Benedict Liwenga, ‘Wakurungenzi Wa TCRA Wasimamishwa’, HabariLeo Newspapers (Dar es Salaam, 19 
February 2016). 
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4.5.3.1 Nature of the Proceedings 
The tribunal’s proceedings are provided for in Sections 85 and 90 of the FCA and the 
Tribunal Rules.811 Of importance is that its proceedings follow the adversarial system. 
Each party has a right to appear in person or through representation by an advocate. 
Furthermore, Rule 4 of the Tribunal Rules makes every authority (i.e., the FCC or 
sector regulator), whose decisions are challenged, a party to the Tribunal’s 
proceedings. The Tribunal justified this position in Ntully Huggins v MIC Tanzania 
Limited and Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority.812 It held that regulators 
are joined as parties to the appeal “so that they can defend their own decisions by 
advancing arguments and making submissions on how they have arrived at a certain 
decision.”813  
4.5.3.2 Jurisdiction on Telecom Matters 
Even though its name suggests that it deals with competition matters, the Tribunal 
also has powers over all regulators’ decisions. Regarding telecom matters, Section 
85(1)(c) of the Fair Competition Act empowers the Tribunal to carry all functions as 
the TCRA Act provides. Section 36(1) of the TCRA Act provides that appeals against 
the Authority’s decision shall lie with the Tribunal. The Tribunal is the highest judicial 
organ in solving telecommunications disputes. Thus, it has powers customarily 
enjoyed by the highest courts of the land. Typically, such powers include the power to 
confirm, reverse, or vary the Authority’s decision. It may remit the decision to the 
Authority with specific instructions, say, a fresh examination of witnesses. 
Furthermore, the Tribunal may order fresh proceedings. Moreover, it has the liberty 
to issue other necessary, incidental, or consequential orders. 
4.5.3.3 The Finality of the Tribunal’s Decisions  
Section 61(8) of the Fair Competition Act and Section 36(3) of the TCRA 
unambiguously declare the FCT’s decisions to be final. The effect of these provisions 
is to exclude ordinary courts from enforcing competition in the sector and the entire 
 
811 Fair Competition Tribunal Rules, 2012, GN. 219 OF 2012. 
812 Ntully Huggins v MIC Tanzania Limited and Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority, p. 3. 
813 Ntully Huggins v MIC Tanzania Limited and Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority, p. 3. 
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country at large. On the one hand, having such a Tribunal is acceptable because it 
brings a highly professional approach to addressing competition and regulatory 
issues. On the other hand, however, some concerns arise. For example, there are 
concerns that specialized courts are more prone to capture.814  
Beyond capture concerns, specialized courts may limit levels of access to judicial 
recourse, especially on matters that demand appeals or reviews. For example, only 
one level of appeal is available to a party aggrieved by the TCRA’s decision. As a 
result, it becomes impossible to judicially test competition and regulatory rules, a fact 
that would lead to their growth and maturity.  
On a separate note, one must note that the adopted enforcement approach 
contradicts Article 107 of the Constitution. Article 107 requires the judiciary to be the 
final body in the administration of justice in the country. It is worthy to note that 
other tribunal systems (for example, land, taxes, and labor tribunals) allow appeals to 
the Judiciary up to the highest court in the land, the Court of Appeal. It is unclear, 
both in law and practice, why it should be different for competition and regulatory 
matters.  
4.5.4 The Fair Competition Commission 
The Fair Competition Commission (FCC) is established by Section 62(1) of the Fair 
Competition Act (the FC Act). Under Section 62(2) of the FC Act, it is a body 
corporate with a specific mandate to operate independently and discharge its 
functions impartially without fear or favor. As provided under Section 62(6) and (7) 
of the FC Act, its composition constitutes five members. They include the non-
executive chairperson appointed by the President, three other non-executive members 
appointed by the Minister for commerce, and the Director-General, who is also 
appointed by the Minister for commerce. The Act under Section 96(1)-(3) limits the 
FCC’s role in the telecommunication sector only to regulating mergers and 
acquisitions. Since mergers, especially between telecom firms, are infrequent, the 
FCC’s role in this sector remains minimal.  
 
814 J. Jonas Anderson, ‘Court Capture’, Boston College Law Review, Vol. 59.5 (2018), 1543–94 (pp. 1550 & 
1565). 
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4.5.5 The Bank of Tanzania  
The Bank of Tanzania (BoT) is established under Section 4 of the Bank of Tanzania 
(BoT Act) Act of 2006. It is the central bank of Tanzania.815 In exercising the functions 
of a central bank, Section 5(1) of the BoT Act empowers the Bank “to formulate, 
implement and be responsible for monetary policy” and “to regulate and supervise 
banks and financial institutions.” Furthermore, regarding specific regulation of 
clearance and settlement system, the Bank is empowered by Section 6(1) and (2) to  
 “regulate, monitor, and supervise the payment, clearing, and settlement system 
including all products and services thereof; and to conduct oversight functions on 
the payment, clearing, and settlement systems in any bank, financial institution, or 
infrastructure service provider or company.” 
The Bank derives its mandate to regulate mobile money transactions from Section 
6(1) and (2) above.816  
The early days of mobile money transactions did not see strict regulatory 
requirements.817 Telecom firms needed only to apply for and receive a letter of no 
objection from the Bank.818 The letter cleared the mobile network operators (MNO) to 
offer mobile money services. This simple authorization system lasted until 2015, 
when the government enacted the National Payment Systems Act, which introduced a 
regulatory framework for all electronic money services providers, including telecom 
firms.819 Then, to intensify regulation even further, the Bank issued two Regulations; 
the Electronic Money Regulations820 and the Licensing and Approval Regulations.821  
The new framework brings in new and complex rules. For example, each MNOs must 
now have independent units to run mobile money services.822 Instead of the 
 
815 Bank of Tanzania Act, ACT NO 5 OF 2006. 
816 Clara Mramba and Nicholas Nditi, ‘Legal Regulation of Mobile Money Transfer Service in Tanzania’, 
Eastern Africa Law Review, 42.2 (2015), p. 97. 
817 Max Mattern and Claudia McKay, ‘Building Inclusive Payment Ecosystems in Tanzania and Ghana’, 
Focus Note, 110 (2018), 1–36 (p. 4). 
818 Mattern and McKay, p. 4. 
819 National Payment Systems, 2015, ACT NO 4 OF 2015. 
820 Payment Systems (Electronic Money) Regulations, 2015. 
821 Payment Systems (Licensing and Approval) Regulations, 2015. 
822 Reg 12 of Payment Systems (Electronic Money) Regulations. 
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authorizations, which existed until then, it is now mandatory to apply for a license.823 
Several other regulatory requirements exist, apart from licensing.824 Note that failure 
to observe these regulations has penal consequences. For example, operating mobile 
money without a valid license has a minimum fine of Tanzanian shillings five 
hundred million (about 220,000 USD).825 
The integration of the mobile money system has also brought in the sector some 
aspects of financial regulation. The Bank of Tanzania, which a few years ago had 
nothing to regulate in the telecom sector, now forms part of the broader regulatory 
framework. The BoT has the final say regarding the mobile money system, even 
though other regulatory concerns fall under the TCRA. For example, while the BoT 
regulates electronic money services, complaints arising from using mobile money 
services or other competitive concerns ought to be handled by the TCRA.826 
4.5.6 The Judiciary  
Article 107A of the Constitution establishes the Judiciary as an “authority with the 
final decision in the dispensation of justice in the United Republic of Tanzania.” 
According to the Constitution and the Magistrates Courts Act, Tanzania’s judicial 
hierarchy has four courts. In ascending orders, these are the Primary Courts, the 
District and Resident Magistrates Act (they have concurrent jurisdiction), the High 
Court of Tanzania, and the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, the highest court in the 
country. Apart from these courts, various laws have established specialized tribunals 
to deal with specific matters such as employment and labor cases, tax matters, 
insurance, and matters arising from regulated sectors.  
The Judiciary of Tanzania has no jurisdiction on matters arising from the 
telecommunications sector. Part II, III, and VII of the Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Act empower the TCRA to entertain disputes arising from the industry as a 
tribunal of the first instance. Section 42 of the TCRA Act directs that appeals from the 
Authority’s decision shall lie with the Fair Competition Tribunal. According to Section 
 
823 Reg 13 of Payment Systems (Electronic Money) Regulations. 
824 See for example Regulations 23, 34, and 36 of Payment Systems (Electronic Money) Regulations. 
825 S.14(b) of National Payment Systems, ACT NO 4 OF 2015. 
826 See several TCRA annual reports.  
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61(8) and 84(1) of the Fair Competition Act, the Tribunal acts as an appellate court 
whose decision is final. These provisions have ousted powers of the Judiciary in 
matters arising from the sector. No appeals may lie from the Tribunal to the High 
Court or Court of Appeal of Tanzania.  
It has been noted that the Minister has significant powers in the whole regulatory 
agenda. In this section, the relevant question is whether courts of law have powers 
over the Minister’s decisions. The TCRA Act does not provide whether the Minister’s 
decisions may be appealed or reviewed by another superior authority. However, as 
Tanzania falls under the common law tradition, decisions of administrative bodies 
may be challenged by way of a judicial review. As a general rule, whoever is affected 
by a decision of administrative bodies, including Ministers, may apply for the review 
of such decisions.  
This review is not an appeal against the decision. It is a request to courts of law, 
usually the High Court of Tanzania, to ascertain the decision’s legality, procedural 
fairness, or rationality. The reviewing court can only overturn such a decision if it 
contravenes those three grounds. The same review process can be applied against the 
TCRA’s and the Tribunal’s decisions. Common practical examples where an 
application for a judicial review may succeed include where the respondent was not 
given the right to be heard, when the deciding authority was impartial, or when the 
deciding body acted ultra vires.  
Thus, it can be argued that the judicial oversight over the TCRA’s and Minster’s 
decision is limited only to the extent accepted under the principles of judicial review. 
It is not possible to challenge the outcome of the Tribunal or Minister’s decision by 
appeal to the superior court. 
4.6 The East African Community Framework  
Unlike the European Union’s framework on competition regulation, East Africa’s 
framework is relatively new and underdeveloped. A desire to have a regional 
competition authority came to a climax in 2006 when the Community passed the East 
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African Competition Act.827 As per the Act’s long title, the Act seeks “to promote and 
protect fair competition in the Community, to provide for consumer welfare, to 
establish the East African Community Competition Authority and for related matters.”  
The object of the Act as provided in Section 3 is to “enhance the welfare of the people 
in the Community” through various measures such as protecting the freedom to 
compete, guarding against states’ barriers on interstate trade and economic 
transactions, and guaranteeing equal opportunity to all market actors in the 
community markets. Further, the Act seeks to provide a level playing field for all 
markets participants from all the Partner States and contribute to the integration 
agenda through enhanced competitiveness and promoting incentives to investment. 
The Act, as Section 4 provides, applies to “all economic activities and sectors having 
cross-border effect.” It binds acts of individual persons, collective industrial bargains, 
and sovereign acts of the Partner States. 
Regarding substantive provisions, Parts II-IV of the Act have rules on restrictive trade 
practices, abuse of dominance, and regulation of mergers and acquisitions. Parts 
V&VII have rules that address state actions, such as state subsidies and public 
procurement. The Act has included under Part VIII consumer protection on the 
broader competition framework. As for enforcement matters, Part IX of the Act 
establishes the East African Community Competition Authority as an enforcing body. 
Apart from the general enforcement provisions in the Act, the Community adopted 
the Competition Regulations of 2010 to provide further details on the enforcement 
approaches.  
Despite having a regional competition framework, this research did not address the 
regional dimensions because its operation started just a few years ago with no 
existing jurisprudence so far. It took ten years since enacting the EAC Competition Act 
before the first commissioners were sworn in in October 2016.828 The official 
operations of the East African Community Competition Authority commenced one 
 
827 The East African Community Competition Act, 2006., ACT NO 2 OF 2006. 
828 EACA, ‘Five Commissioners of the EAC Competition Authority Sworn in at the EAC’, 2016 
<https://www.eacompetition.org/resources/view/five-commissioners-of-the-eac-competition-authority-
sworn-in-at-the-eac> [accessed 20 August 2021]. 
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year later, in October 2017.829 Even then, the findings of this research revealed that 
most of the Authority’s activities have so far been directed to internal organizational 
issues such as developing strategic plans and operational rules than actual market 
monitoring, evaluation, or competition enforcement. As a result, when concluding 
this research, the Authority had no existing jurisprudence to be included in this work. 
Thus, the overall framework for regulation and competition enforcement in the sector 
remains under the TCRA. It remains to be seen what the EAC dimension is likely to 
bring in after it has become fully operational. 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter’s objective was to introduce the legal and institutional frameworks that 
regulate the telecommunication sector in Tanzania. It has shown that regulation aims, 
among other things, to promote efficiency, attract new investments, promote 
competition and universal services, and protect consumers. To achieve all these, the 
government established several institutions and enacted many regulatory rules. To a 
large extent, Tanzania’s regulatory record is impressive. Over forty million 
Tanzanians are now connected to telecommunication services.830 Over twenty-two 
million Tanzanians can access the internet.831 Besides, 4G services are now available in 
some major cities and towns.832 Switching between networks is now possible, even 
though complications still abound. Connection coverage has increased, thanks to the 
Universal Access Communication Services Fund, in addition to several other 
regulatory initiatives. Moreover, there are rules to promote competition, ensure the 
quality of the delivered services, protect consumers, and address disputes in the 
sector.  
However, regardless of realized accomplishments so far, one would notice some 
concerns worth reconsideration. The most obvious one is overregulation. Nothing in 
the sector escapes the regulator’s attention. In other words, regulation has almost 
 
829 EACCA, ‘East African Competition Authority Begins Operations to Check on Malpractices’, East African 
Community Competition Authority, 2017 <https://www.eacompetition.org/resources/view/east-african-
competition-authority-begins-operations-to-check-on-malpractices> [accessed 20 August 2021]. 
830 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2019, p. 1. 
831 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2019, p. 1. 
832 TCRA, Quarterly Communications Statistics: October-December 2019, p. 3. 
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replaced market mechanisms because everything depends first on what the regulator 
directs. Furthermore, in an attempt to regulate everything, regulation has extended 
beyond the traditional justifications of market failure. It has undoubtedly become a 
prominent governance tool, a consistent government’s eye on the sector with some 
powers, albeit in varying degrees, to dictate what should or should not happen. It is 
as if the government gave up a command economy with one big hand during 
liberalization, only to maintain some control with one small but mighty hand called 
regulation. Whereas during the command economy, the government used to dictate 
terms of the telecom market directly, it now achieves the same but through the back 
door called regulation. 
As for the institutional setup, the chapter has shown that Tanzania appreciates the 
role of appropriate institutional frameworks. For this reason, it has separated 
regulatory activities from the ministerial portfolio and placed them under the sector 
regulator. The regulator is expected to act effectively and professionally to ensure the 
sector’s growth and development. Specifically, it has to promote competition by 
setting up rules that guarantee fair play. This has partly been possible, for example, 
by setting rules to facilitate entry. The converged licensing framework, access 
framework, competitive spectrum regulation, and interconnection regulation serve as 
good examples.  
Tanzania’s economic needs demand a robust telecom sector that is innovative and 
competitive enough to be a powerful engine to boost all other sectors.833 Therefore, 
further improvements in the regulatory framework are necessary. Such improvements 
must ensure that regulation does not replace the concept of free transactions in the 
market. Instead, regulation must exist only when it is necessary to mimic market 
conditions. Put differently, regulation should only bridge those gaps rendering the 
market dysfunctional. It could be through remedying those failures caused by, for 
example, the presence of monopolistic features.  
 
833 It has elsewhere been argued that telecommunications is “the glue that binds together firms and market 
participants. See Rodine-Hardy, Global Markets and Government Regulation in Telecommunications, p. 2. 
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Regulation should be only temporary, as an enabling hand for competitive markets. 
Even in natural monopolies, it should establish ‘as-if-competition,’ or, where possible, 
open markets to competition.834 In other words, it is essential to ensure that regulatory 
frameworks exist only to create and ensure a level playing field in the sector.  
To this end, a review of the whole regulatory framework to render it highly 
competitive becomes necessary. For example, it may be necessary to scrap individual 
licenses in favor of single general authorizations. Instead of multiple licenses and 
procedures, a single license with less bureaucratic procedures is a good idea. 
Decisions, which affect firms’ corporate structures and financial positions, should be 
carefully deliberated before implementations and, if not necessary, discarded. 
Availability of spectrum as a crucial input of wireless communications should also be 
simplified and guaranteed to all firms, regardless of financial muscles. Its disposition 
must certainly be possible, even if that means some limitations from the regulators 
are justified. The bottom line is that each regulatory framework, decision, and 
directive must only be necessary for the efficient functioning market, per market 






834 Podszun, ‘State-Related Restraints of Competition and Supranational Antitrust Law: How a Harmonised 
Regional Competition Framework Can Shape a More Market- Oriented Economy’, p. 293. 
 
 185  
 
Chapter 5:  Regulation of Competition  
“Competition, in theory if not always in practice, is nothing short of a 
miracle. Each firm tries to make as much profit as possible without 
regard (at least directly) for social welfare. Each consumer maximizes his 
own utility, ignoring others. Yet the result is that social welfare, in the 
Pareto sense, becomes as great as possible.”835 
5.1 Introductory Remarks  
The content of this chapter’s epigraph could not capture more the relevance of 
competition in any economy. It is a fundamental tool in the market economy. Michal 
Gal once noted that “from the time of Adam Smith until today, competition has been 
viewed as an important tool for achieving social welfare as well as other social 
goals.”836 Indeed, studies indicate that competitive markets have socio-economic 
benefits, including improved services, extensive choices, reduced prices, and better 
quality, among many others.837 It is through competition that consumers may enjoy 
the benefits of free markets. As Kenneth Train puts it in better terms, through 
competition, the “existence of the ‘invisible hand’ molds privately motivated actions 
into socially desirable outcomes—serves as the rationale for a ‘free market.’” 838 
The above paragraph implies that in an ideal functioning market, firms will be 
competing and not cooperating.839 Indeed, if competition is beneficial, one would 
expect business firms to advocate for more competition. This assumption, however, is 
 
835 Train, p. 1. 
836 Michal Gal, Competition Policy for Small Market Economies, 14. 
837 See UNCTAD Secretariat, ‘The Benefit of Competition Policy for Consumers’, in United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (presented at the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy Fourteenth session, Geneva: UNCTAD, 2014), pp. 2–13 
<https://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciclpd27_en.pdf> [accessed 19 October 2019]; 
European Commission, ‘Benefits of Competition Policy – European Commission’, 2012 
<https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html> [accessed 19 November 2019]; Katalin J. 
Cseres, Competition Law and Consumer Protection, European Monographs, 49 (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2005), p. 93; Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida, ‘Trade Policy and Competition Policy’, 
Giornale Degli Economisti e Annali Di Economia, 56 (Anno 110).1/2 (1997), 67–97 (pp. 83–94). 
838 Train, p. 1. 
839 Whish and Bailey, Competition Law, p. 513. 
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fallacious. In many cases, the contrary appears to be accurate.  Many firms have 
continually coordinated their practices, direct or otherwise, to reap more profit from 
markets. As Adam Smith noted over three hundred years ago, “people of the same 
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment or diversion, but the conversation 
ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices.”840 Over 
three centuries down the line, it would appear, the “incentive to coordinate behaviors 
to increase profit remains a powerful one.”841  
It is for such reasons that it is necessary to have rules in place to ensure free 
competition. Such rules, in principle, must seek to protect competition and its 
process. They must not, however, protect competitors. This position is what the FCT 
held in Tanga Fresh v FCC.842 The US Supreme Court also held a similar view in 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan when it held that, 
“the purpose of the Act [the Sherman Act that laid down competition rules] is not to 
protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public 
from the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which 
is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to 
destroy competition itself. It does so not out of solicitude for private concerns 
but out of concern for the public interest.”843  
Thus, this chapter introduces rules of competition in the Tanzania telecom sector. The 
objective is to understand the extent to which the law addresses anti-competitive 
practices, including how enforcement takes place. Whereas the previous chapter 
focused on the ex-ante aspects of sector regulation, this chapter, except for mergers 
and acquisitions, focuses on competition’s ex-post regulation. The chapter addresses 
two main points. It addresses the specific aspects of competition policy, including 
rules on abuse of dominance, collusive practices, and the regulation of mergers and 
acquisitions. It then examines enforcement frameworks.  
 
840 Jurgita Bruneckienė and others, The Impact of Cartels on National Economy and Competitiveness: A 
Lithuanian Case Study (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015), p. 1. 
841 Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow, ‘Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and 
Experimental Economics’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, ed. by Roger D. 
Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford, UK; New York.: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 
442–63 (p. 463). 
842 Tanga Fresh v FCC, Appeal No 5 of 2014, Fair Competition Tribunal (Unreported), p. 52. 
843 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, U.S, (1993) 506 US 447 (UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT)., p. 458. 
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5.2 Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Conduct  
When Tanzania enacted the EPOCA in 2010, it already had competition rules under 
the Fair Competition Act of 2003. However, the lawmakers found it wise to have 
separate rules addressing the same question but limited to the telecom sector. Thus, 
EPOCA establishes two sets of rules, those addressing abuse of dominance and those 
addressing collusive practices.  
5.2.1 Abuse of Dominance  
5.2.1.1 Defining Dominance  
The starting point to understand the abuse of dominance is by defining dominance. 
Dominance relates to firms’ grasp of market powers. It means that a firm has 
significant market powers “to maintain the price at which it sells its product at a level 
that is significantly above its average (unit) costs.” 844 In this context, costs have an 
economic definition. They include “a competitive return on the investment that has 
been made in the enterprise.”845 When dominant, a firm can behave independently of 
other firms in the market. If, for example, it chooses to raise prices excessively, there 
will be no sufficient competitive restraints from other players in the same market. The 
European Court of Justice has captured this fact very well in the case of Hoffmann-La 
Roche v Commission.846 In this case, the ECJ defined dominance as 
“a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording 
it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its 
customers and ultimately of the consumers.”847 
The Hoffmann-La Roche definition appears to have received wide acceptance from 
competition authors,848 even though criticism abounds.849 Several jurisdictions, such as 
 
844 Lawrence White, ‘Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, ed. by Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, Oxford 
Handbooks (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), I, 313–44 (p. 313). 
845 White, I, p. 313. 
846 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, [1979] European Court of Justice, Case 85/76. 
847 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, p. 520. 
848 For literatures in which Hoffmann-La Roche has been referred to see Peter Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal 
Concept of “Abuse” of a Dominant Position and Its Impact on Article 102 TFEU’, in Abusive Practices in 
Competition Law, ed. by Fabiana Di Porto and Rupprecht Podszun, ASCOLA Competition Law (Cheltenham, 
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the Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Belgium, and Switzerland, have 
also adopted this definition in their national laws.850  
Dominance is a question of fact. It requires a detailed market analysis. Generally, the 
starting point is on market shares. Together with market definition, argues Mario 
Monti (the former EU Commissioner for Competition), market shares “are easily 
available proxy for the measurement of the market power enjoyed by firms.”851 In the 
EU, for example, there is generally a strong presumption of dominance when shares 
exceed 70 percent.852 A weaker presumption exists when market shares range between 
50 percent and 70 percent, while market shares between 40 and 50 percent will 
require close examination.853 Those below 40 percent need not raise the dominance 
assumption under normal circumstances.854 
In Germany, the Act against Restraints of Competition has set elaborate criteria to 
determine dominance.855 Section 18(2) (1)-(3) of the Act provides that  
“an undertaking is dominant where, as a supplier or purchaser of a certain type of 
goods or commercial services on the relevant product and geographic market, has no 
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849 For criticisms on the definition see Whish and Bailey, Competition Law, p. 198; Damien Geradin and 
others, The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 
1 July 2005) <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=770144> [accessed 24 September 2019]; Emanuela 
Arezzo, ‘Is There a Role for Market Definition and Dominance in an Effects-Based Approach?’, in Abuse of 
Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms?, ed. by Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, 
Beatriz Conde Gallego, and Stefan Enchelmaier (New York: Springer, 2008), pp. 21–54 (pp. 25–26); 
Giorgio Monti, ‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’, European Competition Journal, 2.sup1 (2006), 
31–52 <https://doi.org/10.5235/ecj.v2n1s.31>. 
850 Pınar Akman, ‘International Report’, in Abuse of Dominant Position and Globalization &Protection and 
Disclosure of Trade Secrets and Know-How, ed. by Pranvera Këllezi, Bruce Kilpatrick, and Pierre Kobel, LIDC 
Contributions on Antitrust Law, Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition (Cham: Springer Verlag, 
2017), pp. 3–26 (p. 8). 
851 O’Donoghue and Padilla, p. 143. 
852 O’Donoghue and Padilla, p. 147. 
853 O’Donoghue and Padilla, p. 147. 
854 O’Donoghue and Padilla, p. 147. 
855 Act against Restraints of Competition in the version published on 26 June 2013 (Bundesgesetzblatt 
(Federal Law Gazette) I, 2013, p. 1750, 3245), as last amended by Article 1 of the Act of 18 January 2021 
(Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2) 
 
 
 189  
competitors, is not exposed to any substantial competition, or has a paramount 
market position in relation to its competitors.”   
Section 18(3) of the Act further guides how one may assess the market position. The 
guiding factors are broad and cover as many scenarios as possible to arrive at an 
accurate analysis. Such factors include, for example, the undertaking’s market share, 
its financial strength, its access to data relevant for competition, and its access to 
supply or sales markets. They also include “the undertaking’s links with other 
undertakings,” “the presence of legal or factual barriers to the market entry of other 
undertakings,” the presence of “actual or potential competition from undertakings 
domiciled within or outside the area of application of this Act,” the undertaking’s 
“ability to shift its supply or demand to other goods or commercial services,” and “the 
possibility for the opposite market side to switch to other undertakings.” These factors 
are modern enough to embrace the dynamics of the current economic developments 
where big firms trade on assets such as data that were once not at the core of the 
market analysis.  
The Act is also specific when focusing on markets with peculiar features such as 
multi-sided markets and networks. A new set of criteria for analyzing market power is 
added in such markets, where telecommunications services fall. Section 3(a) of the 
Act provides that in such market, an assessment of the market position of an 
undertaking will also consider the “direct and indirect network effects,” “the parallel 
use of several services and the switching costs for users,” “the undertaking’s 
economies of scale arising in connection with network effects,” “the undertaking’s 
access to data relevant for competition,” and “competitive pressure driven by 
innovation.”  
By including the factors mentioned above, it is now possible to assess the market 
position of giant tech and telecom companies who, as mentioned already, survive on 
their powers to access data or speed of rolling out new innovative technologies. A 
general rule, Section 4 of the Act set a threshold of at least 40% for an undertaking to 
be considered dominant. It may be argued that the Germany Act brings modern 
approaches and contemporary perspectives in defining and understanding the abuse 
 
 190  
of dominance. It is helpful in understanding abuse in the modern era of big tech 
companies that have been causing anti-competitive concerns recently. 
5.2.1.2 Abuse of Dominance  
Abuse of dominance refers to dominant firms’ behaviors and actions that are likely to 
affect undistorted competition. It refers to how a dominant firm uses its powers 
unfairly or illegally to suppress competition to reap more profits from the markets 
(the US Sherman Act in Section 2 calls this practice ‘monopolization’).856 As some 
authors describe it, abuse of dominance may constitute, among others, dominant 
firms’ behaviors “which harm competition,”857 “which impair undistorted 
competition,”858 or which “deviate from ‘normal’ or ‘fair’ or ‘undistorted’ 
competition.”859 It is the illegal use of dominance in the market to restrict or distort 
competition. 
5.2.1.3 Material Issues in Abuse of Dominance 
At the outset, it is essential to note that being dominant is not in itself illegal.860 Firms 
may grow into dominance for several reasons, such as efficiencies in production and 
marketing, quality of products, or even competitive prices and other techniques.861 
Thus, it would naturally follow that success in business is what every firm aspires, 
and punishing firms for such achievement is, of course, senseless. As Senator George 
Hoar put it while discussing the Sherman’s Act,  
“I suppose, therefore, that the courts of the United States would say in the case put 
by the senator from West Virginia that a man who merely by superior knowledge 
and intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or manufacturer, or artisan of 
any kind, got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could, 
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was not a monopolist, but that it involved something like the means which made it 
impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition, like engrossing, buying 
up of all other persons engaged in the same business.”862 
Senator Hoar rightly held that competition law does not intend to prohibit business 
firms from growing and expanding due to proper business strategies. Such firms are 
entitled to grow and become dominant, if possible. In principle, dominant firms have 
the right to compete on merit.863 The problem comes when they abuse such 
dominance, for example, through the adoption of means that make it impossible for 
others to compete fairly. At this junction, a competition concern arises.  
Thus, what competition law seeks to prohibit is an abuse of such dominance. It 
follows that dominant firms have a responsibility not to allow their conduct to 
“impair genuine and undistorted competition.”864 The European Court of Justice has 
once held that dominant firms have “a special responsibility not to allow its conduct 
to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.”865 Thus, rather 
than embarking on unfair and uncompetitive practices, dominant firms ought to play 
fairly by relying on innovation, quality, and affordability as the key to success.  
5.2.1.4 Many Faces of Abuse of Dominance  
Much as abuse of dominance forms part of almost every competition regime, its 
application, however, has turned out to be one of the controversial areas on 
competition enforcement.866 The root of the controversy lies in the fact that what 
amounts to an abuse of dominance is not an exact science. It has always been 
 
862 United States Congress, Bills and Debates in Congress Relating to Trusts: Fiftieth Congress to Fifty-Seventh 
Congress, First Session, Inclusive (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 279. 
863 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Rulemaking in Air Transport: A Deconstructive Analysis (Switzerland: Springer 
Nature Switzerland AG, 2016), p. 135. 
864 Beata Mäihäniemi, Competition Law and Big Data: Imposing Access to Information in Digital Markets, New 
Horizons in Competition Law and Economics (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2020), p. 28. 
865 See Para 57 Michelin V Commission, [1983] European Court of Justice, Case 322/81., p. 3511. 
866 See what the OECD says regarding the controversial nature of abuse of dominance in ‘Abuse of 
Dominance and Monopolisation - OECD’ <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/abuse/> [accessed 24 
September 2019]. 
 
 192  
challenging to determine when a “firm’s behavior is an abuse of market power instead 
of competitive action.”867  
There is even one more point that complicates the understanding of abuse of 
dominance. It has been observed that what amounts to an abuse of dominance in one 
jurisdiction is not necessarily true in another. For example, while some jurisdictions 
such as the US, Mexico, and Australia do not condemn excessive pricing as an act of 
abuse of dominance,868 the same is prohibited under Article 102 of TFEU.869  
Similar differences also exist concerning margin squeezing.870 In the US, the Supreme 
Court had established its position in this question in Triko’s case where it held that,  
“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the 
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices at least for a 
short period is what attracts business acumen in the first place; it induces risk-
taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to 
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anti-competitive conduct.”871 
 
867 OECD, ‘Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation’, 2020 <http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/> 
[accessed 3 June 2020]. 
868 See Frederic Jenny, ‘Abuse of Dominance by Firms Charging Excessive or Unfair Prices: An Assessment’, 
in Excessive Pricing and Competition Law Enforcement, ed. by Yannis Katsoulacos and Frédéric Jenny (Cham: 
Springer International Publishing, 2018), pp. 5–70 (pp. 7–9); Eleanor M. Fox, ‘Abuse of Dominance and 
Monopolisation: How to Protect Competition Without Protecting Competitors’, in What Is an Abuse of a 
Dominant Position?, ed. by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu, European Competition Law 
Annual, 8.2003 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 69–78 (pp. 70–71). 
869 See for example Arezzo, p. 21; Eleanor M. Fox, pp. 70–71; Some authors have criticised the EU’s 
adoption of formalistic approach than effects-based approach. This approach, some argue, benefits 
competitors and not competition. See O’Donoghue and Padilla, p. 67; As a result, there is a debate for a 
more economic approach in which analysis of abuse conduct will be based on its economic effects. This will 
ensure that the rules protect competition and not competitors. See Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, A Principled 
Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European Competition Law (United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), pp. 15–16; Wolfgang Wurmnest, ‘Predatory Pricing: From Price/Cost Comparisons to Post-
Chicago Thinking’, in Structure and Effects in EU Competition Law: Studies on Exclusionary Conduct and State 
Aid, ed. by Jürgen Basedow and Wolfgang Wurmnest, International Competition Law Series, vol. 47 
(Alphen aan den Rijn : Frederick, MD: Kluwer Law International ; Sold and distributed in North, Central, 
and South America by Aspen Publishers, 2011), pp. 1–2; Rupprecht Podszun, ‘Introduction’, in Competition 
Policy and the Economic Approach: Foundations and Limitations, ed. by Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber, and 
Rupprecht Podszun (Cheltenham Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2011), pp. 1–10 (pp. 2–3). 
870 Germain Gaudin and Despoina Mantzari, Margin Squeeze: An Above-Cost Predatory Pricing Approach 
(Düsseldorf, Germany: Düsseldorf University Press, 2016), pp. 2–4 
<http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125793> [accessed 17 March 2020]. 
871 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, (2004) 540 US 398 (United States 
Supreme Court)., p. 547. 
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Whereas the US holds that excessive pricing is “an important element of the free-
market system,” its European counterparts have a different view. In the United Brands 
v Commission, the European Court of Justice discussed excessive prices by United 
brands in one geographical market, which would sometimes be as much as 100 
percent than the prices charged to customers in other markets such as Ireland.872 One 
of the questions the Court had to determine was whether United Brands abused its 
dominance by charging such excessive prices. The Court observed, 
“It is advisable, therefore, to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has made 
use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap 
trading benefits which it would not have reaped if there had been normal and 
sufficiently effective competition.  In this case, charging a price that is excessive 
because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product 
supplied would be such an abuse.” 873  
The two observations show how the definition of abuse of dominance and its content 
varies with jurisdictions. Whereas in one jurisdiction, abuse of dominance includes 
excessive prices that do not have a reasonable relationship to the product’s economic 
value, other jurisdictions will not condemn such practices at all.  Thus, what exactly 
amounts to an abuse of dominance depends on the laws of specific jurisdiction. 
5.2.1.5 Dominance in Tanzania  
The telecommunications laws in Tanzania do not define the term ‘dominance.’ 
However, its meaning can be inferred from other legal provisions, for example, those 
defining abuse of dominance. Section 3 of the EPOCA defines abuse of dominance as 
an act whereby, 
“a firm holds a position of such economic strength that allows it to operate in a 
market without being significantly affected by competition, and it engages in 
conduct that is likely to impede the development or maintenance of effective 
competition.” 
 
872 See for example, Para 239 United Brands v Commission, [1978] EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, CASE 27/76., 
p. 300. 
873 See Para 249-250 of the United Brands v Commission, [1978] EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, CASE 27/76., p. 
301. 
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From this definition, a dominant firm is a firm that holds a position of economic 
strength in the market such that it can operate without being significantly affected by 
competition. As Section 62(2) of the EPOCA clarifies, a dominant firm “can profitably 
and materially restrain or reduces competition in the telecom market” and must 
possess at least 35 percent of market shares. As a general rule, no presumption of 
dominance exists for a firm with less than 35 percent of the market share.  
It is important to note that dominance is not automatic unless the Authority declares 
so. Section 66(2) of the EPOCA and Regulation 14 of Competition Regulations 
empower the Authority to carry informed inquiries before concluding on a firm’s 
dominance. In so doing, the law lists factors for consideration. From the Act and the 
Regulations, it is clear that determining a dominant firm is not an easy task. It calls 
for an objective analysis of the industry by factoring in diverse issues such as 
economic and market powers, technological aspects and developments, and the 
varying powers, including demand from the consumers’ side. Specifically, the 
Authority will consider the following factors before declaring a service provider 
dominant: 
1. Firstly, it will look at the economic strength of the respective firm in the market. 
Under Section 66(2)(a) and (c) and Regulation 14(a) of Competition 
Regulations, the Authority will consider factors such as the extent of the market 
shares, revenues, number of subscribers, traffic of calls and messages, and sales 
volume. 
2. Secondly, Regulation 14(b) directs the Authority to consider economic 
dimensions, such as its size compared to others, and its command of the 
economies of scope and scale, as these two have the potential to create anti-
competitive effects. 
3. Thirdly, the Authority will consider the control of essential facilities. Regulation 
14(c) of the Competition Regulations provides that a firm with such control has 
the potential to abuse it at the expense of the competitors.  
4. Fourthly, the Authority will also consider the nature of consumers’ side to 
understand the extent and degree of consumers’ involvement in the sector’s 
activities. Under Regulation 14(d), the Authority will consider factors such as 
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weak buying and bargaining powers, complicated switching costs, and 
information asymmetries.  
5. Fifthly, the Authority will consider the market’s overall competitive state, such 
as how easy or difficult it is to enter or exit the market. According to the 
Regulation 14 (e) of the Competition Regulations, the presence of entry or exit 
barriers is likely to strengthen the dominance, and therefore, features in the 
analysis of a firm’s dominance.  
6. Lastly, Regulation 14(6) directs the Authority to consider the sector’s 
technological developments and advancements because they may give the 
respective firm powers over others.  
Both the Act and the Regulations use the word “may” in setting these criteria. Using 
the word “may” gives the Authority the liberty to choose which factor it considers 
necessary in defining dominance. However, the Authority’s studies on assessing 
dominance are rare as there are no ex-post enforcement cases that would have 
provided a better opportunity for such assessment.  
Nevertheless, there is one recent study of 2018 in which the Authority assessed the 
sector’s competitiveness.874 The Authority used market shares, Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI), and other factors. The HHI is an index used to measure the market 
concentration of an industry where a highly concentrated market will be one with 
only a few players that hold a large percentage of the market. The opposite means a 
lower degree of concentration, indicating that the market is closer to perfect 
competition.875 Market shares and HHI were calculated based on subscription, traffic 
volumes, and revenues.876 The Authority also considered other factors such as the 
ownership of essential facilities, advertisement and branding powers, vertical and 
horizontal integration, and pricing behaviors. In so doing, the Authority retains some 
flexibility by including several factors to get the right picture on the state of market 
concentration. 
 
874 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, pp. 13–18. 
875 The HHI is a technical index. For details see Eva Lütkebohmert, Concentration Risk in Credit Portfolios, 
EAA Lecture Notes (Berlin; London: Springer, 2009), p. 72. 
876 TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, pp. 13–18. 
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5.2.1.6 Acts of Abuse of Dominance  
We have already seen that abuse of dominance is a question of fact. A detailed market 
analysis is necessary to establish if dominance exists. Then, it is also necessary to 
prove if that dominance has been abused.  In order to do so, there must be in place 
some legal guidance. In Tanzania, Section 3(i) and Section 60(1) of the Electronic 
and Postal Communications Act, together with the Competition Regulations, state 
what may amount to an abuse of dominance. They include exclusionary practices, 
exploitative practices, tying and bundling as well as unfair methods of competition. 
5.2.1.6.1 Exclusionary Practices.  
Exclusionary practices include all conducts, the very nature of which is to exclude 
rivals in the market.877 Such practices, as Regulation 6 (a) of Competition Regulations 
provides, include predatory pricing, price (margin) squeezing, price (cross) 
subsidization, and price discrimination.878 As their names suggest, all these practices 
include the use of pricing to reap more from consumers. As a result, they exclude 
competitors from the market. 
Price predation or undercutting is a straightforward practice by dominant firms. Its 
theory is interesting. Here, a dominant firm deliberately cuts its price (below the 
marginal costs), i.e., deliberately making losses to gain more market shares. The gain 
is not out of efficiency but due to practices that make it difficult for competitors to 
survive, forcing them to exit the market.879 For price predation to make any sense, the 
dominant firm must regain the incurred loss in the future. Thus, predatory pricing is 
always a short-term strategy.  
Price (margin) squeezing is a practice by a vertically integrated dominant firm in 
which it supplies upstream goods or services to a rival at such a high price that the 
 
877 Akman, p. 13. 
878 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, GN. NO 26 OF 2018. 
879 See Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills, ‘Predatory Pricing’, in The Oxford Handbook of International 
Antitrust Economics, ed. by Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford, UK; New York.: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 40–61; Nicola Giocoli, Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law and 
Economics: A Historical Perspective, The Economics of Legal Relationships, 20 (Milton Park, Abingdon, 
Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1–10; Wurmnest, ‘Predatory Pricing: From Price/Cost 
Comparisons to Post-Chicago Thinking’, pp. 109–14. 
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competitor cannot trade profitably at the downstream market.880 Literature indicates 
about five conditions for a margin squeezing abuse. Firstly, the market in question 
must be vertically integrated. Secondly, the input in question must be essential for 
competition. Thirdly, the supplied input must constitute a high and fixed proportion 
of downstream costs. Fourthly, specific aspects of abuse must be identified. For 
instance, it must be established if downstream firms cannot profitably trade under the 
dominant firm’s pricing arrangements. Lastly, it must be established whether there is 
any other justification for the squeezing arrangement apart from a mere intent to 
exclude rivals from the market.881  
As for cross-subsidization, it refers to a dominant firm’s practice of charging low 
prices below costs in one of its markets or products only to recover the loss in another 
product or market.882 The whole idea of cross-subsidization is deliberate loss-making 
in one product or market, which can be compensated by profits from another product 
or market.883 In so doing, a dominant firm allocates products or markets’ costs in 
which it is dominant to other products or markets. The result is to offer below-cost 
prices, making it impossible for competitors to survive. This practice develops not 
because of efficiency or performance but because of internal subsidization methods 
(artificial cost allocation).884  
Lastly, price discrimination happens when the same supplier charges different prices 
to different customers on the same goods or services. Price difference techniques may 
include charging the maximum price the customer is willing to pay, segregating 
customers into various groups, charging different prices on different geographical 
 
880 See Alison Jones, ‘Identifying an Unlawful Margin Squeeze: The Recent Judgments of the Court of 
Justice in Deutsche Telekom and TeliaSonera’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 13 (2011), 
161–93 <https://doi.org/10.5235/152888712801752942>; Barak Orbach and Raphael Avraham, 
‘Squeezing Claims: Refusal to Deal, Essential Facilities, and Price Squeezes’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Antitrust Economics, ed. by Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford, 
UK; New York.: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 120–31. 
881 Damien Geradin and Robert O’Donoghue, ‘The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and 
Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector’, Journal of Competition 
Law & Economics, 1.2 (2005), 355–425 (pp. 358–60) <https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhi009>. 
882 See Ritter and Braun, p. 458. 
883 Zhijun Chen and Patrick Rey, ‘Competitive Cross-Subsidization’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 50.3 
(2019), 645–65 (p. 1) <https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12293>. 
884 Ritter and Braun, p. 383. 
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markets, or pricing according to the volume of goods or services procured.885 Price 
discrimination includes using different methods such as coupons, discounts, premium 
services, loyalties rebates, and many more. 886 
5.2.1.6.2 Exploitative practices  
Exploitative practices include dominant firms’ practices that directly or indirectly 
disadvantage consumers to gain more profit to solidify their dominance. Regulation 
6(b) and (c) of Competition Regulations give a few examples of exploitative conduct. 
They include excessively high prices, discriminatory prices, unfair contractual terms 
(for example, locking in contracts), and refusal or limiting of supply, markets, and 
technology.  
Exploitative practices such as excessively high prices are subject to debate amongst 
competition authors because they do not amount to an abuse of competition in all 
jurisdictions.887 Furthermore, complications arise because it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which prices are exactly exploitative.888 However, the EU’s position is that 
excessive prices may be determined through price/cost comparison, geographical 
comparison of prices, analysis of product/service’s economic value, and a comparison 
between dominant firm’s prices and prices in other competitive markets.889 However, 
what is essential is that the idea behind prohibiting exploitative practices is that a 
 
885 See S. P. S. Chauhan, Microeconomics: Theory And Applications Part Ii (New Delhi: PHI Learning Pvt. 
Ltd., 2009), pp. 11–15; Luc Peeperkorn, ‘Price Discrimination and Exploitation’, in International Antitrust 
Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2008, ed. by Barry E. Hawk (New York: Juris Publishing, Inc., 
2009), pp. 611–34 (p. 628); Phillip Louis Landolt, Modernised EC Competition Law in International 
Arbitration (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006), p. 79; Roger Sherman, The Regulation of 
Monopoly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 65–66. 
886 See Chauhan, pp. 11–15; Peeperkorn, p. 628; Landolt, p. 79; Sherman, pp. 65–66. 
887 Michael Gal, ‘Abuse of Dominance- Exploitative Abuses’, in Handbook on European Competition Law. 
Enforcement and Procedure, ed. by Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 
2013), pp. 385–422 (pp. 385–86). 
888 A lot has been written on this topic. See, for example, Talya Solomon and Iris Achmon, ‘Excessive 
Pricing in Israel—How to Deal with A “Hot Potato”?’, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 8.10 
(2017), 660–67 (p. 666) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpx066>; Pinar Akman and Luke Garrod, 
‘When Are Excessive Prices Unfair?’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 7.2 (2011), 403–26 (pp. 
404–24) <https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhq024>; Simon Roberts, ‘Assessing Excessive Pricing: The 
Case of Flat Steel in South Africa’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 4.3 (2008), 871–91 (pp. 
873–75) <https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhn005>; David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, ‘Excessive 
Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable Legal Rules’, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 1.1 
(2005), 97–122 (pp. 100–110) <https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhi002>. 
889 Geradin and O’Donoghue, p. 365. 
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dominant firm ought not to use its market powers to exploit other competitors or 
consumers.  
Discriminatory practices also amount to exploitative practices.890 Such practices may 
include pricing based on customers’ willingness to pay (first-degree discrimination), 
pricing based on discounts after a certain quota is reached (second-degree 
discrimination), and group pricing (third-degree discrimination).891 In Tanzania, 
Section 60(2) of the EPOCA prohibits dominant firms to “discriminate between 
persons who acquire or make use of electronic communication service in the market 
in which it operates.” Prohibition of discrimination extends beyond prices to other 
aspects of the sector, such as quality of service, access, and interconnection. Thus, it 
not only applies to end customers but also to the relationship between telecom firms. 
5.2.1.6.3 Tying and Bundling  
Even though tying and bundling are part of dominant firms’ exclusionary practices, 
Tanzania’s law differentiates them from other abusive practices. Section 65 of the 
EPOCA prohibits all types of tying and bundling, whether done by dominant firms or 
not. Tying involves a practice in which a firm makes it a condition to a customer who 
buys one product (the tying product) to buy another product (the tied product).892 For 
example, the EU held that Microsoft selling of windows operating system with 
window media player amount to tying.893 
Bundling, on the other hand, is selling two products or services as one.894 Bundling 
may be pure, in which a firm sells two products jointly at a fixed price, or mixed, 
where a firm sells two products differently, but they are cheaper when bought 
together.895 In either case, the objective of dominant’s firm tying and bundling is to 
force customers to buy its products, hence excluding others. In Tanzania, however, 
 
890 Marco Botta and Klaus Wiedemann, ‘Exploitative Conducts in Digital Markets: Time for a Discussion 
after the Facebook Decision’, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 10.8 (2019), 465–78 (p. 
466) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpz064>. 
891 Botta and Wiedemann, pp. 467–68. 
892 Lorenz, p. 224. 
893 European Commission Court of Justice, Microsoft v the Commission, [2007] European Court of First 
Instance, Case T-201/04., p. 601 (p. 601). 
894 Lorenz, p. 225. 
895 Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, and Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 231. 
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tying and bundling are prohibited, regardless of whether the firm in question is 
dominant or not. 
5.2.1.6.4 Unfair Methods of Competition.  
The law also prohibits the dominant’s firm from unfair competition methods that may 
improperly deter entry or restrict competition. Some prohibited practices in this 
category include predatory logical or physical network alteration to negatively impact 
other competitors without any legitimate business, technical or operational 
justifications. This may include physical or logical alteration of the dominant firm’s 
network such that interconnected licensees incur additional operational costs. Under 
Reg. 6(f) of the Interconnection Regulation, such alteration must be without 
legitimate business, operational or technical justification. Unjustifiable limitation of 
products, services, markets, or technical developments to the detriment of consumers 
is another prohibited method of unfair competition.896 Furthermore, the practices 
include refusal to interconnect, supply, or grant access to communication facilities.897 
Other practices include false or misleading claims, the provision of misleading or false 
information to competitors, and all acts that interfere with end-user or supplier 
relationships.898   
5.2.1.7 TCRA and the Regulation of Abuse of Dominance 
The documentary review and interviews conducted in this research revealed that the 
TCRA does not monitor markets to establish acts of abuse of dominance, if any. 
Intensive market studies that focus on assessing the state of competition are rare, the 
only ones being of 2012 and 2018. In all these studies, the authority’s focus was on 
understanding the market structure to come up with regulatory remedies. It did not 
assess the markets’ competitive aspects from an ex-post enforcement perspective.  
The TCRA’s study of 2018, for example, indicated the markets to be concentrated, 
with Vodacom and Tigo commanding dominance in some markets. These firms had 
some practices, which, if well investigated, could have revealed possible abuse of 
 
896 Reg. 6(c) of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, GN. NO 26 OF 2018. 
897 Reg. 6(h) of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, GN. NO 26 OF 2018. 
898 Reg. 6(i) of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, GN. NO 26 OF 2018. 
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dominance. For example, the findings of this research indicated that it is not unusual 
for them to run low promotional prices, sometimes with zero tariffs, for a 
considerable amount of time. It was also found that similar conduct has been 
experienced in which prices are considerably reduced, sometimes to zero tariffs in 
some geographical areas, whereas others continue to pay the standard or heightened 
tariffs. Furthermore, the integration of telephony and mobile money service was 
observed to have fortified the dominance of Vodacom and raised the possibility of 
cross-subsidization, especially with the increase of associated charges. These are not 
matters that the TCRA investigated in the light of abuse of dominance. 
Further findings of this research noted similar concerns relating to internet charges in 
which the leading supplier, the TTCL, is also active in the downstream markets. There 
have been concerns from other telecom firms that the TTCL supplies the internet at a 
higher rate, making it difficult for them to offer competitive practices at the 
downstream market. These concerns do not indicate the presence or absence of an 
abuse of dominance. This is a question that only the TCRA can answer. It would then 
be expected that the Authority would go a step further to investigate and address 
possible acts of abuse of dominance. As chapter six shows, it has not done so because 
it is not designed to do so.  
5.2.1.8 Comments on the Regulation of Abuse of Dominance  
The regulation of abuse of dominance in Tanzania is just like other competition rules 
in its nascent stage. They provide a theoretical framework that defines dominance 
and instances of its abuse. However, their relevance and practicality remain abstract 
paperwork that has not been tested by real markets scenarios. Thus, unfortunately, 
we do not have judicial precedents that demonstrate these rules’ applicability, 
especially those that introduce some unconventional elements in the abuse of 
dominance concept. This fact stems from the TCRA’s design as it does not afford 
sufficient opportunities and possibilities for ex-post competition enforcement. 
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5.2.2 Collusive Practices 
Collusion (also referred to as cartels) is the “joint determination of output, prices, or 
other terms of trade by ostensibly independent firms to elevate their profits.”899 
Collusive practices may deal with determining output level, allocation of markets or 
customers, or even coordination to win contracts.900 Collusion may either be express 
or tacit.901 Express collusion means clear stipulations of coordinated practices.902 Here, 
firms deliberately take joint measures to restrict competition, for example, through 
sharing information, joint pricing decisions, market divisions, and restricting 
production, among others. 
Tacit collusion means coordinated efforts due to informal communication and on a 
non-verbal basis.903 The whole idea here is that firms need not reach a formal 
agreement. Thus, tacit collusion may result from market behaviors, for example, by 
following what leading firms do. A joint increase in price and aggressive advertising 
are some of the few examples. What is even more important is that the effects of tacit 
and express collusion are the same.  
Some authors have considered collusive practices the worst form of anti-competitive 
conduct because they rarely offer any economic or social justifications.904 Collusive 
practices have continued to grow despite legal reactions around the world. For 
example, a century has passed since the US criminalized them by making price-fixing 
a felony.905 In Europe, Germany was the first country to pass the law against cartels in 
 
899 Michal S. Gal, p. 157; Bruneckienė and others, pp. 2–3. 
900 Antoine Colombani, Jindrich Kloub, and Ewoud Sakkers, ‘Cartels’, in Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of 
Competition, ed. by Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, and Deirdre Taylor, Third edition (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 1023–1362 (p. 1024). 
901 For detailed technical differences between the two concepts see Miguel A. Fonseca and Hans-Theo 
Normann, ‘Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments’ 
(Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), 2012). 
902 Jones and Sufrin, pp. 660 & 672; Michal S. Gal, p. 157; Barry J. Rodger and Angus MacCulloch, 
Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK, 4. ed (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), pp. 175–78; 
John Lipczynski and John Wilson, The Economics of Business Strategy (England: Pearson Education, 2004), 
p. 111. 
903 Jones and Sufrin, pp. 660 & 672; Michal S. Gal, p. 157; Rodger and MacCulloch, pp. 175–78; Lipczynski 
and Wilson, p. 111. 
904 Kamala Dawar and Peter Holmes, ‘Trade and Competition Policy’, in The Ashgate Research Companion to 
International Trade Policy, ed. by Kenneth Heydon (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 225–44 (p. 229). 
905 Levenstein and Suslow, p. 443. 
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1958.906 About two decades ago, the literature reveals, “the United States, the 
European Commission, and competition authorities around the world reached 
consensus that hard core cartels would not be tolerated.”907 Such reaction 
notwithstanding, cartels have continued to grow. As Margaret Levenstein and Valerie 
Suslow observe, cartels “form in local markets with relatively small firms, and they 
form in highly concentrated global markets dominated by multiproduct 
multinationals.”908 
Impacts of collusive practices on competition, efficiency, innovation, and consumers 
are considered similar to monopolies.909 “If a single firm can damage the market and 
produce unwelcome welfare effects,” it has been argued, “then so too can a group of 
firms which act together as if they were one.”910 It is not astonishing that some 
describe collusive practices as the “cancer on the open market”911 or “the supreme evil 
of antitrust.”912 
5.2.2.1 Collusive Practices in Telecom Sector  
Because of their oligopolistic nature, collusive practices are more likely to happen in 
telecom markets.913 Green, Marshal, and Marx, for example, argue that 
“firms in an oligopoly can be expected to recognize their mutual interdependence in 
the market. Each firm realizes that its profits depend not only on its own actions but 
also on the actions of its rivals. It is possible that firms, each possessing this insight 
and understanding that its competitors all possess it, might be able to succeed in the 
 
906 Justus Haucap, Ulrich Heimeshoff, and Luis Manuel Schultz, Legal and Illegal Cartels in Germany between 
1954 and 2004, 2010, p. 1 <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-20110104150> [accessed 20 
August 2021]. 
907 Levenstein and Suslow, p. 443. 
908 Levenstein and Suslow, p. 443. 
909 Decker, Economics and the Enforcement of European Competition Law, p. 16. 
910 Sandra Marco Colino, p. 143. 
911 Whish and Bailey, Competition Law, p. 514. 
912 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, p. 408. 
913 Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach, ‘Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics’, 
in The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, ed. by Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, 
Oxford Handbooks (Oxford, UK; New York.: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 415–41 (p. 418); Edward 
J. Green, Leslie M. Marx, and Robert C. Marshall, ‘Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and 
Experimental Economics’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, ed. by Roger D. 
Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford, UK; New York.: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 
464–98 (p. 465); Nicolas Petit, ‘THe Oligopoly Problem in EU Competition Law’, in Handbook on European 
Competition Law: Substantive Aspects, ed. by Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2013), pp. 259–349 (p. 284); Femi Alese, Federal Antitrust and EC Competition Law Analysis (England: 
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), p. 55. 
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implementation or even the establishment of a collusive agreement without 
communication.”914  
Furthermore, observing the likelihood of collusive practices in concentrated markets, 
Kovacic and others make this vital observation, 
“In markets characterized by interdependence, each firm realizes that the effect of its 
actions depends on the responses of its rivals. In highly concentrated markets, the 
recognition of interdependence can lead firms to coordinate their conduct 
simply by observing and reacting to their competitors' moves. In some 
instances, such oligopolistic coordination yields parallel behavior (e.g., parallel 
price movements) that approaches the results that one might associate with a 
traditional agreement to set prices, output levels, or other conditions of 
trade.”915 
The effect of collusive or coordinated practices is to replace market forces. Market 
factors such as demand, marketing strategies, and quality of products and services do 
not determine prices in such an environment. Instead, coordination between firms 
becomes the decisive factor. For this reason, many jurisdictions treat collusions as 
illegal per see, meaning one does not need to prove any resulting harm.916  
5.2.2.2 Prohibition of Collusive Practices in Tanzania  
The law in Tanzania prohibits all collusive practices, whether done by a dominant 
firm or not. Section 64 of the EPOCA reads,  
“A licensee shall not enter into any understanding, agreement, or arrangement, 
whether legally enforceable or not, which provides for – (a) rate fixing; (b) market 
sharing; (c) boycott of a supplier of apparatus; or (d) boycott of another 
competitor.”  
The law does not define the terms “price-fixing, “market sharing,” and “boycotting,” 
as used in Section 64 of the EPOCA. However, it is argued that they have a similar 
 
914 Green, Marx, and Marshall, p. 465. 
915 William E Kovacic and others, ‘Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law’, Michigan Law Review, 110 
(2011), 393–436 (p. 405); See also S. 1 of Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C 1-38; See Art 101 of ‘Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, Official Journal of the European Union, 
C326, 2012, 47. 
916 Choi and Gerlach, p. 415. 
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meaning as typically applied in law and economics. Price fixing includes any 
technique designed to interfere with the market’s pricing mechanism.917 It is 
immaterial whether such techniques are intended to interfere with maximum or 
minimum prices or stabilize prices.918 Market sharing includes practices between two 
or more firms that agree on customers’ apportioning, for example, by refraining from 
entering each other’s territories.919 Boycotting of suppliers’ or competitors’ products 
refers to a deliberate refusal by two or more firms on dealing with another 
competitor.920 
In defining collusive practices, Section 64 of the EPOCA uses different terms such as 
“understanding, agreement, or arrangement.” By their very nature, these terms are 
broad enough to include both explicit and implicit collusion. Thus, both formal and 
informal collusive practices are prohibited. It is unnecessary to have a legal 
agreement in place to prove collusion.  
5.2.2.3 Regulatory Powers over Collusive Agreements 
In general, Section 23(1) of Tanzania’s Law of Contract Act makes illegal any contract 
with an unlawful object or unlawful consideration.921 Consequently, since the law 
already prohibits collusive practices, any agreement to such effect is unlawful. The 
legal effect of such agreement is, as Section 24 of the Law of Contract Act provides, 
void. No court of law may give effect to such agreements.  
Apart from this void effect of collusive agreements, the telecommunications laws 
empower the TCRA to take further steps. Thus, Regulation 11 of Competition 
Regulations authorizes the TCRA to review all licensees’ agreements to ensure the 
absence of collusion. These are extensive powers without any specific conditions on 
 
917 Seplaki, p. 335.For a detailed discussion on price-fixing see Louis Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price 
Fixing (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 21–60; John M Connor, Global Price 
Fixing (Berlin: Springer, 2008), pp. 17–52; Keith N Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common 
Law Evolution (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 113–31. 
918 Seplaki, p. 335.For a detailed discussion on price-fixing see Kaplow, pp. 21–60; Connor, pp. 17–52; 
Hylton, pp. 113–31. 
919 Paul Belleflamme and Francis Bloch, ‘Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks’, International 
Economic Review, 45.2 (2004), 387–411 (p. 387); Mark Furse and Susan Nash, The Cartel Offence (Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 140. 
920 For further details see Timothy J. Brennan, ‘Refusing to Cooperate with Competitors: A Theory of 
Boycotts’, The Journal of Law & Economics, 35.2 (1992), 247–64. 
921 The Law of Contract Act, CAP 345 [R.E 2019]. 
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how the Authority may exercise them. Therefore, the Authority has the right to 
demand and review any agreement between licensees, irrespective of the subject 
matter. If the Authority proves collusion, it has powers to issue necessary directives or 
remedies, if any.  
5.3 Substantial Lessening of Competition 
In an attempt to be as thorough as possible, Regulation 8 (a)–(i) of Competition 
Regulations introduces another set of prohibitions known as ‘acts that lessen 
competition substantially.’ The prohibitions relate to acts that may not necessarily be 
uncompetitive, but they may lessen competition. Moreover, the prohibitions are 
somewhat unconventional compared to standard competition rules, which seek to 
protect competition and not competitors. The Regulations read that “subject to a 
licensee demonstrating otherwise in the course of any inquiry or other procedure 
conducted by the Authority, the following conducts or practices shall be deemed to 
result in a substantial lessening of competition.” The Regulations then list several 
conducts that may reduce competition substantially in the sector, which this 
subsection discusses.  
5.3.1 Refusal to Deal Regarding Essential Services  
Regulation 8(a) of Competition Regulations provides that a firm’s refusal regarding 
interconnection or access to essential facilities amounts to acts that lessen 
competition. The law in Tanzania does not define an essential facility. However, 
according to literature, an essential facility refers to an essential input owned by a 
dominant firm and which its refusal for access may affect or foreclose competition.922 
For example, the EU defines it as a “facility or infrastructure, without access to which 
competitors cannot provide services to their customers.”923 In principle, essential 
facility doctrine applies under the following conditions: (1) the facility in question is 
 
922 See Alemu, p. 146; Stoyanova, pp. 97–98; Andrea Renda, ‘Competition–Regulation Interface in 
Telecommunications: What’s Left of the Essential Facility Doctrine’, Telecommunications Policy, 34.1–2 
(2010), 23–35 (pp. 24–33) <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2009.11.005>; Jean Tirole, 
‘Telecommunications and Competition’, in The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications: 
Perspectives for the New European Regulatory Framework, ed. by Pierre-André Buigues and Patrick Rey 
(Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004), pp. 260–65 (pp. 261–62). 
923 See Para 66 of European Commission, Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, [1993] European Commission, 
Case IV/34.689., p. 16. 
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under control of a dominant firm, (2) competitors cannot reproduce the facility, (3) 
competing firms are denied access, and (4) a dominant firm can provide access to 
such a facility (i.e., there is no objective justification for the refusal).924 Unless there is 
a justified reason, a dominant firm should not refuse access to an essential facility.  
The law in Tanzania does not define what an essential facility is. However, unlike its 
applicability in Tanzania, we learn from the literature that essential facility doctrine 
refers to an essential input owned by a dominant firm and which its refusal may 
affect or foreclose competition. Essential facilities must be ones that cannot be easily 
duplicated. In principle, a dominant firm should not refuse access to an essential 
facility unless there is a justified reason.925 
In Tanzania, this rule extends to all firms regardless of their market powers. Both 
dominant and non-dominant firms should interconnect. Furthermore, regardless of 
market powers, a firm must grant access if the Authority determines that it owns an 
essential facility. The rationale for this generalization is unclear. However, the effect 
is to subject smaller firms to the mandatory sharing of their facilities.   
5.3.2 Discrimination on Interconnection, Communications Services or Facilities 
Regulation 8 (b) states that any discrimination regarding the provision of 
interconnection or other communication services and facilities (regardless of whether 
they are essential or not) amounts to a lessening of competition. This prohibition 
applies to all firms regardless of their market powers. The Regulation allows 
discrimination only where there is an objective justification, for example, due to 
differences in supply costs. In the same manner, Regulation 8(d) provides that 
offering one competitor more favorable terms than others amount to a lessening of 
competition.  
This Regulation envisages that each firm should treat all other firms on the same 
terms and conditions, regardless of market position. Prima facie, this might appear to 
be a good approach aiming at reducing entry barriers. However, a closer look reveals 
 
924 Mats A. Bergman, ‘The Role of the Essential Facilities Doctrine’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 46.2 (2001), 403–
34 (pp. 407–8) <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X0104600206>. 
925 See Alemu, p. 146; Stoyanova, pp. 97–98. 
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that having such a provision that does not consider the market position forces equal 
treatment amongst unequal firms and may affect competition. For example, big firms 
with considerable market powers may still demand access to services or facilities 
offered by small competing firms. According to this Regulation, such services need 
not be essential. Thus, a smaller firm cannot refuse its competitor access to such 
services or facilities nor provide it on different terms and conditions unless only when 
the refusal is justified on supply conditions such as service delivery costs.  
It is argued, this provision does not provide a specific room for smaller firms to grow 
and offer meaningful competition. It may also be a disincentive to invest. The right 
approach would be to restrict this Regulation to those firms with significant market 
powers to facilitate entry. Maintaining this provision contradicts what competition 
policy seeks to achieve.  
5.3.3 Exclusionary or Exploitative Conduct 
Exclusionary or exploitative conduct present yet another controversial aspect of 
competition regulation in the sector. The Regulations extend the prohibition of 
exclusionary or exploitative acts, which generally apply to dominant firms, to all 
other firms. For instance, Regulation 8 (e) makes predatory pricing amount to acts 
lessening competition. It is immaterial whether a dominant or non-dominant firm did 
it. The same is true for cross-subsidization under Regulation 8(f) and margin 
squeezing under Regulation 8(h)(i).  
How these rules apply to all firms remains to be seen in practice since the rules are 
relatively new. They were enacted in 2018. There is, however, one area where the 
practice has shown the effects of these rules. A non-dominant firm may not charge 
lower prices than those approved by the Authority, even if that is its only business 
strategy for expansion. Smart’s internet charges can provide a good example.  
Smart had established itself as a fast internet service provider in Dar es Salaam and 
other cities. It has no significant voice shares (less than 1%). For a long time, one 
would pay Tsh. 70,000/= (about 30USD) to get an unlimited monthly internet 
connection. However, since 2018, the TCRA directed Smart to limit its unlimited 
internet service because it was below the Authority’s threshold price set for 1 
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Gigabyte (GB).926 In other words, the Authority meant that Smart violated competition 
principles by charging internet service too cheap (undercutting). As per the 
Authority’s directives, Smile had to raise its prices like other big firms such a 
Vodacom and Tigo.  
Such a decision has no advantage to consumers or small firms like Smart. Contrary to 
what competition seeks to deliver, consumers do not benefit because they now have 
to pay more. The disappointing fact is that they pay more not because of market 
demand but because of the regulatory intervention. This scenario is one of the many 
that shows how regulatory intervention may affect markets’ smooth operation. 
Regulation has replaced market powers of demand and supply.  
Furthermore, such a decision narrows down smaller firms’ opportunities to compete 
with those already well-established in the market. Specifically, for Smart, that 
decision meant that a firm with less than 1% of the market shares is forced to 
compete with more prominent firms like Tigo or Vodacom using the same techniques. 
It is unclear why the regulator would promote “equality” or “uniformity” between 
firms because this is not the objective of competition. However, it is clear that this 
decision will make it difficult for small firms to compete with those already having 
scales and scope. The small firms will exit the markets. And this is what happened to 
Smart. It closed its shop in 2019.927  
5.3.4 Refusal to Deal or Supply 
The Regulations have designated individual acts, whose effects amount to a refusal to 
deal or supply, as lessening competition in the sector. For example, Regulation 
8(h)(ii) provides that any act that requires or induces a supplier to refrain from 
selling to competitors lessens competition in the sector. Similarly, under Regulation 
8(h)(iii), adopting technical specifications without objective justification to 
complicate interoperability amounts to a refusal to deal and, therefore, lessens 
competition. Furthermore, under Regulation 8(h) (iv), failure to timely provide a 
 
926 Information obtained during field research. 
927 Alfred Zacharia, ‘“Smart” Quits Tanzania Market’, The Citizen (Dar es Salaam, 7 October 2019) 
<https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/1840340-5301700-9r90ua/index.html> [accessed 17 June 2020]. 
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competitor with technical specifications or information on essential facilities, or other 
necessary pieces of commercial information to compete lessens competition.  
Again, as with other previous rules, these rules apply symmetrically even though 
some usually apply to dominant firms. For example, it is generally accepted that 
unless a firm is dominant, and only in instances of essential facilities, all firms have or 
must have the freedom to choose with whom to deal with, to share commercial 
information, or to enter into business relationships.928 Firms, even those dominant in 
the market, do not have an obligation to deal.929 Thus, under normal circumstances, 
refusal to deal is not illegal per see unless the deterring of competition comes out as 
an apparent effect of such a refusal.930 In the US, for example, as it was held in 
Trinko’s case, 
“Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension 
with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the 
monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities. 
Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, 
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for 
which they are ill-suited. Moreover, compelling negotiation between 
competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion. Thus, as a 
general matter, the Sherman Act “does not restrict the long-recognized right of 
[a] trader or manufacturer engaged in entirely private business, freely to 
 
928 Tiancheng Jiang, China and EU Antitrust Review of Refusal to License IPR, Maklu Competition Series, 3 
(Antwerpen; Portland: Maklu, 2015), p. 224; François Lévêque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential 
Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case’, in Antitrust, Patents, and Copyright: EU and 
US Perspectives, ed. by François Lévêque and Howard A. Shelanski, New Horizons in Competition Law and 
Economics (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), p. 103; Penelope Kent, 
Law of the European Union, Frameworks, 3. ed (England: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), p. 258; OECD, 
Refusal to Deal (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2009), p. 9; Estelle Derclaye, ‘Abuse of a Dominant Position and 
Intellectual Property Rights: A Suggestion to Reconcile the Community Courts’ Case Law’, in Competition, 
Regulation, and the New Economy, ed. by Cosmo Graham and Fiona Smith (Oxford; Portland: Hart Pub, 
2004), pp. 55–76 (pp. 59–61). 
929 Katarzyna Czapracka, Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust: A Comparative Study of US and EU 
Approaches, New Horizons in Competition Law and Economics (Cheltenham, U.K; Northampton, Mass: 
Edward Elgar, 2009), p. 14. 
930 Alison Jones, ‘A Dominant Firm’s Duty to Deal: EC and US Antitrust Law Compared’, in Handbook of 
Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust, ed. by Philip Marsden, Elgar Original Reference (Cheltenham, UK: 
Elgar, 2006), pp. 236–86 (pp. 245–46). 
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exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will 
deal.”931 
In the EU, Courts have limited an obligation to deal as an exception only when the 
result is to foreclose competition altogether. For example, in the Commercial Solvent 
case (regarding a refusal to supply essential raw materials), the European Court of 
Justice held that a dominant firm is liable for abuse of its dominance “if it acts in a 
manner that risks eliminating all competition” [in the market].932 Putting it in detail, 
the Court noted, 
“it follows that an undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in raw 
materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw material for 
manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is itself a 
manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all competition on 
the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 86.”933 
Similar observations were also made in the United Brands case.934 Perhaps, it was the 
Bronner case that succeeded in advancing criteria upon which refusal to deal may 
amount to an abuse of dominance.935 The criteria include, firstly, where such refusal 
eliminates all competition in the market, secondly, where the refusal is not objectively 
justified, and where the refused service is indispensable for the latter’s carrying of 
business.936  
Apart from Bronner’s case, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. 
KG, is another case decided by the European Court of Justice that explains 
circumstances under which refusal to supply, in this case, intellectual property rights 
(IPR), may amount to an abuse of dominance.937 IMS Health had developed a system 
in the pharmaceutical industry in Germany by providing sales data on pharmaceutical 
 
931 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, p. 408. 
932 Commercial Solvents v Commission, [1974] European Court of Justice, Joint Cases 6 & 7/73., p. 251. 
933 Para 25 Commercial Solvents v Commission, p. 251. 
934 See specifically para 182-3 United Brands v Commission, [1978] EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, CASE 27/76., 
p. 292. 
935 Bronner v Mediaprint, [1998] European Court of Justice, Case C-7/97. 
936 See Para 41 Bronner v Mediaprint, p. 7831. 
937 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, [2004] European Court of Justice, Case C-
418/01. 
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products. It had organized the system in 1860 bricks corresponding to geographical 
areas in the country. This system became de facto in the industry. Later on, the 
respondent started to use a system similar to the brick system raising IPR issues. The 
matter landed in the German regional court, Landgericht Frankfurt am Main. The 
German court had to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice to ascertain 
whether, by refusing to grant a license based on IPR reasons, a dominant firm 
commits abuse of dominance under Art 82 EC, now Article. 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. Answering this question in the affirmative, the 
court went a step further to provide circumstances under which such refusal may 
amount to an abuse of dominance. The court held:  
“…the refusal by an undertaking which holds a dominant position and owns an 
intellectual property right in a brick structure indispensable to the presentation of 
regional sales data on pharmaceutical products in a Member State to grant a licence 
to use that structure to another undertaking which also wishes to provide such data 
in the same Member State, constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within the 
meaning of Article 82 EC where the following conditions are fulfilled:  
— the undertaking which requested the licence intends to offer, on the market for 
the supply of the data in question, new products or services not offered by the owner 
of the intellectual property right and for which there is a potential consumer 
demand;  
— the refusal is not justified by objective considerations;  
— the refusal is such as to reserve to the owner of the intellectual property right the 
market for the supply of data on sales of pharmaceutical products in the Member 
State concerned by eliminating all competition on that market.”938 
The position in Tanzania is different. It would appear that any refusal to deal, even by 
firms with no significant powers in the market, may amount to acts that lessen 
competition.  
 
938 See para 52 of IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, p. I–5080. 
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5.3.5 Comments on Acts that Lessen Competition 
It may be argued that the introduction of these rules is unnecessary as they add no 
value to the whole architecture of competition regulation in the sector. They certainly 
add pointless complications because they go beyond the general objective of 
protecting competition. If they are implemented, one can see nothing but confusion in 
compliance, as firms will be required to comply with some of the rules that have no 
competition value and contradict the principles of market operations. Even more 
critical is their redundant nature, for most of what they cover could very well be 
addressed by the rules of abuse of dominance or collusive practices.  
5.4 Merger Regulation  
A merger happens when “two or more formerly independent entities unite.”939 It is a 
common way in which businesses expand or address other organizational issues. 
Literature indicates at least three common types of mergers: horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate mergers.940  Regarding horizontal mergers, they involve firms operating 
on the same market level, for example, two telecom firms. Such mergers are of the 
most concern in competition regulation as they increase market concentration.941 
Vertical mergers happen when two firms at a different level in the production and 
distribution chain merge, for example, manufacturer and suppliers of telecom 
devices.942 Vertical mergers can also be of concern, especially if they end up 
foreclosing competition.943 Conglomerate mergers involve firms with no vertical or 
horizontal effects.944 Motives for conglomerate mergers, apart from the general 
 
939 Jones, Sufrin, and Dunne, p. 1059. 
940 See for example Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law, Ninth edition (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 830–31; Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, 
Fundamentals of Financial Management, 13th edn (Mason, USA: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2012), 
p. 712; Alese, p. 409. 
941 Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases, Sixth edition (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2018), p. 417. 
942 Ezrachi, EU Competition Law, p. 418. 
943 See Steven Salop, ‘Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshoot 
the Mark’, in How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Efect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. 
Antitrust, ed. by Robert Pitofsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 114–55 (p. 149); Sarkis J. 
Khoury, Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States (Washington, D.C: Beard Books, 2002), 
p. 112. 
944 Jones, Sufrin, and Dunne, p. 1064. 
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assumption on risk reduction, are unknown.945 Conglomerate mergers are considered 
of little impact in competition law.946 However, if they are likely to bring any anti-
competitive effects, merger regulation will still step in.  
5.4.1 Objectives of Merger Regulation in the Sector  
Generally, not all mergers and acquisitions are bad for competition. Mergers and 
acquisitions have been argued to facilitate firms’ growth and hence, obtain a range of 
benefits to include economies of scale and scope and relevant trading inputs such as 
access to information, licenses, patents, or even a broader base of customers.947 It will 
not be surprising when literature proves that mergers bring benefits to markets and 
consumers, including reduced prices, improved quality, increased choices, and 
improved efficiency.948  
However, certain mergers may have the effect of creating monopolies and hence, 
harm competition and the economy at large. For example, in horizontal mergers, the 
likely impact of concentration is huge because, after the mergers, two firms are 
reduced to one with even more significant market shares than before.949 It is when it 
comes to this stage that mergers of such anti-competitive effects are prohibited. In 
other words, a merger with no anti-competitive effects will face no objection from 
competition authorities. 
Merger regulation in Tanzania is under the Fair Competition Commission’s 
jurisdiction. The legal mandate comes from Sections 11 to 14 of the Fair Competition 
Act and Part V of the Competition Rules of 2018. In principle, Section 11(1) of the 
FCA prohibits a merger only “if it creates or strengthens a position of dominance in a 
market.” The FCC will not block any merger that does not strengthen a position of 
 
945 Whish and Bailey, Competition Law, pp. 831 & 840; Yokov Amihud and Baruch Lev, ‘Risk Reduction as a 
Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers’, in Mergers and Acquisitions: Motivaton, ed. by Simon Peck 
and Paul Temple (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 228–42 (p. 228). 
946 Whish and Bailey, Competition Law, pp. 831 & 840; Amihud and Lev, p. 228. 
947 Ezrachi, EU Competition Law, p. 412. 
948 See for example Jones, Sufrin, and Dunne, p. 1060; Paul Healy, ‘The Effect of Changes in Corporate 
Control of Firms Perfomance’, in Transforming Organizations, ed. by Thomas A. Kochan and Michael Useem 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 61–79 (pp. 41–42); Donald F. Turner, ‘Conglomerate 
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act’, Harvard Law Review, 78.7 (1965), 1313–95 (p. 1317) 
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1338906>. 
949 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 5th edn (USA: 
West Group, 2016), p. 668. 
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dominance. As the FCT held in Tanga Fresh v FCC, the general policy objective for 
merger regulation is to protect competition “so that mergers do not harm 
consumers.”950  
Because not every proposed merger will have anti-competitive effects, the FCC must 
carry a sound economic analysis to evaluate the proposed merger’s effects. It usually 
does this through a factual analysis comparing the likely effects of competition with 
and without the proposed merger in question. This approach is known in the EU 
merger regulation framework as counterfactual analysis, and it is well documented in 
the EU merger regulations.951 When no anti-competitive effects are likely to arise from 
the proposed merger, the FCC will clear it.  
5.4.2 Notification Requirement 
There is a mandatory notification requirement for all prospective mergers, the failure 
of which is in itself a violation of the merger Regulations. Section 11(2) allows the 
FCC to set a threshold for notification. The latest limit is Tanzanian shillings 3.5 
billion (around 1.5 mil USD).952 The threshold calculation relies on the “combined 
market value of assets or turnover of the merging firms.”953 The notification 
requirement is necessary as it allows authorities to scrutinize every envisaged merger 
and its probable effects on competition. Stressing on this point, the FCT observed the 
following in the Tanga Fresh case: 
“Notification of a merger, we would say, is a standstill obligation under our law. 
The validity of a transaction carried in contravention of the standstill obligation is, as 
a general rule, dependent on clearance or approval by the Fair Competition 
Commission. The respondent [the FCC] retains the powers to review such 
mergers/concentrations. Where a merger is implemented in violation of the 
standstill obligation (as the merger in questions) (the so-called “gun-jumping”), the 
Competition Authority should take measures with a view to ensuring that any 
negative impact on effective competition in the market arising from the 
 
950 Tanga Fresh v FCC, p. 52. 
951 See Emily. F. Clark and Cecilia. E. Foss, ‘When the Failing Firm Defence Fails’, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, 3.4 (2012), 317–31 (p. 317) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lps023>. 
952 The Fair Competition (Threshold for Notification of a Merger (Amendment) Order, 2017, GN. 222OF 2017. 
953 See Reg 2 of The Fair Competition (Threshold for Notification of a Merger (Amendment) Order, GN. 222OF 
2017. 
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implemented transaction are allayed to the extent possible and in the event are 
not protracted or rather prolonged.”954  
5.4.3  Initial Investigation (First Stage Investigation) 
Once prospective merging firms have notified the Commission of their merging 
intention, the law under Section 11(3) of the Fair Competition Act grants the 
Commission fourteen days to decide whether or not that merger requires further 
examination. Within this time, the Commission carries its initial analysis of the 
competitive effects of the proposed merger. During that time, the proposed merger is 
automatically blocked. Should the Commission find it necessary to carry further 
examination, it will have another ninety days in which the proposed merger continues 
to remain blocked unless Commission’s decision comes earlier. If not, and should the 
Commission need more time, 30 more days are possible under Section 11(4)(a) of the 
Fair Competition Act. Furthermore, if more delays result from parties’ inactions, 
further extensions are possible under Section 11(4)(b) of the Act. In all this time, the 
prospective merger remains blocked.  
During the ninety days (or in that time as it may be extended), the Commission’s 
Director responsible for mergers is tasked under Regulation 38(1) & (2) and 39(1) of 
Competition Rules to carry out analysis of the proposed mergers to determine 
whether it is likely to harm competition. The law directs specifically under Regulation 
39(1) of Competition Rules that the investigation is to be carried together with the 
Commission’s lawyers and economists. Regulation 39(4) of Competition Rules directs 
the Director responsible for mergers to give a “no objection” finding to the parties if 
the investigation concludes that “there is little or no possibility that the relevant 
merger is likely to harm competition.”  
5.4.4 Further Investigation (Second Stage Investigation)  
If the initial investigation concludes that the proposed merger is likely to harm 
competition, Regulation 39(5) of the Competition Rules directs further investigation 
 
954 Tanga Fresh v FCC, p. 49 emphasis originally from the judgment. 
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known as the second stage investigations. This stage is intended to explore the 
proposed merger in detail. Several things happen at this point.  
1. Firstly, Regulation 41(1) of Competition Rules allows any interested third party 
to make its submission to the Commission. The door for interested third parties 
is wide. It includes suppliers, competitors, customers (who can either be legal or 
natural persons), and consumers’ organizations.955  
2. Secondly, under Regulation 41(3), parties may argue why the merger should be 
exempted.  
3. Thirdly, the Director responsible for mergers is allowed under Regulation 41(4) 
of the Rules to make rounds of hearings with all interested parties.  
4. Fourthly, upon conclusion of the hearings, the Director must prepare a technical 
report to be presented before the Commission (here, the commissioners sit as 
judges). Regulation 42(1) of the Rules directs the report to be technical with 
legal and economic reasoning explaining why the proposed merger poses a 
danger to the competition. Furthermore, the report should also explain, where 
applicable, whether or not such a merger amounts to an exemption under 
Section 13 of the Fair Competition Act.  
5.4.5 Hearing and Decision  
Unlike in the first stage, where the Director makes a decision, the Commission 
decides in the second stage. Thus, the Director acts as a ‘prosecutor’ by presenting the 
findings to the Commission. Regulation 42(5) of the Rules empowers the Commission 
to carry a full hearing. Thus, each party, including the Director, gets an opportunity 
to defend its case. Under Regulation 42(8) to (10) of the Rules, the Commission will 
analyze all submitted arguments and finally decide.  
The Commission can make three decisions as Regulation 42(3) of the Rules provides. 
It may approve the merger, approve it with conditions, or prohibit it altogether. This 
decision is followed by a certificate of merger clearance or prohibition, as the case 
may be. Further, Regulation 42(14) of the Rules entitles parties to receive a copy of 
 
955 See Reg. 49 of FCC, Competition Rules, GN. 344 of 2018, 2018. 
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the Commission’s reasoned decision. Also, the Commission must publish a notice of 
its decision in the Government Gazette or on its official website.  
5.4.6 Exceptions  
Some exceptions allow clearing of mergers, which would have otherwise been 
blocked. Section 13(1)(b) of the Fair Competition Act stipulates those exceptions. 
They can mainly be defined to four: efficiency, technical or economic reasons, failing 
firm defense, and other relevant considerations, for example, environmental reasons. 
It must be noted that these exceptions, as Section 13(1)(b)(vi) of the Fair 
Competition Act provides, stand only when the benefits of such a merger to the public 
outweigh their adverse anti-competitive effects. Put differently, a merger falling 
under the exceptions below will nevertheless not be cleared if the public benefits are 
few compared to anti-competitive effects of increased dominance.  
5.4.6.1 Efficiency  
Under Section 13(1)(b) (i) and (iii) of the Fair Competition, a merger would be 
allowed if it leads to greater efficiency in production, distribution of goods or services, 
or allocation of resources. A good example is where a merger leads to increased 
employment opportunities or boosts smaller firms’ capacity to produce or deliver 
goods and services. The preceding is the view of the Fair Competition Tribunal in the 
case of Tanga Fresh v FCC.956 In this case, Tanga Fresh, a significant producer of dairy 
products in the Tanga region, had acquired small farmers’ businesses with a view of 
improving their productivity. The FCC vehemently opposed such a move.  
On appeal, the FCT opined that this was the case in which a merger would have been 
cleared under efficiency considerations. The FCT opined the merger in question 
increased efficiency by increasing and improving dairy products’ production and 
distribution.957 It further held that the merger was in agreement with national policies 
 
956 Tanga Fresh v FCC, pp. 57–59; See also Assimakis Komninos and Jan Jeram, ‘Changing Mind in Changed 
Circumstances: Aegean/Olympic II and the Failing Firm Defence’, Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, 5.9 (2014), 605–15 (pp. 162–67) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpu040>. 
957 See Tanga Fresh v FCC, pp. 57–59. 
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of expanding the industrial sector.958 However, since no party raised efficiency or 
public interest as a defense, the FCT upheld the FCC’s objections.  
5.4.6.2 Technical or Economic Reasons  
Section 13(I)(b)(ii) of the Fair Competition Act allows a merger’s clearance even 
though it may have anti-competitive effects if it otherwise contributes to technical or 
economic progress. This exception affords Tanzania, a small growing economy, to 
utilize possible economic and technical benefits of new investments, which may only 
be realized through mergers with existing firms. This is what the judges stressed in 
the Tanga Fresh case that if a merger contributes to the economy’s growth by 
providing new employment opportunities, technology, and innovation, they will clear 
it.959  
5.4.6.3 Failing Firm Defense  
Failing firm defense is another exception that Section 13(1)(c) of the Fair 
Competition Act provides. The failing firm defense (or doctrine) allows clearing of a 
merger, which would have otherwise been prohibited, if in its absence, the business 
in question faces actual or imminent danger of collapse and that the proposed merger 
is the only last option.960 Literature shows at least two conditions must exist before 
courts accept the defense: that the targeted firm faces imminent danger of failure and 
that there is no other purchaser with lesser anti-competitive effects.961 It has also been 
argued that the targeted firm’s failure of successful reorganization or the possibility 
 
958 See Tanga Fresh v FCC, pp. 57–59. 
959 Tanga Fresh v FCC, pp. 47–49. 
960 For further details on the failing firm defence (doctrine) see Joshua R. Wueller, ‘Mergers of Majors: 
Applying the Failing Firm Doctrine in the Recorded Music Industry’, Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, 
Financial & Commercial Law, 7.2 (2013), 589–612 (pp. 590–93); Alistair Lindsay and Alison Berridge, The 
EU Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), pp. 556–72; Robert S. 
Schlossberg, Mergers and Acquisitions: Understanding the Antitrust Issues (USA: American Bar Association, 
2008), pp. 275–79; OECD, The Failing Firm Defence (Paris: OECD, 2009), pp. 19–46; Ritter and Braun, pp. 
594–96. 
961 Jan Bouckaert and Peter M. Kort, ‘Merger Incentives and the Failing Firm Defense: Merger Incentives 
and the Failing Firm Defense’, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 62.3 (2014), 436–66 (p. 436) 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12053>; Schlossberg, Mergers and Acquisitions, p. 275; Antonio Bavasso 
and Alistair Lindsay, ‘Causation in EC Merger Control’, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 3.2 
(2007), 181–202 (pp. 185–93) <https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhm004>; Lars Persson, ‘The Failing 
Firm Defense’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 53.2 (2005), 175–201 (pp. 175–76) 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2005.00251.x>. 
 
 220  
that the target firm’s asset may exit the market may also qualify under this defense.962 
The rationale for the last criterion lies in the argument that if “the relevant assets 
would otherwise leave the market, customers are no worse off after the merger than 
they would have been had the merger been prevented.”963 Thus, the law allows 
clearing a merger if that is the only way to save a firm that would otherwise collapse. 
5.4.6.4 Other Relevant Considerations  
It is also possible to have a merger cleared for other considerations, for example, 
environmental reasons, as Section 13(I)(b)(iv) of the Fair Competition Act provides. 
One scenario may include the clearance of a merger that intends to invest in research 
and development to find new and environmentally friendly means of production. 
Some authors even argue that environmental considerations increase efficiency as 
they improve customer protection and satisfaction.964 They also improve the means of 
production and distribution.965 Thus, it is right if authorities consider environmental 
factors when deliberating firms’ exclusion from strict rules of merger regulation.  
There are a few scenarios where merger exemption on environmental considerations 
makes much sense. A merger that provides clean energy may fall into this exception. 
So are those that seek to improve the environment or address environmental 
problems such as those associated with climate change. Furthermore, as for the 
telecom sector, a merger that leads to better management of e-waste, efficient usage 
of communication resources, or leads to few visibilities of communication 
infrastructure in urban areas may be a good example. The law allows authorities to 
consider all these concerns when deciding on merger exemptions.   
 
962 Schlossberg, Mergers and Acquisitions, p. 275; Bouckaert and Kort, p. 436; Application of the failing firm 
defense to protect assets of the target firm is well acknowledged in the EU framework. See para 90 of 
European Union, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, (2004/C 31/03), 2004; See also, especially from para 804-
833 Aegean/Olympic II, [2013] European Commission, Case COMP/M.6796., pp. 162–67; Giorgio Castaldo 
and Aleko Bogdanov, ‘The Nynas Case: The Interplay Between the Failing Firm Defence and the 
Counterfactual Method’, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 6.5 (2015), 324–26 (p. 325) 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpu120>. 
963 Helder Vasconcelos, ‘Can the Failing Firm Defence Rule Be Counterproductive?’, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 65.2 (2013), 567–93 (p. 567) <https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gps034>. 
964 Simon Holmes, ‘Climate Change, Sustainability and Competition Law-Climate Change Is an Existential 
Threat: Competition Law Must Be Part of the Solution and Not Part of the Problem’, 2019, p. 23 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/simon_holmes.pdf> [accessed 2 June 2020]. 
965 Holmes, p. 23. 
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It has to be known that the exceptions discussed in this chapter will only apply if they 
prove a broad range of benefits to the public. As a result, merger analysis takes a 
case-to-case approach as there is no no-one-size-fit-all solution. In this way, the 
authorities will know the particular circumstances of each firm. Only then can they 
conclude whether or not a merger, if exempted, will significantly lessen competition.  
Furthermore, to guide against possible abuse, exceptions granted are not infinite. As a 
general rule, Section 13(2) allows an exception for one year. After that, a review is 
possible if there is any change of circumstances. Moreover, as Section 13(4) of the Act 
provides, a review is possible at any time if the Commission later discovers to have 
granted an exception based on false, misleading, or incomplete information. The 
overall observation here is that exemptions receive conservative treatment from the 
authorities. Mechanisms are in place to ensure their granting only when it is 
necessary. 
5.4.7 Merger Examples  
Mergers, especially between network services providers (horizontal mergers), are not 
common in Tanzania. The only big recorded merger is that of Tigo acquiring Zantel. 
Firstly, Tigo moved to acquire 85 percent of Zantel in 2015.966 In 2019, Tigo notified 
the FCC of its intention to acquire the remaining 15 percent.967 On the 4th of 
November 2019, Tigo announced to have finally acquired Zantel.968 There is another 
merger in 2016 in which Vodacom acquired Share Network Tanzania Limited, a 
company that had a 900Mhz spectrum for usage in rural areas.969 It appeared that 
Vodacom had intended to acquire the company to exploit its frequency license only to 
learn that it is not transferable.970  
 
966 Samuel Kamndaya, ‘Tigo Finally Acquires Zantel - The Citizen’, The Citizen (Dar es Salaam, 6 June 
2015) <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/Tigo-finally-acquires-Zantel/1840340-2742156-
9lywaf/index.html> [accessed 7 October 2019]. 
967 FCC, ‘In the Matter of the Merger Notification by Mic Tanzania Limited to Acquire Entire Shares in 
Zanzibar Telecommunication PLC and Telesis Tanzania Limited: Public Notice’ (Fair Competition 
Commission, 2019). 
968 Tigo Tanzania, ‘Tigo Announces Combination with Zantel’, Tigo Tanzania, 2019 
<https://www.tigo.co.tz/news/tigo-announces-combination-with-zantel> [accessed 7 November 2019]. 
969 Vodacom Tanzania, p. 61. 
970 Vodacom Tanzania, p. 61. 
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Others are non-horizontal mergers with vertical effects or those belonging to different 
markets. For example, the most common one concerned tower companies acquiring 
towers from telecom firms. The leading player is HTT Infraco’s (the biggest tower 
operator in the country), acquiring telecommunications towers from telecom 
operators. The recent acquisitions are those of Vodacom Tanzania (2013), Zantel and 
Benson Informatics (2017), and Viettel Tanzania Ltd (2019).971 These acquisitions 
received unconditional clearance, even though they gave HTT Infraco dominance in 
the tower services market.  
5.5 Competition Concerns in the Telecom Sector  
This chapter has so far examined rules that regulate competition in the sector. 
However, despite the presence of those rules, some concerns that may adversely 
affect competition in the sector exist. This section looks briefly at those concerns. 
5.5.1 The Role of TTCL  
Ideally, the telecom markets’ competition regulation is centered around the 
incumbent telecom firm’s position vis-à-vis newcomers. The idea here is simple: since 
the incumbent had a monopoly over telecommunication services, including 
infrastructures and customers, new rules are necessary to create an environment for 
competitive operation.972 It was for this reason that early regulatory initiatives focused 
on access and interconnection regulation. For Tanzania, however, the situation is a 
bit different.  As seen in the previous section, the former monopolist does not 
command a significant market share.973  
Despite this insignificant influence, research findings revealed that the former 
monopolist still has some powers and privileges, which may have some anti-
 
971 Fair Competition Commission, ‘Merger Applications Approved by the Commission from April to July 
2017’ (Fair Competition Commission, 2017), p. 2; Fair Competition Commission, ‘Merger Applications 
Approved by the Commission from 1st July 2016 to 2nd March 2017’ (Fair Competition Commission, 
2017), p. 5. 
972 See for example Thomas K. Cheng, Competition Law in Developing Countries (United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, 2020), pp. 73–76; Björn Wellenius and David Townsend, ‘Telecommunications and 
Economic Development’, in Technology Evolution and the Internet, ed. by Sumit Kumar Majumdar, Ingo 
Vogelsang, and Martin Cave, Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Vol. 2, 3. ed (The Netherlands: 
Elsevier, 2008), pp. 557–621 (pp. 564–71). 
973 TCRA, Quarterly Communication Statistics: January to March 2020. 
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competitive concerns. These concerns became even highly pronounced when the 
government, through the Tanzania Telecommunication Corporation Act, changed the 
TTCL status from the national telecom company to the national telecom 
corporation.974 The effects of these changes are to have the TTCL run under the Public 
Corporations Act.975 This new structure elevates the TTCL’s position in the sector and 
raises some competition concerns, which this section highlights.   
5.5.1.1 TTCL’s Regulatory Powers  
The recent changes give the TTCL status equivalent to that of a sector regulator. For 
example, Section 6(1)(a) of the Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation Act (the 
TTCA) directs the corporation to “enhance safety, security, the economic and 
commercial viability of national telecommunications services and telecommunications 
infrastructure.” The TTCL may discharge such duties through several initiatives, 
including the “promotion effective management and operations of 
telecommunications services” and “development, maintenance, promotion and 
management of telecommunications services.” Furthermore, it is the function of the 
TTCL “to promote local and foreign investments in telecommunications services” 
under Section 6(1)(k) of the Act.  
These functions are certainly beyond the undertakings of a typical telecom operator. 
Moreover, the law calls for the corporation to go a step further by issuing policy 
guidelines and directives in the sector. Thus, the corporation will also have certain 
powers over other telecom providers. How exactly will this framework work, and how 
will it interact with the TCRA and other operators remain to be seen. However, 
inevitably, the TTCL will no longer trade on the same footing with other telecom 
firms. It does not only benefit from sharing the same table with the law and 
policymakers. It becomes one of them.  
 
974 See Section 4(1) of the Tanzania Postal and Telecommunication Corporation, ACT NO 15 OF 1977. 
975 See Section 5(1) and (2) of the Tanzania Telecommunication Corporation Act 2017 (Act No 12 of 
2017); read together with Part III to IV of Public Corporations Act 1992 (Act No 2 of 1992). 
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5.5.1.2 Monopoly Powers over Strategic Infrastructure  
Beyond being a telecom firm, the law gives TTCL powers over strategic infrastructure. 
Specifically, Section 6(1)(b) TTCA directs the TTCL to “plan, build, operate and 
maintain the strategic telecommunications infrastructure as determined by the 
Government.” What exactly amounts to strategic infrastructure is uncertain, but 
under Section 3 TTCA, it includes “transport core infrastructure, datacenter, and such 
other telecommunications infrastructure.” Already, the TTCL has a monopoly over the 
National ICT Broadband Backbone (NICTBB), a network of broadband internet 
distribution in the country. The NICTBB connects Tanzania to the world. Thus, all 
other telecom firms must contract the TTCL for broadband connectivity. The same is 
true for the national data center in which the government directs all firms to establish 
either primary or secondary data centers with it.  
Therefore, it is clear that TTCL will now own and control the strategic infrastructure 
necessary for communication services. However, no detailed framework exists to 
guarantee access by other firms. The existing rules on access apply between telecom 
operators. It is unclear whether they will also bind the TTCL, which is now a public 
corporation. The only existing provision regarding access is Section 20 TTCA, which 
puts the corporation under liberty to offer access on a contractual basis to telecom 
operators. The totality of this framework is to give the corporation an unfair 
competitive advantage over other operators. Since this is the new arrangement, 
practice is yet to give a full picture of ensuing consequences.  
5.5.1.3 State Support and Related Favors  
Being a state-owned enterprise, the TTCL now qualifies for budgetary and other 
financial support from the government (state aid). For example, even though the law 
directs it to operate on sound commercial principles, the first source of its income 
under Section 21(1)(a) TTCA is monies appropriated by the Parliament. Also, TTCL 
qualifies for financial subsidies or guarantees from the government. For instance, the 
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company has recently requested the State to support it by providing it with 1.7 trillion 
Tanzanian shillings (about 750 million USD).976  
Apart from monetary support, the TTCL, as a public corporation, is entitled to other 
benefits and preferential treatments from the state. For instance, the President has 
directed all public bodies and employees who receive communication allowance from 
the government to procure such service only from TTCL.977 Furthermore, it was 
revealed during the field study that the government has commissioned TTCL to 
establish and run systems that would have otherwise been offered on a competitive 
basis. The running of the data center, national payment systems, and similar systems 
are a few examples. This support and preferential treatment give TTCL an unfair 
benefit over other operators. It leads to an imbalanced competitive environment.  
5.5.1.4 Immunities and Protection from the Government  
Since the TTCL is now a public corporation, the Attorney General (AG) has powers 
under Section 4(3) TTCA to intervene in any suit initiated for or against the 
corporation. This provision gives the Attorney General the right (but not an 
obligation) to intervene in such suits. Noteworthy is Section 4(5) of the TTCA that 
directs the TTCL to notify the Attorney General of impending suits by or against the 
TTCL. Here, the intention is clear that the AG must be informed of all legal 
developments in order to decide whether to join or not. Should the Attorney General 
choose to join any case for or against the corporation, then the nature of the whole 
case changes altogether.  
Under Section 4(4) TTCA, the suit to which the AG has joined will change its status. 
It will now become a suit for or against the government. Consequently, the provisions 
of the Government Proceedings Act will apply. These provisions bring about 
confusion in the interpretation and application. One of them is whether the procedure 
under the Government Proceedings Act, which requires a 90 days’ notice before the 
 
976 Alfred Zacharia, ‘Why State-Run Telco Needs Sh1.7 Trillion’, The Citizen (Dar es Salaam, 22 May 2019) 
<https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/1840340-5126040-8pexdm/index.html> [accessed 17 June 2020]. 
977 Anna Mwikola, ‘TTCL Yavuna Wateja 300,000, Wamo Watumishi Wa Umma’ (Dar es Salaam, 8 
November 2019) <https://habarileo.co.tz/habari/2019-11-085dc5219985f7e.aspx> [accessed 15 May 
2020]. 
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suit’s institution, shall apply. This issue is not made clear in the TTCA. The TTCA does 
not provide for issues of notice. Neither does it require a party to join the Attorney 
General automatically. It only gives the Attorney General the right to intervene. 
Furthermore, the TTCA does not provide limits to the right of the Attorney General to 
intervene. It appears that he may intervene at any time during the proceedings. 
Assuming that the 90 days notice is needed, any pending suit is likely to be rendered 
incompetent when the Attorney General decides to exercise his right of intervention. 
Because under Section 6 of the Government Proceedings Act, no case may be filed 
against the government unless and until a party gives the government a 90 days’ 
notice.978 Thus, the suit will involve the Attorney General’s office and not the 
corporate counsels. All of these sections, technical as they might appear, end up 
protecting the corporation against legal proceedings. It is worth noting that TTCL’s 
competitors do not enjoy such protection.  
The Attorney General’s intervention also has implications on the execution of a decree 
or award against TTCL. Thus, where the corporation loses the case, executing a 
decree or an award becomes complicated because no attachment is possible against 
government properties under Section 16(3) of the Government Proceedings Act. In 
other words, the corporation creditors cannot enforce court decisions against the 
corporation’s properties even though the corporation can certainly do so under 
Section 16(4) of the same Act. Again, this is protection, which the TTCL enjoys, but 
its competitors do not.  
Besides, there is one more crucial point of concern. It is unclear what will happen if 
the AG has opted not to exercise his right of intervention. The reasonable assumption 
is that TTCL’s corporate counsels will be involved in the suit. However, the main 
question is whether it is possible to execute a decree or an award against the 
corporation. The answer is likely to be yes, as Section 4(2) TTCA gives the TTCL 
corporate personality. That would mean that TTCL assets are not government assets. 
However, some facts point to the contrary.  
 
978 For a discussion on the joining of AG under the Government Proceedings Act see Peter Ng’omango v. 
Gerson Mwangwa and AG, [1993] TLR 77 (High Court of Tanzania). 
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For example, it is the government that wholly owns the TTCL. It is the president who 
appoints its Director-General and the Chairperson of its board.979 It is the Minister who 
appoints board members and makes its regulations. Furthermore, the Treasury 
Registrar has powers to issue general or specific directives to TTC. All these indicate 
that the TTCL is more of a government body than an independent corporate person. It 
is likely to enjoy immunities, protection, and privileges from the government even 
when the AG does not join as a party in a case involving the corporation.  
Thus, the corporation takes a superior position over other telecom firms in Tanzania 
by these privileges and immunities. As the owner and manager of strategic 
infrastructures and with powers similar to those of the regulator, one would expect 
specific provisions to ensure fairness in providing communication services. Instead, it 
is even protected when it comes to liability arising from contractual and similar 
responsibilities.  
5.5.2 Entry and Expansion Barriers  
Like in any other market, each entry of a new firm in the telecom sector is likely to 
challenge the concentration of powers by bringing in more options that may promote 
efficiency in production and distribution.980 Entry may take several forms and include 
new investments (both local and foreign), joint ventures, trading licenses, 
acquisitions, and strategic alliances, among many others.981 Thus, the easier it is to get 
into markets, the higher the chances of improving competition. Nonetheless, entry is 
not always an easy task, as entry barriers always characterize the telecom sector.  
5.5.2.1 Defining Barriers  
There is no universal definition of an entry barrier, and, as a result, several definitions 
exist.982 Although, in different words, the definitions suggest that entry barriers are 
 
979 See Section 7(2) and 14(1) of Tanzania Postal and Telecommunication Corporation, ACT NO 15 OF 1977. 
980 Clemens H. M. Lutz, Ron G. M. Kemp, and S. Gerhard Dijkstra, ‘Perceptions Regarding Strategic and 
Structural Entry Barriers’, Small Business Economics, 35.1 (2010), 19–33 (p. 19) 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-008-9159-1>. 
981 Panagiotis Kotsios, ‘Regulatory Barriers to Entry in Industrial Sectors’, in International Conference in 
International Business, 2010, p. 1 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737250> 
[accessed 18 May 2020]. 
982 See for example Gregorio Impavido, Esperanza Lasagabaster and Manuel Garcia-Huitron, New Policies 
for Mandatory Defined Contribution Pensions: Industrial Organization Models and Investment Products 
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costs that new firms must incur for entry but which the incumbent did not or does not 
have to bear. Entry barriers may also mean factors that make entry difficult only for 
newcomers since incumbents continue to trade and profit without facing the same. 
Regardless of the adopted definition, entry barriers present a challenge to the 
competition process.  
5.5.2.2 Structural Barriers 
Structural barriers relate to existing industry conditions such as costs, technology, 
and demands, which a new firm must incur for a successful entry.983 Such barriers 
may take several forms as peculiar economic characteristics of markets determine. For 
example, they may include access to distribution or selling expenses, access to labor 
or skills, advertising, capital requirements, sales volume, economies of scale, 
switching costs, and sunk costs.984 Field visits to the TCRA, together with a review of 
TCRA operational reports, revealed the presence of structural barriers in the sector, 
including substantial investment costs and economies of scale.985 Also, it has been 
noted that the incumbents have invested immensely in advertisement and branding, 
while newcomers may be unable to do so.986 These factors, it is argued, make it 
difficult for young firms to enter the market. 
5.5.2.3 Regulatory Barriers  
Regulatory barriers are not barriers resulting from market conditions but rather from 
legislative or administrative measures.987 Again, field visits to the TCRA and a review 
of its operational reports unveiled such barriers in the sector. It was noted that the 
complicated licensing procedures and limited spectrum availability are the leading 
barriers in this category. For example, using auctions to acquire spectrum rights 
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already favors incumbent firms with a stable financial position. In this case, 
newcomers are unable to compete with these firms. They are left out of the market.988 
It is argued that the market patterns we have seen in chapter three, in which only 
three firms have dominated the market for over twenty years, result from these 
regulatory barriers.  
5.5.2.4 Strategic Barriers 
Strategic barriers relate to deliberate actions that the incumbents devise to deter new 
entry, for example, by adopting exclusive dealing arrangements.989 Strategic barriers 
include pricing techniques, strategic branding or advertisement, retaliation, collusive 
practices, strategic distribution, asymmetric information, and strategic control of 
necessary resources or inputs.990 The Tanzania telecom sector has such barriers. For 
example, one of the barriers noticed in this research is strategic pricing. The research 
findings revealed that it is common for a provider to charge different prices based on 
on-net and off-net calls. So, on-net calls are always cheaper than off-net calls. 
The impact of such an arrangement is to lock in customers to providers with 
significant scales. New customers are also likely to be attracted to more prominent 
firms with substantial subscribers because it will be easier to reach many subscribers 
within the same network. As for smaller firms, such techniques hardly work. It was 
noted that they have no substantial customer base or financial muscles to justify 
pricing differences. It was further noted that the new firms’ standard practices are to 
charge excessively lower prices for both on-net calls and off-net calls. However, such 
strategies are always short-lived, without significant changes in the market shares.  
The differences between on-net calls and off-net calls are significant enough to affect 
most Tanzanians’ decisions on which network to choose.  In 2010, for example, 
customers had to pay an average of 66 percent more (calculated between Vodacom, 
Tigo, and Airtel) when making off-net calls.991 Astonishingly, it was cheaper for 
 
988 See TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 22. 
989 OECD, ‘Competition and Barriers to Entry’, p. 3. 
990 Lutz, Kemp, and Gerhard Dijkstra, p. 23. 
991 TCRA, Telecommunications Statistics from September to December 2010 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2010), p. 
2. 
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Vodacom customers to call someone in the East African region (outside Tanzania) 
than to make off-net calls in Tanzania.992 Note that by that time, Vodacom was 
dominant, with 41 percent of the market shares.  
Pricing differences continue to vary as the industry continues to grow. In 2018, for 
example, customers paid 22 percent more when making off-net calls vis-à-vis on-net 
calls.993 That year saw a significant decrease in differences between on-net and off-net 
call prices compared to previous years, say, 2010. However, in the first quarter of 
2020, a different picture appeared as the gap between on-net and off-net calls 
increased. The average prices of bundled services show that Vodacom, Tigo, and 
Airtel customers pay 55 percent, 41 percent, and 57 percent more, respectively, when 
making off-net calls.994 This strategy creates ‘false loyalty’ because customers and 
potential customers will find it cost-efficient to stay with an operator with a large 
customer base. Chances for the survival of smaller firms are slim unless they adopt a 
robust competitive plan.  
Apart from pricing behaviors, the research found out that switching costs are 
strategically high with cumbersome procedures. It was noted that the established 
framework for number portability, for example, is complicated and unfriendly both to 
customers and service providers. The author’s personal experience suggests that even 
the telecom firms are not entirely welcome to the portability idea, probably because 
they perceive it as a quick method of losing customers. Further complications arise as 
one’s sim card is also a default mobile money account, which was not portable when 
concluding this research. From consumers’ perspective, these switching costs and 
accompanying inconveniences might influence them to remain with the same 
provider (locking-in effect). As a result, the first movers continue to enjoy loyal 
customers at the expense of smaller firms.995   
 
992 By then, Vodacom charged Tsh 345 (about 0.15 US cents) for calls to East African countries while 
charging Tsh 390 (about 0.17 USD cents) for off-net calls in Tanzania. See TCRA, Telecommunications 
Statistics from September to December 2010, p. 2. 
993 See TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 22. 
994 TCRA, Quarterly Communication Statistics: January to March 2020, pp. 1–3. 
995 See TCRA, Competition Assessment in Tanzania Communications and Broadcasting Markets, p. 22. 
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5.5.3  Collusive Practices  
This research revealed some practices with elements of collusion in the sector. It was 
found that such practices relate to the timing and extent of tariffs set by the MNOs, 
advertisements, other marketing strategies, and several other promotions. In most 
cases, there are usually striking similarities, especially between Vodacom, Airtel, and 
Tigo, the three MNOs with over 80 percent of all subscribers. In 2015, for example, 
the three companies made significant changes in their tariff setting in a manner that 
raised public concerns.  
Firstly, they all introduced changes at the same time, around February. Secondly, 
they significantly reduced their data packages that were, until then, bundled with 
voice and SMS services. Instead, they all introduced new stand-alone internet 
bundles. Thirdly, pricing for their new bundles was coincidentally very similar, with 
some minor variations.996 Furthermore, all three companies also introduced monthly 
bundles. The highest monthly package cost Tsh 49,000 for all three companies. As for 
the stand-alone internet bundles, all three companies introduced a single package of 
Tsh. 25,000 for unlimited internet access.997 
Table 5.5-1 Number of minutes and SMS for low and high price daily bundles 
Before  After  
 Price (Tsh) Minutes SMS MB Price (Tsh) Minutes SMS MB 
Vodacom 399 4 50 15 499 7 300 8 
999 21 100 100 999 20 1000 8 
Airtel  399 5 50 15 499 9 300 10 
995 40 Unlimited 200 999 24 1000 10 
Tigo 499 7 300 30 649 13 450 8 
999 21 1000 100 999 20 1000 8 
 
Table 5.5-2 Number of minutes & SMS for low and high price weekly bundles 
Before  After  
 Price (Tsh) Minutes SMS MB Price 
(Tsh) 
Minutes SMS MB 
 
996 TCRA, ‘Public Notice on the Issue of Tariffs in the ICT Sector’ (TCRA, 2015), p. 4. 
997 TCRA, ‘Public Notice on the Issue of Tariffs in the ICT Sector’, p. 5. 
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Vodacom 1999 30 500 100 1999 29 500 60 
4999 90 1000 300 9999 190 1000 60 
Airtel  1995 60 7000 175 1999 34 1000 70 
5999 200 Unlimited 2000 9999 200 5000 70 
Tigo 1999 40 700 300 4999 91 2000 60 
9999 250 5000 1024 9999 190 5000 60 
Source: TCRA notice on tariffs in the sector.998 
These changes raised some questions. For example, how could the three competitors 
come up with very similar determinations at the same time? Was there possible 
collusion amongst the biggest firms in the country? The only mandated Authority to 
investigate and answer these questions is the TCRA. It responded. However, its 
response was relatively simple, with little or no relevance to competition policy. It 
merely noted that “although some of the service providers have changed the prices, 
generally, the changes in voice and SMS are not significant. There is, however, a huge 
decrease in data with a decrease in MBs.”999  
Therefore, the TCRA directed all telecom firms to file their tariffs with the Authority 
before becoming effective. It also directed that they ensure any changes are “gradual 
and not abrupt to avoid shocks in the market.”1000 The TCRA did not approach the 
matter from the competition enforcement perspective. Its concern, it would appear, 
was to address public concerns regarding the changes in communication prices and 
packages. Of course, the public registered its discontent because the changes meant 
consumers had to pay more for data and voice services. Unfortunately, by channeling 
its reaction to please the public, the Authority missed an opportunity to carry out a 
detailed analysis of the market from competition perspectives. It was at this point that 
it could have found out whether there were collusive practices. Since it conducted no 
such studies, it remains unknown whether such and similar practices are a result of 
collusive practices (explicit or tacit) or not.  
 
998 TCRA, ‘Public Notice on the Issue of Tariffs in the ICT Sector’, p. 6. 
999 TCRA, ‘Public Notice on the Issue of Tariffs in the ICT Sector’, p. 6. 
1000 TCRA, ‘Public Notice on the Issue of Tariffs in the ICT Sector’, p. 2. 
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5.5.4 Unregulated Dominant Markets  
Interviews with telecom firms unveiled that some markets are not regulated even 
though they may have anti-competitive effects. One of those areas is the 
communication towers market, where Helios Towers company has significant market 
power. The firm had 3,661 towers in the country as of 2019, most of which it 
acquired from existing telecom firms.1001 The research findings registered complaints 
from some telecom firms, especially TTCL, that the Authority does not regulate prices 
charged by Helios. As a result, tower charges are too high for small firms to afford, 
and hence, it is an entry barrier.  
The towering market would have been an area where the Authority ensures that 
services are available on reasonable terms on an ex-ante basis. However, the research 
findings concluded that no regulation takes place in this area. Furthermore, the FCC 
has no jurisdiction because the tower market falls in the telecom sector, and, 
therefore, it cannot examine if there are instances of abuse of dominance and address 
them accordingly. Thus, the firm remains free from the TCRA’s ex-ante regulation and 
FCC’s ex-post enforcement. 
There is another dimension to this matter. It was established that some of the telecom 
firms own or had owned shares in this company.1002 These firms had or continue to 
have a say on charges the tower company sets. Some small telecom firms have noted 
that such charges have been high. So, while firms with shares in the dominant tower 
firm continue to enjoy the ease of doing business (because of the close business 
relationship), the smaller ones with no share struggle to raise the tower fees. Since 
this specific market is monopolistic and vertically integrated, anti-competitive 
concerns from the tower arrangements should be examined. It is possible, for 
example, that instances of cross-subsidization or margin squeezing are present. 
 
1001 Helios Towers is present in five Africa countries; Tanzania, Ghana, South Africa, Congo DRC and Congo 
Brazzaville. In all these countries it owns 6974 towers where more than half of them, that is 3, 661 come 
from Tanzania. See Helios Towers Plc, Helios Towers Plc: Annual Report and Financial Statements (London: 
Helios Towers Plc, 2019), p. 3 <https://www.heliostowers.com/media/1786/ht-ar-2019.pdf> [accessed 
17 June 2020]. 
1002 As of 2017, Vodacom owned 24.6% of shares at Helios. See Vodacom Tanzania, p. 53; Also, Millicom 
Holding BV which fully owns MIC Tanzania Limited (Tigo) owned 22.8% of Helios shares as of December 
2017 Helios Towers, Helios Towers Annual Report 2017 (Mauritius: Helios Towers), p. 53. 
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However, the research findings could not establish any active measures taken in this 
market for lack of monitoring and investigation.  
Some telecom firms raised similar concerns regarding co-location and sharing of 
infrastructures. Again, the point here is that even though there is a general 
framework to regulate such arrangements, there is no stipulation from the Authority 
regarding fee arrangement. As a result, some firms provide these services on 
unreasonable terms and hence, complicate entry for newcomers and free competition. 
There is one problem regarding these concerns. There are no studies to determine 
whether there is a firm with significant market powers in this market. In the absence 
of this knowledge, it is difficult to know the extent to which the regulator should 
intervene. This is an area where ex-post enforcement would have addressed these 
concerns. Since the Authority is highly inclined to ex-ante regulation and since the 
FCC has no jurisdiction in this market, this area remains a potential candidate for 
anti-competitive practices.  
5.6 Competition Enforcement Framework  
The enforcement framework is perhaps the most crucial aspect of competition policy. 
It is this framework that realizes what competition policy seeks to achieve. In 
Tanzania, there is only public enforcement of competition law. Public enforcement is 
a conventional approach to all jurisdictions that have adopted competition law.1003 It is 
an intervention that, among others, serves as a deterrence mechanism.1004 Under 
public enforcement, public authorities (these could be sector regulators, competition 
agencies, or judicial organs) have the power to address and remedy violations of 
competition rules. In those jurisdictions with a strong functioning regional 
competition law, for example, the EU, public enforcement also includes enforcement 
 
1003 See Kai Hüschelrath and Sebastian Peyer, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – A 
Differentiated Approach’ (Centre for European Economic Research, 2013), p. 1 
<http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp13029.pdf> [accessed 11 November 2019]; Donald Baker, 
‘Private and Public Enforcement: Complements, Substitutes and Conflicts-Global Perspectives’, in Research 
Handbook on International Competition Law, ed. by Ariel Ezrachi (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), pp. 238–65 (p. 238). 
1004 Donald Baker, ‘Private and Public Enforcement: Complements, Substitutes and Conflicts-Global 
Perspectives’, in Research Handbook on International Competition Law, ed. by Ariel Ezrachi (Cheltenham, 
UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), pp. 238–65 (p. 238). 
 
 235  
by regional authorities such as the European Commission.1005 In the case of Tanzania, 
the law vests such powers to the TCRA in the telecom sector. 
The reading of competition laws in the sector reveals a skeletal approach in the 
enforcement framework. There are general blank statements with no details. Section 
114 of the EPOCA states that “the Authority may take enforcement measures against 
any person who contravenes license conditions, regulations, and provisions of this 
Act.” Furthermore, Regulation 4 of the Competition Regulations also has similar 
provisions. It reads; 
“The Authority shall have powers to (a) monitor and enforce fair competition in the 
communications sector; (b) investigate all acts alleged to be in breach of fair 
competition rules; (c) conduct proceedings, inquiries, or public consultations in 
order to render or make a decision on acts or conducts in breach of fair competition 
rules; and (d) impose sanctions, penalties or issue orders against licensees and 
persons whose acts or conducts are anti-competitive or in breach of fair competition 
rules.”  
From the quoted provisions, the TCRA does all enforcement in the sector. Firstly, it 
acts as a competition agency by monitoring a sector to ensure fair competition. 
Monitoring includes its use of ex-ante regulatory powers to provide a level playing 
field. Secondly, the Authority assumes powers usually enjoyed by competition 
authorities; to investigate all acts in violation of competition rules. Thirdly, having 
carried out the investigation, the Authority convenes as a quasi-judicial organ. Here it 
can carry out proceedings (as in a court of law), inquiries, or even public 
consultations to decide on the alleged breach of competition law. Fourthly, it has 
powers to make decisions, including ordering remedies, sanctions, or any other 
redress it deems fit. 
The enforcement framework reveals a concentration of powers in the Authority as it 
covers all enforcement dimensions. Its powers range from alleging the violation of 
competition rules to making and enforcing decisions against the alleged violators. As 
the next chapter shows in detail, necessary checks to ensure fairness (both process 
 
1005 Jurgita Malinauskaite, Harmonisation of EU Competition Law Enforcement, 2020, p. 116. 
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and substance) are limited in all these procedures. Furthermore, these powers are a 
skeletal approach as details on procedures, especially on enforcement, are also 
missing. The next chapter looks at this and other related aspects in detail. 
5.6.1 Remedies  
Before addressing structural and behavioral remedies available in the competition 
enforcement framework, we first examine the terms ‘remedies’ and ‘sanctions.’ These 
are two terms used to describe actions taken to address anti-competitive conduct, 
even though their exact meaning is not universal. They may have similar or different 
meanings, depending on definitions adopted in respective jurisdictions. Such 
definitions generally take two approaches: the narrow approach and a broader 
approach.  
On the one hand, the narrow approach limits remedies to all actions taken by 
authorities to “cure, correct, or prevent” anti-competitive behavior or practice.1006 
Here, the focus is not to punish violators but to rectify the effects of violations. 
Regarding sanctions, the approach limits them to all actions that penalize or punish 
violators.1007 At this juncture, the focus is to punish violators.  
On the other hand, the broad approach would define remedies to include all actions 
taken to address anti-competitive practices.1008 Here, remedies include sanctions as 
well. When this approach is taken into consideration, the distinction between 
remedies and sanctions becomes irrelevant. They all mean the same thing: all actions 
taken to address the violation of competition rules. 
For purposes of this study, remedies and sanctions are differentiated so that the 
former is limited to correcting anti-competitive concerns, while the latter deals with 
penalizing anti-competitive behaviors.  
 
1006 OECD, Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases (Paris: OECD, 2006), p. 19 
<https://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/38623413.pdf> [accessed 1 June 2020]; See also Wang Wei, 
‘Structural Remedies in EU Antitrust and Merger Control’, World Competition, 344.4 (2011), 571–96; Per 
Hellström, Frank Maier-Rigaud, and Friedrich Wenzel Bulst, ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’, 
Antitrust Law Journal, 76.1 (2009), 43–63 (p. 45). 
1007 OECD, Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases, p. 18. 
1008 Wang Wei, p. 573. 
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5.6.1.1 Structural and Behavioral Remedies  
Generally, the enforcing authorities have two approaches when remedying 
competition violations, structural remedies and behavioral remedies.1009 Stating on the 
differences between the two, Wang notes; 
“The structural/behavioral distinction of remedies has been widely accepted. 
Structural remedies, for example, divestiture, may directly change market structure, 
while behavioral remedies set limitation on the conducts of firms. Structural 
remedies are more drastic than behavioral remedies, because structural remedies 
target the incentives of the entity concerned by changing the corporate structure, 
whereas behavioral remedies intend to deter specific conduct without touching 
incentives.”1010 
From Wang’s quotation, the differences between structural and behavioral remedies 
are apparent. On the one hand, structural remedies go to a business firm’s core 
setting, for example, through restructuring through divestiture.1011 When applied, 
structure remedies affect not only the respective firm’s behavior but also its core 
structure. It is as if taking extreme measures to limit the speed of a specific regional 
bus. Instead of fining the driver for over-speeding, authorities go a step further by 
reconfiguring the bus engine so that it is unable, at least theoretically, to over-speed 
again.  
However, it would appear that structural remedies are not applied frequently, and 
when so, they are applied only in limited circumstances.1012 Merger regulation is the 
 
1009 See for example OECD, The Divestiture of Assets as a Competition Remedy: Stocktaking of International 
Experiences (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019), pp. 24–27 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/divestiture-of-assets-competition-remedy-ENG-web.pdf>; Whish 
and Bailey, Competition Law, pp. 253–54; UNCTAD, Appropriate Sanctions and Remedies (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 8 November 2010), p. 10 <https://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdrbpconf7d5_en.pdf>. 
1010 See for example OECD, The Divestiture of Assets as a Competition Remedy: Stocktaking of International 
Experiences, pp. 24–27; Whish and Bailey, Competition Law, pp. 253–54; UNCTAD, Appropriate Sanctions 
and Remedies, p. 10. 
1011 Thomas Sullivan, ‘Antitrust Remedies in the U.S. and EU: Advancing a Standard of Proportionality’, The 
Antitrust Bulletin, 48.2 (2003), 377–425 (p. 396) <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X0304800205>. 
1012 See OECD, The Divestiture of Assets as a Competition Remedy: Stocktaking of International Experiences, p. 
28; Marilena Filippelli, Collective Dominance and Collusion: Parallelism in EU and US Competition Law 
(Cheltenham, U.K; Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), p. 228; Wei Wang and Matti 
Rudanko, ‘EU Merger Remedies and Competition Concerns: An Empirical Assessment: EU Merger Remedies 
and Competition Concerns’, European Law Journal, 18.4 (2012), 555–76 (p. 563) 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2012.00610.x>; Whish and Bailey, Competition Law, pp. 177 & 
214. 
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most common area where many jurisdictions prefer structural remedies.1013 Such 
practices have also been standard in the past when addressing dominant firms. For 
example, divestiture was once used to limit the powers of dominant firms such as 
AT&T.1014 
The cautious application of structural remedies results from their inherently invasive 
nature. For example, the OECD argues that structural remedies may affect the already 
functioning market or act as a disincentive to innovate. This is the reason why in the 
EU, “structural remedies can only be imposed either where there is no equally 
effective behavioral remedy or where any equally effective behavioral remedy would 
be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy.”1015 
On the other hand, behavioral remedies tend to control firms’ actions in the markets. 
They often require lengthy and complicated controls and monitoring systems. They 
may include control over pricing or monitoring of future conduct and practices.1016 
Generally, such remedies can be positive with a directive to perform certain 
obligations.1017 They can also have negative directives, for instance, with prohibitions 
of uncompetitive acts.1018 Positive remedies may include, for example, licensing 
obligations, distribution obligations, access obligations, IP related directives, and non-
discriminatory directives.”1019 Regarding negative remedies, OECD notes that they 
 
1013 Thomas Wilson, ‘Merger Remedies - Is It Time to Go More Behavioural?’, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 
2020, p. 1 <http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2020/02/21/merger-remedies-is-it-
time-to-go-more-behavioural/> [accessed 1 June 2020]; Wang Wei, p. 572; Bundeskartellamt, ‘Guidance 
on Remedies in Merger Control’ (Bundeskartellamt, 2017), p. 11 
<http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitlinien/Guidance%20on%20Remedies
%20in%20Merger%20Control.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3> [accessed 1 June 2020]. 
1014 See details in Steve Coll, The Deal of the Century: The Breakup of AT&T (USA: Open Road Media, 2017); 
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘AT&T Corporation: American Company’. 
1015 OECD, The Divestiture of Assets as a Competition Remedy: Stocktaking of International Experiences, pp. 
27–28; Cyril Ritter, ‘How Far Can the Commission Go When Imposing Remedies for Antitrust 
Infringements?’, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 7.9 (2016), 587–98 (p. 587) 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpw037>; OECD, Report on Experiences with Structural Separation (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2011), p. 9. 
1016 Sullivan, p. 396. 
1017 OECD, The Divestiture of Assets as a Competition Remedy: Stocktaking of International Experiences, p. 24. 
1018 OECD, The Divestiture of Assets as a Competition Remedy: Stocktaking of International Experiences, p. 24. 
1019 OECD, The Divestiture of Assets as a Competition Remedy: Stocktaking of International Experiences, p. 25; 
See also José Luis Azofra Parrondo and Carlos Bobillo Barbeito, ‘Merger Control Enforcement in Spain: An 
Ongoing Saga of the Assessment of Behavioural Remedies’, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 
7.5 (2016), 320–25 (pp. 4–6) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpw012>. 
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“often take the form of declaratory statements or cease and desist orders and are 
frequently imposed together with fines.”1020 
5.6.1.2 Compliance Orders 
In Tanzania, the most common approach taken to remedy competition violations is 
the issue of compliance orders. A compliance order is an order from the Authority 
directing a licensee to take specific steps concerning, among others, a breach of 
competition law. The general powers to make compliance orders come from Section 
45 (1) of the TCRA Act. As per Section 45(4), the order has the same effect as an 
order of the High Court of Tanzania. There are no further details on circumstances 
leading to the making of the compliance order. Nor are there prescribed standards 
within which the order is confined to.  
In practice, almost all orders from the Authority also carry a requirement to pay fines. 
In other words, a compliance order is some kind of a judgment reached by the 
Authority regarding breach of regulatory rules. In theory, the issuance of compliance 
orders also extends to competition enforcement. Practice, however, is yet to give us 
real examples of its application. 
Much as the Authority prefers compliance orders, it has issued none, to date, 
concerning competition enforcement. However, it has issued many such orders on 
breach of other regulatory rules. For example, in 2016/17, the Authority issued 15 
compliance orders relating to breaches of several regulatory requirements.1021 Most of 
these orders relate to service quality, sim-card registration, and failure to adhere to 
the Authority’s directives. In 2015/16, it issued 30 compliance orders on similar 
grounds.1022 
5.6.2 Sanctions: Fines and Imprisonment  
At the beginning of this section, we noted the differences between sanctions and 
remedies. Sanctions involve all measures that intend to punish or penalize anti-
 
1020 OECD, The Divestiture of Assets as a Competition Remedy: Stocktaking of International Experiences, p. 24. 
1021 TCRA, TCRA Annual Report 2017 (Dar es Salaam, 2018), p. 36. 
1022 TCRA, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2016 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2017), p. 31. 
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competitive practices.1023 Whereas remedies take more of administrative or civil 
actions, sanctions are generally criminal matters. The most common penalties are 
fines and imprisonment. Tanzania has also enacted rules to address anti-competitive 
practices in the sector. The relevant provision is Section 69 of the EPOCA that reads, 
“A person who contravenes any prohibition under this Part commits an offence and 
shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not less than five hundred thousand shillings 
or to imprisonment for a term not less than five years or to both and shall be liable 
to a further fine of one thousand shillings for every day or part of a day during 
which the offence continues.”  
The reading of the presented provisions reveals something interesting about the 
criminalizing of anti-competitive practices in Tanzania. The Part to which the cited 
section refers to is Part IV of the EPOCA. This part establishes conducts amounting to 
anti-competitive practices. The use of words such as ‘conviction’ and ‘imprisonment’ 
means there is a criminal sanction for each competition rule violation.  
It would appear that the intention was to criminalize all anti-competitive practices, 
regardless of their nature and magnitude. The penalty for violating the competition 
rules includes either a fine of not less than five hundred thousand shillings (around 
220 USD) or imprisonment for not less than five years or both. The Competition 
Regulations of 2018 also maintain similar criminal remedies. For abuse of dominance, 
Section 60(5) of the EPOCA sets a maximum of not more than twenty thousand US 
dollars or its equivalent in Tanzania shillings.  
The striking irony of the criminal sanctions lies on two points. Firstly, it criminalizes 
all anti-competitive practices, even those not ordinarily falling under criminal law. 
For example, while cartels’ criminalization quickly finds justifications for several 
reasons, it is unclear why the law also criminalizes non-cartel practices.1024 It is unclear 
why one should go to jail for tying and bundling, cross-subsidization, margin 
 
1023 OECD, Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases, p. 18. 
1024 See generally Peter Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement: Theoretical, Legal, and 
Practical Challenges (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014); Also see Caron Beaton-Wells, 
‘Australia’s Criminalization of Cartel: Will It Be Contagious’, in More Common Ground for International 
Competition Law?, ed. by Josef Drexl, Warren S. Grimes, and Clifford A. Jones (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), pp. 148–76 (p. 148); Christopher Harding, ‘Business 
Collusion as a Criminological Phenomenon: Exploring the Global Criminalisation of Business Cartels’, 
Critical Criminology, 14.2 (2006), 181–205 (pp. 181–83) <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-006-9000-6>. 
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squeezing, or failure to provide information to competitors, for example. It is not 
conceivable why even tying by the non-dominant firm also amounts to a criminal 
offense. Thus, it can only be assumed that either Tanzania wanted to punish all anti-
competitive practices in the sector, a fact that lacks empirical evidence, or that this 
legal framework results from poor legislative drafting and lack of clear policy 
enforcement direction, which appears to be the case. In any case, the criminal 
enforcement framework leaves a lot to be desired. 
Secondly, despite the criminalization of ant-competitive practices, the enforcement 
practice has not recorded any evidence where the Authority has initiated criminal 
proceedings on competition violations. Thus, the link between the law and practice is 
non-existent. However, the Authority has recently demonstrated its growing appetite 
for criminal proceedings as its favorite remedy for other regulatory violations. For 
example, for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017, criminal cases instituted by the TCRA 
increased from 8 to 18 and 40, respectively.1025 Many cases related to the provision of 
communications services without license and cybercrimes. It remains to be seen 
whether this bolstered spirit of criminal enforcement shall also extend to competition 
enforcement.  
5.6.3 Arbitration 
Another avenue to address competition matters in the sector is through arbitration. 
Arbitration in competition law is a relatively young concept introduced first in the US 
about 30 years ago. This was in the case of Mitsubishi Motors v Soler.1026 In this case, 
the US Supreme Court cautioned itself of the danger of discouraging business society 
if they [the courts] insist on a parochial concept that only courts of law must resolve 
all disputes.1027 Since the Mitsubishi Motors v Soler, arbitration became a developing 
area of the law, and today, it is considered in many parts of the world that 
competition rules are arbitrable.1028  
 
1025 See statistics in TCRA, TCRA Annual Report 2017; TCRA, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 
2016; TCRA, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2015 (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2016). 
1026 Mitsubishi Motors v Soler, (1985) 473 US 614 (United States Supreme Court). 
1027 Mitsubishi Motors v Soler, p. 629. 
1028 James Segan, ‘Arbitration Clauses and Competition Law’, Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, 9.7 (2018), 423–30 (p. 423) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpy039>; Gordon Blake, ‘EU 
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In the same spirit, the Competition Regulations have also introduced arbitration of 
competition disputes in the sector in Tanzania. According to Regulation 17, 
arbitration applies to acts that substantially lessen competition. A party who is 
aggrieved may petition to the Authority for arbitration. Upon receiving the petition, 
the Authority will then accord the other party right to be heard. After that, it shall 
make its determination based on an assessment of facts and evidence.  
The arbitration process provides an opportunity, mostly for telecom firms, to resolve 
their disputes without following a strict legal process. However, in practice, the 
arbitral provisions remain vague without exhaustive details. For example, it is unclear 
who the arbitrator is within the Authority, the arbitrator’s qualifications, what rules of 
arbitrations apply, and the arbitrators’ powers and jurisdiction. Furthermore, there 
are no practical experiences on matters which the Authority has handled through 
arbitration. From the telecom firms, this study learned that awareness of how 
arbitration operates does not exist. As a result, the arbitration framework exists 
without having necessary clarities and structures for its operation. 
5.7 Comments and Observations on the Regulation of Competition 
This chapter has examined rules that regulate competition in the sector on an ex-post 
basis. Most of these rules are in the new Competition Regulations of 2018. Because 
these rules are new, and there was no established competition enforcement culture 
on an ex-post basis, not many practical examples exist. However, even in their raw, 
untested state, some observations on their efficacy and suitability become relevant.  
5.7.1 Symmetric Regulation of Competition  
One would notice there is symmetric regulation of competition. For example, rules, 
which generally would apply to dominant firms, apply to all firms. This approach is 
somewhat unconventional because many prohibited practices do not have anti-
 
Competition Arbitration’, in EU Competition Procedure, ed. by Luis Ortiz Blanco, Third Edition (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 1075–1112 (pp. 1078–79); See also Adriana Almășan, ‘The 
Arbitrability of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU’, in The Consistent Application of EU Competition Law, ed. by 
Adriana Almășan and Peter Whelan (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), IX, 141–61; Damien 
Geradin and Emilio Villano, ‘Arbitrability of EU Competition Law-Based Claims: Where Do We Stand After 
the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide Case?’, World Competition, 40 (2017), 67–91. 
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competitive effects when done by non-dominant firms.1029 On the contrary, some of 
the prohibited conducts, it has been argued, may have justifications for technical or 
commercial reasons such as to reduce transaction costs, improve dynamic efficiency, 
and ensure standardization and operability.1030  
One must note that the symmetrical application of competition rules may counter the 
envisaged benefits of competition. The case of Smart we have seen before is a good 
example. Because of these rules, a firm with no significant powers is forced not to 
charge lower prices because it does not meet the regulator’s threshold. The effect is 
for consumers to pay more, contrary to what competitive markets seek to offer. More 
importantly, it is as if these rules promote equality of competitors and hence, do away 
with the entire concept of competition.  
Now, since competition rules aim to promote competition and not protect 
competitors, most prohibitions in these rules should not have been there. Instead, 
most of the prohibitions ought to apply only to dominant firms, which actions can 
significantly impair competition.1031 In other words, it is argued that there is no need 
to prohibit what does not harm competition. Rules that go beyond protecting 
competition run the risk of not only being awkward but counterproductive. They 
bring unnecessary complications in compliance, create unnecessary ambiguity in 
enforcement, and negate the whole market concept and its resulting efficiencies.  
5.7.2 Conflict with Wider Goals of Competition Policy 
In an attempt to set rules for almost everything, the drafting of competition rules 
ended up with too many rules. Some of them are either confusing or conflicting with 
competition policy’s general objectives. There is enough literature support, especially 
 
1029 See Guy Sagi, ‘A Comprehensive Economic and Legal Analysis of Tying Arrangements’, Seattle 
University Law Review, 38.1 (2014), 1–35 (pp. 20–21); Lorenz, p. 225; Ritter and Braun, pp. 449–52. 
1030 See justifications of tying and bundling at Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, and Hans Zenger, 
‘Article 101’, in Faull & Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition, ed. by Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, Third 
edition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 329–538 (pp. 450–53); Robert M. 
Schwartz, ‘Confusing Bundling with Tying under Article 82 EC: Batteries Included or It Only Comes with 
Fries’, Hastings Business Law Journal, 6.1 (2010), p. 155; ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Federal Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (USA: American Bar Association, 2010), p. 102; 
Anderman and Schmidt, pp. 72–73. 
1031 For further details see Stefan Holzweber, ‘Tying and Bundling in the Digital Era’, European Competition 
Journal, 14.2–3 (2018), 342–66 (pp. 346–51) <https://doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2018.1533360>; 
Geradin, Layne-Farrar, and Petit, p. 225. 
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from US scholars, arguing that competition policy must protect competition and not 
competitors.1032 One can argue that competitors get protected through protecting 
competition. Though that may be true, it is argued that the law should not be 
designed such that protecting competitors appears to be a distinct and primary 
objective. The Competition Rules of 2018, especially Regulation 8, have the exact 
effect. They promote and “force” cooperation (market shares notwithstanding) among 
the players in the name of not lessening competition.  
Again, just as we have seen in the previous section, adopting such rules complicates 
the whole competitive process. If well examined, these rules may lead to collusion as 
they promote more cooperation than competition. Creating a regulatory framework 
that promotes, and in some instances, requires more cooperation provides an avenue 
for coordination. It might kill the spirit of competition, replacing it with collaborative 
practices, thankfully assisted and encouraged by regulation. In the end, we will not 
see the positive effects of competition as would have been expected. In other words, 
such rules defeat the overall policy objectives of competition policy in the sector.   
5.7.3 Disregard of “Effects-Based Approach” in Competition Rules 
Another important observation in these Regulations is the shift of the burden of proof 
to telecom firms. By so doing, the law disregards an ‘effects-based approach’ in 
competition regulation in favor of rules that establish a presumption of competition 
violation. The “effect-based approach” is a concept developed in the European Union 
to modernize its competition policy. Included in the broader package called a “more 
economic approach” and influenced by Chicago Economics, the approach calls for a 
shift from a legalistic form-based approach to an economic analysis of the effects of 
anti-competitive practices. Thus, it is not enough only to look at the legal 
 
1032 See for example Richard R. Abood and Kimberly A. Burns, Pharmacy Practice and the Law, Eighth 
edition (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2017), p. 350; Lars-Hendrick Röller, ‘Efficiencies in EU 
Merger Control: Do They Matter?’, in European Competition Law Annual 2010: Merger Control in European 
and Global Perspective, ed. by Philip Lowe and Mel Marquis (Oxford; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2013), pp. 61–70 (p. 62) <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10732015> [accessed 28 May 2020]; Daniel 
Zimmer, ‘The Basic Goal of Competition Law: To Protect the Opposite Side of the Market’, in The Goals of 
Competition Law, ed. by Daniel Zimmer, ASCOLA Competition Law (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, 
USA: Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 486–502 (p. 499); Alese, p. 205; Ewing, p. 206; Cseres, p. 248; William 
Kolasky, ‘Single-Firm Conduct: The Search for the Holy Grail of Administratable Procompetitive Standards’, 
in On the Merits: Current Issues in Competition Law and Policy ; Liber Amicorum Peter Plompen, ed. by Paul 
Lugard and Peter Plompen (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2005), pp. 59–70 (pp. 69–70). 
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prohibitions. One must go a step further to analyze the economic effects of the 
complained acts to establish whether it reduces consumer welfare. Proponents of this 
approach pin the goal of competition policy on consumer welfare. Thus, conducts 
which do not affect consumers are not likely to amount to a violation of competition. 
The effects-based approach also calls for case-by-case analysis instead of the blanket 
legalistic interpretation of legal rules. In further explaining the more economic 
approach, Witt says  
“the more economic approach is premised on the consumer welfare aim, welfare-
based concepts of harm and countervailing effects, and the idea that legal 
presumptions of legality or illegality should only be used sparingly, so that, with a 
few exceptions, business conduct should not be prohibited as anti-competitive 
without prior in-depth economic assessment of the investigated conduct’s actual 
effects on competition and consumer welfare.” 1033 
 Tanzania has taken an unorthodox approach. The law has defined what is wrong and 
directly proceeded to prohibit it without further regard for its effects on competition 
and consumers. For example, symmetric prohibition of acts such as underpricing, 
overpricing, or tying and bundling does not have any due regard to their effects in the 
competition process and, more importantly, to consumers’ welfare. The presented 
case of Smart Telecom is an example of how practices that would otherwise have no 
effects on competition or consumers end up condemned for being uncompetitive.  
The shift of the burden of proof of competition violation to telecom firms is related to 
the above point. Ideally, Regulation 7 of the Competition Regulations empowers the 
Authority to assess conduct that lessens competition in the sector. However, 
Regulation 8 comes up with a long list of conducts that lessen competition. It reads,  
 
1033 See Anne C. Witt, ‘The European Court of Justice and the More Economic Approach to EU Competition 
Law—Is the Tide Turning?’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 64.2 (2019), 172–213 (p. 173) 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X19844637>; For details on the more economic approach and effects-
based approach see Avishalom Tor, ‘Justifying Competition Law in the Face of Consumers’ Bounded 
Rationality’, in New Developments in Competition Law and Economics, ed. by Klaus Mathis and Avishalom 
Tor (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), pp. 3–25 (p. 55) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
030-11611-8_1>; Penelope Papendropoulus, ‘The Implementation of an Effects-Based Approach Under 
Article 82: Principles and Application’, in The Reform of EC Competition Law: New Challenges, ed. by Ioannis 
Kokkoris and Ioannis Lianos (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2010), pp. 419–33 (pp. 419–32). 
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“subject to a licensee demonstrating otherwise in the course of any inquiry or other 
procedure conducted by the Authority, the following conducts or practices shall be 
deemed to result in a substantial lessening of competition”1034   
This provision means that the Authority has the right to accuse a licensee of 
substantially lessening competition without any proof based on sound economic 
analysis of the effects of the condemned practices.  
Now, one may defend these provisions in the view that each firm will have an 
opportunity to defend itself. However, adopting rules that already condemn such 
practices without a need for anti-competitive effects already gives the regulator an 
upper hand. We must also note that the regulator can already collect almost every 
piece of information it wants from the firms. Again, this gives it an upper edge. 
Furthermore, and we will see in the next chapter, there are no sufficient checks to 
limit the regulator’s powers. These factors make it possible for the regulator to 
address competition concerns without investing in the actual anti-competitive effects. 
5.7.4 Limiting Freedom of Contract and Freedom to Compete 
Generally, the application of competition rules may somewhat affect the firms’ 
freedom to contract and compete. The interference with firms’ freedom to contract 
and compete may have effects on firms’ economic activities. Thus, competition policy 
must find the right balance between competition and freedom to contract so that 
competition may flourish while “upholding the contractual freedoms necessary for a 
functioning market.”1035 For this reason, competition policy is concerned more with the 
rules to enable efficiently functioning markets, for example, the absence of restrictive 
practices. Thus, it will be understood if such rules seek to prohibit collusive practices 
or ensure that a dominant firm does not use its powers to restrain trading. As the 
European Court of Justice held, restrictions must be higher to a dominant firm 
because it has a “special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market.”1036  
 
1034 Emphasis added. 
1035 Mark Steiner, Economics in Antitrust Policy: Freedom to Contract vs. Freedom to Compete (Boca Raton, 
Florida: Dissertation.com, 2007), p. 4. 
1036 See Para 57 Michelin V Commission, p. 3511. 
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Extension of the above rules to a firm with neither significant market powers nor 
involvement in collusive practices amounts to an unnecessary restraint of freedom to 
contract and compete. For example, the Competition Regulations restrict firms’ choice 
of competitors as any refusal to deal or difference in treatment between competitors 
is prohibited. Furthermore, the Regulations go a step further to limit how non-
dominant firms compete. They limit their pricing strategies, such as lower prices, or 
marketing strategies, such as bundled services.   
Even more thought-provoking, the Regulations go a step further to make it a 
condition that each firm shall treat competitors equally. For example, this rule would 
require a telecom to have a uniform price for infrastructure access and sharing unless 
differences are justified by cost considerations. It is also true for sharing information 
on technical standards and relevant commercial information that must be uniformly 
and equally. This study argues that such an approach, which seeks to provide 
uniformity in the market, does not, in practice, facilitate competition. Unless 
licensees’ actions directly affect or eliminate competition, each firm must retain its 
freedom to act as it wishes, including the choice of whom to trade with and on which 
basis. 
5.7.5 Insufficiency of Enforcement Frameworks  
In this section, we have also seen that the law tasks the TCRA to enforce competition. 
The task would mean, among other things, that the Authority has the legal mandate 
to enforce the law and has exhaustive frameworks on the procedural aspects detailing 
how each enforcement aspect takes place. However, the detailed procedural 
framework for competition enforcement is missing. There is only a legal basis for 
offering structural and behavioral remedies and the possibility of penal sanctions, 
which the Authority prefers, at least when dealing with other regulatory matters. As 
chapter six will explore further, these weaknesses in the enforcement framework 
contribute to the lack of active ex-post enforcement of competition law in the sector.  
5.8 A Comparison with the General Competition Framework 
As already provided in this work, the general framework for competition enforcement 
is under the Fair Competition Commission (FCC). The FCC derives its mandate and 
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enforcement from the Fair Competition Act of 2003. The Act, under Part II, provides a 
framework against anti-competitive practices. It prohibits anti-competitive practices 
under Sections 8 and 9. As a general rule, Section 8(1) prohibits any agreement “if 
the object, effect or likely effect of the agreement is to appreciably prevent, restrict or 
distort competition.” Specific prohibitions under this rule are price-fixing agreements, 
collective boycotting, and collusive bidding or tendering. The Part also prohibits 
abuse of dominance under Section 10.  Section 11 to 14 covers merger regulation as 
already discussed in Section 5 of this chapter. 
The holistic reading of these provisions does not provide significant material 
differences from the competition rules adopted to govern the telecom sector under 
the EPOCA of 2010 and the Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) 
Regulations, 2018. Both frameworks have regulations that address restrictive trade 
practices, control abuse of dominance, and regulate mergers and acquisitions. This 
generally means that the adoption of competition rules under the telecom framework 
was unnecessary reproduction of the already existing rules under the general 
competition framework that would have also addressed anti-competitive practices in 
the sector.  
However, there are differences between the two frameworks worth mentioning at this 
point.  
1. Firstly, the competition framework in the telecom sector has been specifically 
designed to address anti-competitive practices in the telecommunication 
industry. Certain provisions can only be applied in the industry, for example, 
those connected to interconnection or access.   
2. Secondly, the telecom sector’s framework has gone a step further in providing 
details and examples on anti-competitive practices and acts likely to lessen 
competition. This is a positive approach that would have simplified enforcement 
processes. However, by doing so, these rules have gone a step further to prohibit 
practices that would not have amounted to a violation of competition law. This 
chapter has provided, as an example, how acts that are usually prohibited when 
done by dominant firms are considered illegal in the sector regardless of the 
market position of the firm in question.  
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3. Thirdly, the general competition law framework has integrated competition 
rules and rules on consumer protection. As a result, the FCC administers both 
competition law and consumer protection law. Some of the addressed issues in 
the consumer protection framework, such as misleading practices, unfair 
business practices, and regulation of product and service information, may also 
have anti-competitive dimensions.1037 Including them in the general competition 
enforcement gives the FCC broader powers to address all possible anti-
competitive practices in the sector. The competition framework in the telecom 
sector does not include consumer protection regulation. A separate framework 
exists, but it is not as extensive as the one under the general competition 
framework.1038  
4. Fourthly, the general competition framework contains extensive procedures as 
provided for in the Competition Rules of 2018.1039 These rules, made under the 
Fair Competition Act, are substantially different from the Competition Rules of 
2018 made under the EPOCA that regulate competition in telecommunication. 
Under the Competition Regulations under the FCC, the law has articulated 
procedures for enforcing competition from start to finish. There are rules to 
regulate the handling of documents, investigation, and hearing of competition 
matters, handling of mergers and acquisitions, decision making, and 
enforcement of the FCC’s decisions. The Regulations also provide for the FCC’s 
general powers of monitoring the markets, including studies, investigations, and 
inquiries on the state of the markets. These procedures provide certainty of 
enforcement procedures, unlike the TCRA, whose procedures regarding 
competition enforcement do not exist.  
Thus, in the end, one finds the rules under the general competition framework to be 
reasonably balanced to address any possible anti-competitive practices in any market 
in the country.  They provide general rules of substance that identify what is 
prohibited and establish procedural aspects of how such rules can be enforced to yield 
 
1037 See Parts III, IV, and VI of the Fair Competition Act, ACT NO 8 OF 2003. 
1038 See The Electronic and Postal Communications (Consumer Protection) Regulations, GN. NO. 61 OF 2018. 
1039 The Competition Rules, 2018, GN NO 344 OF 2018. 
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the desired results. The introduction of specific rules under the telecom sector has not 
proved to have any added significance in competition enforcement. 
5.9 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter looked at the regulation of competition in the Tanzania 
telecommunication sector. At the policy level, it has demonstrated that the Tanzania 
government has appreciated and understood the imperative role of fair and effective 
competition for the growth, development, and efficiency of the sector. It has then 
translated this understanding into competition laws, which prohibit anti-competitive 
practices such as restrictive trade practices and abuse of dominance. Besides, the laws 
guide on how to deal with mergers and acquisitions.  
However, one must note at this point that some of the developed rules are 
unconventional. There is a generalized approach in which the rules apply 
symmetrically to all players in the markets regardless of their market positions. Some 
practices, which are typically not condemned under competition rules, are prohibited 
and thus, attract penal sanctions. This novelty, which results from attempts to 
regulate almost everything in the sector, is unnecessary, with no legal justifications. It 
does not lead to enhanced enforcement because, so far, the practice demonstrates 
otherwise.  
Therefore, this chapter concludes that the telecom sector’s competition law 
framework is still at its elementary stage. Though addressing common competition 
issues, the adopted rules have been ‘perfected and modified’ only to result in an 
unconventional framework that is not short of uncertainties. Nevertheless, an option 
exists to hone them through judicial proceedings. The problem with this option is that 
it depends on how the regulator opts to enforce the rules. So far, this study has 
observed a significant laxity in this area. Should the situation continue as it is, not 
only will Tanzania have underdeveloped rules of competition in the telecom sector, 
but also it would not have a robust jurisprudence of competition enforcement, 
especially on an ex-ante basis.  
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Chapter 6:  TCRA’s Efficacy in Competition Law Enforcement 
The governance arrangements of a regulator are critical. The legal remit 
of the regulator, the powers it is given, how it is funded, and how it is 
held accountable are all key issues that should be carefully designed if 
the regulator is to succeed in combining effective regulation with high 
standards of integrity and trust. Regulators are pivotal in making 
regulatory regimes work for sustainable growth and equitable 
societies.1040 
6.1 Introduction  
Any legal system has at least two components: substantive and procedural rules and 
institutional arrangements to enforce the rules. Both components must work 
efficiently to have the desired effects. This fact, which is also true for competition law 
(as it applies to sector regulation), is captured well by Phillip Lowe, the once Director-
General for Competition in the EU. Lowe asserts that 
“All competition policy and enforcement systems consist of essentially two 
components: the legal instruments (‘rules’) governing both substance, competences, 
and procedure, and the administrative structures and processes through which the 
legal instruments are implemented. Each of these is necessary for the success of the 
system as a whole. Good rules remain a dead letter if there is no efficiently run 
organization with the processes to implement them. Conversely, an efficiently 
managed authority cannot compensate for fundamental flaws in the rules which it is 
to implement.”1041 
So far, this work has dealt much with the first part of the system: policy environment 
and legal rules. It has hitherto provided a bigger background picture of Tanzania’s 
telecom sector and its regulation. This background includes some critical aspects such 
 
1040 OECD, The Governance of Regulators, p. 10. 
1041 Philip Lowe, ‘The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century — the Experience of 
the European Commission and DG Competition’, Competition Policy Newsletter, 2008, p. 1. 
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as introducing telecommunications, an overview of Tanzania’s sector and examining 
the legal rules. Also, it has briefly given an overview of the institutional frameworks.  
This chapter looks at the second aspect of the system, the institutional framework. It 
takes a narrow approach by focusing only on the TCRA as the enforcer of competition 
rules. The central idea here is that good substantive rules remain of no value without 
exhaustive structures that guarantee enforcement. The enforcement structures 
depend on many aspects, including how the law establishes enforcers, the mandate, 
powers, and resources. Therefore, based on the developed criteria in Section 6.2, this 
chapter seeks to evaluate the efficacy of the TCRA in enforcing competition law, 
especially on an ex-post basis.  
The chapter takes the following structure. Firstly, it examines whether the Authority 
has sufficient legal mandate to enforce competition law. Here, the chapter examines 
the sufficiency of available rules, the regulatory objectives, and the remedies 
framework. Secondly, it evaluates the procedural framework, including mechanisms 
for detecting, reporting, and handling competition violation concerns. In a similar 
vein, the chapter looks at aspects of procedural fairness and the presence of private 
enforcement. Thirdly, the chapter looks at the institutional design and organization. 
In this section, the relationship between the TCRA and the Executive, Judiciary, and 
the FCC is covered. Also covered in this section are TCRA’s internal arrangements and 
their impact on competition enforcement. Fourthly, the chapter looks at the extent to 
which the TCRA is independent in executing its functions. Fifthly, it assesses whether 
the Authority has sufficient human and financial resources to execute its mandate. 
The chapter’s objective is that after covering the preceding aspects, there will be an 
answer on whether or not the TCRA is well-suited to enforce competition in the 
sector.  
6.2 Evaluation Criteria  
It was necessary to establish criteria to evaluate the efficacy of TCRA’s competition 
enforcement. Those criteria, developed from diverse literature and presented in this 
section, are a benchmark for an ideal regulator with powers to enforce competition 
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law.1042 As one can already notice, the standards must be higher because such a 
regulator performs two tasks in one. It is, in principle, a sector regulator and a 
competition enforcement agency. It follows that it must deliver what is expected both 
of an efficient regulator and an efficient competition enforcement authority. The 
following are the developed evaluation criteria: 
1. Firstly, there must be a sufficient legal mandate to legitimize and empower the 
regulator in its enforcement.1043 It has elsewhere been argued that the choice of a 
proper legal framework is a “strategic decision that impacts on the extent and 
type of available powers and success and efficiency of a policy package.”1044 
Thus, a sufficient legal mandate must provide for, among others, the set of 
prohibited acts, regulator’s objectives, jurisdictions, and functions, including 
remedies for infringement. Without a proper definition of the legal mandate, it 
is unlikely that any effective enforcement will follow. 
2. Secondly, there must be exhaustive enforcement rules that provide clarity and 
certainty of enforcement procedures and structures.1045 Such clarity is necessary 
to avoid possible conflicts with other authorities.1046 Having substantive rules 
without setting a framework for their enforcement indicates that no 
enforcement will occur. There must be rules to direct the regulators on what to 
 
1042 For similar evaluation approach, see LITER principles developed in Ottow, p. 86. 
1043 See for example Julia Molestina, Regional Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries 
(Germany: Springer Verlag GmbH, 2019), pp. 310–11; OECD, Driving Performance at Ireland’s Commission 
for Regulation of Utilities, The Governance of Regulators (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018); UNCTAD 
Secretariat, ‘Ways and Means to Strengthen Competition Law Enforcement and Advocacy: Note by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat’ (presented at the Seventh United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set 
of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, 
Geneva: UNCTAD, 2015), p. 4; OECD, The Governance of Regulators; Blackman and Srivastava; OECD, 
APEC-OECD Co-Operative Initiative on Regulatory Reform APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory 
Reform A Policy Instrument for Regulatory Quality, Competition Policy and Market Openness: A Policy 
Instrument for Regulatory Quality, Competition Policy and Market Openness (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008), 
p. 15; Farid Gasmi, Paul Noumba, and Laura Recuero Virto, ‘Political Accountability and Regulatory 
Performance in Infrastructure Industries: An Empirical Analysis’ (The World Bank, 2006). 
1044 Margit Cohn, ‘Law and Regulation: The Role, Form and Choice of Legal Rules’, in Handbook on the 
Politics of Regulation, ed. by Dāwid Lēwî-Faur (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2011), pp. 185–200 (pp. 195–96). 
1045 Jörg Philipp Terhechte, International Competition Enforcement Law Between Cooperation and 
Convergence (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011), pp. 59–62 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17167-3>. 
1046 Nicolas Petit, ‘The Proliferation of National Regulatory Authorities alongside Competition Authorities: A 
Source of Jurisdictional Confusion’, in Regulation Through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European 
Governance, ed. by Damien Geradin, Rodolphe Muñoz, and Nicolas Petit (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar, 2005), pp. 180–214 (pp. 180–205). 
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enforce and how to enforce it.1047 Furthermore, the rules must ensure that 
enforcement complies with the accepted standards and principles at national 
and international levels.1048 
3. Thirdly, the institutional design and organization must be such that they support 
effective enforcement of competition. For example, the OECD opines that “the 
manner in which the regulator was established (design, structure, decision 
making, and accountability structures) are all important factors in how effective 
it will be in delivering the objectives it was intended to deliver.”1049 In other 
words, bad institutional design and organization have a direct effect on 
enforcement efficacy.  
4. Fourthly, there must be explicit protection of the regulator’s independence both 
in law and in practice.1050 The regulator must be free from external influences 
regardless of whether they come from the government, the regulated, or other 
stakeholders. Only when a regulator is independent can it discharge its 
enforcement duties legally, professionally, and fairly. If the regulator has no 
independence, the chances of capture will most certainly be high. Favoritisms 
may grow instead of fairness. And extraneous justifications may overtake and 
replace professional judgments.  
5. Lastly, there must be available resources for enforcement, particularly human 
and financial resources. Studies indicate that it is naïve to expect that the 
 
1047 Terhechte, pp. 59–62. 
1048 Andreas Mitschke, The Influence of National Competition Policy on the International Competitiveness of 
Nations: A Contribution to the Debate on International Competition Rules, Contributions to Economics 
(Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2008), p. 35. 
1049 See OECD, The Governance of Regulators, p. 18; See also Blackman and Srivastava, p. 17. 
1050 For discussions on the independence and accountability of sector regulators see Malinauskaite, p. 197; 
Adriana Mutu, ‘The Regulatory Independence of Audiovisual Media Regulators: A Cross-National 
Comparative Analysis’, European Journal of Communication, 33.6 (2018), 619–38 (pp. 4–6) 
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323118790153>; Christel Koop and Chris Hanretty, ‘Political 
Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 51.1 (2018), 38–75 (pp. 41–44) <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017695329>; Dolly Arora, 
‘Independent Regulatory Authorities: Contours of the Debate and Experience’, Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, 64.3 (2018), 358–72 (pp. 2–9) <https://doi.org/10.1177/0019556118783050>; Ahmed 
Badran, ‘Revisiting Regulatory Independence: The Relationship Between the Formal and De-Facto 
Independence of the Egyptian Telecoms Regulator’, Public Policy and Administration, 32.1 (2017), 66–84 
(pp. 3–6) <https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076716643381>; Okeoghene Odudu, ‘The Wider Concerns of 
Competition Law’, ed. by Christopher Townley, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 30.3 (2010), 599–613 (p. 
365). 
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regulator will discharge its duties effectively without sufficient resources.1051 
Sufficient resources are necessary if the regulators are to achieve their 
objectives. Resources are also necessary to enable the regulator to attract 
qualified personnel.1052 Furthermore, additional financial resources would be 
required to equip the regulator to cope with the sector’s dynamic and complex 
nature. In other words, there is a direct link between the Authority’s resources 
and its institutional capacity.  
The presented criteria encompass a yardstick for factors that this study considers 
minimum for a sector regulator’s effective enforcement of competition law. There are 
certainly some other factors that influence regulatory efficacy. For example, they 
include the political will, the overall national socio-economic policies, and the state of 
a particular country’s economy. However, these other factors are not within the 
purview of this study. In the context of this research, it is assumed that at least, in 
theory, the regulator exists in a country whose policy direction in the sector is to 
promote the competitive provision of telecommunications services. Then, these 
factors assist in evaluating the manner the regulator can discharge such responsibility 
within such settings.  
One more critical point: These factors are building blocks. They must all be present in 
full. The absence of one or more factors is likely to derail the regulator from its 
enforcement agenda. Table 6.2-1 presents a summary of such factors and the 
expected outcomes.  
Table 6.2-1 Evaluation Framework 
 
1051 See further Martín Molinuevo and Sebastián Sáez, Regulatory Assessment Toolkit: A Practical 
Methodology for Assessing Regulation on Trade and Investment in Services (Washington, D.C: World Bank 
Publications, 2014), pp. 18–19; OECD, Making Reform Happen Lessons from OECD Countries (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2010), p. 52; Marianne Fay and Mary Morrison, Infrastructure in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Recent Developments and Key Challenges (Washington, D.C: World Bank Publications, 2007), pp. 
65–66; David Townsend, ‘The Vital Role of Regulation in the Telecommunications Sector’, in Implementing 
Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector: Lessons from Experience, ed. by Bjorn Wellenius and Peter A. 
Stern (Washington, D.C: World Bank Publications, 1994), pp. 505–10 (p. 509). 
1052 Recent trends show that even though poor countries already have a shortage of skilled personnel, the 
available few tend to move elsewhere for greener pasture. This trend, as known as brain drain, has seen a 
lot of skilled workers moving from developing to developed world. See James Ted McDonald and 
Christopher Worswick, ‘High-Skilled Immigration in a Globalized Labour Market’, in Handbook of the 
Economics of International Migration, ed. by Barry Chiswick and Paul Miller (Elsevier, 2014), pp. 537–84 
(p. 568); International Organization for Migration, World Migration 2005 Costs and Benefits of International 
Migration (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2006), p. 176; World Bank, Innovation Policy: A Guide for 
Developing Countries (Washington, D.C: World Bank Publications, 2010), p. 172. 
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Criteria  Required  Outcomes 
Sufficient 
legal mandate 
Clear definition of regulatory objectives, 
institutional powers, and arrangement. 
Clear definition of substantive rules of 
the competition. 
Clear definition of sanctions and 
enforcement. 
Clarity of rules on the substance and 
procedure for enforcing competition. 
Increased legitimacy in the regulatory 
process and the possibility of reaching 
regulatory objectives. 
Enforcement 
Rules   
Presence of clear and exhaustive rules of 
procedure for enforcement and 
enforcement structures. 
The certainty of rules and 
enforcement procedures and 





Presence of rules defining the 
Authority’s management structure, its 
relationship with other stakeholders, 
and dedicated department for 
competition enforcement.  
Enhanced independence, 
professionalism, integrity, and 





Presence of rules and practices that 
guarantee the independence of the 
regulators, both from the government 
and stakeholders. 
Professional, independent, and 
legitimate regulation and enforcement 
of competition  
Increased compliance and chances of 
reaching objectives. 
Resources  Sufficient human and financial 
resources.   
Expatriate regulatory intervention, 
reduced possibilities of capture, 
efficient enforcement based on sound 
analysis, enhanced regulatory 
confidence and capacity, and quality 
of enforcement decisions.   
 
Source: Developed by the researcher from various literature sources 
6.3 Legal Mandate to Enforce Competition in Telecom Sector  
Certainty is key to any regulatory body tasked with enforcement responsibilities. One 
of the factors that guarantee certainty is the clarity of legal rules. Substantive rules 
ought to be exhaustive and clear enough to allow all stakeholders to make pre-
informed decisions with probable consequences in mind. Thus, the law must clearly 
state matters subject to regulation, regulation objectives, the extent of regulation, 
powers of the regulator, and consequences of violating the Regulations.1053 A well-
designed regulation system must establish its objectives ex-ante and adopt verifiable 
 
1053 For further support of this argument see Araceli Castaneda, Mark A. Jamison, and Michelle Phillips, 
‘Considerations for the Design and Transformation of Regulatory Systems’ (Public Utility Research Center 
Warrington College of Business Administration University of Florida, 2014), p. 22; Baldwin, Cave, and 
Lodge, Understanding Regulation, pp. 27 & 28; OECD, Regulatory Institutions: A Blueprint for the Russian 
Federation, 1 May 2008, p. 6 <https://doi.org/10.1787/241530366501>; Brown, Stern, and Tenenbaum, 
p. 60. 
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performance criteria.1054 The law must explicitly provide how responsible authorities 
enforce competition and whether such responsibility is exclusive or shared with other 
institutions.  
This section answers whether the law sufficiently mandates and empowers the TCRA 
to enforce competition law in the sector. In so doing, the chapter focuses on the 
following three primary areas: sufficiency of competition rules, clarity of regulatory 
objectives, and sufficiency of available remedies.  
6.3.1 Substantive Rules of Competition 
The starting point in evaluating the efficacy of enforcement is to ascertain whether, in 
the first place, there are rules to be enforced. Substantive rules of competition law 
define enforcement parameters. In this aspect, competition rules in the sector are 
relatively young. They were first introduced in 2010 under the Electronic and Postal 
Communications Act (EPOCA). Under EPOCA also came several regulations, the 
notable ones being Competition Regulations of 20111055 and 2018.1056  
By the time competition rules were introduced in 2010, 17 years had passed after 
introducing competition in the sector. Besides, seven years had also passed since the 
establishment of the TCRA as an enforcement authority. It means that the TCRA had 
seven years to enforce what was non-existent. By that time, Tanzania had already 
established general competition rules to apply in other sectors of the economy but 
excluded the regulated sectors, including telecommunication. The obvious conclusion 
here is that the government intended to exclude competition law in the sector. At 
least, in theory, policymakers believed that ex-ante regulation would be sufficient.  
A documentary review of existing laws and regulations on telecommunications 
revealed that as it stands now, and as chapter five provide in detail, rules detailing 
anti-competitive practices are in place. They deal with a wide array of competition 
issues such as regulating dominant licensees, prohibiting collusive agreements such as 
rate fixing, market sharing, boycotting suppliers and competitors, proscribing tying or 
 
1054 Phillippa S Dee, ‘Possible Elements of a Reform Agenda’, in Institutions for Economic Reform in Asia, ed. 
by Philippa S Dee (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 12–35 (p. 29). 
1055 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, GN 420 OF 2011. 
1056 The Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, GN. NO 26 OF 2018. 
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linking arrangements, and regulating mergers and acquisition. However, as chapter 
five has already shown, the drafting of the rules was awkward as they are quite 
unconventional. They attempt to cover almost everything, and, as a result, they 
extend to practices that are in principle not subject to competition rules (for example, 
criminalizing all forms of tying and bundling or underpricing even when not done by 
dominant firms).  
Nevertheless, it suffices to say that there are rules, albeit in a rudimentary form, that 
define anti-competitive practices. Such rules would have been perfected through 
judicial interpretation had the Authority undertaken to have active enforcement. 
However, field findings noted the limited jurisprudence in this aspect, and therefore, 
competition rules remain as they are, in their elementary state. 
6.3.2 The multiplicity of Regulatory Objectives  
To any authority tasked with enforcement obligations, objectives present a sense of 
direction.1057 It may be argued that if one takes the objectives away, the authority goes 
nowhere. The argument goes further that if one puts too many objectives, the 
authority will likely crash in attempts to do everything. The key is to have fewer, 
clear, and not self-defeating objectives. Having “lofty objectives,” as one author puts 
it, is one of the deadly sins in public administration.1058 A direct guarantee for non-
performance, he argues, “is to try to do several things at once.”1059 The argument goes 
further that the truth is, “if you try to do everything, you’ll accomplish nothing.”1060 
When authorities have too many objectives, they face what is known as priority goal 
ambiguity, where some goals are sacrificed at the expense of others.1061 
Is the TCRA a victim of priority goal ambiguity? The answer lies in what the law tasks 
the TCRA to do. Except for mergers and acquisitions, every other aspect of the sector 
 
1057 The OECD mentions clarity of objectives as a key component of a good regulator. See OECD, OECD 
Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018), p. 110. 
1058 Peter F. Drucker, ‘The Deadly Sins in Public Administration’, Public Administration Review, 40.2 (1980), 
103–6 (p. 103) <https://doi.org/10.2307/975619>. 
1059 Drucker, p. 103. 
1060 Donna E. Shalala, ‘Guest Editorial: Are Large Public Organizations Manageable’, Public Administration 
Review, 58.4 (1998), 284–89 (p. 287) <https://doi.org/10.2307/977557>. 
1061 Christopher Carrigan and Lindsey Poole, ‘Structuring Regulators: The Effects of Organizational Design 
on Regulatory Behavior and Performance’, 2015, p. 17 <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4707-
carriganpoole-ppr-researchpaper062015pdf>. 
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is under the TCRA’s regulation. The TCRA regulates competition, licensing, 
interconnection, tariff setting, spectrum, quality of services, consumer protection, and 
all dealings with communication equipment. Furthermore, it regulates internet 
services and monitors all online content, even those channeled via social media. On 
top of all these, it is the same Authority that regulates broadcasting and postal 
services, and it is responsible for ensuring cybersecurity and responding to cyber risks 
and attacks. With all these responsibilities, it is not surprising that some of its 
mandates, such as competition enforcement, are at the bottom of the Authority’s 
priorities. 
Documentary and field research revealed that there is limited institutional 
jurisprudential experience in handling competition concerns. Interviews with the 
Authority’s senior legal officer found out that the Authority has not handled a single 
exclusive competition case to date.1062 When asked why this inaction, the Authority 
has a response, even though unconvincing. It argues that Tanzania has not yet 
developed a strong competition culture.1063 As a result, the Authority further opines, 
telecom companies are not so keen to pursue acts of unfair competition, and hence, 
no cases are pending with it. Besides, the Authority argues that Tanzanians are not 
‘pro-litigation’ because they do not prefer legal proceedings even when there is an 
outright violation of laws.1064   
These explanations, as already hinted, are not convincing. For example, interviews 
with enforcement department of the Fair Competition Commission revealed evidence 
of the FCC’s active enforcement of competition in other sectors of the economy.1065 
Lack of competition enforcement jurisprudence with the Authority must be attributed 
to other factors, which, as this chapter continues to show, include a lack of priority on 
competition enforcement. This argument finds evidence when one looks at the 
Authority’s structure.  For example, it was noted during field research that as of 
 
1062 Many filed cases deal with consumer protection or disputes between the Authority and service 
providers.  
1063 An interview done to the Authority’s senior legal officer.  
1064 An interview done to the Authority’s senior legal officer.  
1065 For updates on the decided cases visit FCC, ‘Fair Competition Commission’, 2020 
<https://www.competition.or.tz/> [accessed 24 March 2020]; Further see cases handled by the FCC as of 
December 2016 at FCC, Annual Report and Audited Accounts for The Year Ended On 30th June 2016 (Dar es 
Salaam: Fair Competition Commission, 2017), p. 14. 
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January 2020, no department existed to deal exclusively with competition 
enforcement. Competition fell under the consumer and industry affairs department, 
which had over a dozen other responsibilities. Many efforts are dedicated to ex-ante 
regulation of the sector, which focuses more on the sector’s technical aspects.  
Therefore, one can already see that with the breadth of objectives to achieve, much of 
the enforcement focus is on technical regulation of the sector, which is, in principle, 
the Authority’s specialty. Thus, the answer to the question posed at the beginning of 
this section is yes. The TCRA has fallen victim to priority goal ambiguity. The overall 
research findings suggest that the TCRA has a lot on its plate, thereby sacrificing 
some goals in favor of others. Since it is more of a technical regulator, it has done 
much on the sector’s technical aspects. However, this comes at the expense of ex-post 
competition enforcement. It was found that competition enforcement is at the bottom 
of enforcement priorities, with not a single case and no dedicated department.  
6.3.3 Remedy and Sanctions Framework  
Reading of the competition rules will reveal that not all is lost despite the unusual 
drafting, which takes a highly general symmetric regulation. It is still possible to tell 
what is prohibited in the sector. Based on the research findings from interviews with 
the Authority and telecom firms, the most significant deficiency was found to lie in 
uncertainties of available remedies. It is important to note that the certainty of 
available remedies and sanctions is necessary because it instills a compliance 
culture.1066 It has been argued that “regulatory agencies will be able to speak more 
softly when they are perceived as carrying big sticks.”1067 It is necessary that the law 
clearly states what sanctions are available in cases of contraventions. Moreover, the 
sanctions must fit the violation or contravention; they must have deterrent effects. 
There are two points this section examines to evaluate the efficacy of the sanctioning 
and remedy framework; insufficiency of the fining framework and over-
criminalization of competition violations.  
 
1066 Richard Macrory, ‘Reforming Regulatory Sanctions-Designing Systematic Approach’, in The Regulatory 
State: Constitutional Implications, ed. by Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser, and Richard Rawlings (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 229–42 (p. 230). 
1067 Macrory, p. 231. 
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6.3.3.1 Insufficiency of Fining Framework  
Fines are a common way of addressing competition law infringements.1068 The 
imposition of fines, among others, serves as a deterrence to the violation of 
competition law.1069 Deterrence, it has been argued, works  “if, and only if, from the 
perspective of the company contemplating whether or not to commit a violation, the 
expected fine exceeds the expected gain from the violation.”1070 If a company pays just 
insignificant fines in violation of competition rules compared to gained advantages, 
there will be no compliance pressure. Thus, the consequences of competition 
violations, argues the OECD, “should be significant enough to encourage compliance” 
and that the imposed sanctions should be “sufficient to deter violations.”1071 When we 
place Tanzania’s fining framework against this rule, some concerns arise.  
6.3.3.1.1 Low Fines 
As seen in chapter five, the law provides for fines for almost every violation of 
competition rules. For example, according to Section 69 of the EPOCA, on conviction 
for contravening competition provisions, there is a fine of not less than Tanzanian 
shillings five hundred thousand (equivalent to 220 USD) or imprisonment for not less 
than five years.1072 The new Competition Regulations of 2018 also maintain a penalty 
of not less than five hundred thousand Tanzanian shillings but reduce jail term to 
three months.1073  
It is argued that setting fines at such a low rate does not communicate a firm resolve 
to address anti-competition practices in the sector. Even though one may argue that 
the rates are only a minimum threshold, nothing will prevent a presiding judge or 
 
1068 See for example Eric Barbier de La Serre and Eileen Lagathu, ‘The Law on Fines Imposed in EU 
Competition Proceedings: Time for a Refresh of the Fining Guidelines?’, Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, 8.6 (2017), 409–19 (pp. 1–6) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpx031>; Bas van Bockel, 
The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in EU Law (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International B.V., 2010), p. 94; 
Rodger and MacCulloch, p. 48. 
1069 Ian Forrester, ‘A Challenge for Europe’s Judges: The Review of Fines in Competition Cases’, European 
Law Review, 36.2 (2011), 185–207 (p. 137). 
1070 Wouter Wils, ‘Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement; Theory and Practice’, World Competition, 30.1 (2007), 
25–63 (p. 188). 
1071 OECD, Taking Stock of Regulatory Reform A Multidisciplinary Synthesis: A Multidisciplinary Synthesis 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008), p. 30. 
1072 S. 69 The Electronic and Postal Communications Act, ACT NO 3 OF 2010. 
1073 Reg 19 Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, G.N No. 26 of 2018. 
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magistrate from imposing the minimum prescribed fines. One does not imagine the 
imposition of fines as heavy as those issued by the European Commission to Google 
and similar tech giants. For example, in 2019, Google was fined 1.49 billion Euros for 
advertising violations. Between 2017 and 2019, the EU has fined google 8.2 billion 
Euros for breaching various competition rules.1074 Realistically, few Tanzania 
companies may have assets close to such fines. Nevertheless, fining 220 USD as a 
minimum payable fine is hugely on the lower side. No telecom firm may fear entering 
into any anti-competitive arrangement if it is likely to pay a penalty of 220 USD. 
6.3.3.1.2 Lack of Fining Policy 
Another concern in the remedy framework is the absence of an established fining 
policy. Fining policies go beyond stipulating minimum payable fines. Since fines affect 
firms’ pecuniary interests, it is imperative to establish a clear fining policy. It should 
set forth, for example, what should be fundamental considerations in the setting of 
fines (for instance, gravity and duration), the legal maximum of fines, and specific 
instances in which fines may be increased for deterrence purposes.1075  
The fining policy should also consider the role of mitigating factors, the presence of 
leniency programs, and in some circumstances, the ability to pay.1076 Beyond these 
legal certainties, a fining policy should also ensure equal treatment to all players, and 
above all, restrain the authorities from setting unreasonable fines based on 
superfluous grounds. As a result, a clear policy moves officers from “personal 
 
1074 See Adam Satariano, ‘Google Fined $1.7 Billion by E.U. for Unfair Advertising Rules’, The New York 
Times, 20 March 2019, section Business <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/business/google-fine-
advertising.html> [accessed 25 November 2019]; European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines 
Google 4.34 Billion for Abuse of Dominance Regarding Android Devices’, European Commission - European 
Commission, 2018 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581> [accessed 25 
November 2019]; Karen Gilchrist Balakrishnan Anita, ‘EU Hits Google with a Record Antitrust Fine of $2.7 
Billion’, CNBC, 2017 <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/27/eu-hits-google-with-a-record-antitrust-fine-of-
2-point-7-billion.html> [accessed 25 November 2019]; European Commission, ‘Statement by 
Commissioner Vestager on Fining Scania for Participating in Trucks Cartel’, European Commission - 
European Commission, 2017 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_17_3509> [accessed 25 
November 2019]. 
1075 See for example European Commission, Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to 
Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, C 210/2, 2006, p. 4. 
1076 European Commission, Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, p. 4. 
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assessment to a more neutral, objective, and consistent method.”1077 However, a 
documentary review of all relevant laws, regulations, and policies could not find any 
such policy in the telecommunication sector in Tanzania. No was the Authority’s 
directorate of legal affairs able to explain the policy used for fines during field 
research interviews.  Such policy only exists with the Fair Competition Commission.1078  
Without a fining policy, the Authority retains an arbitrary hand in deciding what fines 
fit certain violations. The absence of a fining policy presents an apparent uncertainty 
of the regulatory environment and a recipe for unfair or unequal treatment. Further, 
it is also an opening to entertaining political or other unclear motives. Below is a 
good example, though not directly connected to ex-post enforcement of competition.  
From 2015 to 2017, all telecom firms, except the government-owned TTCL, were 
fined three times for violating sim-card registration regulations.1079 Within the same 
period, telecom firms, except for the TTCL, were investigated, prosecuted, convicted, 
and fined for violating the Quality of Service Regulations. Table 6.3-1 shows fines 
imposed by the Authority from 2015-2017 for violation of sim-cards registration for 
the three big firms.1080 
Table 6.3-1 The TCRA’s Fines for violation of SIM-Cards registration from 2015-17 
Year  2015 2016 2017 
Vodacom USD 11,000 USD 42,500 USD 420,000 
Tigo USD 11,000 USD 84,000 USD 580,000 
Airtel  USD 11,000 USD 81,000 USD 480,000 
Source: Extracted from TCRA Decisions from 2015-2017 
In light of the presented fining trends, one can observe some tendencies, which would 
not have been the case, had the fining policy be in place. For instance, there were no 
justifications for excluding the state-owned firm from the investigations. Furthermore, 
 
1077 Forrester (n 1062) 188. 
1078 See S 60(1), Fair Competition Act, ACT NO 8 OF 2003 and Rule 28 of the Fair Competition Procedure 
Rules of 2018. 
1079 TCRA, Hatua Dhidi Ya Watoa Huduma Kwa Kushindwa Kuzingatia Utaratibu Wa Usajili Wa 
Namba/Laini Za Simu Za Kiganjani’ (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2017), p. 1. 
1080 See TCRA, Hatua Dhidi Ya Watoa Huduma Kwa Kushindwa Kuzingatia Utaratibu Wa Usajili Wa 
Namba/Laini Za Simu Za Kiganjani (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2019), p. 1; TCRA, Maelezo Ya Kaimu 
Mkurugenzi Mkuu, Mamlaka Ya Mawasiliano Tanzania, Eng. James Kilaba Kuhusu Uamuzi Kuhusu 
Ukiukwaji Wa Masharti Ya Usajili Wa Namba/Laini Za Simu Za Mkononi (Dar es Salaam: TCRA, 2016), p. 
1. 
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there were no justifications given on how the Authority calculated such amounts. In 
all instances, the Authority traced its fining powers from Section 17 of the Second 
Schedule of the TCRA Act. The Section empowers the Authority to impose sanctions 
for violations of regulatory rules.1081 This lack of justifications made telecom firms 
question the ‘coincidence’ in which the state-owned TTCL was neither investigated 
nor fined.1082 It is clear, they argue, that the TCCL enjoys protection from the 
authorities.  
There were other concerns that the imposed fines, especially those of 2017, were 
politically motivated. Some telecom firms argued that they were a direct order from 
the higher powers that be, in which the Authority had to penalize telecoms for their 
“many misdeeds”1083 For example, findings from the field revealed a perception 
amongst the Tanzania policymakers that most telecom firms use various techniques to 
avoid their statutory responsibilities, such as tax payment and corporate social 
responsibilities. There are also allegations that telecom firms steal from their 
consumers by overcharging them, non-delivery of purchased services, or even 
mysterious expiry of service without being consumed. Note that CSR is not obligatory 
to telecommunication companies. It is because of these perceptions, telecom firms 
responded, that the political establishments were unhappy with the way the Authority 
was lightly handling the telecom firms. As a result, the directive required more 
stringent measures against the telecom firms, thereby aggravated fines.  
At this juncture, one point must be clear. It is not argued that that telecom firms are 
fined excessively. Nor is it argued that the decisions to impose fines were not 
justified. The critical observation here is that the lack of fining policy leads to 
inconsistencies in the fining process with amounts that lack legal or mathematical 
justifications.  
Lack of the fining policy has also been linked with the government’s need to raise 
revenues. The central government, especially under the fifth government, had 
continually demanded that each government agency, department, and independent 
 
1081 The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, ACT NO 12 OF 2003. 
1082 Interviews with regulatory officers from Smart and Halotel. They requested anonymity. 
1083 Interviews with regulatory officers from Smart and Halotel. They requested anonymity. 
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authority contribute 15 percent of its income to the government (it would appear, 
regardless of whether it makes a profit or not).1084 Since there is no policy to guide 
how the Authority may set fines, telecom firms opine that the need to raise revenues 
has also pushed the TCRA to issue high fines compared to previous years. Indeed, the 
TCRA emerged as the top contributor in 2017 after remitting over Tsh 59,86 billion 
(approximately 26,4 mil USD) to the central government treasury, 15 percent of its 
income.1085  
All these factors make it questionable how far the Authority can go without a clear 
fining policy. Without restraints, it would appear that fining may continue to be 
mounted on grounds only known to the Authority. This does not send the right 
message to the regulated, whose number one wish is to have a stable and friendly 
regulatory environment.1086  
6.3.3.2 Overcriminalization of Competition Violation  
Chapter five of this work has noted strong criminal law influence in drafting 
competition rules. One would notice that all violations of competition rules amount to 
criminal offenses. For example, Section 69 of the EPOCA sets a blanket criminal 
punishment for all anti-competitive conducts. Section 60(5) of the EPOCA 
criminalizes all acts of abuse of dominance. The main concern here is the 
criminalization of practices that are typically not criminal. The effect of this 
arrangement, if adequately enforced, is to shift enforcement from the TCRA to the 
National Prosecution Service because the TCRA has no jurisdiction to carry out 
criminal proceedings.  
The striking point here is that research findings revealed no laws to guide all criminal 
proceedings in these new sets of criminal offenses. The laws do not even mention 
courts with appropriate jurisdiction. Similarly, the role of the TCRA in these criminal 
proceedings is unclear. Furthermore, questions such as gathering and presenting 
 
1084 The Reporter, ‘Mashirika 47 Kutoa Gawio Kwa Serikali’, Mwananchi Newspaper (Dar es Salaam, 22 July 
2018). 
1085 Alex Malanga, ‘Government Earns Hundreds of Billions in Dividends’, The Citizen Newspaper, 24 July 
2018. 
1086 The lack of a stable and friendly regulatory environment was raised as a significant concern by all 
interviewed telecom firms, including those owned by the government wholly or partly. 
 
 266  
evidence, including the burden of proof, are uncertain. Thus, criminalizing all anti-
competitive practices and shifting enforcement to other bodies with competent 
criminal jurisdiction without proper legal rules to guarantee certainty of enforcement 
means creating an enforcement framework that is bound to fail. Perhaps this is why 
there is no criminal case on competition matters, either pending in any court of law 
or determined on merit.  
6.4 Procedural Framework  
The procedural framework lies at the center of any enforcement process. It is through 
well-designed and exhaustive procedures that a sector regulator may address 
competition concerns. This is particularly important to a regulator with multiple 
objectives. There must be clarity of procedural rules for each of its given mandates. 
Having substantive competition law rules, extensive as they may be, is pointless 
unless a robust enforcement framework exists.   
A review of relevant laws established that most of the Authority’s enforcement powers 
are provided in general terms. For example, Section 17(1) of the TCRA Act gives the 
TCRA powers to conduct investigations and inquiries in the sector, including matters 
relating to competition enforcement. Similarly, it has powers to summon attendance 
of any persons under Section 17(5) of the TCRA Act, powers to collect and retain 
physical evidence under Section 17(6) of the TCRA Act, and powers under Section 
17(7) of the TCRA Act, to carry out “dawn raids” in the course of its investigation.1087 
The Competition Regulations of 2018 further provides for the general powers of 
competition enforcement. Regulation 4 of the Regulations reads, 
“4. The Authority shall have powers to- (a) monitor and enforce fair competition in 
the communications sector; (b) investigate all acts alleged to be in breach of fair 
competition rules; (c) conduct proceedings, inquiries or public consultations in order 
to render or make a decision on acts or conducts in breach of fair competition rules; 
and (d) impose sanctions, penalties or issue orders against licensees and persons 
whose acts or conducts are anti-competitive or in breach of fair competition rules.”  
 
1087 Temu, p. 109. 
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Despite these powers, the whole procedure for enforcing competition law in the 
sector raises some concerns regarding their efficacy. Some of the observed 
deficiencies are explained in the subsequent sub-section. 
6.4.1 Detecting Mechanisms 
Detection of violation of competition rules is the first stage in the enforcement 
process. Without proper detection mechanisms, effective enforcement remains a 
theoretical ambition and compliance far from reality. As Caron Beaton-Wells notes,  
“a long-standing theory on compliance is that behavior is most effectively influenced 
by increasing the likelihood of detection and punishment of wrongdoing and 
threatening the application of severe sanctions for transgressions.”1088  
It follows that an enforcement body cannot adequately address competition and 
inculcate a compliance culture in the absence of precise mechanisms to detect 
violations in the first place. Such detection may be possible, for example, through 
various methodologies such as market monitoring, information from other national 
institutions, complainants’ information, consumer information, inquiries, and 
programs such as leniency.1089 All these intend to solicit information from the field. 
Generally, one may argue that the Authority has powers to monitor competition and 
detect anti-competitive practices in the sector.1090 However, monitoring presupposes 
organized departments and dedicated staff that gather data and understand market 
operations, including their implications on the competition process. Unfortunately, 
the law does not establish a dedicated department for competition monitoring. Nor 
does that department exist in practice.1091 When concluding this study, monitoring 
competition was under the Department of Consumers and Industry Affairs, which 
deals with more than a dozen other responsibilities.  
 
1088 Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Substance and Process in Competition Law and Enforcement.: Why We Should 
Care If It’s Not Fair,’ in Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings, ed. by Paul Nihoul and Tadeusz 
Skoczny, ASCOLA Competition Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2015), pp. 3–43 
(p. 3). 
1089 Geradin, Layne-Farrar, and Petit, pp. 341–48. 
1090 See Reg 4(1) Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations. 
1091 Response from the director of huma resources during field research.  
 
 268  
This structure directly explains the Authority’s starvation for jurisprudence on 
competition enforcement. Cases on competition enforcement do not exist because, 
with its too many objectives and lack of dedicated department and staff for 
competition enforcement, it is implausible to have active monitoring and detection of 
violations in the sector. Simply put, the authority has no effective mechanisms to 
monitor the market and detect violations of competition rules, if any. 
6.4.2 Reporting Mechanisms and Complaint Initiation  
Relating to the mentioned point is the absence of a well-established structure for 
reporting violations or competition complaints. Well-established machinery of 
reporting anti-competitive practices is also an effective method any regulator may use 
to detect competition violations. Many jurisdictions allow natural or legal persons’ 
complaints on competition rules infringements.1092 They also provide a room to report 
any information that might be inconsistent with competition laws.1093 Regrettably, 
there are no legal provisions and mechanisms that allow or guide individual persons 
or even telecom firms to lodge their complaints to the Authority.1094  
The Authority could not provide a precise picture of how it handles competition 
matters.1095 Its general response was that enforcement matters fall under the legal 
department.1096  However, the legal department is not an exclusive enforcement 
department. Instead, it deals with everything with a legal element, meaning almost 
 
1092 In Uganda, the Communications Commission may receive complaints from any person having 
legitimate interests. See S 45(a) and (b) of Uganda Communications Act, 2013, ACT NO 1 OF 2013; In the EU 
for example, a natural or legal person who can show legitimate interests may report an infringement. See 
Alina Kaczorowska, European Union Law, 3rd edn (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 899; Themistoklis K. 
Giannakopoulos, Safeguarding Companies’ Rights in Competition and Anti-Dumping/Anti-Subsidies 
Proceedings, 2nd edn (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International B.V., 2011), p. 35; Even with the 
Tanzania Fair Competition Commission, any person has a right to initiate a complaint either in a prescribed 
form or in any manner convenient to him or her. See S. 69(a) and (b) of Fair Competition Act, ACT NO 8 OF 
2003. 
1093 In Uganda, the Communications Commission may receive complaints from any person having 
legitimate interests. See S 45(a) and (b) of Uganda Communications Act, ACT NO 1 OF 2013; In the EU for 
example, a natural or legal person who can show legitimate interests may report an infringement. See 
Kaczorowska, p. 899; Giannakopoulos, p. 35; Even with the Tanzania Fair Competition Commission, any 
person has a right to initiate a complaint either in a prescribed form or in any manner convenient to him or 
her. See S. 69(a) and (b) of Fair Competition Act, ACT NO 8 OF 2003. 
1094 See the 1st Schedule, The Electronic and Postal Communications (Consumer Protection) Regulations, GN. 
NO. 61 OF 2018. 
1095 An interview with the TCRA legal department. An interview was done with the director of legal services 
and senior legal officer responsible for enforcement.  
1096 An interview with the TCRA legal department. An interview was done with the director of legal services 
and senior legal officer responsible for enforcement.  
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everything in the sector. It means that, in principle, the legal department does not 
have sufficient capacity to handle competition matters, in addition to other legal and 
administrative matters arising from regulatory duties.  
Thus, it is apparent that no dedicated framework for handling competition complaints 
exists. It was learned from an interview with the TCRA’s director of human resources 
that plans were underway to have an enforcement department that handles, among 
others, competition matters. What the department will look like and whether there 
will be specific mechanisms to handle the reporting of competition violations remain 
to be seen.1097 As a result, it is more likely than not that many anti-competitive 
practices will remain undisclosed to the Authority. Furthermore, consumers and 
stakeholders remain unaware of whether they can complain of competition violations, 
and if yes, they are unsure of methods to use. In the end, it is the TCRA’s institutional 
capacity that gets undermined because it loses opportunities to detect anti-
competitive practices. Naturally, the Authority cannot enforce what it is unaware of.  
It was surprising to learn, from an interview with regulatory departments of three 
telecom respondents, that even the telecom firms do not know how to initiate a 
competition complaint despite raising several concerns requiring ex-post 
enforcement.1098 It was found that complaints initiation is one of those many areas in 
which legal uncertainty appears to be a law of the day because rules of procedures 
are determined ad hoc by the Authority. As one practitioner working with one 
telecom firm further intimated, most TCRA proceedings follow no established legal 
procedures. That in many cases, he further noted, there are no known specified 
procedures. He concluded that telecom firms follow what the TCRA says without 
enjoying the structured format of an established procedure that ensures certainty of 
proceedings.  
Further interviews with the respondents established that telecom firms would use 
official letters to convey their grievances. Such practice may be extended to anti-
 
1097 As of 2021 August, no such department existed. See TCRA, ‘TCRA Organization Structure 2021’ 
<https://www.tcra.go.tz/uploads/text-
editor/files/TCRA%20Organisation%20Structure_1622544286.pdf> [accessed 16 August 2021]. 
1098 Interviewed in this aspect were TTCL, Tigo and Halotel. 
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competitive practices. The use of letters comes out of the usual way of transacting 
business in the field and not a defined legal framework. Principally, the research 
findings established, there is no known framework to govern the initiation of 
competition complaints with the Authority. 
6.4.3 Procedural Fairness  
Authors of administrative and constitutional law agree that procedural fairness is a 
central requirement for administration of justice.1099 However, what amounts to 
procedural fairness is not a matter of universal certainty, although literature reveals 
what may constitute its essential elements.1100 For example, they include the 
impartiality of decision-makers, the right to appear, present and defend a case before 
an impartial judge, the right to present and examine evidence from the other party, 
and the right to have a decision reviewed by another independent body.1101 Procedural 
fairness is essential “in shoring up the perceived legitimacy of the law and, in that 
way, strengthening voluntary compliance on normative grounds.”1102 
In a system that seeks to uphold justice, the fairness of procedures should be 
positively embraced, among other things, to “prevent even the probability of 
unfairness.”1103 The Constitution of Tanzania stipulates that, 
“When the rights and duties of any person are being determined by the court or any 
other agency, that person shall be entitled to a fair hearing and to the right of appeal 
or other legal remedy against the decision of the court or of the other agency 
concerned”.1104  
 
1099 See for example William F. Funk and Richard H. Seamon, Administrative Law, Examples & 
Explanations, Fifth edition (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2016), p. 122; Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, ed. by Neil Parpworth and Nicola Padfield, Core Text Series, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), pp. 300–301; Alex Carroll, Constitutional and Administrative Law, Foundation 
Studied in Law Series, 6th ed (Harlow Essex, England ; New York: Pearson Longman, 2011), pp. 350–51; 
Timothy O’Riordan, Ray Kemp, and Michael Purdue, Sizewell B: An Anatomy of Inquiry (Hampshire and 
London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 73. 
1100 Douglas Ginsburg and Taylor Owings, ‘Due Process in Competition Proceedings’, Competition Law 
International, 1.11 (2015), 39–49 (p. 39); Tom R. Tyler, ‘What Is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by 
Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures’, Law & Society Review, 22.1 (1988), 103–35 (pp. 111–
13) <https://doi.org/10.2307/3053563>. 
1101 Ginsburg and Owings, p. 39; Tyler, pp. 111–13. 
1102 Beaton-Wells, ‘Substance and Process in Competition Law and Enforcement.: Why We Should Care If 
It’s Not Fair,’ p. 27. 
1103 Ginsburg and Owings, p. 104. 
1104 See Article 13(6) (a), The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, CAP 2 [R.E 2002]. 
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The Constitution corresponds to the need to have a framework that embraces 
procedural fairness as an integral factor for effective enforcement. Without 
procedural fairness, it is possible to have unfair remedies or punishments or to leave 
violators unpunished.  
Examination of procedural fairness in the enforcement of competition law in the 
telecom sector provides mixed results. Prima facie, the TCRA appears to be one of 
Tanzania’s agencies and authorities that embrace fairness. Indeed, its code of 
conduct, for example, upholds virtues such as fairness, accountability, integrity, the 
prohibition of undue influence, and avoidance of conflict of interests.1105 The same 
values also appear in the TCRA Enforcement Guidelines of 2012.1106  
The above observations notwithstanding, some crucial legal framework and details 
that would guarantee fairness are still wanting regarding competition enforcement. 
For example, while it is clear that a party has a right to a hearing, representation, and 
presenting of evidence, it is uncertain how the Authority upholds impartiality. 
Furthermore, the standard of proof is unknown, decision-making processes inexact, 
and rules for making decisions unstipulated. The next sub-section provides further 
stipulation of some critical observations. 
6.4.3.1 Evidence and Standard of Proof  
The standard of proof is the certainty and level of evidence needed to establish 
liability.1107 Generally, in Tanzania, the standard of proof in civil cases is on the 
“preponderance of probability” and in criminal law is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”1108 
For criminal cases, this standard is higher, and as a general rule, it does not shift from 
the prosecutor to the defense side.1109 The requirements of the standard of proof 
demand that whoever alleges, as a general rule, must prove.  
 
1105 TCRA, ‘Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority Code of Conduct’ (TCRA, 2015). 
1106 TCRA, ‘Enforcement Guidelines’ (TCRA, 2012), p. 2. 
1107 Tony Reeves and Ninette Dodoo, ‘Standards of Proof and Standards of Judicial Review in European 
Commission Merger Law’, Fordham International Law Journal, 29.5 (2005), 1034–67 (p. 1037). 
1108 See S. 3(2)(a) &(b), The Evidence Act, CAP 6 [R.E 2019]; Yves Botteman, ‘Mergers, Standard of Proof 
and Expert Economic Evidence’, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2.1 (2006), 71–100 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhi027>. 
1109 Ahmed Omari v R, Criminal Appeal No 154 of 2005 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania) (Unreported). 
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Rules on the standard of proof are fundamental because the TCRA has powers to 
allege breach of the law and then investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and enforce its 
decision. The problem is that with the TCRA enforcement system, there is no legal 
framework governing how it handles evidence and proves its allegations. Generally, 
the TCRA avers to have always ensured that each party has the right to be heard.1110 It 
then proceeds to decide.  
However, in practice, its decisions are based on its own rules of practice, which 
telecom firms claimed to be unfamiliar with. For example, interviews with telecom 
firms revealed that the actual procedures are primarily one-sided. Typically, the 
Authority would proceed to conduct its investigation and form its opinion. This 
opinion in the form of the Authority’s judgment is then transmitted to the 
“respondent.” The respondent will have an opportunity to presents its case in a 
hearing. In this hearing, the respondent is required, in most cases, to show cause why 
the Authority’s finding should not be implemented. One legal officer from one big 
MNO noted, “the hearing is just a mere formality. In all cases we had appeared before 
the Authority, it had already formed its decision. Our defense did not change 
anything.”1111  
Because there is the concentration of powers on the Authority, legal controls should 
have been in place. Such control would ensure, among others, that the TCRA’s 
decisions are made after a careful analysis of the evidence on objective criteria. As of 
the moment, that is not the case. Everything hangs on the Authority, which we have 
already noted, albeit in other regulatory issues, that is not impartial because it is 
already interested in cases it adjudicates (See Section 6.6 for further detail on the 
Authority’s independence).  
6.4.3.2 Concentration of Powers   
Generally, the law empowers the TCRA to monitor the sector, and in case of any 
breach of regulatory rules, investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate such breach.1112 
 
1110 An interview with the TCRA’s senior legal officer.  
1111 The respondent requested anonymity.  
1112 See for example Reg 4 of The Electronic and Postal Communications (Competition) Regulations, GN. NO 
26 OF 2018. 
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When it finally determines the matter at hand, it has the power to enforce its 
decision. In practice, the TCRA has an internal enforcement arrangement in which the 
Director of Legal Services oversees all enforcement matters.1113 Under this directorate 
lies the powers to allege, investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and enforce its decisions. 
The Director of Legal Services may work with directors from other departments 
(where the subject matter of enforcement lies) or another member appointed by the 
TCRA’s Director-General.1114  
There are concerns, specially recorded from the telecom firms and stakeholders, over 
this arrangement’s desirability. There is direct disregard for natural justice principles, 
which prohibit one from being a judge of its case (Nemo judex in causa sua). Article 
13(6) of the Constitution of Tanzania embeds these principles by guaranteeing 
equality before the law. Specifically, Article 13(6)(1) of the Constitution emphasizes 
the right to a fair trial. Tanzania courts have already established that provisions that 
guarantee natural justice are no longer common law principles but “fundamental 
constitutional rights.”1115  
Thus, it is entirely against the Constitution to disregard these principles. It is 
undesirable to establish a separate enforcement framework with a concentration of 
powers without establishing sufficient checks on the Authority’s enforcement. Even 
though there is a tribunal as an appellate body, one must note that not all matters are 
appealable. The result is that most decisions are likely to conclude without due regard 
to principles of natural justice and other principles of fairness. 
The impact of such congestion of powers is not far-fetched. Telecom firms have raised 
some concerns about procedural impartiality and lack of fairness.1116 For example, the 
Directorate of Legal Services interacts with the telecom firms regularly. In so doing, it 
collects tons of information in its regulatory capacity. Besides, it collects much 
 
1113 TCRA, ‘Enforcement Guidelines’, p. 2. 
1114 TCRA, ‘Enforcement Guidelines’, pp. 2–3. 
1115 See for example, Mbeya-Rukwa Auto Parts & Transport Limited vs Jestina George Mwakyoma, [2003] 
TLR 257 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania).; Onesmo Nagole v Steven Kiruswa, Civil Appeal No. 129 of 2016 
(Court of Appeal of Tanzania) (Unreported).; Dishoni Mtaita v The DPP, Criminal Appeal No 132 of 2004 
(Court of Appeal of Tanzania) (Unreported).; The Principal Secretary, Ministry of Defence & National 
Service vs Devram Valalmbhia, [1992] TLR 185 (Court of Appeal of Tanzania). 
1116 Response from TTCL, Smart, Tigo and Vodacom.  
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information from the regulated, for instance, their revenues, network expansion 
plans, customer base, and business plans. In so doing, the directorate is already 
possessing a powerful asset: information. With such information, it can then turn 
itself into a complainant, then an investigator, then a prosecutor, and finally, a judge. 
Of course, it is also an enforcer of its own decision. The bottom line here is that the 
concertation of powers affects the Authority’s ability to deliver fair decisions. 
Furthermore, it even affects the Authority’s ability to develop expertise because it is 
unlikely to excel in each enforcement mandate.  
6.4.3.3 TCRA’s Independence and Fairness  
It must always be remembered that the TCRA has its interests in the regulatory 
process. For example, an interview with a senior officer within the Authority reveals 
that the TCRA being an executive government body, regularly receives government 
directives for implementation. Further, as a sector regulator, the Authority has goals 
that it strives to achieve for each financial year. As a result, the TCRA enters into a 
regulatory arena with varied interests it wishes to achieve. For example, the Authority 
may act as a complainant, investigator, prosecutor, and adjudicator when address 
regulatory matters. When it passes a decision, monetary penalties go back to its 
account.  
With such interests, the Authority is already an interested party. As such, it is 
compromised to enforce the law impartially. The more pertinent issue here is whether 
the Authority can be fair in the absence of its independence. For example, since it has 
access to firms’ financial information, it has been argued that the Authority might 
decide when to initiate an investigation and issue an order for fines. Thus, it is 
apparent that such an accumulation of powers in its hands makes it even easier for 
the Authority to proceed with whatever intentions it might have. Telecom companies 
noted that it is one of the grave weaknesses.1117  
On another note, the TCRA is purely an executive body. In terms of policy directions, 
the TCRA is still answerable to the executive (the Minister and the President). 
 
1117 TTCL, Smart, and Halotel were most vocal on this aspect.  
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Therefore, it is not within the judiciary hierarchy and not bound by the judicial 
principles of administration of justice. The telecoms fear that the TCRA may be (and 
some opine that it already is) inclined to favor the executive.1118 Instances of sparing 
the government-owned telecom company while punishing others or acting on the 
executive directions were cited as examples that undermine the Authority’s fairness in 
decision making.1119 Thus, it follows that the totality of the powers on its hand actually 
complicates the enforcement process and does not necessarily help the Authority to 
actively, fairly, and effectively enforce the law.  
6.4.4 Absence of Private Enforcement Framework  
Even though there is a sufficient body of literature supporting private enforcement of 
competition law, no such framework exists in Tanzania.1120 There is no clear policy 
justification for why the law does not enable private enforcement. However, it is clear 
that given regulatory circumstances already explained in this work so far and the fact 
that competition does not rank high within the regulator, the presence of a private 
enforcement framework would have proved beneficial in many ways. Stressing on the 
importance of private enforcement in competition enforcement, Andreas Mundt, the 
President of Bundeskartellamt, observes that “if cartel members have to expect actions 
for damages from customers harmed by the cartel in addition to a heavy fine, this 
appreciably weakens the attractiveness of these illegal and socially damaging 
agreements.”1121 
 
1118 Apart from the government-owned TTCL, all other interviewed telecom firms indicated their perception 
that the TCRA is not free and that it acts on the government directions in most cases. 
1119 Respondents from Smart and Halotel were very vocal on instances that the TCRA appears to have acted 
under the government's influence. They averred that in most cases, such decisions affect the smaller firms 
the most. The respondents, two legal officers from the companies, requested anonymity. 
1120 See for example, Christopher H. Bovis and Charles M. Clarke, ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition 
Law’, Liverpool Law Review, 36.1 (2015), 49–71 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10991-015-9164-9>; Niamh 
Dunne, ‘The Role of Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law’, Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies, 16 (2014), 143–87 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1528887000002585>; Wolfgang Wurmnest, 
‘Assimakis P. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition 
Law by National Courts (Oxford and Portland/ Oregon, Hart Publishing 2008) 314 Pp., ISBN: 978-1-
84113-744-5 Doi:10.1017/S1566752909006491’, European Business Organization Law Review, 10.4 
(2009), 649–52 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752909006491>; Paul D. Carrington, ‘The American 
Tradition of Private Law Enforcement’, German Law Journal, 5.12 (2004), 1413–29 
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S2071832200013328>. 
1121 ‘Interview with Andreas Mundt, President of the German Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office)’, The 
Antitrust Source, 2016, p. 4 
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For instance, private enforcement would have encouraged enforcement culture as 
applicants would have personal incentives (damages) to enforce the law. 
Furthermore, private enforcement would have complemented the TCRA’s 
enforcement when unable to act for various reasons, such as insufficient resources or 
other priorities. Private enforcement would have also provided the Authority with 
market information, helping it reformulate its policies to address pertinent and 
relevant issues. In sum, private enforcement would have increased deterrence, 
provide a possibility of compensating victims, complement public enforcement, and 
promote competition culture within the sector.1122 Such an opportunity is lost for lack 
of necessary frameworks.  
6.4.5 The Shortcoming of Arbitration Framework  
It is presented in chapter five that the Competition Regulations have introduced 
arbitration of disputes on acts that lessen competition in the market. It is a standard 
practice that arbitration agreement/clause is an essential condition without which 
arbitration cannot take place.1123 The Regulations, however, introduce what this study 
calls “institutional-imposed arbitration,” where telecom firms may resort to 
arbitration without first having an arbitration clause. Much as this new development 
is welcome, some critical concerns touch on its practicability and viability as one way 
to enforce competition in the sector. Should the telecom firms resort to the arbitration 
framework, some questions find no answers.  
For example, Regulation 17(5) of the Competition Rules designates the TCRA as the 
arbitrator. However, it remains unclear who within the Authority can qualify to form 
an arbitration panel. The arbitration panel’s certainty is necessary because the panel 
determines many things, from the impartiality of proceedings to the expertise 
required. Further, there are procedural uncertainties on how arbitration takes place. 
It is unclear, for example, how one files an arbitration petition. Furthermore, it is also 
unclear how the arbitrators handle or determine the standard of proof. It is also 
 
<https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Interviews/the_antitrust_source%20-
%20An_interview_with_Andreas_mundt.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3> [accessed 29 August 2021]. 
1122 Donncadh Woods, Ailsa Sinclair, and David Ashton, ‘Private Enforcement of Community Competition 
Law: Modernisation and The Road Ahead’, Competition Policy Newsletter, 2 (2004), 31–37 (p. 34). 
1123 Blake, p. 1089. 
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unclear what kind of remedies the Authority can award in the process. Will the 
Authority be bound by competition law provisions, or does it have complete freedom 
to offer remedies it deems fit? This question has no answer in the law.  
These points raise concerns over the feasibility of the arbitration framework. Scrutiny 
of the law gives no answers. And so is the practice. To the telecom firms, for example, 
arbitration remains unchartered territory for lack of a clear framework. An interview 
with some of them revealed that they are unaware of how it works.1124 However, it 
would appear that even a letter may trigger the arbitration process. At one time, 
Benson Informatics Limited (Smart) refused to interconnect with Viettel Tanzania 
Limited (Halotel).1125 Viettel wrote a letter to the Authority stating its case. The 
Authority called Smart to respond to such allegations using a standard official letter. 
However, before the TCRA could determine the dispute, the parties decided to settle. 
It would have been interesting to learn whether or not such proceedings would have 
led to arbitration and how that process would have worked out. Much as it did not 
materialize, we are left only with questions and skepticism. What is certain is that the 
arbitration framework is uncertain. It is not clear what substantive rules govern the 
arbitration. Nor is it clear whether competition principles would prevail or that 
parties can ignore them. 
6.5 Institutional Design and Organization  
It is essential to understand that designing authorities to enforce competition law is 
not an exact science as no unique framework may fit all.1126 Nevertheless, such 
authorities’ design is crucial as it links with the success in enforcement.1127 In other 
words, sloppy design may affect the institutional ability to discharge its 
responsibilities. This section looks at some design issues that may undermine the 
Authority’s efficacy in enforcing competition law. Specifically, the section focuses on 
 
1124 Firms that responded to this matter were Halotel, TTCL, Smart, and Tigo.  
1125 Information obtained from field study. 
1126 See Frederic Jenny, ‘The Institutional Design of Competition Authorities: Debates and Trends’, in 
Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries, ed. by Frederic Jenny and Yannis 
Katsoulacos, International Law and Economics (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016), pp. 
1–57 (p. 1) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30948-4_1>. 
1127 Ariel Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 5 (2017), 49–75 (p. 54) 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnw011>. 
 
 278  
TCRA’s relationship with the Executive, Judiciary, and the FCC. Also, the section 
examines the Authority’s internal organization.  
6.5.1 TCRA and the Executive  
The relationship between the TCRA and the Executive is a matter of concern. In 
principle, the TCRA cannot exist in complete isolation from the government. 
However, the primary point of concern is whether legal and practical mechanisms 
exist to guard against any possible exploitation of such a relationship. Put differently, 
the relationship between the TCRA and the Executive should only be to the extent 
that the Executive supports the Authority to effectively deliver its objectives. Anything 
beyond this role may jeopardize the Authority’s ability to discharge its roles.  
Unfortunately, a review of all relevant laws and regulations does not reveal any 
safeguards the relationship between the TCRA and the government. There are no 
legal provisions that prohibit the government from interfering with the Authority’s 
operation. Further, in terms of policy coordination, the TCRA is under the Ministry 
responsible for communications. It receives directives from and is accountable to the 
Minister. Combining these two factors (lack of legal protection from interferences and 
being accountable to the Ministry) makes it possible for the executive to exercise 
some powers over the Authority. In other words, the Authority cannot act in complete 
independence from the executive.1128 Some examples in the next sub-sections may 
help to explain this point further. 
6.5.1.1 Dismissal of TCRA’s Board and its Officials 
Dismissal of the TCRA officials and TCRA’s board may shed light on the executive 
powers in the sector. It is a common practice that each Director General (DG) serves 
for five years, renewable once. The five years term is an accepted standard practice at 
the Authority.1129 The law, however, does not provide for that term with certainty. It 
says that the DG may serve for a term specified in the appointment letter (typically 
 
1128 The lack of express guarantee of independence is of course contrary to the international accepted 
practices such as the WTO Reference Paper on Telecommunications which charges all WTO members to 
adopt independent regulators. See WTO, ‘Telecommunications Services: Reference Paper 24 April 1996 
Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications’ (WTO, 1996) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm> [accessed 30 July 2019]. 
1129 This information was confirmed by the director of human resources during the field study. 
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five years term) or for another term as approved by the Board of Directors with 
consultation with the Minister responsible for communications.1130  
In 2016, however, the President removed the then Director-General, who had served 
only nine months for failing to discharge his duties properly.1131 The decision was 
followed by the dismissal of the entire TCRA’s Board of Directors. The mentioned 
reason was underperformance, causing loss to the government.1132 It is worth noting 
that even though there is no protection of tenure for the authority’s officials, the law 
sets some limits on their removal. For example, under Section 12(1) of the TCRA Act, 
the removal of board members is possible on the grounds of bankruptcy, criminal 
conviction, conflict of interests, inability to discharge duties due to physical or mental 
inabilities, or failure to attend two-third of the Authority meetings.  
The removal of the DG in question and the entire board of directors did not comply 
with the aforementioned provisions. The mentioned reason appears to have been 
used to camouflage the actual reasons that were never disclosed to the public. For 
example, one top official from the Authority (he requested anonymity) termed the 
dismissal of the DG as “purely political,” having nothing to do with his capacities, 
which, as he confided, were beyond reproach.1133  
It is worth mentioning that even though the President has no powers to appoint the 
DG, he or she has dismissal powers under Section 12(1) of the TCRA Act. By 
extending such powers to the Executive, the law allows the Executive to decide who 
heads the Authority and how he or she heads it. The impact of this structure is to 
have the Authority, whose functioning depends much on the Executive wishes.  
6.5.1.2 Extension of Tenure 
Another aspect of the executive powers relates to an extension of the TCRA’s top 
official’s tenure. Even though it is upon the Minister to appoint and renew the DG’s 
 
1130 See the The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, ACT NO 12 OF 2003. 
1131 BBC Swahili, ‘Magufuli aivunja bodi ya TCRA’, BBC News Swahili, 2016 
<https://www.bbc.com/swahili/habari/2016/04/160426_magufuli_yahaya_sack> [accessed 3 December 
2019]. 
1132 BBC Swahili. 
1133 The DG who holds PhD in Information Engineering went on to become the Executive Secretary of the 
East African Communications Organizations. See EACO, ‘Dr. Ally Yahaya Simba: EACO Executive 
Secretary’, 2020 <http://www.eaco.int/pages/exsec> [accessed 4 June 2020]. 
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tenure, research findings show that even other Executive members, for example, the 
President, can also assume those responsibilities. A good example is an incident in 
2019, presenting a stark contrary to what happened in 2016 (See Section6.5.1.1). 
While in a public function, the President extended the current Director-General’s 
tenure for five more years.1134 The reason for the extension was that the DG was doing 
an outstanding job, in the President’s opinion.  
One must note that under Section 13 of the TCRA Act, the President has no powers to 
appoint the Director-General. Nonetheless, he extended the DG’s tenure. 
Furthermore, by this extension, there was a violation of Section 13 of the TCRA Act, 
which sets procedures to appoint the DG, including a process that involves a 
nomination committee. These procedures were not followed.  
The two examples in the preceding paragraphs show how much the Authority’s 
design makes it permeable to external interferences. Even more importantly, they 
show how the Executive can make such essential decisions, like who becomes the 
Authority’s chief without objective criteria. It is at the Executive’s hand to hire or fire, 
based on a personal assessment of performance or underperformance. By having 
these powers, the appointed person automatically works under the pleasure of the 
appointing authority because he or she can be removed at any time. This structure 
culminates in the Authority’s lack of personal independence, which translates to the 
Authority’s lack of independence.  
6.5.1.3 Dismissal of Employees not Accountable to the Executive 
The field findings observed that the Executive has powers over the TCRA officials 
(civil servants) not appointed by the Executive. It was established that the Minister 
may order a suspension or removal of the Authority’s employees because of 
dissatisfaction with their performances. For example, in 2016, the Minister for 
communications suspended three departmental directors for allegedly failing to 
discharge their regulatory responsibilities.1135 One needs to remember that the 
 
1134 Aurea Simtowe, ‘Magufuli Ataja Sababu Za Kumng’oa Bosi TCRA’, Mwananchi (Dar es Salaam, 18 
January 2019) <https://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/kitaifa/Magufuli-ataja-sababu-za-kumng-oa-bosi-
TCRA/1597296-4940668-138cyh2/index.html> [accessed 3 December 2019]. 
1135 Liwenga, p. 1. 
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Minister had neither power to appoint them nor to dismiss them. The employees had 
their tenure governed by the civil service laws.  
The presented examples show a complicated relationship between the two. The 
Executive has an edge to exploit that relationship as it wishes. At this point, some 
clarification is necessary. This research did not look into the merit of all the decisions 
taken. That task is altogether different, not covered in this work. The point, which 
this research drives home, is that the existing relationship has made it possible for the 
Executive to act outside the prescribed legal parameters and established legal 
procedures. These advances from the Executive may likely paralyze the Authority’s 
ability to enforce the law objectively. 
The summation of the Executive’s recent actions culminates into one clear message to 
the regulatory officials, ‘do what we want, and stay longer or disobey and get 
removed.’ At any rate, the undefined and uncontrolled relationship between the 
Executive and Authority undermines the Authority’s ability to stand on the objective 
criteria in its enforcement responsibilities. Moreover, because of the absence of legal 
protection of the Authority’s independence, the TCRA has no legal justification for 
refusing politically motivated advances or advances without legal justification 
because it has no legal basis to do so. 
6.5.2 TCRA and the Judiciary 
Judicial oversight of sector regulators’ decisions is crucial to check and counter the 
regulators’ powers.1136 It is an ex-post tool of addressing what one author called the 
“democratic and accountability” deficit in regulation.1137 Through judicial 
accountability, the judiciary scrutinizes regulators’ decisions for their legality and 
 
1136 Saskia Lavrijssen and Fatma Çapkurt, ‘Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Oversight of the Authority 
Consumer and Market’s Energy Regulations in the Netherlands’, in Judicial Review of Administrative 
Discretion in the Administrative State, ed. by Jurgen de Poorter, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, and Saskia Lavrijssen 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2019), pp. 133–71 (p. 137) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-307-
8_8>. 
1137 Luis E. Mejía, ‘Judicial Review of Regulatory Decisions: Decoding the Contents of Appeals against 
Agencies in Spain and the United Kingdom’, Regulation & Governance, 2020, 1–25 (pp. 1–2) 
<https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12302>; Marek Szydło, ‘Judicial Review of Decisions Made by National 
Regulatory Authorities: Towards a More Coherent Application of EU Sector-Specific Regulation’, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 12.4 (2014), 930–53 (p. 931) 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mou069>. 
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legitimacy. Put differently, judicial oversight guards against improper use of the 
regulators’ discretionary powers. Thus, once in the periphery of regulation, courts are 
now at the very center of it.1138 It would follow that judicial oversight is vital to ensure 
regulators work within their legal mandate and correct mistakes, including omissions, 
which would have otherwise impaired the regulators’ efficacy.  
A review of relevant laws and regulatory practices established that the relationship 
between the TCRA and the judiciary in Tanzania is limited, at least in two ways. 
Firstly, the judiciary is excluded from reviewing the TCRA’s decisions. According to 
Section 36 of the TCRA Act, decisions of the TCRA are appealable only once to the 
Fair Competition Tribunal, whose decision is final. One must note that both the TCRA 
and FCT are more administrative than judicial bodies, accountable to the government 
and not the judiciary. Some stakeholders have raised some concerns over their 
independence and the likelihood of favoring the government.1139 Widening the 
possibility of appeal to the Court of Appeal would provide a more unbiased review of 
the TCRA’s decision. It would also conform to the Constitution, which places the 
responsibilities of making final decisions in the dispensation of justice only to the 
Judiciary.1140  
Secondly, even the extent of review by the Fair Competition Tribunal is limited. For 
example, as per Section 36(2) of the TCRA Act, appeals are possible only on four 
grounds. They are the following: an error of law, procedural impropriety, lack of 
jurisdiction, and a decision without regard to the produced evidence. In other words, 
appeals are available mainly on technical grounds. One may not generally appeal 
upon being dissatisfied by the decision or, for example, on the extent of issued 
remedies.  
It would naturally follow that limited opportunities for judicial oversight of the 
regulator’s decision mean that many decisions end at the regulator’s level. It is argued 
 
1138 Despoina Mantzari, ‘Judicial Scrutiny of Regulatory Decisions at the UK’s Specialist Competition Appeal 
Tribunal’, in Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion in the Administrative State, ed. by Jurgen de 
Poorter, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, and Saskia Lavrijssen (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2019), pp. 63–80 (p. 
64) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-307-8_4>. 
1139 Concerns from some telecom firms and private practitioners observed during field study.  
1140 See Art 107 A, The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, CAP 2 [R.E 2002]. 
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that this is not healthy for effective regulation since the judicial interpretation of 
regulators’ decisions provides an avenue for further sharpening and finetuning the 
relevant rules. More importantly, the oversight would instill a sense of accountability 
and hence, necessitate the regulator’s self-review of its practices and decision for 
better and effective regulation. Even though there is almost a consensus on the role of 
judicial review, it is also essential to ensure courts are not used to impair the 
regulatory process. Thus, judicial oversight becomes meaningful if it is efficient in 
terms of time and quality of decisions made, and it does not act to paralyze the whole 
regulatory machinery.1141 
6.5.3 TCRA and the Fair Competition Commission 
Formal or informal cooperation between the Authority and other stakeholders, for 
instance, the FCC, would have enhanced the Authority’s capacity to detect anti-
competitive behaviors and enforce competition law. This relationship is essential 
because, as some studies have shown in other jurisdictions such as the UK, sector 
regulators with powers to enforce competition tend towards not being active in ex-
post enforcement of competition.1142 Some of the reasons for such indifference include 
hardship in proving infringement, resource constraints, and lack of expertise.1143 
To address such challenges, the involvement of competition authorities becomes 
necessary. The UK, for example, has established a competition network comprising 
the national competition agency, i.e., the Competition and Market Authority, with 
other sector regulators.1144Among others, they work together on strategic dialogue, 
enforcement cooperation, enhancing their enforcement capabilities, sharing best 
practices, and advocacy.1145 
 
1141 See OECD and IDB, p. 45; OECD, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Germany 2004 Consolidating 
Economic and Social Renewal: Consolidating Economic and Social Renewal (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2004), 
p. 15; Scott Colin, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’, Journal of Law and Society, 27.1 (2000), 38–60 
(pp. 44–45). 
1142 Woodward-Carlton and Collinson, p. 141. 
1143 Woodward-Carlton and Collinson, p. 142. 
1144 See UK Competition Network, ‘UK Competition Network’, GOV.UK 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/uk-competition-network> [accessed 30 July 2019]. 
1145 Woodward-Carlton and Collinson, p. 147. 
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In Tanzania, however, a review of relevant laws and interviews with FCC and TCRA 
established that the relationship between the TCRA and the FCC is limited. The law 
provides two circumstances in which the two might work together. Firstly, the TCRA 
may report any competition infringement in the sector to the FCC under Section 
19(1) of the TCRA Act. The word used in the Section is ‘may,’ notifying discretion on 
the TCRA’s side. Thus, it may or may not report uncompetitive acts to the FCC, 
depending on its evaluation and discretion. Secondly, the law under Section 65(5) of 
the Fair Competition Act requires the FCC to consult with the TCRA when dealing 
with any matter falling within the telecom sector. The law demands that the FCC 
should receive the TCRA’s written advice before it can decide. The Section uses the 
word ‘shall,’ meaning that it is mandatory on the FCC’s side. For example, an 
interview with the FCC’s director of restrictive trade practices unveiled that the FCC 
cannot clear any merger in the telecom sector without first writing the TCRA for 
advice. This provision gives the regulator an influence even in those competition 
matters that the FCC handles.  
Even though the law envisages some limited cooperation between FCC and TCRA, 
practice showed a different picture. An interview with the FCC’s senior legal officers 
noted that it has a good relationship with other sector regulators, apart from the 
TCRA. For example, the FCC noted that the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority could 
not deal with any competition matter without consulting the FCC.1146 One must note 
that the legal provision which gives the TCAA powers to deal with competition cases 
is in pari materia with the provision giving the TCRA powers to deal with competition 
law.1147 There was also evidence of FCC working with another regulator, EWURA, 
regarding boycotting fuel suppliers from supplying petrol and diesel between 2011-
15. The FCC intervened to carry a study to find whether there were collusive practices 
because almost all petrol stations in Dar es Salaam refused to sell petrol and diesel 
over disagreement on price regulations with the regulator.1148  
 
1146 These were findings from an interview with senior legal officers from research, mergers, and advocacy 
and compliance divisions of the Fair Competition Commission. 
1147 See Section 46(2) of the Civil Aviation Act, CAP 80 R.E 2020. 
1148 These were findings from an interview with senior legal officers from research, mergers, and advocacy 
and compliance divisions of the Fair Competition Commission. 
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However, the interviews revealed that the relationship between the two, i.e., FCC and 
TCRA, is not at the expected level. Also, some studies in the past indicate that there 
have always been some turf wars between the two.1149 The relationship is almost non-
existent, save on a few circumstances where FCC had to clear a few telecom-related 
mergers. While commenting on this state of a poor relationship, one author noted 
that, 
“On the face of it, there seems to be no antagonism between the FCC and regulated 
sectors. This is because it is perceived that FCC regulates competition in trade in goods 
while the regulated sectors regulate competition in services. But behind the scenes, 
according to the private sector and a consumer association there is a lot of tension and 
protection of turfs. The concern of business is that there seems to be a gap between law and 
theory. Thereby in theory the law is clear in the mandate given to different agencies, 
however, the reality in implementation is different. In addition, the perception of industry 
and civil society is that while the different agencies might consult each other, in actual fact 
when it comes to implementation, there is lack of cooperation as agencies are engaged 
in turf wars as already mentioned.”1150  
In due regard, the lack of a working relationship means that TCRA misses an 
opportunity to benefit from a culture of competition and enforcement experience 
already enjoyed by the FCC. This experience would have boosted its capacity and 
efficacy, and where necessary, complement it.  
It must be mentioned here that at the international level, the TCRA has maintained 
good relationships with other regulators in the East Africa Community and with the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Nevertheless, it is not a member of 
the International Competition Network (ICN), which, as the German’s 
Bundeskartellamt described it, is an “important association of competition authorities 
worldwide.”1151 On the contrary, the FCC is a member of the ICN. This means the FCC 
benefits by learning from and sharing experiences with more than 130 other 
competition authorities. However, it cannot pass such benefits, experiences, and 
lessons to the TCRA for lack of cooperation framework. This means the TCRA will 
 
1149 Noor, p. 44. 
1150 Noor, p. 44. 
1151 See The Bundeskartellamt Annual Report 2017 (Bonn: The Bundeskartellamt, July 2018), p. 13. 
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continue to enforce competition in the sector with a regulation mindset pegged on ex-
ante rules and, therefore, fail to address concerns, which only ex-post enforcement 
can address.  
6.5.4 TCRA’s Internal Organization  
Since the TCRA also enforces competition law, it must have an internal organization 
reflecting on its enforcement priorities and capacities. For example, because it has a 
broad range of functions and responsibilities, it is crucial to have internal structures 
and systems, which show how it deals with each of its mandated responsibilities. 
Such an approach is necessary to avoid any possible confusion or sluggishness in 
enforcement. It is also necessary to create certainty for the public and the regulated.  
Field visits to the TCRA observed that it has organized itself with units and 
directorates to deliver its regulatory roles. It has six units (legal services, internal 
audit, quality management, procurement, corporate communication, and risk 
management) and four directorates (licensing and enforcement; industry analysis; 
ICT applications and services; and corporate resources). A closer look, however, 
reveals some concerns when competition enforcement comes into the big picture. 
Firstly, this study has already seen a concentration of powers in the Authority.1152 Even 
though the concentration of powers with regulators is not atypical, one must consider 
all circumstances in assessing this system’s desirability. It is crucial to consider 
prevailing circumstances such as lack of independence, political influence, and limited 
judicial accountability.1153 With all these factors in mind, it is not difficult to see the 
possibilities of inefficiencies. Designing the Authority in this way complicates its 
ability to address competition concerns in the sector.  
Secondly, it would have been ideal if departments existed to correspond to each 
enforcement mandate (i.e., monitoring, investigation, prosecution, and adjudication, 
for example). This arrangement is crucial because the concentration of powers calls 
for institutional certainty on specific departmental roles. For instance, such an 
arrangement would have created a “Chinese wall” to ensure fairness and promote 
 
1152 See Section 6.4.3.2. of Chapter six of this study.  
1153 See Sections 6.4 and 6.6 of Chapter six of this study. 
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public trust. Such practice has been the case with the FCC, where it separates 
investigation (investigation department) from decision-making (commissioners).1154 
The plus point here is that the commissioners, who are also ‘judges’ of the 
Commission, do not form part of the Commission’s day-to-day activities. This 
arrangement allows the commissioners to approach competition cases with some 
degree of neutrality. The commissioners can dismiss cases presented by the FCC’s 
investigation department if they are not well supported by sufficient evidence.1155   
Thirdly, field visits to the TCRA found out that with all its responsibilities, it has no 
dedicated department for competition enforcement. One may argue that the entire 
regulatory mandate seeks, among others, to promote competition. However, a 
difference exists between ex-ante enforcement and ex-post enforcement.  The 
regulators can very well do the former. The latter usually is a specialty of competition 
agencies. When placed within a sector regulator, it might be necessary to ensure 
dedicated structures for such purposes.  Such structures do not exist.1156 Instead, 
competition falls into the consumer and industry affairs department, which, among 
others, “monitor market behavior, competition, and pricing by commercial providers 
of communication services.”1157  
At the date of concluding the field study in January 2020, there was no single 
employee with exclusive duty to promote and enforce competition. According to one 
senior legal officer at the Authority, “competition cases are dealt with on an ad hoc 
basis, but they are not many [none could be produced] as Tanzania has no 
competition culture.”1158 In the absence of specific departments and personnel to 
enforce competition law in the sector, and with so many other objectives on the 
Authority’s plate, one would say this design did not envisage any active enforcement 
of competition in the sector. 
 
1154 See Regulations 10(3), (5) and (18) of FCC, Competition Rules. 
1155 See Regulations 12-20 of FCC, Competition Rules. 
1156 Findings from interviews with the Authority’s director of human resources. 
1157 TCRA, ‘Directorate of Industry Affairs’, 2019 <https://www.tcra.go.tz/index.php/about-
tcra/departments/2-tcra/81-department-consumer-and-industry-affairs> [accessed 30 July 2019]. 
1158 An interview with Authority’s senior legal officer. 
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6.6 Independence of the TCRA 
Even though opinions regarding the role of regulation in the economy and the design 
of regulators diverge, there is consensus that independence is one of the crucial 
factors that guarantee efficiency in regulation.1159 For example, Damien Geradin calls 
the independence of sector regulators the “most central principle of good 
governance.”1160 The reasons for the elevation of independence are not inconceivable. 
Independence is particularly essential because regulators must develop and cultivate 
public trust in the regulatory process. The public must trust the regulatory process, 
mainly when both public and private entities are regulated and when regulators’ 
decisions significantly impact the regulated and the public.1161 This trust can only be 
possible if regulators are independent.  
Apart from developing public trust, independence is necessary to guarantee expertise, 
impartiality, and stability.1162 An independent regulator may also work best against 
influences and captures.1163 Further, it may organize its priorities, make informed and 
objective decisions, and execute and enforce its decisions freely and fairly only if it is 
independent.1164 Regulators cannot achieve all these objectives if external factors such 
as political motivations or the regulated industry’s influence have an opportunity to 
thrive. Furthermore, independence is essential as it ensures consistency in policy 
 
1159 See for example May Chu and others, ‘Perceptions of Communications Sector Regulatory Performance 
in the East Asia and Pacific Region’, Utilities Policy, 58 (2019), 128–35 
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2019.05.006>; Arora; Badran; Paolo Subrato Dasgupta, ‘The 
Independence of Regulatory Agencies in Practice: The Case of Telecommunications Regulators in the 
United Kingdom and France’ (unpublished A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2009) <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2750/1/U615699.pdf>; 
Gilardi, Delegation in the Regulatory State; Fabrizio Gilardi, ‘The Formal Independence of Regulators: A 
Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors’, Swiss Political Science Review, 11.4 (2005), 139–67 
<https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00374.x>. 
1160 Damien Geradin, ‘The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: Lessons from the American 
Experience’, in Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European Governance, ed. by 
Damien Geradin, Rodolphe Muñoz, and Nicolas Petit (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 
2005), pp. 215–45 (p. 230). 
1161 OECD, Creating a Culture of Independence: Practical Guidance against Undue Influence, The Governance 
of Regulators (OECD, 2017), p. 5 <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264274198-en>. 
1162 Rachel Barkow, ‘Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design’, Texas Law 
Review, 89.15 (2010), 15–79 (pp. 19–24). 
1163 Barkow, pp. 19–24. 
1164 Ogus, p. 117. 
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implementation, uniform interpretation of the laws, and promotes public confidence 
in the regulator.1165 As the European Commission once held, regulators must 
“have genuine autonomy in their internal organization and functioning if their 
contribution is to be effective and credible. The independence of their technical 
and/or scientific assessments is, in fact, their real raison d’être.”1166  
From what the EU holds, one should not expect efficiency in performance from a non-
independent regulator. This is because, as the EU further held, independence of 
competition authorities is necessary for them to “effectively apply Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU,” i.e., effective application of competition law,  
“so that competition in the internal market is not distorted and that consumers and 
undertakings are not put at a disadvantage by national laws and measures which 
prevent national competition authorities from being effective enforcers.”1167  
In other words, competition authorities cannot be effective in the absence of their 
independence.1168 Lack of independence takes away the regulator’s ability to make 
objective technical and operational decisions. Furthermore, independence becomes 
imperative when a regulator assumes a judge’s position to determine firms’ rights and 
responsibilities. 
6.6.1 Defining Independence  
Even though definitions vary, sector regulators’ independence implies that a regulator 
can act without bowing to influences and pressures from the government, legislature, 
or industry interests. With independence, the regulator can translate its preferences 
 
1165 Ellen Vos, ‘Independence, Accountability and Transparency of European Regulatory Agencies’, in 
Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European Governance, ed. by Damien Geradin, 
Rodolphe Muñoz, and Nicolas Petit (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2005), pp. 120–40 
(p. 121). 
1166 The Commission of European Communities, ‘COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION; the 
Operating Framework for the European Regulatory Agencies’ (The Commission of European Communities, 
2002), p. 5 <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fa3ad044-8751-408c-
8735-a7e52925e059/language-en> [accessed 6 December 2018]. 
1167 See Art 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 to Empower the Competition Authorities of the Member States to Be More Effective Enforcers and to 
Ensure the Proper Functioning of the Internal Market ([2019] OJ L 11/3), p. 16. 
1168 See further recitals 3,5,8,10,17,18,22 and 25 of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 December 2018 to Empower the Competition Authorities of the Member States to Be More 
Effective Enforcers and to Ensure the Proper Functioning of the Internal Market. 
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into authoritative actions without external restraints.1169  Through independence, 
other values such as “objectivity, impartiality, integrity, expertise, and 
professionalism” can be realized.1170 Emphasis on independence is in the sense of 
integrity and impartiality.1171 Fabrizio Gilardi argues that, 
“The defining characteristic of independent regulatory agencies is precisely their 
independence: the fact that they cannot be directly controlled by elected officials, or 
to use a catchphrase, that they are at arm’s length from politicians.”1172  
Stressing further on factors, which affect regulatory independence with African 
context in mind, Anton Eberhard notes that,  
“[for many African countries] regulatory independence and accountability have 
often been compromised by political expediency, lack of regulatory commitment and 
institutional and human resource constraints that have sometimes resulted in 
inconsistent and poor regulatory decisions. Disempowered regulators are either 
subject to undue political influence, or they lack the resources to make quality, 
robust, predictable, credible, transparent, and justifiable regulatory decisions.”1173 
Regulatory independence may be guaranteed by the law and hence, de jure (legal or 
formal) independence or acquired due to daily authority experiences, henceforth, de 
facto (actual) independence.1174 The regulator has de jure independence when the law 
places it outside the direct control of a government.1175 It concerns the presence of 
legal controls on sensitive questions such as regulatory officials’ appointments 
 
1169 Martino Maggetti, ‘De Facto Independence after Delegation: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis’, Regulation & 
Governance, 1.4 (2007), 271–94 (p. 272) <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00023.x>. 
1170 Ottow, p. 90. 
1171 Katja Sander Johannsen, Regulatory Independence in Theory and Practice– a Survey of Independent Energy 
Regulators in Eight European Countries (Copenhagen: AKF Forlaget, 2003), p. 20. 
1172 Gilardi, Delegation in the Regulatory State, p. 9. 
1173 Anton Eberhard, ‘The Independence and Accountability of Africa’s Infrastructure Regulators: Re-
Assessing Regulatory Design and Performance’ (presented at the 4th AFUR Annual Conference, 
Livingstone, Zambia, 2007), p. 15 <https://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/files/AfurKeynoteAddress.pdf> [accessed 
30 April 2018]. 
1174 See for example Maggetti, ‘De Facto Independence after Delegation’, p. 272; Marc Tenbücken and 
Volker Schneider, ‘Divergent Convergence: Structures and Functions of National Regulatory Authorities in 
the Telecommunications Sector’, in The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age 
of Governance, ed. by Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur, The CRC Series on Competition, Regulation and 
Development (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA: E. Elgar, 2004), pp. 271–94 (pp. 255–56). 
1175 Karin Ingold and Frédéric Varone, ‘Regulation of the Telecommunications in Switzerland: A Network 
Approach to Assess the Regulatory Agencies’ Independence’, in Multi-Level Regulation in the 
Telecommunications Sector, ed. by David Aubin and Koen Verhoest (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
2014), pp. 137–61 (p. 146) <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137004925_6>. 
 
 291  
(especially top ones), the regulator’s legal status, its finances, and the degree of 
reporting and accountability.1176 As for de facto independence, the regulator has 
powers of self-determination and autonomy in executing its daily regulatory 
activities.1177  
This section considers both de jure and de facto independence when assessing the 
TCRA’s independence. In principle, there is no guarantee that the presence of the 
former will guarantee the latter. Therefore, it is essential to examine the authority’s 
laws and practice to assess its level of independence. In so doing, the study 
considered five dimensions: the authority’s legal status, appointment and dismissal of 
top officials, autonomy on operational activities, financial independence, and degree 
of accountability. Table 6.6-1 presents a summary of what is required in each case. 
Table 6.6-1 Criteria for analyzing the independence of the TCRA 
Factor  Required  
Legal status  Operate outside the government/executive 
Legal guarantee of independence 
Limited interference from the executive, only in 
instances of policy direction 
Appointment and dismissal of top 
officials (Protection of Tenure)  
Transparency in the appointment of top officials, 
possibly by involving the legislature for vetting  
Protection of tenure for top officials  
Operational autonomy  Powers to act in the absence of interference, pressures, 
or approval from the executive, other departments, or 
the regulated  
Financial independence  Sufficient source of funds independence of the executive 
control  
Accountability  Accountability on clear objective criteria  
Source: Developed by the researcher from various literature 
 
1176 Ingold and Varone, p. 146. 
1177 See for example Badran, p. 4; See Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, ‘The Politicization of Regulatory 
Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence’, Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory, 26.3 (2016), 507–18 (p. 509) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muv022>; Colin Scott, 
‘Independent Regulators’, in The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, ed. by Mark Bovens, Robert E. 
Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2014), pp. 472–87 (p. 479); Fabrizio Gilardi and 
Martino Maggetti, ‘The Independence of Regulatory Authorities’, 2010, p. 4 
<https://www.fabriziogilardi.org/resources/papers/gilardi_maggetti_handbook.pdf> [accessed 30 March 
2020]; Maggetti, ‘De Facto Independence after Delegation’, p. 272. 
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6.6.2 Legal Status  
The law has separated the TCRA from the central government structure. Section 4(1) 
and (2) of the TCRA Act establish the regulator as a corporate body with perpetual 
succession. It has some degree of autonomy in its operation, including powers to sue 
or be sued, acquire properties, or enter into contracts or other legal transactions. As a 
result of this separation, the TCRA is not structurally under the Ministry of 
communications, nor is it subjected, at least from a theoretical perspective, to daily 
ministerial bureaucracies and controls. Nevertheless, the law does not expressly state 
the TCRA to be independent.  
Failure to guarantee the regulator’s independence is somewhat unconventional, even 
in the standards of developing countries where their competition and regulation 
institutions are yet to mature. A review of competition and regulatory laws from other 
jurisdictions indicates that the independence of regulators receives deserving 
attention and is explained in no uncertain terms. In Uganda, for example, Section 8 of 
the Uganda Communications Act calls the Uganda Communications Commission to 
discharge its functions “independently of any person or body.”1178 The same is true for 
South Africa with the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa, where 
the law declares it to be “independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the 
law, and must be impartial and must perform its functions without fear, favor or 
prejudice.”1179 Furthermore, the law directs it to discharge its functions without 
political or commercial interference.1180 Similar observations are found in Kenya, 
where the respective law declares Kenya’s Communications Authority to be 
“independent and free of control by government, political or commercial interests in 
the exercise of its powers and in the performance of its functions.”1181 
The idea of having such a guarantee aims not only at having a formal legal 
declaration of independence but also to form a strong basis upon which an authority 
can claim its actual independence. For example, as the OECD notes regarding the 
 
1178 Uganda Communications Act. 
1179 See Section 3(3) of Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act, No. 13 of 2000, 2000. 
1180 See Section 3(4) of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act. 
1181 See Section 5A Kenya Information and Communications Act, Act No 2 of 1998, 1998 as amended by the 
Kenya Information and Communications (Amendment) Act, Act No 41A of 2013. 
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German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and 
Railway (“Bundesnetzagentur”), the Agency has not only legal declarations of 
independence but also frameworks to make it highly independent. In its words, the 
OECD observes that the Agency is “an example of a highly independent regulator for 
all regulated sectors.”1182 It proceeds to observe further that the Agency’s  
“independence is stated explicitly in the law (§ 1, Gesetz über die Bundesnetzagentur 
für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen), it has no dominant 
source of funding, and the regulator cannot receive instructions or guidance from 
the government on its strategy, individual cases or appeals. The regulator’s decisions 
can only be appealed in court in the final instance.”1183 
The lesson we get from Germany’s Bundesnetzagentur is that legal structures are 
necessary for a regulator to claim its de facto independence. The law must explicitly 
articulate the protection of regulators’ independence. From such structures, a 
regulator can now flex its muscles to claim autonomy in its operations. It is not easy 
to see how a regulator may start to ascertain its independence without ascertained 
legal structures.  Such structures are missing with the TCRA. 
When comparing TCRA to the FCC, it is surprising to learn that even though both 
institutions were established in the same year with laws passed in the same 
parliamentary seating, the FCC has an explicit guarantee of its independence. The law 
states that the “Commission shall be independent and shall perform its functions and 
exercise its powers independently and impartially without fear or favor.”1184 Thus, 
considering the history of their establishment, it is clear that the government did not 
intend to guarantee the independence of the TCRA, as is also the case with other 
regulators.1185 Put differently, the government did not want an independent TCRA. 
The omission appears to be a calculated decision to give the government some form 
of control in the sector. The result is to affect the regulator’s operational 
independence. 
 
1182 OECD, The Governance of Regulators, p. 49. 
1183 OECD, The Governance of Regulators, p. 49. 
1184 See S. 62(1) of Fair Competition Act. 
1185 As for other regulators, for example the TCAA, LATRA or EWURA, there are also no legal provision 
expressly guaranteeing their independences.  
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6.6.3 Appointment and Dismissal Powers  
The OECD study on the independence of regulators reveals that, among others, 
regulators’ top officials are always under substantial pressure both from governments 
and the industry.1186 Such pressure notwithstanding, such officials are responsible for 
their decisions.1187 The public and even respective governments will hold them 
accountable for regulatory decisions despite various pressures from different 
interested groups. Thus, regulators’ top officials must be persons who can balance the 
interest of the government, the industry, and the public. It is only possible to do so if 
such officials are independent. For example, knowing how heads of regulators come 
into power will reflect whether they can act independently or swing into varying 
compelling interests.  
The independence of regulators’ top officials is necessary because it reflects on 
institutional independence as well. Principally, studies indicate more independence of 
regulators if the appointment of regulators’ top officials stands on a transparent and 
objective process and is subject to checks and balances, for example, from the 
Parliament.1188 In many cases, it has been found that joint appointment of heads of 
regulatory bodies, for example, through the parliamentary system, has improved 
regulatory independence.1189 A good example is when Parliament vets the executive’s 
appointments.1190  
It is argued that the vetting process puts a cap on appointing authorities’ powers, 
especially in countries with strong presidential systems like Tanzania. The process 
will bring some sense of accountability to the appointing authority. It will also 
 
1186 OECD, The Governance of Regulators: Being an Independent Regulator (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), p. 
4. 
1187 OECD, The Governance of Regulators: Being an Independent Regulator, p. 4. 
1188 See for example OECD, The Governance of Regulators: Being an Independent Regulator, p. 29; OECD and 
IDB, p. 43; OECD, The Governance of Regulators: Being an Independent Regulator, p. 41; Adam Jasser, 
‘Independence and Accountability’, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 6.2 (2015), 71–72 (p. 
71) <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpu117>; Eberhard, p. 1; Dominique Custos, ‘The Rulemaking 
Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies’, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 54 (2006), 615–39 
(p. 616); The World Bank, Private Solutions for Infrastructure in Angola (Washington, D.C: World Bank 
Publications, 2005), p. 122. 
1189 See details at the OECD studies at OECD, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Brazil 2008 
Strengthening Governance for Growth: Strengthening Governance for Growth (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008), 
p. 214. 
1190 See details at the OECD studies at OECD, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, p. 214. 
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inculcate objectivity in the appointment process because the appointing authority 
knows that its decision will be scrutinized by another (supposedly) independent body. 
Unfortunately, as presented in the next section, Tanzania’s appointment process is 
purely an executive affair with minimal checks and balances. In the absence of 
distributed powers of appointment, studies indicate that appointments done solely by 
the executive are usually politicized “by appointing ‘loyal people’ in top 
management.”1191 
6.6.3.1 Appointment of the TCRA’s Head  
Appointment of the head of the TCRA is solely the executive’s affair. Section. 8(1) to 
(3) of the TCRA Act establishes the appointment procedure. Firstly, there is a 
Nomination Committee of three persons, whose function is to present three names to 
the Minister to appoint one as the DG. The Minister will then appoint the DG on the 
terms and conditions prescribed in the appointment letter. Prima facie, it would 
appear that there are some mechanisms to ensure, at least in partial ways, that 
appointment is objective and transparent. 
Nevertheless, a closer observation of practical experiences revealed this to be more of 
a theoretical mask than a practical reality. For example, the nomination committee 
comprises top executives from the government. The chairperson is the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Communications. Other members are the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Information and a member appointed by the Minister of 
Communications. In a practical sense, these officials work under the Minister’s direct 
instructions and may not purport to act independently.   
Another point of concern noted during the field study is the lack of transparency in 
the appointment process. Neither the law nor practice reveal how exactly the 
nomination committee gets the names. In other words, there is no evidence to the 
public that the nomination process takes place at all. Worse, even those with no 
powers to appoint top officials can now make the appointment. Additionally, there is 
a complete absence of checks and balances against the appointment decision. No 
 
1191 For details on the politics of political appointments see David E Lewis, The Politics of Presidential 
Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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other Authority, including the Parliament, has powers to check the appointment 
process. Once done, the appointment stands uncontested. As shown here in this 
section, the lack of clear and transparent structures undermines an authority’s 
independence. Elsewhere, such structures have been considered as a key pillar to an 
effective and independent Authority. For example, Article 4 (4) of the EU Directive 
2019/1 holds that: 
“Member States shall ensure that the members of the decision-making body of 
national administrative competition authorities are selected, recruited or appointed 
according to clear and transparent procedures laid down in advance in national 
law.”1192 
The said appointment structure shows that the Executive has powers over the 
appointment process. There are no controls over the process as the legislature, for 
example, is not in the picture. Furthermore, there is evidence of complete disregard 
for the appointment process, as the law determines.1193 The effects of this structure are 
to make the appointed head serve under the pleasure of the executive. In other 
words, the appointment process has the effect of taking away the Authority’s top 
officials’ independence. In a jurisdiction where appointment and dismissal depend on 
the appointing authority’s mood, survival wisdom demands the appointed to cultivate 
a culture of submission and compromise rather than objectivity and self-
determination. In practice, this means the appointed heads’ survival in power 
depends not on performance efficiency but on pleasing the executive. The outcome is 
clear: lack of independence.  
6.6.3.2 Security of Tenure and the Dismissal  
Theoretically, there is a significant impact on independence when the head of the 
regulatory body serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Some authors 
argue that the protection of the heads of regulators’ tenure is the “legal touchstone of 
 
1192 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to Empower 
the Competition Authorities of the Member States to Be More Effective Enforcers and to Ensure the Proper 
Functioning of the Internal Market, p. 18. 
1193 See Section 6.5.1 of Chapter 6 of this study. 
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agency independence.”1194 Thus, it is always desirable to put some mechanisms against 
their arbitrary removal.1195 As for TCRA, however, the law does not secure the tenure 
of the TCRA’s head. Under Section 13(3) of the TCRA Act, the TCRA’s head tenure 
depends on the terms of his or her appointment letter. This position is dangerous as 
the director’s employment hangs on the Minister’s determination.  
Such a lack of tenure protection provides the government with an upper hand while 
dealing with the directors. It could be through an immediate removal from the office 
or extension of tenure (whether legally or not) as the government desires. It is 
difficult for lack of transparency to know why one head would serve for a long time 
(almost ten years) and another for just a short time (less than a year). The most 
intriguing factor, though, is not always the duration of their terms. It is the 
controversy surrounding their appointment or removal that matters.1196 As for other 
divisional directors who are decision-makers as they head respective departments, the 
law does not stipulate their removal. As it has already happened, the Minister can 
order their removal at any time.1197  
As a result of these practices, the individual independence of top officials who are the 
actual decision-makers comes into question. The primary concerns are whether or not 
these top officials, especially when acting in their judicial capacities, can fairly 
administer justice in fear of their possible imminent removal.1198 Elsewhere, studies 
already indicate that lack of protection of tenure is likely to undermine officials’ 
independence.1199 In the context of this study, it will be naïve to expect such officers to 
 
1194 See Breyer and others, p. 144; For Further insights see Kirti Datla and Richard L. Revesz, 
‘Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies)’, Cornell Law Review, 98.4 (2013), 768–
844 (pp. 789–92); Jacint Jordana and Carles Ramió, ‘Delegation, Presidential Regimes, and Latin American 
Regulatory Agencies’, Journal of Politics in Latin America, 2.1 (2010), 3–30 (p. 6). 
1195 Jordana and Ramió, p. 6; Datla and Revesz, pp. 789–92. 
1196 See Section 6.5.1. of Chapter 6 of this work.  
1197 Liwenga. 
1198 For constitutional provisions on the fairness of judicial and administrative bodies, see The Constitution 
of the United Republic of Tanzania, CAP 2 [R.E 2002]. 
1199 Breyer and others, p. 144; Rachel Ellett, Pathways to Judicial Power in Transitional States: Perspectives 
from African Courts (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 104; Lameck Mfalila, ‘Twenty Five Years of 
the Court of Appeal and the Independence of the Judiciary’, in Law and Justice in Tanzania: Quarter a 
Century of the Court of Appeal, ed. by Chris Maina Peter and Helen Kijo-Bisimba (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na 
Nyota, 2007), pp. 81–98 (pp. 86–87); Benjamin William Mkapa, ‘The Legal System Should Be More 
Accessible and Affordable to More Tanzanians’, in Law and Justice in Tanzania: Quarter a Century of the 
Court of Appeal, ed. by Chris Maina Peter and Helen Kijo-Bisimba (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2007), 
pp. 33–42 (pp. 35–36). 
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enforce the law effectively. The best approach would be to ensure appointments on 
objective criteria and security of tenure for top officials.  
6.6.3.3 Ministerial Powers  
This work has already demonstrated that the Minister has significant powers in the 
regulatory process.1200 These powers also go to the appointment of top officials. The 
previous section has shown that the tenure of the DG depends on the Minister. There 
are also reports from telecom firms and Authority’s sources indicating that most 
political interventions are channeled informally through the Minister.1201 This culture 
has long historical roots.1202 For example, we have seen that even though the Tanzania 
Communication Commission (TCC) was established in 1994, no commissioners were 
appointed by the Minister until 1998.1203 The Minister acted as a regulator. Even after 
the appointment in 1998, the Minister soon dismissed them over a dispute on which 
company should be licensed as a mobile operator.1204 Thus, the Minister continued to 
act as a regulator.1205 Such is the culture that continues to exist to date, affecting the 
very independence that the Authority requires for effective enforcement.  
6.6.4 Operational Autonomy  
Operational autonomy means that regulators should be free to make their daily 
regulatory decisions. However, this is not always the case. As one author noted 
(especially about African regulators), “many regulators lack full independence and 
continue to be subject to undue political influence and interference.”1206 As a result, he 
further contends, “regulators are actually exacerbating the problems they were meant 
to ameliorate.”1207 In other words, the author argues that lack of independence directly 
affects the efficiency of regulators. Thus, it is essential to ensure that regulators are 
autonomous in carrying their mandate for effective regulation.  
 
1200 Section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4 of this work. 
1201 An interview with a TCRA senior official who requested anonymity. 
1202 Mustafa, Laidlaw, and Brand, Telecommunications Policies for Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 65. 
1203 Noll and Shirley, p. 54. 
1204 Noll and Shirley, p. 54. 
1205 Noll and Shirley, p. 54. 
1206 Eberhard, p. 1. 
1207 Eberhard, p. 1. 
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In principle, the research findings established that the TCRA has a certain degree of 
operational autonomy. Under normal circumstances, it ought not to consult any other 
body to approve its decisions except only where the law requires. It should not worry, 
for example, whether the Minister, the President, or any other politician will end up 
overruling its decisions. Had this been entirely the case, one would conclude that the 
TCRA has de facto independence even though there is no express guarantee of its 
independence in the law.  In practice, however, there are some observations, which 
point to the opposite. Let us see a few examples to cement this argument further.  
1. Some telecommunication firms that responded to this study admitted that 
there is an external influence on the functioning of TCRA.1208 Some of the 
examples they cited include limitations on what type of identification card is 
acceptable for sim-card registration, an abrupt introduction of mandatory 
biometric sim-card registrations after the initial registration with approved IDs 
was complete, the imposition of massive fines without any known method of 
calculation, and imposition of complicated mobile number portability. Telecom 
firms opined that these few regulatory examples, which had no known 
objective justifications, resulted from other forces outside the Authority.  
2. It was observed that there are instances where politicians have overruled the 
Authority’s decisions.1209 For example, the TCRA had introduced new biometric 
registration of sim cards to last up to December 2019. However, both the 
President and the Minister of Home Affairs overruled that decision, saying the 
registration shall continue indefinitely.1210 Soon after that, the President again 
came with a new directive. This time he extended the registration for twenty 
days until the 20th of January, 2020.1211 In all these instances, the TCRA had to 
 
1208 The respondent firms were Smart, Tigo, Vodacom, Halotel, and TTCL. 
1209 Similar instances have also been recorded in the energy and water sector regulated by EWURA and the 
insurance sector regulated by SSRA. 
1210 ‘Rais Magufuli Abatilisha Muda Wa Usajili Wa Laini Za Simu Kama Ilivyotangazwa Awali Na TCRA’, 
JamiiForums <https://www.jamiiforums.com/threads/rais-magufuli-abatilisha-muda-wa-usajili-wa-laini-
za-simu-kama-ilivyotangazwa-awali-na-tcra.1577401/> [accessed 30 July 2019]; Anastazia Anyimike, 
‘Wasion Na Vitambulisho Kutokuzimiwa Simu’, HabariLeo Newspaper (Dar es Salaam, 14 November 2019) 
<https://habarileo.co.tz/habari/2019-11-145dcce3183c86b.aspx> [accessed 27 November 2019]. 
1211 Herieth Makwetta, ‘Rais Magufuli Aongeza Siku 20 Usajili Laini Za Simu, Atoa Agizo Kwa TCRA - 
Mwananchi’, Mwananchi Newspaper (Dar es Salaam, 27 December 2019) 
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comply with new directives from the politicians. If anything, these examples, 
though specifically apply to ex-ante regulation, show how powerful the 
executive can be, even to the extent of overruling the Authority’s decisions.  
3. The research findings also revealed instances in which politicians reverse the 
Authority’s decisions. For example, Section 26 of the EPOCA demands all 
telecom firms to offer 25 percent of their shares to the public. On the 1st of 
June, 2016, the President ordered the TCRA to cancel licenses of all non-
compliant firms.1212 However, in 2019, the same government allowed Airtel to 
defer listing on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE).1213 The decision came 
after Airtel had transferred 35 percent of shares it previously owned in TTCL to 
the government. Because of the transfer, TTCL is now under 100 percent 
government ownership.1214 Furthermore, Airtel freely raised the Government’s 
shares (in Airtel) from 40 percent to 49 percent.1215 Now that the Government 
of Tanzania had gained substantial interest in Airtel, it could exclude the 
company from the requirements of Section 26.  
4. There are concerns from some telecom firms over some preferential treatments 
received by others. For instance, some pointed fingers at TTCL, arguing that it 
receives preferential treatments from the Authority and other government 
offices.1216 Furthermore, some observations show that while other firms get 
spectrum through competition, the same process does not apply to the TTCL. 
Then, there are some concerns regarding the entry of Halotel in the Tanzanian 
 
<https://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/kitaifa/Rais-Magufuli-aongeza-siku-20-usajili-laini-za-simu-
/1597296-5399334-kmallm/index.html> [accessed 30 March 2020]. 
1212 The Reporter, ‘JPM Aagiza TCRA Kuzifuta Kampuni Za Simu Zitakazoshindwa Kujiunga Na Soko La 
Hisa’, Mwananchi Newspaper (Dar es Salaam, 1 June 2017). 
1213 Allan Olingo, ‘Tanzania Allows Airtel to Defer Listing on DSE’, The East African Newspaper (East Africa, 
30 June 2019). 
1214 Bob Koigi, ‘Government Takes Total Control of Tanzania Telco after Airtel Exit’, Africa Business 
Communities, 27 June 2016 <https://africabusinesscommunities.com/news/government-takes-total-
control-of-tanzania-telco-after-airtel-exit.html> [accessed 30 July 2019]. 
1215 Financial Times Reporter, ‘Halotel, TTCL Play Catch up as “big 3” Extend Dominance’, Financial Times 
(Dar es Salaam, 30 January 2019) <https://www.ippmedia.com/en/business/halotel-ttcl-play-catch-big-3-
extend-dominance> [accessed 30 July 2019]. 
1216 For example, they gave recent examples in which the Authority fined all telecom firms except the TTCL. 
See TCRA, ‘Public Notice: Regulatory Action Taken Against Operators’ (TCRA, 2015) 
<https://www.tcra.go.tz/index.php/archive-panel/headlines-archive/263-public-notice-regulatory-action-
taken-against-operators> [accessed 30 July 2019]. 
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market as some firms argued that it received special attention from the 
authorities because some people in the government had to do the ‘pushing.’1217 
These are few examples indicating the presence of external powers that affect the 
Authority’s autonomy. Some sources confided that the Authority often receives 
directions on how to act on certain aspects that the sources named ‘sensitive.’1218 The 
sources disclosed that most of the influence comes through informal channels. The 
Authority did not concede to having received orders, which impair its ability to act 
independently.1219 It maintained that it acts only according to the law.1220  However, the 
interviews conducted in the cause of this study and the result of research indicate that 
even though the Authority exercises some degree of autonomy, it still receives 
directions and faces pressures both from the government and other establishments.1221  
Its operational independence is far from reality.  
6.6.5 Financial Independence 
Regulators’ financial independence means the regulator has sufficient resources to 
execute its duties. With financial independence, regulators minimize chances of 
capture and influence from the industry and the government.1222 The result is to grant 
regulators more independence in transacting their businesses. A review of relevant 
laws points to the Authority’s limited financial independence. According to Section 
49(1) of the TCRA Act, the Authority’s funds include regulatory fees, levies, monies 
earned due to Authority’s activities, grants, donations, or bequests from other sources 
and interested stakeholders. An interview with the Authority’s finance department 
pointed out that there is no budget or specialized fund to cater to the Authority’s 
financial needs hence overreliance on regulatory fees, as Table 6.6-2 shows.   
Table 6.6-2 The Authority’s source of revenues from 2014/15 to 2016/17 
Source of Revenue  2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
 
1217 Information disclosed from other telecom firms and legal practitioners.  
1218 Mentioned in this category are decisions regarding disclosure of information from MNO’s, decisions on 
certain regulatory measures, and other decisions on the grounds of national interests and security. The 
sources wished to remain anonymous.  
1219 An interview with TCRA’s senior legal officer.  
1220 An interview with TCRA’s senior legal officer.  
1221 An interview with TCRA’s senior legal officer.  
1222 OECD, The Governance of Regulators: Being an Independent Regulator, p. 22. 
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Radio frequency  48% 47% 43% 
Numbering resources 21% 22% 24% 
Licensing Fees (Network 
services license, Network 
facility license, Application 
services license, and Content 
services licenses) 
22% 25% 26% 
Other sources 9% 6% 7% 
Source: TCRA Annual Reports from 2014/15-2016/17 
Although providing a moderately stable source of income at the moment, the 
authority’s financial system has some points of concern. Generally, there are debates 
on whether budget financing1223 or regulatory fees is an ideal source of regulators’ 
funds.1224 This part does not dwell on that point. However, it argues that regardless of 
the financing model, it is necessary to ensure that the Authority’s financing system 
does not undermine regulators’ independence or efficiency.  
As for Tanzania, its preferred approach to funding the regulator has a few concerns 
worth shedding light on. For example, while regulatory fees may provide a stable 
income source, overreliance on them would mean that the authority is under constant 
pressure to raise funds. Furthermore, as we have already seen, the government has 
intensified its demands for all agencies to contribute 15 percent of their annual 
turnover.1225 The pressures may end up affecting enforcement priorities as some firms 
have already complained that most of the TCRA’s interventions, for example, seek to 
raise more revenue.  
It is also essential to note the extent to which ministerial supervisory powers and 
government policies limit the Authority’s freedom of budgeting and spending. For 
example, according to Section 54 of the TCRA Act, the Minister has powers to 
 
1223 OECD recommends budget funding of regulators see OECD, The Governance of Regulators, p. 100; 
OECD, Regulatory Policy in Peru Assembling the Framework for Regulatory Quality: Assembling the 
Framework for Regulatory Quality, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), p. 
185; The OECD believes budgeting financing to be fitting because of the involvement of the parliament in 
the appropriation process. That way, the OECD holds, there is a promotion of transparency and 
accountability. See OECD, The Governance of Regulators: Being an Independent Regulator, p. 80. 
1224 The World Bank, on the other hand, prefers regulatory fees to fund regulators. See Brown, Stern, and 
Tenenbaum, pp. 222–23. 
1225 See Section 6.3.3.1.2. of Chapter 6 of this work. 
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approve or disapprove the Authority’s budget proposals. These powers are generally 
not a problem as some degree of accountability is necessary. Nevertheless, given the 
already immense powers the Minister enjoys over the sector, the budgeting powers 
mean even a wider say, which may swing the authority’s independence. In other 
words, the Authority may not object against ministerial directives because the same 
Minister has the final say over its finances. As the adage goes, one should not “take a 
saw to the branch he is sitting on.” Besides, an interview with the Authority’s director 
of human resources noted an increased involvement of the central government in the 
Authority's budgetary activities, taking away the freedom it had once enjoyed in the 
past. 
6.6.6 Regulatory Accountability and Independence  
Regulatory accountability means a requirement for regulators to provide information 
and justify their actions or conduct to another body.1226 Some regulatory decisions may 
need sanctions, while accounting bodies may overrule others.1227 A typical 
accountability routine may involve reporting duties, parliamentary oversight, judicial 
reviews, ethical committees, information exchange, and stakeholders’ engagements.1228 
Another level of accountability may include the formation of regulators’ networks at 
the national or international level or a network of public authorities to peer review 
their activities.1229 This approach, which includes regulators’ self-control, presents a 
self-accountability approach where no one controls the authority, yet it is under 
control.1230 
 
1226 Christel Koop, ‘Assessing the Mandatory Accountability of Regulatory Agencies’, in Accountability and 
Regulatory Governance: Audiences, Controls and Responsibilities in the Politics of Regulation, ed. by Andrea 
Bianculli, Xavier Fernàndez-i-Marøn, and Jacint Jordana (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 78–104 (p. 82); Martino Maggetti, Karin Ingold, and Frédéric Varone, 
‘Having Your Cake and Eating It, Too: Can Regulatory Agencies Be Both Independent and Accountable?’, 
Swiss Political Science Review, 19.1 (2013), 1–25 (p. 4) <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12015>. 
1227 Article 63(2) & 93, The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, CAP 2 [R.E 2002]. 
1228 Christopher Carrigan and Lindsey Poole, ‘Structuring Regulators: The Effects of Organizational Design 
on Regulatory Behavior and Performance’ (unpublished Research Paper Prepared for the Penn Program on 
Regulation’s Best-in-Class Regulator Initiative presented at the Penn Program on Regulation, George 
Washington University, 2015), p. 10 <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4707-carriganpoole-ppr-
researchpaper062015pdf> [accessed 15 May 2015]; Brown, Stern, and Tenenbaum, p. 60. 
1229 Vos, pp. 128–29. 
1230 Martino Maggetti, ‘Legitimacy and Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical 
Review’, Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010, 1–9 (p. 5). 
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Tanzania’s law has set the TCRA’s accountability at three levels; political level, 
performance and financial level, and judicial level. Political accountability relates to 
the Parliamentary constitutional duty to oversee government operations through 
parliamentary standing committees. Dawn Oliver says the objective of political 
accountability is “to determine whether the regulatory bodies are working as 
intended and whether they are operating effectively and efficiently.”1231 In the 
Authority’s case, the responsible committee has powers to inquire about anything 
done in the Authority’s operations.1232 The committee has powers to question the 
authority’s performance and direct rectification of specific errors or omissions.1233  
Performance and financial accountability relate to how the Authority handles its 
finances and discharges its statutory mandate. The Controller and Auditor General 
(CAG) is the one responsible for this task. 1234 As for the judicial review, the Authority 
is accountable only to the Fair Competition Tribunal, whose decision is final as per 
Section 36(1) of the TCRA Act.  
It is crucial to understand that judicial review in this context does not refer to the 
powers of courts to review the decisions of administrative bodies. It refers to direct 
appellate powers to review the merit of lower courts’ decisions through appeal, 
review, or revision. In administrative law, judicial review is a constitutional right that 
cannot be simply ousted by legislation. So, the finality that the law provides here is in 
respect of an appeal, so that there is no right to appeal further. It takes away the right 
to question the decision on merits.  
As for the judicial review in the context of administrative law, it is argued that such 
review has not been ousted. This means the High Court can still question the 
lawfulness of the TCRA’s actions and decisions. Such review will not answer whether 
the decision reached is right or wrong but only question the lawfulness of decisions 
 
1231 Dawn Oliver, ‘Regulation, Democracy, and Democratic Oversight in the UK’, in The Regulatory State: 
Constitutional Implications, ed. by Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser, and Richard Rawlings (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 243–66 (pp. 252–53). 
1232 See Articles 63(2), 89 (1) & (2), and 93 of The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, CAP 2 
[R.E 2002]. 
1233 For further detail see Sections 6, 137, 138, and Sections 5-7 of the 8th Schedule to the Parliament of 
Tanzania, Standing Orders, Parliament of Tanzania, 2020, G.N NO 626 OF 2020. 
1234 See Article 143 of The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, CAP 2 [R.E 2002]; and S. 5(1)(c) 
of The Public Audit Act, CAP 418 R.E 2020; and S. 5(1) (c) of The Public Audit Act, CAP 418 R.E 2020. 
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and actions taken. This position has been reemphasized by Tanzania courts as well as 
in common law tradition.1235 
Accountability of the TCRA is necessary to ensure it discharges its functions legally 
and adequately. With a proper framework, accountability ought to complement the 
Authority’s independence. The research findings did not come across any indication 
that the current framework has affected the TCRA’s operations. However, some areas 
demand closer scrutiny for necessary legal and policy reforms to avoid future 
complications. They include the following: 
1. Since the Tanzanian Parliament is highly partisan, it is imperative to have legal 
means to ensure accountability on objective criteria. Such measures would 
ensure that no political agenda overshadows existing legal requirements. One 
of the ways to ensure this point is to avoid any opportunity for conflict of 
interest. For example, unlike many other jurisdictions, Tanzania had, for a long 
time, been appointing Members of Parliament into different Boards of 
Directors of government agencies (including the TCRA).1236 The National Audit 
Office found that such practice counters good governance principles and opens 
doors for conflict of interests and political influences.1237  
2. As already noted before in this chapter, judicial accountability should extend 
to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. This would allow the judiciary, which is 
disconnected from the regulatory process, to review regulatory decisions, the 
FCT’s inclusive.  
 
1235 See for example AG v. Lohay Akonaay and Joseph Lohay, TLR, 1995, p. 80; James Gwagilo v. AG, TLR, 
1994, p. 73; R. v. Medical Appeals Tribunal, Exp. Gilmore, QB, 1957, I, 574. 
1236 As for TCRA, however, latest records show that MPs ceased to sit on its board in 2011. See TCRA, 
Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2011, p. 3. 
1237 See for example National Audit Office, Ripoti Ya Mwaka Ya Mdhibiti Na Mkaguzi Mkuu Wa Hesabu Za 
Serikali Kuhusu Ukaguzi Wa Mashirika Ya Umma Kwa Mwaka Wa Fedha 2013/2014 (Dar es Salaam: 
National Audit Office, 2015), p. 79; National Audit Office, Ripoti Ya Mwaka Ya Mdhibiti Na Mkaguzi Mkuu 
Wa Hesabu Za Serikali Kuhusu Ukaguzi Wa Mashirika Ya Umma Kwa Mwaka Wa Fedha 2012/2013 (Dar es 
Salaam: National Audit Office, 2014), p. 98; National Audit Office, Ripoti Ya Mwaka Ya Mdhibiti Na 
Mkaguzi Mkuu Wa Hesabu Za Serikali Kuhusu Ukaguzi Wa Mashirika Ya Umma Kwa Mwaka Wa Fedha 
2011/2012 (Dar es Salaam: National Audit Office, 2013), p. 91; National Audit Office, Kuwasilisha Ripoti 
Ya Mwaka Ya Mdhibiti Na Mkaguzi Mkuu Wa Hesabu Za Serikali Kuhusu Ukaguzi Wa Mashirika Ya Umma 
Kwa Mwaka Wa Fedha 2010/2011 (Dar es Salaam: National Audit Office, 2012), p. 46; National Audit 
Office, Ripoti Ya Mwaka Ya Mdhibiti Na Mkaguzi Mkuu Wa Hesabu Za Serikali Kuhusu Ukaguzi Wa 
Mashirika Ya Umma Kwa Mwaka Wa Fedha 2009/2010 (Dar es Salaam: National Audit Office, 2011), p. 
81. 
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3. Legal frameworks ought to be adopted to emphasize self-regulation of the 
regulator. This can be in two ways. Firstly, the Authority should strengthen its 
internal audit committee. The committee should have powers to assess the 
propriety of all decisions, be it on technical, financial, regulatory, or 
adjudicatory aspects. Secondly, a formal network of regulators can also 
provide an excellent opportunity for independent peer review, for example, 
under the auspices of an international organization.   
Thus, in the end, the research findings have established that the TCRA’s 
independence is limited. It has some degree of autonomy as it operates outside the 
ministry of communications. However, there is no legal protection of its 
independence, a decision appearing to be deliberate when considering the legislative 
history. The executive maintains a strong influence on some areas of regulation. It has 
the power to appoint and dismiss top officials. Besides, it has powers to determine the 
extent of some regulatory decisions that include reversing them when it wishes to. As 
for finances, regulatory fees provide a relatively stable source of income. However, 
the executive’s pressures on raising revenues and government limits on financial 
spending affect its independence.  These policies, to some degree, subject the 
authority to the executive. Such aspects affect its enforcement priorities, which may 
also affect competition law enforcement.   
6.7 Institutional Capacities  
The OECD defines regulatory capacity as the “ability to perform appropriate tasks 
effectively, efficiently and systematically in a timely manner.”1238 It is one thing to 
have laws that set the regulatory objectives in place, but it is entirely another thing to 
implement such objectives. Implementation of objectives requires regulators to have 
sufficient resources, such as enough financial resources.1239 Furthermore, they must 
have sufficient staff required for effective enforcement. The sufficiency of resources 
 
1238 OECD, ‘Regulatory Management Capacities of Member States of the EU That Joined the Union on 1 
May 2004’, 2007, p. 98 <https://doi.org/10.1787/5kml60q573g6-en>. 
1239 See for example, Better Regulation in Europe: Italy 2012, ed. by OECD, Better Regulation in Europe, rev. 
ed., June 2012 (Paris: OECD, 2013), pp. 45–55; OECD, Better Regulation in Europe; United Kingdom (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2010), pp. 55–72; OECD, Better Regulation in Europe; the Netherlands (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2010), pp. 45–59; OECD, Better Regulation in Europe; Portugal (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010), 
pp. 41–51. 
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also extends to the quality of available resources. Providing on the importance of 
sufficient resources, the EU notes that responsible enforcement authorities must have 
“a sufficient number of qualified staff and sufficient financial, technical and 
technological resources that are necessary for the effective performance of their 
duties.”1240 For example, the existing staff must be equipped to address the changing 
nature of the sector. Stressing on the need for expertise, Louis Jaffe notes that, 
“With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness become dominant; for the art of 
regulating an industry requires knowledge of details of its operations, ability to shift 
requirement as the conditions of the industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic 
measures upon the appearance of emergency, and the power through enforcement 
to realize conclusions as to policy.”1241 
Lack of resources means regulators are disposed to underperformance and capture by 
a well-equipped and robust industry.1242 This section addresses two resources the 
Authority requires mostly, financial resources and human resources.  
6.7.1 Financial Resources 
Interviews with the Authority’s finance department and review of its financial reports 
observed that the Authority’s finances depend on regulatory fees. In theory, 
regulatory fees present a relatively stable source of income. In practice, however, it 
was found that the stability of income depends on the timely payment of fees. This is 
not always the case, as delays in fee remittances are not uncommon. The Authority 
has repeatedly made calls for timely payment of regulatory fees with threats on 
cancellation of licenses.1243 For instance, Augere Tanzania Limited lost its licenses for, 
 
1240 See Article 5(1) of the Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
December 2018 to Empower the Competition Authorities of the Member States to Be More Effective Enforcers 
and to Ensure the Proper Functioning of the Internal Market, p. 19. 
1241 See for example, Louis L. Jaffe, ‘James Landis and the Administrative Process’, Harvard Law Review, 
78.2 (1964), 319–28 quoted in; Giandomenico Majone, ‘Introduction’, in Deregulation or Re-Regulation? 
Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States, ed. by Giandomenico Majone (London : New York: 
Pinter; St. Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 1–6 (p. 2). 
1242 Mark Thatcher, ‘Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe’, in Regulation 
through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European Governance, ed. by Damien Geradin, Rodolphe 
Muñoz, and Nicolas Petit (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2005), pp. 47–66 (pp. 56–
57). 
1243 TCRA, ‘Public Notice: Outstanding Payment of Regulatory Fees’, 2016 
<https://www.tcra.go.tz/index.php/archive-panel/headlines-archive/287-public-notice-oustanding-
payment-of-regulatory-fees> [accessed 5 August 2019]. 
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among others, failure to pay regulatory fees.1244 Another firm that lost its license is Six 
telecom company for, among others, failure to pay regulatory fees.1245 
Nevertheless, the Authority’s finance department revealed that the Authority has been 
able to meet its basic monetary demands. For example, information obtained from the 
Authority’s human resources department revealed that the Authority’s employees are 
paid better than other government officials. Quite unconventional, while many 
institutions in Tanzania weep for insufficient funds, the TCRA has raised surplus and 
hence, stock it in the special fund as required by Section 50 of the TCRA Act. 
Therefore, based on these findings, it may be argued that the Authority has sufficient 
financial resources to meet its essential operational requirements, even if revenue 
collection is not as smooth as anticipated. 
6.7.2 Human Resource  
Human resource is at the core of any enforcement framework. A practical 
enforcement framework must hold sufficient personnel with requisite knowledge and 
skills. It is even more critical in the highly dynamic telecom sector. While the 
Authority has sufficient funds, there are some weaknesses in the availability of 
sufficient staff and recruitment methods, as the next part elucidates.  
6.7.2.1 Limitations and Complications in the Recruitment Process 
Section 14(4) of the TCRA Acts allows the Authority to employ officers, staff, and 
employees of such titles and numbers as it shall be necessary to discharge its 
functions effectively. However, the Authority’s human resources intimated that this 
provision is not implemented in practice because of restrictions set by the Public 
Service Act.1246 The recruitment process for public service, including the TCRA, is now 
under the President’s Office through the Public Service Recruitment Secretariat (the 
Secretariat).1247 Under this relatively new structure, the Secretariat carries on the 
employment process on behalf of the TCRA (like it is with other government offices, 
 
1244 TCRA, ‘Cancellation of Licence Granted to Augere Tanzania Limited (Issued under Section 22 of the 
Electronic and Postal Communications Act, Cap. 306)’. 
1245 TCRA, ‘Cancellation of Licenses Granted to Six Telecoms Company Limited’. 
1246 Parliament of Tanzania, Public Service Act, CAP 298 R.E 2019. 
1247 See details at ‘Public Service Recruitment Secretariat – PSRS’ <https://www.ajira.go.tz/> [accessed 5 
August 2019]. 
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departments, agencies, and authorities), and only after the treasury has permitted it 
to employ.  
A review of recruitment procedures under the Secretariat noticed some adverse 
concerns. Firstly, studies already indicate many cases of delay in obtaining permission 
to employ.1248 The result of this process is to delay the availability of staff when 
needed. Secondly, as Table 6.7-1 shows, the process becomes complicated and, often, 
unnecessarily long. Thirdly, there are questions about the capacity of the Secretariat 
to recruit the required personnel. Some studies have already indicated a lack of 
competent recruiting personnel, delays in filling vacancies, failure to address 
emergency needs, and inability to recruit competent staff based on the employers’ 
needs.1249 Lastly, there are concerns about the recruited staff’s quality because the 
Authority does not control the process. Its involvement in the recruitment process is 
limited.  
Table 6.7-1 The Recruitment Process at the TCRA 
Stage  Required Action  
Step 1 The Authority determines its staff needs and applies to the 
Treasury for permission to employ  
Step 2 The Treasury reviews and approves (or rejects the application) 
Step 3 If the application is approved, the Authority communicates with 
the Public Service Recruitment Secretariat under the President’s 
Office. 
 
1248 See for example Christina Arnold, ‘Do Centralized Recruitment in Tanzania Recruit Competent Staff in 
Local Government Authorities? A Case of Kinondoni Municipal Council’ (unpublished A Dissertation 
Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Award of the Masters of Public Administration 
(MPA), Mzumbe University, 2017), p. 50; Magreth Kiwara, ‘Institutional Strength of the Public Service 
Recruitment Secretariat in Managing the Recruitment and Selection Functions in Tanzania’ (unpublished A 
Thesis Submitted to the School of Public Administration and Management in Partial Fulfilment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Human Resource Management, Mzumbe University, 
2015), p. 54. 
1249 For detailed discussions see Alex Augustino Nkondola, ‘Succession Planning Challenges in The Public 
Sector in Tanzania’, Global Journal of Human Resource Management, 7.1, 59–68; Nuru Kalufya, Francis 
Michael, and Henry Chalu, ‘Human Resource Management Reforms and Public Sector Governance in 
Tanzania: An Application of Decentralization Perspective’, ORSEA Journal, 8.1, 51–67; Lameck Yusuph 
Mashala and Wang Guohua, ‘Challenges for Implementing New Public Management Reforms in Local 
Government in Tanzania: Evidence from Six Selected Local Government Authorities’, Public Policy and 
Administration Research, 7.6, 32–45; Nathanael Sirili and others, ‘Addressing the Human Resource for 
Health Crisis in Tanzania: The Lost in Transition Syndrome’, Tanzania Journal of Health Research, 16.2 
(2014) <https://doi.org/10.4314/thrb.v16i2.6>. 
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Step 4 The Secretariat starts the recruitment processes, including the 
advertisement of employment opportunities, shortlisting, 
interviews, selection, and notification to successful applicants. 
Step 5 The successful applicants have to report to their workstations. If 
there is an unfilled slot, or if one of the successful applicants does 
not show up, the process to fill his slot starts afresh.  
Source: Developed by the researcher based on the recruitment process under the 
relevant laws 
The impact of this structure is to limit the Authority’s independence in the 
recruitment process. For example, the human resources department observed that not 
always does the TCRA timely gets the required staff or of the quality it desires.1250 
Furthermore, in the worst-case scenario, which is not unlikely, the government may 
exploit the recruitment process to frustrate the TCRA, especially when they do not see 
eye-to-eye. In other words, this structure directly interferes with the Authority’s 
autonomy by cementing the executive’s hands on the Authority’s affairs.1251 
6.7.2.2 Sufficiency of Human Resources  
One far-reaching observation regarding the Authority’s human resources is an 
inadequate number of lawyers and economists employed by the Authority. The 
research findings observed that the number of staff on post raises a presumption that 
the Authority was designed to be more of an institute of engineers for technical 
regulation than lawyers and economists for economic regulation. As of April 2018, 
the Authority had a total of 167 employees.1252 Of those staff, almost half are 
supporting staff and, therefore, not directly engaged in enforcement.1253 As Table 6.7-2 
 
1250 An interview with the director of human resources.  
1251 See Lukio Lawrence Mrutu and Adam Othaman Ngowi, ‘How Centralized Recruitment Influence 
Employee’s Turnover in Tanzania Local Government Authorities: Experience from Moshi Municipal 
Council’, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 6.9 (2016), Pages 334-
343 (pp. 335–36) <https://doi.org/10.6007/IJARBSS/v6-i9/2314>; Felister Bruno Njovu, ‘Experience of 
Decentralized and Centralized Recruitment Systems in Local Government Authorities of Tanzania: A Case 
Study of Two Local Government Authorities in Morogoro Region’ (unpublished A Research Paper Presented 
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of Master of Arts in Development 
Studies, The Netherlands, 2013), pp. 32–35. 
1252 Data obtained from the Human Resources Office on April 2018. 
1253 Supporting staff means those not dealing with direct enforcement activities. Here we include office 
attendants, drivers, secretaries, accountants, procurement and supply officers, security officers and 
statisticians. 
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indicates, of the remaining half, 72 are engineers, 6 are lawyers, and 3 are 
economists.   
Table 6.7-2 TCRA Human Resource Distribution as of April 2018 
Category  Number of Staff Percentage  
Engineers  72 43% 
Lawyers  6 2% 
Economists  3 4% 
Postal and supporting staff1254 86 51% 
Source: Information from TCRA Human Resource Department as of April 2018 
From these numbers, one can see that lawyers and economists make a tiny fraction of 
the Authority’s staff. However, they are expected to enforce competition law. In other 
words, at least from a theoretical perspective, there are nine employees available for 
competition law enforcement. However, this suggestion is a very liberal construction 
since all those nine are not exclusively dealing with competition.1255 Lawyers and 
economists are already involved in many other administrative and regulatory 
functions that take away their focus on enforcement matters. For example, lawyers 
are responsible for, among other things, 
“the provision of legal services to the Authority, drafting/review of contracts for the 
provision of goods/services to the Authority, follow up of court proceedings, 
representing the Authority in Courts of law, coordinating Board meetings, 
drafting/reviewing communications legislation (rules, regulations, policies, etc.), 
processing and issuance of licenses, and enforcement of license conditions.”1256 
With all these responsibilities at their tables, it is unrealistic to imagine them having 
sufficient time to enforce competition law. The TCRA staff structure may be 
contrasted with the Fair Competition Commission (FCC). Out of 52 employees of 
FCC, 26 deal exclusively with competition enforcement.1257 
 
1254 In this supporting group are Messengers, Drivers, Secretaries, Accountants, Librarians etc. 
1255 The Authority’s Human Resource Office informed the researcher that plans were underway to establish 
a full-fledged enforcement department. 
1256 TCRA, TCRA Annual Report 2017, p. 35. 
1257 Information obtained from the Fair Competition Commission as of April 2018. 
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During the field study, the human resources department acknowledged the shortage 
of lawyers and economists.1258 However, it could not project how many lawyers and 
economists were needed to fill the gap. It just hinted that plans were underway to 
increase the number of lawyers and economists. Such lack of concrete plans relates to 
what we have already observed that competition enforcement ranks low in the 
Authority’s regulatory agenda. It is not difficult to prove the assertion because while 
the human resources department was so particular that it needed at least 12 more 
engineers and other specialists in communication science and technology at the end 
of 2019, it was uncertain regarding the lawyers and economists’ gap.  
Based on those facts, the overall findings point to one conclusion that the Authority 
has no sufficient staff to enforce competition. However, when concluding this study, 
the human resources department admitted that plans were underway to establish a 
full-fledged enforcement department. This department will also deal with competition 
law enforcement.1259 At the latter stage, during a follow-up study, it was observed that 
the Authority had restructured its organization. It now has the Directorate of 
Licensing and Enforcement and the Legal Services Unit under the Director-General’s 
Office.1260 Both units, unfortunately, have nothing to do with competition 
enforcement. The enforcement unit’s design is such that it deals with ex-ante 
regulatory matters, most of which deal with licensing. It remains doubtful if the 
Directorate will ever deal with competition matters. The description of its scope of 
function does not suggest so.  
As for the legal Unit, the TCRA has designed it to provide support services. As already 
noted, since almost every aspect of the Authority’s mandate is likely to have legal 
implications and therefore involves the Unit, it is right to conclude that it is involved 
in almost everything in the Authority. It does not exclusively deal with competition 
enforcement. Nor is it mentioned in its core functions. Thus, the conclusion that the 
existing staff does not support effective enforcement of competition law remains 
valid, even after these changes. As the TCRA expands into regions with six zonal 
 
1258 An interview with the TCRA’s director of human resources.  
1259 Information obtained from field study.  
1260 TCRA, ‘About Us’, TCRA Website, 2020 <https://www.tcra.go.tz/about-tcra/departments> [accessed 
17 November 2020]. 
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offices already established, staff shortage is acute.1261 Due to such expansion, more 
staff are indispensable to ensure the sector’s successful regulation and effective law 
enforcement. 
It is enigmatic that with enough funds to raise surplus, there is still a staff shortage. It 
is argued that this is a question of the Authority’s priorities. The Authority did not 
raise any employment restrictions from the central government as a validation of this 
shortage. Thus, it means the shortage comes from the Authority’s own doing. In other 
words, the Authority’s engineering was that it should deal more with technical 
regulation. Therefore, it is observed that full enforcement of competition takes a 
peripheral role, as evidenced by a lack of enforcement rules and requisite human 
resources.   
6.7.2.3 Quality of Human Resources  
Having sufficient human resources is the first step toward effective enforcement. The 
second and perhaps more important aspect is the quality of available staff. Therefore, 
it is critical to ascertain whether available staff has the requisite skills in addressing 
various enforcement questions in the sector. At the onset, it must be noted that the 
Authority is one of the few government agencies that maintain quality human 
resources. Unlike many other regulators in Africa, the Authority has a full-fledged 
department of human resources.1262 Before the Secretariat took over, it recruited staff 
on a competitive basis, with all technical staff required to have at least a bachelor’s 
degree (as of 2018).1263  
The majority of the top management staff have at least master’s degrees in their fields 
of specialization. For example, the board comprises people not only with an excellent 
academic background but also outstanding achievements in their career lives. For 
example, of the current five board members (as of August 2021), there are two Ph.D. 
 
1261 These are Zanzibar Zone Office, Southern Highlands Zone Office, Northern Zonal Office, Eastern Zone 
Office, Central Zone Office and Lake Zone Office.  
1262 van Gorp and Maitland, ‘Regulatory Innovations in Tanzania’, p. 74. 
1263 Information obtained from the Human Resources Department. 
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and three master’s degree holders.1264 Furthermore, each member brings into the 
Authority over twenty years of career experience. See Table 6.7-3. 
Table 6.7-3 Academic Qualifications for TCRA Board Members as of December 2019. 
Name  Highest Academic Qualifications 
Dr. Jones Killimbe Ph.D. in Telecommunications, University of Communications and 
Transport, Dresden, Germany 
Dr. Mzee Mndewa Ph.D. in Optoelectronic information engineering from Huazhong 
University of Science and Technology, Wuhan - China 
Ms Vupe Ligate Master of Arts degree in Gender and Development (MA), from 
University of Sussex, UK 
Amb. Sylvester Mabumba Master of Science degree in Community Economic Development 
(M.Sc. CED) from the Southern New Hampshire University, USA 
Ms. Valerie Msoka Master of Arts degree in International Journalism from City 
University, UK 
Source: TCRA’s Website as of August 2021 
The preceding observations indicate that the TCRA has developed a mechanism to 
attract competent staff. If anything, the qualifications of its board members, for 
example, provide a clear testimony. Therefore, it would appear that if all factors 
remained constant, the Authority would have qualified staff to enforce competition 
law. However, as already noted, the number of staff available for competition 
enforcement is almost negligible. Furthermore, the fact that the staff is also involved 
in other administrative activities highly minimizes their availability for competition 
enforcement.  
It is also noteworthy that regular training and continuing education are necessary to 
bring the staff to speed with enforcement issues. This is one of the areas the TCRA 
has exceptionally performed. For example, in 2006, it set aside 630,000 USD for 
workshops and training and 620,000 USD for conferences and meetings.1265 In 2011, 
the Authority spent about 1.4 million USD on training over 85 employees on short 
courses and four employees on long courses.1266 With the said programs, the Authority 
ensured that at least each staff attended one training yearly.1267  
 
1264 TCRA, ‘TCRA Board Members’, 2021 <https://www.tcra.go.tz/administration/board-members> 
[accessed 16 August 2021]. 
1265 van Gorp and Maitland, ‘Regulatory Innovations in Tanzania’, p. 74. 
1266 TCRA, ‘Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2011’ (n 651) 49 & 70. 
1267 Information from the human resources department. 
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However, since 2015, the Authority has reduced its investment in human resource 
training due to changes in the financial and public service management policies. 
Nevertheless, it has continued to offer short courses to its staff and very few long-
term training at the Master's or doctoral degree (Ph.D.) level.1268 Of interest, however, 
is that those training programs do not focus on competition and its enforcement. For 
example, between 2015 and 2017, 173 staff attended short-term and long-term 
training programs.1269 Remarkably, from all such training programs, no single one was 
on competition law. They mostly focused on the technical side of the regulation (ICT, 
cybersecurity, Internet Protocol TV technology, radio frequency spectrum, quality of 
service) or improving capacity for the supporting staff (procurement law, labor law, 
and record management).1270 
6.8 Conclusion 
Is the TCRA best suited at the moment to enforce competition law in the 
telecommunication sector? This question was at the center of this chapter and the 
primary question of this study. In an attempt to answer it, the chapter reviewed the 
Authority in five aspects: the legal mandate, the procedural framework, institutional 
organization, institutional independence and accountability, and human and financial 
resources. In the end, the research findings established that there are legal, 
procedural, and practical challenges that make it difficult for the TCRA to enforce 
competition law effectively. For example, while the law has tried to define 
competition rules in the sector, albeit in a rudimentary form, it does not set rules to 
govern the enforcement process. Nor are the questions regarding remedies provided 
for without uncertainties.  
Furthermore, one would also notice the close relationship with the executive and vast 
powers bestowed to the Minister responsible for communications. These powers open 
doors to the executive command of the regulatory process and undermine its 
 
1268 See details at TCRA, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2015; FCC, Annual Report and Audited 
Accounts for The Year Ended On 30th June 2016. 
1269 See details at TCRA, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2015; FCC, Annual Report and Audited 
Accounts for The Year Ended On 30th June 2016. 
1270 See details at TCRA, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 2015; FCC, Annual Report and Audited 
Accounts for The Year Ended On 30th June 2016. 
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independence. Lack of an express guarantee of the Authority’s independence creates 
an amenable ground for manipulation, especially from those occupying higher 
political offices. 
Apart from its independence, there are serious questions such as limited personnel for 
competition enforcement and limited powers of recruitment. If all these findings are 
taken in the broader context of this study, one will conclude that even though the 
Authority does best regarding the sector’s ex-ante regulation, it is not well equipped 
for ex-post enforcement of competition. It is a promising sector regulator but certainly 
not tailored to enforce competition. Table 6.8-1 shows some areas where the 
Authority has displayed some strengths and weaknesses in the competition 
enforcement framework.  Note that P stands for Present, while A stands for Absent. 
Ö* stand for where the evaluation criteria are present but limited. 
Table 6.8-1 Summary of the Evaluation of the TCRA as an Enforcer of Competition Law in the 
Tanzania Telecommunications Sector  
Evaluation 
Criteria 
Category P A Remarks  
The Legal 
Mandate  
Substantive rules of 
competition law 
Ö  The EPOCA and its Regulations 
somewhat define what practices are 
prohibited in the sector. 
Clarity of objectives Ö*  The laws set the Authority’s objectives, 
but they are too many such that 
competition enforcement is peripheral.  
Clarity of remedies  C There is no framework for fining policy. 
Further, there is an over criminalization 
of anti-competitive practices and an 




Clarity of enforcement 
rules and procedure 
 
 X Rules for enforcing competition laws are 
not in place. 
The mechanism for 
detection of violation 
 X No such mechanisms are in place. 
Mechanisms for reporting 
and initiating complaints  
 X No such mechanisms are in place. 
Rules to ensure procedural 
fairness 
 X No such rules are stated in the law. 
There is a concentration of powers in the 
Authority where it acts as complainant, 
investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator, 
and enforcer. 
Private enforcement   X No room for private enforcement.  
Arbitration  Ö*  The room for arbitration exists, although 
its framework remains vague. 
Institutional 
Organization  
Legal status; separation 
from the executive 
Ö  The Authority operates outside the daily 
control of the executive. 
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Presence of rules to guide 
against undue influence 
from the executive 
 C No such rules exist. The Minister 
responsible for communications has 
many powers in the sector. Further, 
practices have already shown several 
political interferences.  
Exclusive department for 
competition enforcement   
 C No such department exists at the time of 
concluding this study. 
Cooperation with FCC   C No such cooperation exists. 
 
Judicial review   X The Judiciary has no powers over the 
TCRA’s decisions except only through 





Presence of legal 
protection of 
independence 
 C No such rules exist. As a result, there are 
no safeguards against interferences, 
especially from the executive. 
Financial Independence Ö  The Authority has sufficient funds from 
regulatory fees. 
Budgetary independence Ö*  It is limited subject to the approval from 
the Minister.  
Independence on 
recruitment    
Ö*  It is limited, subject to permission from 
the Treasury. Further, the actual 
employment process is not in the 
Authority’s hands but the President’s 
Office.  
Accountability Ö*  Both political and constitutional exists. 
Judicial accountability is, however, 
limited to the FCT. The Judiciary has no 
jurisdiction in the sector.  
Resources  Sufficient human 
resources 
 C Not sufficient. There is a minimal 
number of lawyers and economists 
compared to engineers, for example. 
Sufficient financial 
resources 
Ö  Has sufficient resources.  
Quality personnel Ö*  The available staff members are very 
qualified. However, policy changes that 
limit training and further education is a 
threat.  
Source: Developed from findings from this study 
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Chapter 7:  Summary of Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
“The general telecommunication policy objective is to ensure that 
telecommunication services are provided in a liberalized and competitive 
manner.”1271 
7.1 Summary of Findings  
At the center of this research is the design of the TCRA, the Tanzania 
telecommunications regulator, as the sole enforcer of competition law in the sector. 
The law has explicitly excluded the Fair Competition Commission from enforcing 
competition in the sector, except for mergers and acquisitions. Thus, being both the 
regulator and competition enforcement authority, one is justified to expect that the 
TCRA’s design would provide for ex-ante pro-competition regulation and proactive 
and effective ex-post regulation and competition law enforcement. Such design would 
entail, for instance, detailed rules on competition, an exhaustive enforcement 
framework, guaranteed independence, a dedicated department for competition 
matters (since the TCRA deals with many things), and sufficient resources, among 
others.  
However, the preliminary review of the whole enforcement architecture raised some 
questions on the efficacy of the desired enforcement approach. There was no single 
case on the TCRA’s ex-post enforcement of competition law. Further, a perusal of 
relevant laws did not reveal how the TCRA ought to address anti-competitive 
concerns in the sector. Thus, the primary question arose on whether the current legal, 
policy, institutional, and regulatory frameworks enable effective enforcement of 
competition in the sector. This question proposed to look into the TCRA’s legal 
 
1271 The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Communications and Transport, p. 2. 
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mandate, institutional design, and institutional capacities and resources. Thus, to 
exhaustively address this question, it is further subdivided into three. 
1. Whether the current policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks 
enable the TCRA to enforce competition rules in the sector effectively, 
2. Whether the Authority possesses requisite resources and capacities to 
enforce competition law, and  
3. What should be the best way to enforce competition law in the 
telecommunications sector. 
The main objective was to critically analyze and evaluate the legal, policy, 
institutional, and practical framework for enforcing competition in the sector. 
Specifically, it examined whether the TCRA is well-placed legally and institutionally 
to enforce competition. In so doing, the work studied legal, policy, and regulatory 
frameworks governing telecommunications regulation and competition. It then 
critically assessed the efficacy of TCRA’s institutional design, practice, and procedures 
in promoting and enforcing competition law. Furthermore, it assessed the sufficiency 
of TCRA’s resources and enforcement. As a result, the study has the following 
significant findings: 
1. To a certain degree, the research findings indicate that Tanzania’s laws and 
policies generally support competition in the sector. The relevant sections of 
telecommunications laws and Regulations charge the TCRA to monitor, 
promote, and enforce competition. Furthermore, there are policy statements 
that charge the government and its institutions to do the same. Although 
undeveloped for lack of enforcement, such a framework set the basis for 
promoting competition in the sector.  
2. The study of relevant laws, regulations and regulatory practice observed 
unnecessary overregulation. A telecom firm in Tanzania is subject to too many 
regulatory requirements. A few examples are multiple licensing requirements, 
many regulatory fees and royalties, interferences with telecom firms’ internal 
organizations, heightened taxes, and related fees. As such, complying with all 
of them without fail becomes almost impossible.  Furthermore, regulation has 
also turned out to pose entry barriers, for example, by maintaining rules that 
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limit availability or disposition of spectrum, complicated licensing regime, or 
failure to address exclusionary practices such as locking-in arrangements. 
Thus, overregulation has ended up defeating the very purposes of regulation. 
Whereas regulation is aimed at promoting competition, overregulation has 
achieved precisely the opposite by erecting entry and expansion barriers. It is 
as if the framework was meant (either intentionally or inadvertently) to 
protect those already stable in the market.  
3. In broad policy analysis, the research findings noted another worrying trend 
observed in the past few years. During the liberalization era, the government 
had decided to withdraw from doing business. However, there are elements of 
rescinding its decisions, especially the way it treats the TTCL. The government 
has reacquired and elevated TTCL to a public corporation. It has given the 
corporation some mandate, which may compromise effective competition. 
With these new developments, it is doubtful whether effective competition will 
exist for all players. It is not easy to imagine how the TTCL, which is now 
elevated above other telecom firms and has some powers over them, can 
compete fairly. It might very well be the beginning of uneven competition 
policies that favor government-owned firms.  
4. The research findings established that there is no ex-post enforcement of 
competition law. The TCRA has remained mostly a regulator dealing with the 
sector’s technical aspects. It may be argued that the Authority has not 
succeeded in exercising its powers as a competition enforcer by actively 
monitoring the market players’ conduct and addressing the subsequent 
violation, if any. There is no single case in which the TCRA dealt exclusively 
with a competition matter. As the rest of the findings show, this observation 
emanates from the Authority’s design. Putting it simply, even though it has the 
mandate to enforce competition, this study concludes that it was not designed 
to do so. 
5. Despite the existence of rules that define anti-competitive practices, lack of 
enforcement frameworks was found to be the most significant shortcoming of 
the entire regulatory framework. There are no rules to explicate how 
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enforcement takes place. This void raises uncertainties in the regulatory 
process. We must note, though, that details for other ex-ante regulatory 
matters abound. Such stark contrast sends one clear message; the TCRA may 
be an excellent regulator but not an enforcer of competition law. On a 
different note, the research findings established the absence of private 
enforcement of competition. No rules or regulation allows such type of 
enforcement. As a result, only public enforcement through the TCRA is 
available. Such framework, however, is inefficient for lack of necessary 
enabling frameworks. Thus, one should not expect any effective enforcement 
unless there is an extensive overhaul of some crucial legal aspects in the sector 
that will establish necessary frameworks for public and private enforcement of 
competition law.   
6. Regarding institutional design, the findings revealed some concerning 
shortcomings that may paralyze the whole enforcement agenda. For example, 
the Authority’s independence is limited. That being the case, regular 
interferences, especially from the political powers, are not unusual. Then, 
there is a question of internal organization. The breadth of the Authority’s 
mandate calls for dedicated arrangements to ensure the effective discharge of 
its mandates. However, the findings noted the absence of any department 
dedicated to competition enforcement. Competition does not receive the 
proper weight it deserves, even though it should be at the core of regulation.  
7. The research findings established that TCRA has sufficient financial resources, 
even though the available sources are unstable. The Authority has never failed 
to execute its function for lack of funds. Instead, it has always generated a 
surplus from its collections. Surprisingly, however, the number of staff for 
competition enforcement, namely, lawyers and economists, is minimal. Only 
six lawyers and three economists existed at the time of concluding this study, 
making only 6 percent of all staff. This percentage, when compared to 
engineers (and related fields) who make 43 percent of the Authority’s staff, is 
disappointing. We know at this point that an in-depth economic and legal 
analysis of market practices is necessary to establish anti-competitive practices. 
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Without a sufficient number of lawyers and economists who monitor markets, 
it is unlikely that any active enforcement will take place.  
8. Another observation regards the lack of a working relationship with the FCC. It 
was observed that by excluding the FCC in the sector, the Authority misses 
necessary experience on ex-post enforcement. Furthermore, it loses an 
opportunity to complement its enforcement, primarily when it cannot address 
ex-post enforcement adequately. Apart from the FCC’s exclusion, there is no 
collaborative relationship with other sector regulators. Such a relationship 
would have promoted the institutional sharing of enforcement experiences, 
assistance in capacity building, sharing of information and new techniques, 
and establishing joint enforcement approaches. 
9. Another design point of equal importance is the unnecessary concentration of 
powers in the Authority. Such concentration gives it huge powers in regulation 
and enforcement. By being able to do everything, the authority may also end 
up doing nothing in some areas. It will not be a surprise to see some regulatory 
agenda overriding others. This is what has happened in enforcing competition. 
Competition enforcement became a victim of other regulatory goals. 
7.2 General Conclusions 
Based on the presented findings, this study concludes as follows: 
1. Firstly, while the policy, legal, and policy framework generally support and 
promote competition in the sector, there is no adequate framework to guarantee 
effective enforcement. Most of the TCRA’s work centers on ex-ante regulation. 
Admittedly, this study can prove the TCRA to have done a fair job on that 
aspect. Ex-ante regulation, however, cannot address post-entry anti-competitive 
practices, which generally require ex-post enforcement. In this area, the TCRA 
has failed. It is concluded this has happened so because the TCRA was not 
designed as an ex-post enforcement authority. 
2. Secondly, the TCRA’s institutional design makes it highly unlikely to enforce 
competition effectively. The study found out that the TCRA is designed to be 
more of a sector regulator than a competition authority. It has no systems and 
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structures that support ex-post competition enforcement. Additionally, there are 
no structures to provide for private enforcement of competition law. This left the 
entire enforcement agenda to the TCRA, which has design shortcomings that 
make effective enforcement impossible. Thus, it follows that competition 
enforcement powers are imposed on a structure that is destined to fail. 
3. Thirdly, even though the TCRA has sufficient financial resources, it has not 
employed them efficiently for competition enforcement. Whereas sometimes the 
TCRA has had a budget surplus, it is surprising to see a minimal number of 
lawyers and economists working with it. Thus, without dedicated lawyers and 
economists to monitor and evaluate players’ conduct, the TCRA is in no position 
to address competition matters. Lack of competition cases, as this study already 
pointed out, proves this conclusion. 
Thus, patched against research questions, these conclusions provide the following 
respective answers: 
1. Research question one, which inquired into whether the current policy, legal, 
institutional, and regulatory frameworks enable the TCRA to enforce 
competition rules in the sector effectively, is answered partly in the affirmative 
and partly negative. That while the policy, legal, and policy framework 
generally supports and promotes competition in the sector, there is no 
adequate framework to guarantee effective enforcement. The rudimentary 
nature of the competition rules and lack of regulations and procedures for 
enforcement makes it highly improbable for the TCRA to enforce competition.  
2. Regarding the part on institutional design, the answer is negative. The 
institutional design of the TCRA makes it highly unlikely to enforce competition 
effectively. The TCRA is designed to be more of a sector regulator than a 
competition enforcement authority. Attempt to make it a competition 
enforcement agency without changing underlying structures is but fruitless.  
3. Research question two, which inquired into whether the Authority possesses 
requisite resources and capacities to enforce competition law, is answered partly 
in the affirmative and partly negative. That while the TCRA has sufficient 
financial resources, it has not employed them efficiently for competition 
 
 324  
enforcement. With only six lawyers and three economists, it is impossible to see 
how the Authority will adequately address competition matters.  
4. Research question three, which sought to answer what should be the best way 
to enforce competition law in the telecommunications sector, is answered in the 
next section on the recommendations.  
In the upshot, the overall research findings conclude that while the Authority may be 
an efficient regulator, it has fallen short on competition enforcement. The legal 
mandate, procedural enforcement, and internal organization do not allow it to 
enforce competition effectively. As a result, we have a framework that empowers the 
Authority to enforce the law but lacks actual enforcement because of the existing 
legal and institutional weaknesses. As it stands now, in the absence of significant 
legal and institutional overhaul, the TCRA cannot effectively enforce competition in 
the sector. 
7.3 Recommendations  
The objective of telecommunication policy in the sector is to have telecom services 
provided in a liberalized and competitive environment. Achieving this objective is 
only possible if there are corresponding legal frameworks and enforcement structures. 
The research findings found that such structures are generally not present. These 
concerns need immediate attention from the policymakers. Therefore, this section 
presents recommendations on crucial reforms that policymakers must make for a 
highly competitive telecom sector. With these recommendations in considerations, it 
is possible to achieve the overall objectives of the telecommunication policy.  
7.3.1  Policy Reforms  
Regarding policy matters, it is recommended that: 
1. The government should reaffirm its support for the market economy in the 
sector. It should continue to establish a friendly environment to support 
competition, including treating all firms equally.  
2. The government should avoid any policies likely to create elements of 
monopolies. Any policies, which favor the national telecom, or any other firm on 
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top of others, should be avoided. Moreover, to ensure fair play, the government 
should avoid doing business in the sector. Instead, it should continue to support 
private firms.  
3. There is a need to redefine the role of the TCRA in competition enforcement. 
The relevant laws and regulations must define the Authority’s ex-post powers of 
competition enforcement, including establishing appropriate structures. The 
idea here is to ensure the Authority does not consider itself only as an ex-ante 
regulator.  
4. The government should consider extending the FCC’s jurisdiction to the sector 
to complement the Authority’s weaknesses and failures in ex-post enforcement.  
7.3.2 Legal Reforms  
On legal aspects, it is recommended that: 
1. The government should review competition rules to ensure they comply with 
the accepted standards of competition enforcement and are reasonably practical. 
Among other aspects, the review should avoid unnecessary duplication of rules 
or adoption of rules that are confusing or inconsistent.  
2. There is a need to modernize regulation and competition rules to address rapid 
technological developments in the sector. For example, with the convergence of 
communication services, a regulation that is based on the old PSTN concept 
might not be ideal. The new framework ought to consider current aspects such 
as the role of intellectual properties, data, and digital services, among others. 
3. The law should guarantee TCRA’s de jure and create frameworks for its de facto 
independence. Specifically, it should ensure the Authority’s top officials’ 
appointment is on transparent and objective criteria and that their tenure is 
protected. The law should categorically prohibit political interference in 
regulation, mostly when the regulator sits in a judicial capacity.  
4. If the TCRA continues to enforce competition, it is necessary to enact detailed 
enforcement rules. Such rules should articulate how enforcement takes place 
from complaint initiation to the enforcement of decisions. Further, there is a 
need to review the sanctions framework to ensure it instills a fear of violating 
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the rules. Further, rules must be established to ensure fairness in addressing 
competition violations.  
5. There is a need to introduce rules that provide for private enforcement of 
competition. The presence of these rules could prove helpful in cultivating an 
enforcement culture since, as we have seen in chapter five, incentives such as 
damages may encourage more enforcement actions. Increased enforcement 
actions are helpful as they will test competition rules leading to the growth and 
maturity of the competition regime in the sector. Besides, private enforcement 
could complement the weaknesses of public enforcement, filling the gaps 
already explained by the findings of this research. 
6. Since ex-post competition enforcement can address most of the issues currently 
under regulation, there should be a reduction of regulatory rules in the sector by 
maintaining only rules that promote efficiency and support the market-based 
transaction. Such rules ought to be necessary (for example, as justified by 
monopolistic features of markets or technical necessities), proportionate (only to 
address specific aspects of market failure), and pro-competition (i.e., they foster 
and not foreclose competition). Specifically, the study recommends regulation in 
the following areas, as Table 7.3-1 shows. 
Table 7.3-1 Proposed aspects of the telecom sector that may continue to be under regulation.  
Regulatory 
Aspect 
The extent of Recommended Regulation  
Access 
Regulation 
Regulation to provide possibilities of entry, for example, by ensuring interconnection 
and access to essential facilities.  
Technical 
Regulation  
Regulation to set standards for communication equipment to ensure technical 
interoperability and public safety 
Regulation to ensure availability of spectrum both for bigger and younger firms 
Consumer 
Protection  




Regulation to set frameworks to address the availability of communications services 
to all 
Source: Developed from findings from this study 
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7. Since there is limited judicial accountability, it is recommended that the right to 
appeal from the FCT’s decisions be extended to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, 
the country’s highest judicial organ. In so doing, the opportunity for perfecting 
competition policy in the sector would increase. Furthermore, being the highest 
court of the land, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania is the court of record, 
meaning that its decision binds all lower courts and other bodies involved in 
justice administration. By having powers to entertain competition and other 
regulatory matters originating from the TCRA’s decision, the Court has the 
prospect to set a precedent that may contribute to the country's development of 
competition policy.  
7.3.3 Institutional Design  
The research findings noted that the institutional setup of the TCRA affects its ability 
to address competition matters effectively. Thus, it is recommended that;  
1. There is a need to carry out institutional reforms to enhance the TCRA’s 
mandate to enforce competition law. Specifically, the Authority should have a 
dedicated department for competition enforcement. Such a department must be 
organized to provide rooms for effective market monitoring and structures for 
active enforcement.  
2. There is a need to have coordinated cooperation between the TCRA and other 
regulators.  The cooperation should be an official forum to address joint and 
cross-cutting issues, share information officially, and develop shared 
approaches. It should further provide room for joint programs, including 
research projects, advocacy, enforcement, and market monitoring and 
evaluation. 
3. There is a need to have coordinated cooperation between the TCRA and the 
FCC. Such cooperation will provide room for experience sharing. Further, since 
the FCC has a long competition enforcement culture, it will complement the 
TCRA’s deficits on ex-post enforcement.  
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7.3.4 Resources  
Since sufficiency of resources forms the backbone of any enforcement system, this 
sub-section recommends the following: 
1. It is necessary to have stable sources of funds that do not rely on executive 
controls unless only to the extent public accounting principles permit. A mix of 
regulatory and budgetary appropriation by specific fixed amounts or 
percentages may prove to be useful. More importantly, the sources of funds 
should be carefully crafted to ensure they do not become an avenue to 
compromise the Authority’s independence. 
2. The Authority must enhance the quantity and quality of its staff to match the 
sector’s changing nature. Specifically, the Authority must have the freedom to 
hire qualified staff and develop them regularly. Since the Authority is 
responsible for enforcing competition law, it must employ enough lawyers and 
economists. 
Table 7.3-2 A summary of significant findings (conclusions) and recommendations  
Regulatory 
Aspect 
Major Findings/Conclusion Recommendations  
Policy setting The government has enacted pro-
competition policies that promote a 
market-based economy. However, 
recent trends show elements of a 
‘command-like approach’ in the 
economy. 
The government should reaffirm its 
support for the market economy. It should 
refrain from directly doing business where 
it becomes one of the competitors. 
The government should avoid policies that 
create monopolies in the sector. It must 
separate political activities (which 
demands political correctness) from 
administrative decisions (which should be 





There is a presence of regulatory 
rules which, among others, have 
facilitated the introduction of 
competition. However, the sector is 
highly regulated as nothing escapes 
regulatory hands. 
The government should reduce the extent 
of regulation in the sector to maintain 
only those rules necessary for efficient 
market functioning. 
The government should review the 
adopted rules of competition to avoid any 
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There are also rules for ex-post 
competition enforcement. However, 
their design is flawed and confusing, 
and they have not been tested in 
courts of law. Additionally, the law 
has excluded the FCC in the sector. 
possible confusion and ensure they are on 
par with standard rules.  
The government should grant the FCC 
jurisdiction to enforce competition in the 
sector, unless the TCRA is better-equipped 
for a meaningful ex-post enforcement of 
competition law.   
Enforcement 
Framework 
There is an enforcement gap, as no 
ex-post enforcement has been 
recorded so far. Also, there are no 
rules of procedures to govern the 
enforcement process. 
There is no room for private 
enforcement, which would have 
supplemented the weak public 
enforcement. Further, the 
framework for sanctions and 
remedies is also wanting.  
The government should review its laws to 
establish exhaustive rules to govern the 
enforcement process. 
The government should amend the laws 
to provide room for private enforcement. 
The government should review the 
sanctions and remedy framework to 
ensure it has a deterrent effect. Expressly, 
the government should adopt a policy to 
guide fining and other sanctions to ensure 
fairness and transparency of procedures, 
processes, and decisions.  
Institutional 
Framework 
The TCRA has been established as a 
principal body to regulate the sector 
and to enforce cooperation. 
However, the Authority has no 
department to enforce competition, 
nor does it have cooperation with 
other enforcement bodies.  
The government should amend the law to 
reorganize the TCRA so that there is a 
distinct department dealing with 
competition enforcement. 
The government should amend the law to 
grant the FCC jurisdiction in the sector. 
In order to improve efficiency, 
coordination between the TCRA and other 





Even though the TCRA operates 
outside the government’s structure, 
it has limited independence. 
Further, the judicial accountability 
of the Authority is limited to only 
one level of appeal 
The government should expressly 
guaranteed the Authority’s independence, 
both in law and in practice.  
The government should amend the law to 
provide appellate rights to the Court of 
Appeal of Tanzania  
Resources  The Authority has sufficient funds 
even though its sources are not 
The government should establish stable 
sources. 
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stable.  
There is insufficient staff competent 
to address competition matters 
The Authority should hire competent staff 
(lawyers and economists) to monitor, 
investigate, prosecute competition 
concerns in the sector.  
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Appendix: Table of Respondents   
Below is a list of various respondents who were contacted at different stages of this research. 
Since most have requested anonymity, the list includes their positions/designation instead of 
their actual names. There were three research visits, January to April in 2018, January to 
April in 2019, and January to February 2020. 
S/N Name of the Institution Department/Section 
(If relevant) 
Contacted person (persons) 
1. Ministry of Communications, 




2. Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority (TCRA) 
Human Resources  Director of human resources  
Legal Services  Director of legal services 
Licensing and 
Enforcement  
Senior legal officer 
 
Finance  Director of finance 




Director of restrictive trade 
practices 
Enforcement  Senior legal officers (3) 
4 Fair Competition Tribunal  Registry Registrar  
Tribunal  Members of the Tribunal (2) 
5 Tanzania Communications 






6 Smart Tanzania Limited Legal and 
Regulation  
Legal and regulatory officer 
Telecommunication engineer 
7.  MIC Tanzania Limited (Tigo)  Legal and regulatory officer 
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(Now merged with Zantel 
8. Vodacom Tanzania Limited  Legal officer 




Legal officers (2) 
Telecommunication engineer 
10 Higher learning institutions 
(University of Dar es Salaam 
and University of Dodoma) 
 Lecturers conversant in 
telecommunications and 
competition law (5) 
11 Law Offices   Practicing advocates specializing in 
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